

Editorial Board / Comité de rédaction

Editor-in-Chief

Rédacteur en chef

Kenneth McRoberts, York University, Canada

Associate Editors

Rédacteurs adjoints

Isabel Carrera Suarez, Universidad de Oviedo, Spain

Daniel Salée, Concordia University, Canada

Robert S. Schwartzwald, University of Massachusetts, U.S.A.

Managing Editor

Secrétaire de rédaction

Guy Leclair, ICCS/CIEC, Ottawa, Canada

Advisory Board / Comité consultatif

Irene J.J. Burgers, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

Patrick Coleman, University of California/Los Angeles, U.S.A.

Enric Fossas, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, España

Lois Foster, La Trobe University, Australia

Fabrizio Ghilardi, Università di Pisa, Italia

Teresa Gutiérrez-Haces, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico

Eugenia Issraelian, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

James Jackson, Trinity College, Republic of Ireland

Jean-Michel Lacroix, Université de Paris III/Sorbonne Nouvelle, France

Denise Gurgel Lavallée, Universidade do Estado da Bahia, Brésil

Eugene Lee, Sookmyung University, Korea

Erling Lindström, Uppsala University, Sweden

Ursula Mathis, Universität Innsbruck, Autriche

Amarjit S. Narang, Indira Gandhi National Open University, India

Heather Norris Nicholson, University College of Ripon and York St. John,
United Kingdom

Satoru Osanai, Chuo University, Japan

Vilma Petrash, Universidad Central de Venezuela-Caracas, Venezuela

Danielle Schaub, University of Haifa, Israel

Sherry Simon, Concordia University, Canada

Wang Tongfu, Shanghai International Studies University, China

The *International Journal of Canadian Studies (IJCS)* is published twice a year by the **International Council for Canadian Studies**. Multidisciplinary in scope, the *IJCS* is intended for people around the world who are interested in the study of Canada. The *IJCS* publishes thematic issues containing articles (6,500 words max.), research notes (4,500 words max.) and review essays. It favours analyses that have a broad perspective and essays that will interest a readership from a wide variety of disciplines. Articles must deal with Canada, not excluding comparisons between Canada and other countries. The *IJCS* is a bilingual journal. Authors may submit articles in either English or French. Individuals interested in contributing to the *IJCS* should forward their papers to the *IJCS* Secretariat, along with a one-hundred word abstract. Beyond papers dealing directly with the themes of forthcoming issues, the *IJCS* will also examine papers not related to these themes for possible inclusion in its regular Open Topic section. All submissions are peer-reviewed; the final decision regarding publication is made by the Editorial Board. The content of articles, research notes and review essays is the sole responsibility of the author. Send articles to the *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 325 Dalhousie Street, S-800, Ottawa, CANADA K1N 7G2.

For subscription information, please see the last page of this issue.

The *IJCS* is indexed and/or abstracted in *America: History and Life*; *Canadian Periodical Index*; *Historical Abstracts*; *International Political Science Abstracts*; and *Point de repère*.

ISSN 1180-3991 ISBN 1-896450-13-X

© All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the permission of the *IJCS*.

The *IJCS* gratefully acknowledges a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Paraissant deux fois l'an, la *Revue*

internationale d'études canadiennes (RIÉC) est publiée par le **Conseil international d'études canadiennes**. Revue multidisciplinaire, elle rejoint les lecteurs de divers pays intéressés à l'étude du Canada. La *RIÉC* publie des numéros thématiques composés d'articles (6500 mots max.), de notes de recherche (4500 mots max.) et d'essais critiques, et privilégie les études aux perspectives larges et les essais de synthèse aptes à intéresser un vaste éventail de lecteurs. Les textes doivent porter sur le Canada ou sur une comparaison entre le Canada et d'autres pays. La *RIÉC* est une revue bilingue. Les auteurs peuvent rédiger leurs textes en français ou en anglais. Toute personne intéressée à collaborer à la *RIÉC* doit faire parvenir son texte accompagné d'un résumé de cent (100) mots maximum au secrétariat de la *RIÉC*. En plus d'examiner les textes les plus pertinents aux thèmes des numéros à paraître, la *RIÉC* examinera également les articles non thématiques pour sa rubrique Hors-thème. Tous les textes sont évalués par des pairs. Le Comité de rédaction prendra la décision finale quant à la publication. Les auteurs sont responsables du contenu de leurs articles, notes de recherche ou essais. Veuillez adresser toute correspondance à la *Revue internationale d'études canadiennes*, 325, rue Dalhousie, S-800, Ottawa, CANADA K1N 7G2.

Des renseignements sur l'abonnement se trouvent à la fin du présent numéro.

Les articles de la *RIÉC* sont répertoriés et/ou résumés dans *America: History and Life*; *Canadian Periodical Index*; *Historical Abstracts*; *International Political Science Abstracts* et *Point de repère*.

ISSN 1180-3991 ISBN 1-896450-13-X

© Tous droits réservés. Aucune reproduction n'est permise sans l'autorisation de la *RIÉC*.

La *RIÉC* est redevable au Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada qui lui accorde une subvention.

Publiée par la Carleton University Press pour le Conseil international d'études

International Journal of Canadian Studies Revue internationale d'études canadiennes

17, Spring / Printemps 1998

Representation La représentation

Table of Contents / Table des matières

Daniel Salée Présentation / Introduction	5
Jennifer Smith and Ronald G. Landes Entitlement versus Variance Models in the Determination of Canadian Electoral Boundaries	19
William Cross The Conflict Between Participatory and Accommodative Politics: The Case for Stronger Parties	37
A. Brian Tanguay and Barry J. Kay Third-Party Advertising and the Threat to Electoral Democracy in Canada: The Mouse that Roared	57
Manon Tremblay Femmes et représentation à la Chambre des communes du Canada : un modèle des orientations du rôle de représentation des femmes	81
Brenda O'Neill The Relevance of Leader Gender to Voting in the 1993 Canadian National Election	105
Linda Trimble "Good Enough Citizens": Canadian Women and Representation in Constitutional Deliberations	131
Micheline de Sève Féminisme et nationalisme au Québec, une alliance inattendue	157
Deborah Parnis Representation, Regulation and Commercial Radio Broadcasting in Canada	177

Lynda Jessup Prospectors, Bushwhackers, Painters: Antimodernism and the Group of Seven	193
---	-----

Open Topic Article / Article hors-thème

John Harles Multiculturalism, National Identity, and National Integration: The Canadian Case	217
---	-----

Review Essays / Essais critiques

Frank Caucci La question d'identité, ou la représentation sous toutes ses formes	249
--	-----

Gillian Whitlock "One Nation"	257
---	-----

Authors / Auteurs	263
------------------------------------	-----

Canadian Studies Journals Around the World Revue d'études canadiennes dans le monde	265
--	-----

Présentation Introduction

Dans l'ensemble des sociétés modernes, la représentation est un enjeu central lié tant à la juste place que les individus et les groupes désirent occuper dans les débats publics, qu'à leur volonté de faire entendre correctement leur voix au sein de ces mêmes débats, qu'à la qualité, enfin, de l'image sociale de soi, du groupe auquel on appartient ou des idéaux que l'on défend. La représentation participe en quelque sorte du désir naturel de l'individu de voir reconnu et légitimés par les autres les normes, valeurs, paramètres et priorités par lesquels il/elle se définit et cherche à s'imposer dans l'espace public.

La problématique de la représentation a depuis longtemps marqué de ses multiples facettes le développement de la société canadienne. On ne compte plus au Canada les débats de société qui ont eu comme source des questions de représentation. Que l'on pense aux nombreuses luttes populaires pour l'extension du droit de vote et l'élargissement de la sphère démocratique; ou encore, dans un autre registre, aux efforts déployés dans tous les coins du pays par tout un chacun pour se forger et faire reconnaître qui une identité communautaire, qui une identité régionale ou nationale, qui une identité culturelle — chacune, il va sans dire, prétendument distincte, spécifique ou unique. La volonté de représentation a toujours constitué un déterminant central de la dynamique sociétale canadienne.

Representation is a central question in all modern societies. It involves the desire of individuals and groups to assume their rightful place in public debates, and to be properly heard, and it concerns the validity of the image that society holds of one's self, one's group and the ideals one advocates. To some extent, representation stems from the natural desire of individuals to have others recognize and legitimize the standards, values, parameters and priorities through which they define themselves and seeks to participate in the public sphere.

In a multitude of ways, the question of representation has long shaped the development of Canadian society, just as it has given rise to innumerable debates within that society. We need only consider the many popular struggles to extend voting rights or broaden the sphere of democracy. As well, there are the efforts of groups and individuals alike all over the country to forge and gain recognition of identities of all kinds—be they local, regional, national or cultural. Needless to say, each identity is alleged to be distinct, specific or unique. The desire for representation has always been a crucial factor in the dynamics of Canadian society.

Accordingly, the IJCS has decided to explore this theme. This issue of the IJCS offers a series of articles from several intellectual and disciplinary outlooks that shed new light on diverse aspects of

C'est pour cette raison que la RIÉC a cru bon de se pencher sur cette question. Le présent numéro offre une série d'articles d'horizons intellectuels et disciplinaires différents qui jettent un éclairage nouveau sur certaines manifestations de la problématique de la représentation dans le contexte canadien. Il y est d'abord question des enjeux électoraux et partisans que soulèvent les mécanismes actuels de la représentation politique (Smith et Landes, Cross, Tanguay et Kay). Le phénomène de *présence*, particulièrement en ce qui a trait à la place réservée aux femmes dans la configuration du paysage politico-constitutionnel canadien est ensuite analysé (Tremblay, O'Neill, Trimble). Enfin, un dernier bloc de textes aborde les dimensions idéologiques et symboliques de la représentation (de Sève, Parnis, Jessup).

Il ne peut être question de représentation sans que ne soit fait référence aux mécanismes propres à l'exercice d'une saine démocratie. On ne se surprendra donc pas de ce que le problème de la mise en place de moyens et de méthodes permettant l'expression juste et équitable des voix multiples et diverses qui traversent la communauté politique, occupe une place centrale dans tout débat ou discussion sur la représentation.

Le texte de Jennifer Smith et Ronald G. Landes nous y plonge d'entrée de jeu. Ces derniers nous font part de leur réflexion tissée à même leur expérience à titre de vice-présidente et président de la Commission sur les frontières électorales provinciales de la Nouvelle-Écosse en 1991-1992.

representation in Canada. The electoral and partisan stakes involved in today's political representation mechanisms are first considered (Smith and Landes, Cross, Tanguay and Kay). Next, the phenomenon of *presence*, particularly in terms of the role assigned to women in Canada's political and constitutional landscape, is examined (Tremblay, O'Neill, Trimble). A final set of articles examines the ideological and symbolic dimensions of representation (de Sève, Parnis and Jessup).

One can hardly address the question of representation without dealing with the structures that are needed for the functioning of a healthy democracy. Central to any debate or discussion of representation is the problem of establishing the means and methods necessary to allow the many diverse voices throughout the political community a fair and equitable opportunity to be heard.

The article by Jennifer Smith and Ronald G. Landes, with which we begin, places us at the heart of this problem. The authors present reflections borne of their past experience as Vice-Chair and Chair, respectively, of the Electoral Boundaries Commission for the Province of Nova Scotia in 1991-92. Canadian democracy is based upon an electoral system that is organized in terms of territorial representation. The constitutional prescriptions currently in force aim to create electoral ridings of comparable demographic size, and assume that all voters have equal standing in the electoral process.

La démocratie canadienne, notent-ils, s'appuie sur un système électoral fondé sur la représentation territoriale. Les prescriptions constitutionnelles couramment en vigueur visent à la création de circonscriptions électorales de tailles démographiques comparables et supposent l'idée que tous les électeurs occupent une place égale dans le processus électoral. Dans la pratique, l'application de ces principes s'est souvent butée à des considérations qui ont peu à voir avec une stricte répartition numérique de l'électorat. Les exigences de la géographie et le poids d'intérêts particuliers, entre autres, s'imposent dans le processus de détermination des frontières électorales comme valeurs concurrentes au principe d'égalité des électeurs. Pour remédier à ce problème, Smith et Landes suggèrent l'élaboration au niveau national d'une solution de remplacement développée en Nouvelle-Écosse, qui, à la fois, garantit une meilleure représentation en fonction du poids démographique réel d'une région ou district donné et permet la mise en place de circonscriptions protégées définies suivant des impératifs locaux et minoritaires. Leur texte analyse de près l'expérience de la Nouvelle-Écosse et supputent ses possibilités d'application au niveau national.

Poursuivant dans le même registre intellectuel et analytique, l'article de Bill Cross propose une réflexion qui vient compléter celle de Smith et Landes et permet de saisir plus avant les exigences de la représentation électorale au Canada. Cross note que le processus politique au Canada reste dominé par des élites essentiellement préoccupées d'obtenir les consensus nécessaires à

In practice, however, the application of these principles often clashes with considerations that have little to do with a strictly numerical division of the electorate. In the process of drawing up electoral boundaries, the demands of geography and the dictates of special interests often compete, among other things, with the principle of voter equality. To remedy this problem, Smith and Landes suggest developing a national equivalent to the alternative devised in Nova Scotia. This approach guarantees better representation based on the actual demographic size of a given region or district and allows for the creation of protected constituencies which better reflect local and minority representation imperatives. Their article offers an insider's analysis of the Nova Scotia experience and speculates about the possibilities of applying it nationwide.

Writing along similar intellectual and analytical lines, Bill Cross raises some questions that complement Smith and Landes's reflection and further our understanding of the requirements of electoral representation in Canada. He observes that the Canadian political process is still dominated by elite factions primarily concerned with establishing the consensus necessary to their own legitimacy and bent on political arrangements that serve their own advantage. As a result, citizens are pushed aside and left with few opportunities for making a meaningful contribution to the decisions that affect them. Increasingly, the bargaining that goes on among elites leaves the

leur légitimité et portées surtout vers la conclusion de marchés politiques qui les arrangent d'abord. Les citoyens sont, de ce fait, souvent tenus à l'écart et disposent de peu d'occasions de participer de manière véritablement significative à la prise de décisions qui les affectent. Les tractations entre élites satisfont de moins en moins l'électorat canadien, mais force est d'admettre aussi que les méthodes participatives, telles que les référendums, sont souvent impuissantes à créer les consensus socio-politiques sans lesquels il est pratiquement impossible de gouverner. Le défi que pose ce dilemme, soutient Cross, est de développer des pratiques politiques qui favorisent à la fois l'obtention de consensus et une participation directe accrue du public à la prise de décision. À défaut de profondes réformes structurelles du système parlementaire canadien, de la mise en place d'institutions nouvelles telles que les assemblées constituantes, ou d'un réaménagement majeur du processus électoral, les partis politiques au Canada offrent, à son avis, une solution mitoyenne réaliste qui permet de faire face adéquatement à pareil défi. Pour Cross, les partis politiques canadiens peuvent encore favoriser une participation accrue de l'électorat au processus politique tout en maintenant leur fonction consensuelle. Il en veut pour preuve certaines pratiques nouvelles qui semblent présentement aller en ce sens à l'intérieur de divers partis politiques au Canada. L'analyse qu'il en fait vise à étayer sa perception des partis politiques comme mécanisme privilégié de représentation et de participation politique au Canada.

Canadian electorate dissatisfied, while alternative participatory methods, such as referenda, are often powerless to create the social-political consensus vital to sound governance. Cross argues that this state of affairs poses a challenge that can be addressed by developing political practices to promote consensus-building and more direct public input in decision making. Without calling for deep structural reforms of the Canadian parliamentary system, the creation of new institutions such as constituent assemblies, or a major overhaul of the electoral process, he suggests that Canada's political parties continue to offer a realistic remedy that can adequately meet such a challenge. Cross believes that Canada's political parties can still foster greater participation by the electorate in the political process while maintaining their consensus-building function. As evidence, he submits certain new practices that currently seem to be moving in this direction within Canada's various political parties. His analysis of them supports his perception of political parties as choice vehicles of representation and political participation in Canada.

A. Brian Tanguay and Barry J. Kay echo the two previous articles by addressing the issue of equitable representation and the influence of special interests in the electoral process. They analyze the electoral impact of the public support a party receives from influential lobby groups that have considerable financial means at their disposal. Flatly refuting other studies claiming that the practices of these groups can unduly affect the vote

A. Brian Tanguay et Barry J. Kay font écho aux deux textes précédents en abordant à la fois la question de l'équité dans la représentation et l'influence d'intérêts particuliers dans le processus électoral. Leur démarche analyse les conséquences électorales de l'appui public que témoignent à un parti ou à un autre certains groupes de pression puissants disposant de moyens financiers considérables. S'inscrivant en faux contre les études qui prétendent que ces groupes peuvent, par leurs pratiques, influencer indûment le vote et faire fi des principes d'équité et d'équilibre prévus par la loi canadienne sur les élections, les auteurs cherchent à démontrer que les efforts déployés par les groupes de pression avant ou pendant une campagne électorale ont peu d'incidence sur l'issue finale du vote. À partir d'une étude en profondeur contrastant les interventions de la *National Citizens' Coalition* et de *Campaign Life* durant les campagnes de 1988 et 1997, aux résultats électoraux, Tanguay et Kay concluent que l'influence d'organisations de ce genre sur la bonne marche des mécanismes de représentation électorale est grandement surestimée. La menace qu'elles semblent constituer pour les fondements de la démocratie canadienne est beaucoup plus théorique que réelle. Cela ne saurait signifier que la vigilance n'est pas de rigueur, s'empressent-ils toutefois de préciser. En effet, la possibilité qu'ont les groupes de pression canadiens de dépenser sans restriction pendant une campagne électorale alors que les partis et les candidats sont tenus de respecter des paramètres sévères en matière de dépenses électorales pose un problème d'équité et de cohérence dans l'application des règles

and undermine the principles of equity and balance provided by Canadian electoral legislation, the authors attempt to show that the efforts of lobby groups before or during an election campaign have little impact on the ultimate outcome of the vote. Based on a detailed study contrasting the activities of the *National Citizen's Coalition* and *Campaign Life* during the 1988 and 1997 campaigns with the actual election results, Tanguay and Kay conclude that the influence of these kinds of organizations on the proper functioning of the structures of electoral representation is largely overestimated. The threat they allegedly pose to the fundamentals of Canadian democracy is much more theoretical than real. However, they are quick to point out we should not necessarily cease to be vigilant. Indeed, the ability of Canadian lobby groups to spend without restriction during election campaigns, while the parties and candidates are held to strict election spending limits, creates problems of equity and consistency in applying the electoral rules; sooner or later, Tanguay and Kay believe, legislators will have to examine this question more closely.

In recent years, the specific dynamics of modern societies have somewhat complicated the way the question of representation presents itself. The question encompasses and extends beyond the mere requirements of electoral and party mechanisms. The emergence of new political challenges stemming from a politics of recognition and the rise of social movements generally striving to voice a

électorales; dra bien tôt ou tard, estiment Tanguay et Kay, que le législateur s'y attarde davantage.

La dynamique particulière des sociétés modernes au cours des dernières années a quelque peu complexifié la manière de poser la question de la représentation. Celle-ci englobe et dépasse tout à la fois les seules exigences des mécanismes électoraux et partisans. L'apparition sur la scène politique d'enjeux nouveaux liés à la volonté de reconnaissance identitaire et à l'émergence de mouvements sociaux désireux de faire entendre une parole généralement minoritaire et longtemps confinée au silence associe désormais la question de la représentation à celle de présence. Depuis l'Accord du Lac Meech en particulier, à la lumière du processus qui devait amener « onze hommes blancs » à régler le sort du Canada au nom d'une population résolument hétérogène, nombreux sont ceux et celles qui se demandent aujourd'hui si les groupes minoritaires et désavantagés sont adéquatement représentés par ces gens qui ne participent que peu ou prou de leur réalité sociale propre. Nest-on jamais bien représenté que par ceux ou celles qui partagent le même sort socio-économique? Et faut-il, dès lors, prévoir un espace particulier de représentation au sein des assemblées élues pour les groupes qui vivent une situation d'exclusion ou de marginalisation?

Ces questions s'inscrivent en filigrane des textes de Manon Tremblay, Brenda O'Neill et Linda Trimble qui ont toutes trois choisi de les aborder sous l'angle de la

minority view long confined to silence, serve to mesh the issue of representation with that of presence. Reacting to the Meech Lake Accord as a process that entrusted "eleven white men" to settle the fate of Canada on behalf of a decidedly heterogeneous public, many now wonder whether minorities and disadvantaged groups are properly represented by people removed from their specific social reality. Can one be adequately represented only by people who are in an identical social and economic situation? If so, should special accommodation be made in our elected assemblies for excluded or marginalized groups?

These questions form a common thread in the articles by Manon Tremblay, Brenda O'Neill and Linda Trimble, all three approaching the topic from the standpoint of the political citizenship of Canadian women.

Manon Tremblay proposes a study aimed at a better understanding of how federally elected women M.P.'s view their role in representing women. Following a series of interviews conducted with nearly all the female members of the House of Commons in 1993, she notes that while most take up women's representation as their responsibility, they have very different ways of perceiving and fulfilling the task. Tremblay establishes four ideal-types that distinguish federally elected women by the nature of their political commitment to women: the traditionalists, the humanists, the egalitarians and the feminists. This topology mirrors the different perceptions of the social role and

citoyenneté politique des femmes canadiennes.

Manon Tremblay propose d'abord une étude qui vise à mieux comprendre comment les élues fédérales envisagent leur rôle de représentation par rapport à la population féminine. S'appuyant sur une série d'entrevues réalisées auprès de la presque totalité des femmes élues à la Chambre des communes en 1993, elle note que si la majorité d'entre elles se reconnaissent la responsabilité de représenter les femmes, elles font montre de manières fort diverses de concevoir et de s'acquitter de cette tâche. Tremblay élabore quatre types-idéaux qui distinguent les élues fédérales quant à la nature de leur engagement politique à l'égard des femmes : citée identifie les traditionnelles, les humanistes, les égalitaires et les féministes. Cette typologie reflète autant de façons de penser le rôle social et la place politique des femmes canadiennes et correspond à l'éventail des réalités et des expériences dont elles sont porteuses. Cette pluralité de conditions n'est pas sans poser le problème de la représentation « idéale » des femmes dans le processus politique. Tremblay y va à cet égard de quelques considérations théoriques qui évoquent les tensions entre représentation générale et représentation des femmes.

L'étude de Brenda O'Neill ne manque pas d'intérêt pour qui s'interroge sur l'importance de l'adéquation identitaire entre représentant et représentés. Celle-ci s'est attardée aux conséquences électorales du leadership féminin de deux partis politiques fédéraux majeurs lors des élections de 1993 : Audrey McLaughlin pour le NPD et

political place of Canadian women, and reflects the range of their realities and experiences. Such plurality leads to the problem of the "ideal" representation of women in the political process. In this regard, Tremblay explores some theoretical considerations that highlight the tensions between general representation and women's representation.

The contribution by Brenda O'Neill addresses the question of whether in the electoral process there is a matching of voter's identities with those of leaders. She studies the electoral effects of having women at the helm of two major federal parties in the 1993 elections: Audrey McLaughlin for the NDP and Kim Campbell for the Conservative Party. Although choosing a woman leader did not spare these two parties their historic setbacks, O'Neill comments that in both cases the presence of a woman at the head of the party provided a greater incentive for the women's vote. This is especially true in the case of the Conservative Party which, for the first time, received more support from women than men. Although the available data does not conclusively show that the presence of a woman leader at the head of a political party drives men away from the party, the female electorate is more sensitive to and supportive of such leadership.

Linda Trimble for her part takes a critical look at analyses that portray women's movements and the aspirations that guide them as primarily motivated by the defense and promotion of narrow and particularistic interests. After reviewing the discourses and

Kim Campell pour le Parti conservateur. Bien que le choix d'une femme comme chef n'ait pas empêché ces deux partis de subir un revers historique, O'Neill remarque que dans les deux cas la présence d'une femme à la tête du parti constitua un plus grand incitatif pour le vote féminin. Cela est tout particulièrement vrai dans le cas du Parti conservateur qui, pour la première fois, se mérita l'appui d'un nombre plus important de femmes que d'hommes. Bien que les données disponibles ne permettent pas de conclure que la présence d'un chef féminin à la tête d'un parti politique amène les hommes à se détourner de ce parti, l'électorat féminin sera plus sensible et plus favorable à ce leadership.

Linda Trimble, pour sa part, y va d'un regard critique sur les analyses qui présentent les mouvements de femmes et les aspirations qui les guident comme étant principalement motivés par la défense et la promotion d'intérêts étroits et particularistes. Passant en revue le discours et les positions que les groupes de femmes ont adopté au cours des délibérations constitutionnelles qui ont marqué le Canada depuis le début des années 1980, elle conclut que malgré la diversité de leurs priorités politico-constitutionnelles, les femmes ont fait preuve au contraire d'un grand respect pour la pluralité sociétale du Canada et que les projets de société qu'elles ont défendus ont toujours participé d'une vision large et englobante du Canada. Pour Trimble, les reproches de particularisme souvent adressés aux femmes dans le dossier constitutionnel canadien participent de conceptions patriarcales et

positions of women's groups during the constitutional debates that have marked Canada's political life since the early 1980s, she finds that despite, their divergent political and constitutional priorities, women have shown a deep respect for Canada's social plurality and the social projects that they have championed always entailed a broad and comprehensive vision of Canada. For Trimble, the complaints of particularism often leveled against women in the Canadian constitutional debate stem from patriarchal, masculine conceptions of citizenship which, by their very nature, cast aspersions on the underlying social and political objectives of women. Women ask to be represented in political institutions in all their constituent diversity because they consider it crucial for full and inclusive citizenship. Trimble argues that striving to be heard and represented with respect for one's own specific characteristics and objectives does not amount to particularism; it should rather be viewed as a necessary prerequisite to any legitimate constitutional discussion.

While some people may view the political arena as the key site of representation issues, it is not the only one. Without a doubt, the way we grasp reality and intellectualize its effects is another vital aspect of what others imply by representation. The ideological, symbolic and cultural realms that groups and individuals create to build their identity, gain self-awareness, master their environment or establish themselves in the public arena are

Masculinistes de la citoyenneté qui, de ce fait, se méprennent sur les véritables objectifs socio-politiques des femmes. Les femmes demandent à être représentées dans les institutions politiques dans toute leur diversité constitutive parce qu'elles estiment qu'il en va de la mise en place d'une citoyenneté pleine et inclusive. S'attendre à être entendu et représenté dans le respect de ses caractéristiques et objectifs propres ne tient pas du particularisme, soutient Trimble, mais devrait plutôt être considéré comme un préalable nécessaire à toute discussion constitutionnelle légitime.

Si pour d'aucuns l'arène politique est le lieu d'actualisation privilégié des questions de représentation, il ne saurait être le seul. La manière de saisir le réel et d'en intellectualiser les manifestations constitue sans contredit un autre aspect essentiel de ce que d'autres entendent par représentation. Les univers idéologiques, symboliques et culturels que les groupes et individus créent pour s'identifier, prendre conscience d'eux-mêmes, maîtriser leur environnement ou s'imposer aux autres dans l'espace public sont aussi partie prenante d'une problématique de la représentation. Le dernier bloc de textes explore cette dimension parfois négligée.

Micheline de Sève trace un bilan historique complet des défis réels et complexes qui se sont posés à l'imaginaire socio-politique des femmes québécoises depuis la Révolution tranquille. Elle montre comment, dans leur définition d'elles-mêmes et de la place qu'elles entendent occuper dans l'espace public, les Québécoises ont dû

also key components of the representation issue. The final series of texts investigates this sometimes overlooked dimension.

Micheline de Sève paints a comprehensive historical portrait of the very real and complex challenges confronting the sociopolitical imagination of Québec women since the Quiet Revolution. She shows how women in Quebec, in defining themselves and the place they intend to fill in the public space, have had to confront squarely the competing imperatives of national emancipation and their own emancipation as women. Asserting themselves as women and Québécois, having to negotiate an identity that is marginalized simultaneously on the basis of gender or national origin, social class and sexual orientation, being sometimes forced to make a political choice between nation and their status as women, between their ethnic background and gender allegiance, all that has not been without wrenching ideological struggles for many women and Québécois feminists. In her analysis, Micheline de Sève examines these struggles and is driven to the conclusion that Quebec's feminists are still far from resolving the enigma of constructing a political strategy adapted to the fragmentation of post-modern life. In this regard, she laments the current lack of permanent forums for independent discussion, such as the major independent feminist journals which nurtured the imaginations of Quebec women for more than fifteen years.

composer de front avec les impératifs concurrents de l'émancipation nationale et de leur émancipation en tant que femmes. S'imposer comme femmes et Québécoises, négocier une identité doublement marginalisée (et même triplement et quadruplement marginalisée, sur la base du genre, de l'identité nationale, de la classe sociale ou de l'orientation sexuelle), se voir forcée, à l'occasion, de choisir politiquement entre la nation et sa condition de femme, entre son ethnicité et son appartenance de sexe, tout cela ne s'est pas fait sans heurts et déchirements idéologiques pour nombre de femmes et de féministes québécoises. C'est l'histoire de ces heurts et déchirements que présente et analyse Micheline de Sève. Force lui est de conclure que les féministes du Québec sont encore loin d'avoir résolu l'énigme de la construction d'une stratégie politique adaptée à la fragmentation du sujet postmoderne. À cet égard, elle déplore l'absence actuelle de carrefours permanents de discussion autonome comme les grandes revues féministes indépendantes qui alimentèrent pendant plus de quinze ans l'imaginaire des Québécoises.

Le thème du nationalisme alimente aussi l'article de Deborah Parnis qui, elle, cherche plutôt à saisir le lien entre la diffusion radiophonique commerciale et la construction d'une idée canadienne de la nation. L'intérêt de ce texte réside principalement dans la perspective nouvelle qu'il apporte à l'étude du rapport entre culture et nationalisme au Canada. Alors que la plupart des travaux sur cette question s'arrêtent surtout aux médias visuels et littéraires, Parnis regarde plutôt du côté de la production radiophonique commerciale (elle exclut d'emblée la

The theme of nationalism also fuels the article by Deborah Parnis who tries to map out the connection between commercial radio broadcasting and the creation of a Canadian idea of nationhood. This article offers a fresh perspective on the relationship between culture and nationalism in Canada. While most studies of this debate dwell on the visual and literary media, Parnis focuses her attention on commercial radio production (deliberately excluding the CBC which attracts only 10 percent of the total Canadian audience). In her opinion, not only has commercial radio played a major role in shaping Canadian social practices, it has long offered an important stage for playing out the power struggles that characterize Canadian society. The Canadian radio broadcasting industry is highly regulated and thereby deeply rooted in the Canadian social fabric and the national unity question which characterizes Canadian social and political reality. In this study, Parnis reveals how the state, through its various regulatory mechanisms, shapes the national identity and imagination. She argues that representation of the Canadian nation hinges on regulations that both force the production of Canadian commercial radio broadcasters to meet Canadian content requirements, and subordinate the radio broadcasting industry to the imperatives of the general or national interest. These regulations are possible because the special interests of commercial radio broadcasters historically match the interests of the country's power bloc; in practice, Parnis concludes, this situation gives rise to the

CBC qui n'attire que dix pour cent de l'auditoire total). À son avis, non seulement la radiophonie commerciale a-t-elle joué un rôle majeur dans la formation des pratiques sociales des Canadiens, mais elle constitue aussi depuis longtemps un lieu important au sein duquel les rapports de pouvoir caractéristiques de la société canadienne se manifestent. L'industrie radiophonique canadienne est fortement réglementée et, à ce titre, elle est profondément ancrée dans le tissu social canadien et s'insère au cœur des questions d'unité nationale qui composent depuis toujours la réalité socio-politique du Canada. Dans cette étude, Parnis lève le voile sur le rôle que joue l'État, à travers ses divers mécanismes de réglementation, dans la formation de l'identité et de l'imaginaire nationaux. Elle soutient que le procès de représentation de la nation canadienne passe entre autre par une réglementation qui force les radiodiffuseurs commerciaux à livrer une production à contenu canadien et subordonne du coup l'industrie radiophonique aux impératifs de l'intérêt général ou national. Cette réglementation est possible parce que les intérêts particuliers des radiodiffuseurs commerciaux s'articulent historiquement aux intérêts du bloc au pouvoir; une situation qui, dans les faits, conclut Parnis, donne lieu à la régulation hégémonique de la culture et de la nation canadiennes par les groupes économiquement dominants de la société.

Dans le dernier article portant sur le thème du numéro, Lynda Jessup prend le contre-pied d'une opinion largement répandue à propos du

hegemonic regulation of Canadian culture and nationhood by groups that are economically dominant in Canada.

In the final theme-based article, Lynda Jessup challenges the conventional understanding of the Group of Seven, and asks us to reconsider some common assumptions about the symbolic and imaginary devices of Canadian identity. Criticizing a recent exhibition at the National Gallery of Canada which portrayed this group of early 20th century painters as the quintessence of modern Canadian culture and celebrated its avant-garde populism, her views are a dramatic departure from the exalted tones of the National Gallery. Jessup argues that the artistic discourse and activities of the Group of Seven actually formed part of a vast, international, anti-modernist movement sweeping through Europe and North America at the start of the twentieth century. Their art has none of the populist character often attributed to it, nor does it endeavor to express a kind of fundamental "Canadianness." Although they claimed to symbolize all of Canada to its deepest core, the Group of Seven painters, Jessup argues, merely portrayed a regional conception of Canada—primarily Ontario—in typical British fashion, which contributed to redrawing the cultural parameters of the Anglo-Canadian elite, but which at the same time divested the Canadian imagination of cultural expression by First Nations or the French Canadians. By showing that Canada's cultural foundations partake of this regional ideology in subsequent decades, Jessup's

Groupe des Sept et nous invite à revoir certaines idées reçues à l'égard de l'univers symbolique et de l'imaginaire identitaire canadiens. Critique d'une exposition récente du Musée des beaux-arts du Canada qui présentait ce groupe de peintres du début du vingtième siècle comme exprimant la quintessence de la culture canadienne moderne et célébrait son populisme avant-gardiste, elle offre un regard qui tranche sensiblement avec le ton exaltant du Musée des beaux-arts. Jessup soutient que le discours artistique et les activités du Groupe des Sept s'inscrivaient en fait dans un vaste mouvement international de réaction anti-moderniste qui balaya l'Europe et l'Amérique du Nord au début du vingtième siècle. Leur art n'a pas ce caractère populiste qu'on lui accole d'emblée, pas plus qu'il n'exprime une espèce de « canadianté » fondamentale. Bien qu'ils avaient la prétention de symboliser le Canada dans sa globalité et dans sa fibre la plus intime, les peintres du Groupe des Sept, d'après Jessup, se révèlent n'être que les définisseurs d'une conception régionale — essentiellement ontarienne — et d'inspiration typiquement britannique du Canada, qui a concouru à reformuler les paramètres culturels de l'élite anglo-canadienne, mais qui, du coup, a évacué de l'imaginaire canadien les manifestations culturelles des Premières nations et des Canadiens français. Dans la mesure où c'est d'abord sur la base de cette idéologie régionale que les balises culturelles de la canadianté seront posées et institutionnalisées au cours des décennies qui suivent, l'article de Jessup permet d'apprécier un des fondements de la symbolique

article allows us to appraise with more critical detachment one of the underpinnings of the symbolic universe of modern Canadian identity.

Our open topic section offers an article by John Harles on Canadian multiculturalism and the Canadian identity. Although not directly addressing the issue of representation, his essay nevertheless makes implicit reference to it. In discussing multiculturalism, Harles explores a key component of civic identity in Canada which often emerges as a focus of debate on representation. He asserts that multiculturalism is a strategy of ethnic inclusion chosen because of Canada's specific social and demographic context but which clearly fails to foster a strong sense of allegiance to the Canadian nation. Multiculturalism policy has fallen short of the national integration objectives set for it. Harles believes we must now look to a civic style of nationalism to anchor Canadian identity within the boundaries of a distinct community. The issue of Quebec, however, remains a major obstacle to this end. As long as Quebec remains part of Canada, Harles surmises, full integration and the emergence of a distinctly Canadian identity may well be impossible.

The issue ends with two review essays that examine recent writings about representation. The first, by Frank Caucci, reviews four Québécois works by Marcos Ancelovici and Francis Dupuis-Déri, Marc Angenot, Claude Beausoleil and Michel Brûlé. These

Identitaire canadienne moderne avec plus de recul.

La section hors-thème nous offre un essai de John Harles sur le multiculturalisme canadien et l'identité canadienne. Bien que le propos ne soit pas directement animé par la question de la représentation, il n'est pas sans l'évoquer implicitement. En abordant le multiculturalisme, Harles explore une composante centrale de l'identité civique au Canada, qui apparaît souvent comme un enjeu des débats sur la représentation. Il affirme que le multiculturalisme constitue une stratégie d'inclusion ethnique dont le choix s'explique vu le contexte socio-démographique particulier du Canada, mais qui, en définitive, reste incapable de favoriser un sentiment robuste d'appartenance à la nation canadienne. La politique de multiculturalisme ne s'est pas montrée à la hauteur des objectifs d'intégration nationale qu'on lui a fait porter. Harles croit plutôt que c'est vers un nationalisme de nature civique qu'il faille désormais se tourner afin d'ancrer l'identité canadienne dans les frontières d'une communauté distincte. La question du Québec constitue cependant un écueil de taille vers cette fin. Tant que le Québec restera partie du Canada, l'intégration du Canada et l'émergence d'une identité résolument canadienne risquent fort d'être impossibles.

Le numéro se clôt sur deux essais critiques qui font le tour d'écrits récents se rapportant à la représentation. Le premier est de Frank Caucci et passe en revue quatre ouvrages québécois de Marcos

four books directly or indirectly approach the issue of representation in terms of identity.

Gillian Whitlock gives us the other review essay intended primarily as a reflection on the problems facing anyone who attempts to study Canadian literature from outside Canada. Taking the latest book by Lynette Hunter as her point of departure, Whitlock analyzes the task confronting anyone who attempts to represent Canada (in terms of reflecting its image) through its literature without necessarily understanding that literature through first-hand contact with the society that produced it. Whitlock examines the dangers of trivializing the deeper meaning of Canada and misunderstanding its signifiers.

In sum, this issue of the IJCS offers stimulating insight and varied readings on a topic that is of key importance to understanding Canada as this century draws to a close.

Daniel Salée
Associate Editor

Ancelovici et Francis Dupuis-Déri, Marc Angenot, Claude Beausoleil et Michel Brûlé. Quatre livres qui tentent d'élaborer directement ou indirectement une problématique de la représentation sous l'angle de la question de l'identitaire.

Gillian Whitlock signe l'autre essai critique qui se veut surtout une réflexion sur les difficultés auxquelles fait face quiconque aborde l'étude de la littérature canadienne de l'extérieur du Canada.

Prenant pour point de départ le dernier ouvrage de Lynette Hunter, Whitlock analyse la tâche qu'est celle de représenter le Canada (au sens d'en rendre l'image) à travers sa

littérature alors que la saisie que l'on peut en avoir ne repose pas nécessairement sur un contact de première main avec la société dont elle provient. Whitlock s'interroge sur les dangers de banaliser le sens profond du Canada et d'en mal comprendre les signifiants.

En bref, ce numéro de la RIEC jette un regard stimulant et propose une lecture variée d'un sujet central à la compréhension du Canada en cette fin de siècle.

Daniel Salée
Redacteur adjoint

Jennifer Smith and Ronald G. Landes

**Entitlement versus Variance Models in the
Determination of Canadian Electoral Boundaries**

Abstract

A crucial variable in any system of democratic representation is the electoral system, in particular, the criteria by which electoral boundaries are drawn. In Canada the longstanding pattern of electoral redistributions has been the variance model of seat allocation. In contrast, the 1991-1992 Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission in Nova Scotia developed an alternative approach — the entitlement model of seat allocation. Combined with the innovative use of “protected constituencies” primarily to encourage minority legislative representation, the entitlement model offers a way of implementing the principle of “voter parity,” while at the same time justifying departures from that principle. This article explains the use of both the protected constituency and the entitlement model of seat allocation in Nova Scotia and then argues for their wider application in the Canadian context.

Résumé

Une variable essentielle de tout système de représentation démocratique est le système électoral et, en particulier, les critères de délimitation des circonscriptions électorales. Au Canada, les remaniements électoraux sont effectués traditionnellement suivant le modèle de variance. Par contre, en 1991-1992, la Commission de délimitation des circonscriptions provinciales de la Nouvelle-Écosse a élaboré un modèle de rechange — le modèle de droit à une répartition des sièges. Combiné à l’usage innovateur de « circonscriptions protégées », visant surtout à favoriser la représentation législative des minorités, le modèle de droit à une allocation de sièges constitue un moyen de mettre en œuvre le principe de la « parité des électeurs », tout en justifiant des dérogations au même principe. Le présent article rend compte de l’usage tant des circonscriptions protégées que du modèle de droit à une allocation de sièges en Nouvelle-Écosse et puis propose que ces deux principes soient appliqués ailleurs dans le contexte canadien.

The quality of any representative democracy is largely defined by its representative nature. Definitions of representation, of course, evolve and change over time. In recent decades, one increasingly important variable in the representative character of a democratic polity is the electoral system, in particular, the manner and means by which electoral boundaries are determined.

As a representative democracy, Canada retains a territorially-based system of representation. The Constitution establishes the “proportionate

representation of the provinces” in the lower house of the federal Parliament and requires that the boundaries of the federal constituencies be readjusted accordingly at each decennial census.¹ Taken together, these two injunctions imply the desirability of constituencies of comparable population size. However, Canadian legislators have not pursued this principle of voter equality with single-minded enthusiasm. To it have been added a series of countervailing factors, like community of interest and geography. As a result, legislators have created the interesting problem of how to weigh the principle of voter equality against other, competing values, a problem that some regard as near insoluble.² Practical attempts to solve it have led to what we have identified as two competing models of boundary determination in Canadian electoral redistributions. Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the authors of this article served, respectively, as Vice-Chair and Chair of the Nova Scotia Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission in 1991-1992.³

Two Competing Models

In the most commonly used approach to the problem to date, the concept of variance is employed. Under the variance model, the legislature sets limits on the permissible departures from voter equality, and then outlines the factors that might justify such departures. Thus, Parliament enjoins federal boundaries commissions to pursue the objective of equal population size per constituency, while at the same time requiring them to consider non-population factors like community of interest, community history and geography. Commissions are permitted to accommodate these factors within a variance that is set generously at 25 per cent above and below the average constituency population, except in “extraordinary” circumstances, in which case there is no practical or real limit at all.⁴

The use of a factor of any kind in the variance model both legitimizes a potential pattern of malapportionment and minimizes the perception of the extent of the variation allowed. For example, until its latest provincial redistribution, Nova Scotia used a \pm factor of one-third applied inside existing county boundaries. While a \pm factor of one-third might not appear excessive at first glance, what is produced, in fact, is a gross pattern of malapportionment (i.e., much larger than 33 per cent). For example, if the average provincial constituency size is 12,000, then a \pm factor of one-third produces a potential variation of as much as 100 per cent (i.e., 16,000 people versus 8,000 people)!⁵ If an initial redistribution shows such malapportionment, combining it with guaranteed representation of counties (regardless of population size) *and* changing population growth patterns over many years will produce an excessive and extreme pattern of malapportionment.

The federal variance model of \pm 25 percent, therefore, clearly offers considerable scope for non-population considerations. Other versions of the model use narrower variances and specify what is meant by

extraordinary circumstances. The effect of such narrower variances is to reduce the extent to which factors like community of interest or community of identity, so elastic in meaning, can be given consideration. Thus, in Saskatchewan, for example, the legislature has set the limits at a mere ± 5 percent, although it has also designated two northern districts with populations falling to 50 percent of the provincial average. Similarly, in Manitoba the limits are ± 10 percent, but there are designated northern districts with populations up to ± 25 percent below the provincial average. However, Saskatchewan and Manitoba are exceptions in Canada, as is Newfoundland with respect to the constituency of Labrador. Most of the provinces, following the federal example, use the variance of ± 25 percent, which is generous enough to encourage citizens and groups to press a multitude of community of interest and other claims against the principle of voter equality.⁶

In principle, of course, such claims are acceptable. But they are not always easy for claimants to justify or for commissions to evaluate. As a result, claimants and commissions alike are tempted to get around the problem by viewing the very existence of a variance band as a kind of permissible margin of error for any particular redistribution. In other words, it is tempting for them to think that as long as the boundaries of the constituencies are within the proscribed variances, be they 25 percent or 10 percent, that is justification enough. But it is not, a point which the courts increasingly have pressed. According to the courts, departures from voter equality require explicit justification.

An alternative model, however, answers the judicial requirement of justification: the entitlement model of seat allocation. It was developed and used by the Nova Scotia Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission established by the provincial legislature in 1991 to redraw the provincial map,⁷ and later used again in the province by the federal commission established to redraw the federal map of the province for the House of Commons.⁸ Typically, the 1991 provincial Commission was expected to do the seemingly impossible, that is, to pursue the principle of voter equality while at the same time making room for authorized and justifiable departures from it. Thus it needed to find a way to format voter equality rigorously *and* at the same time to account for compelling and competing claims of community of interest.

In the remainder of the article we explore the model that the Commission developed in response to the legal and legislative demands confronting it. Accordingly, the first section briefly reviews the relevant legal opinion at the time the Commission was established. In the second section the Commission's legislative terms of reference are noted, especially the instructions regarding minority communities. The third section explains both the entitlement model and the related concept of a protected constituency. The conclusion argues that the entitlement model and the protected constituency combined, unlike the variance model, supply a

formula for explicitly and openly weighing community of interest and other values against the principle of voter equality. It is argued further that such a formula is essential to the integrity of territorially-based systems of representation, currently besieged by equality seekers and particular interests alike.

The Legal Context

Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms stipulates, among other things, that every citizen of Canada has a right to vote in elections to the House of Commons and to provincial legislative assemblies. By the summer of 1991, three judicial decisions had been rendered on the meaning of this right as it pertains to the geographic boundaries that delineate the country's electoral constituencies.⁹ The second decision, which proved to be a catalyst for events in Nova Scotia, was handed down by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in March 1991.

The Saskatchewan case involved a "section 3" challenge to some of the province's key legislative instructions to the boundaries commission and to the electoral map which the commission produced. The legislative instructions, and consequently the electoral map, featured a preset allocation of urban and rural constituencies that was slightly different from the urban and rural population shares, and a 25 percent variance rule, although two northern constituencies were permitted to vary as much as 50 percent from the population average per constituency. Opponents charged that the unequal population sizes of the constituencies violated the principle of voter equality, or the right to an equal vote, which is how they interpreted the right to vote under the Charter. And the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal agreed. The court proclaimed that "we speak of 'one person-one vote', and so it is that the idea of equality is inherent in the right to vote...[the 'one person-one vote' principle] is the guiding ideal in evaluating electoral distribution schemes."¹⁰ The court conceded that there might be unavoidable, practical reasons for tolerating minor deviations from the equal-vote principle — perhaps a snap election that is called before a map can be redrawn. There might even be valid geographic and regional reasons for deviations.¹¹ Nevertheless, the court clearly preferred that deviations be minimized as much as possible. It threw out both the commission's legislative mandate and its proposed electoral map.

The Saskatchewan decision put Nova Scotia's electoral map in constitutional jeopardy. For example, by 1991 the extent of malapportionment was significant, ranging from 5,000 constituents in Cumberland Centre to over 20,000 in urban ridings like Sackville and Dartmouth East — a difference of 400 percent! The product of a major Liberal gerrymander in 1978, and a minor Conservative one in 1981, the map was already in political jeopardy. The new Conservative leader and premier, Donald Cameron, had promised electoral reform in his leadership campaign, including a "nonpartisan" redistribution of seats. Thus, the

events in Saskatchewan added urgency to the leader's publicly-expressed intentions, and undoubtedly helped the government to gain an all-party agreement to the creation (May of 1991) of a legislative Select Committee on Establishing an Electoral Boundaries Commission. Understandably, the select committee sought to devise terms of reference for the province's first independent boundaries commission that reflected a strong commitment to the principle of voter equality. But before it could conclude its work, the judicial firmament shifted.

The government of Saskatchewan had immediately appealed the decision of the province's appellate court to the Supreme Court of Canada, which heard the appeal in late April and handed down its judgment on June 6, 1991. Writing for the majority in *Carter v. Saskatchewan*, as the case is commonly known, Madame Justice McLachlin pursued the discussion of the meaning of the right to vote that she had begun as Chief Justice of the British Columbia Supreme Court in the very first electoral boundaries case, *Dixon*. In that earlier case, she had drawn a contrast between the meaning of the right to vote in Canada and the United States. Whereas in the United States, she argued, the right to vote is a strict one person-one vote concept, in Canada it is a matter of the "relative equality of voting power." Here there are accepted reasons for departing from voter equality, examples being geographic and regional-interest factors. The justification underlying these reasons is the broad notion of good governance.¹²

In *Carter*, Justice McLachlin transposed the good governance justification into the arresting phrase, "effective representation." Employing the "purposive" approach to the interpretation of a Charter right, she concluded that the purpose of the right to vote is to gain effective representation. And the leading or primary condition of effective representation is *relative parity of voting power*. But there are other conditions of effective representation too: "Factors like geography, community history, community interests and minority representation may need to be taken into account to ensure that our legislative assemblies effectively represent the diversity of our social mosaic."¹³ In other words, factors of this kind may be used to justify departures from voter parity.

Justice McLachlin's point about the need of justification is worth stressing. Quoting her own words in *Dixon*, she wrote that "only those deviations should be admitted which can be justified on the ground that they contribute to better government of the populace as a whole, giving due weight to regional issues within the populace and geographic factors within the territory governed."¹⁴ To summarize, in Justice McLachlin's view, the right to vote must be understood in terms of the purpose of effective representation, the condition of which is the relative parity of voting power, modified where necessary by considerations like community of interest and minority representation. She accepted the justifications that the Saskatchewan government advanced to defend the modifications of voter

parity in the electoral map.¹⁵ Accordingly, she reversed the appellate court's decision, and upheld the map.

Nova Scotia's Legislative Instructions

Faced with the Supreme Court's reversal, Nova Scotia's select committee produced a prolix set of instructions to the boundaries commission. However, the select committee declined to establish variance levels for the commission to observe. Indeed, it stated clearly that the commission was "...not to be governed by a predetermined population deviation factor or by a predetermined split between urban and rural ridings."¹⁶ This decision was, and remains, unique in Canada. So, too, was the ample consideration that the committee gave to non-population factors.

Using terminology remarkably similar to Justice McLachlin's, the select committee identified the relative parity of voting power in the form of constituencies of approximate equal population to be the key condition of the right to effective representation. But it also listed five other "primary" factors: geography; community history; community interests; minority representation, including, in particular, representation of the Acadian, Black and Mi'kmaq peoples of Nova Scotia; and projections of the rate of population growth. It even threw in a non-primary factor, county boundaries. The committee then reminded the commission that departures from voter parity could be justified only in so far as they contribute to better governance for the population as a whole.¹⁷ And there was more.

The select committee requested that the commission actively seek the "advice, support and cooperation" of representatives of the Black community, the Acadian community and the Mi'kmaq people. In the case of the Mi'kmaq, it mandated a broad, consultative process, and empowered the commission to create one Mi'kmaq seat in addition to the set total of 52 seats.¹⁸ The committee's concern about minority representation was reflected in the fact that a good half of the terms of reference it produced was devoted to the issue. The legislature accepted the committee's report *in toto*, and the government quickly established the new boundaries commission.¹⁹ The boundaries commission then had to find a way to navigate between voter parity, on the one hand, and competing factors identified in the terms of reference on the other, and to do so in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in *Carter*.

The Entitlement Model and Protected Constituencies

The Population Data

It is essential for a boundaries commission to determine the data set to be used. In Nova Scotia, the select committee required the commission to use the most recent "population" statistics available. The commission decided that this ruled out a data base of voters only as opposed to the population as a

whole. But the 1991 Canadian census figures, based on population, were not yet available. The commission determined that the most recent population data were Statistics Canada's June 1991 estimates of the population in each of the province's eighteen counties. These estimates were projections derived from the previous 1986 census.²⁰ According to these data, the population of the province stood at 899,900, which, in a legislature of 52 districts, produces an average population of 17,300 per electoral district.

The Entitlement System

Having determined the data base, the commission turned its focus to the primary condition of effective representation — voter equality. What would the electoral map of the province look like on the basis of voter equality alone? The entitlement model produced the answer to the question.²¹ Working with the county-based data, the commission worked on the assumption that a county with a population of 17,300 (the new provincial average) was “entitled” to one electoral district. The first step, then, was to allocate to the counties the number of electoral districts that their populations warranted on the basis of the numbers alone. The result was a set of “county seat entitlements” that made for easy comparisons against the provincial average (see Table One). A county with an entitlement of 1.12 was 12 percent above the provincial average, while one at .66 was 34 percent below it. Thus, if precise voter equality was the desired goal, Halifax County, which includes the metropolitan area, required 18.90 electoral districts or 4.9 more than the 14 it currently possessed, while Cumberland County, at the other extreme, required only 2.01 districts, or one less than the three that it had. Following this calculation, the commission initially decided to remove one district from each of three counties over-represented like Cumberland, and add three to under-represented Halifax County.²²

The commission also needed to get a distribution of population and seat entitlements within counties and the entitlement method proved applicable here as well. Let us recall that the commission was using Statistics Canada's 1991 county estimates derived from the 1986 census. So, a town with 20 percent of a county's 1986 population would receive 20 percent of the county's seat entitlement. In its *Report*, the commission cited the example of the town of Clare, in Digby County. According to the 1986 census, Clare had a population of 9,740, while the county had a population of 21,852. The county's 1991 seat entitlement was 1.26. Thus Clare's seat entitlement was calculated to be 0.56, a calculation that would need to be reflected in the boundaries drawn for Clare and the county.²³

Table 1

County Population Estimates
 (June 1, 1991)

County	Estimated Population - 1991	Existing Number of Seats	New 1991 Seat Entitlements
Halifax	327,000	14	18.90
Cape Breton	121,700	7	7.03
Kings	55,000	3	3.18
Pictou	50,000	3	2.89
Colchester	48,000	3	2.77
Lunenburg	47,900	3	2.77
Hants	38,400	2	2.22
Cumberland	34,700	3	2.01
Yarmouth	28,400	2	1.64
Annapolis	23,400	2	1.35
Digby	21,800	2	1.26
Inverness	21,600	2	1.25
Antigonish	19,400	1	1.12
Shelburne	17,600	1	1.02
Queens	13,200	1	0.76
Guysborough	11,800	1	0.68
Richmond	11,300	1	0.65
Victoria	8,700	1	0.50
Nova Scotia	899,900	52	52

Source: Statistics Canada (December 10, 1991) and *Report*, p. 21.

Clearly the assumption of an even growth pattern in terms of a town's proportion of a county's population is inappropriate for areas in which both population growth and internal migration are widely perceived to be significant. Such was the case with Halifax County, and here the commission used the 1991 municipal enumeration figures in determining the proposed electoral boundaries inside Halifax County. As the commission noted in its *Report*, the use of a different data base for Halifax County internally had no effect on the county's overall electoral-district entitlement relative to the entitlements of other counties. But it did allow the commission to make discerning and careful judgements when drawing the

boundaries of the electoral districts within the metropolitan area. Moreover, it demonstrates one of the best features of the entitlement system, namely, the fact that it permits comparisons between population areas, the figures of which are generated by different data sets.²⁴

The Protected Constituency

The entitlement system, applied at the country and sub-county levels, generated some conclusions about the allocation of districts on a population basis alone, in particular, which areas of the province would gain seats and which areas would lose seats. But before proceeding to determine the actual boundaries, the commission had to deal with the non-population factors outlined in the legislative terms of reference, especially the injunctions on minority representation. Following considerable deliberation, the commission made two crucial decisions: (1) to determine which areas of the province are sharply and significantly defined by community interest and history, or minority representation, or geography; and (2) to protect those same areas within discrete electoral districts. In this way, the commission could promote the effective representation of the communities in question. However, protection is not tantamount to an iron-clad guarantee of effective representation, as the situation of the Black communities illustrates.

By far the largest concentration of these Black communities is in the Preston area in Halifax County, where the commission chose to establish a relatively compact electoral district based on two adjacent municipal districts. Although the population of the new district was only half that of the provincial average, the Black communities still comprised only 25 to 35 percent of it. Thus, the district could not be described as a designated "Black seat." On the other hand, political science literature on the competition among political parties in single-member plurality systems like Nova Scotia's indicates that this range is sufficient to give the communities a realistic opportunity of electing a member from their midst.²⁵ And indeed, this is precisely what happened in the first election that was run on the new electoral map.²⁶

As noted earlier, the Acadian communities were also mentioned in the terms of reference. These communities are concentrated to a greater or lesser extent in four different parts of the province. Accordingly, the commission chose not to alter the existing electoral districts of Clare, Richmond and Argyle, the three areas in which the Acadian population is the most numerous and concentrated. Again, these districts were not perceived simply to be "Acadian districts." However, in each case the Acadian proportion of the total was considered sufficiently high to make the election of Acadian representatives a realistic proposition: Clare (65 percent), Argyle (55 percent), and Richmond (35 percent).

The final application of the concept of a protected constituency was a matter of geography and concerned the county of Victoria. Victoria's 1991

entitlement was 0.50 electoral districts. Sparsely populated and large, it stretches north from the Bras D'Or Lakes to the Cabot Strait. The network of roads in the rugged northern half is minimal. Relative to Nova Scotia, then, residents of Victoria County face geographic barriers to effective representation. Moreover, given the existing population patterns, the county could not be easily combined with adjacent electoral districts. On the basis of geography, then, one of the primary non-population factors outlined in its terms of reference, the commission chose to protect Victoria County, while adding the northern part of the neighbouring county of Inverness to it.

Given the fixed total of a 52-seat House of Assembly, the decision to establish five protected constituencies demanded readjusting the entitlements for the other districts. This was accomplished by omitting altogether the protected constituencies from the calculation of the entitlements of the 47 remaining districts. As a result, the adjusted entitlement of an average-sized district of the 47 districts was about 5 percent higher than the entitlement of an average-sized district of the full 52 districts — or, approximately 18,100 people rather than 17,300.²⁷ The 5 percent figure, then, was the “price” that residents of the 47 districts paid to ensure the effective representation of the residents in the protected constituencies. However, the adoption of the protected constituencies did not unduly diminish the commission’s efforts to enhance voter equality, as shown by comparisons of the new electoral map and previous maps. For example, of the 47 non-protected constituencies, 45 had a variance within ± 15 percent of the adjusted provincial average. The trend toward voter equality, significantly enhanced in the new map, is illustrated by the Gini scores in the table below (see Table Two). The Gini Index has a value of 0, when perfect equality has been achieved, and a value of 1, when there is perfect inequality. For the 1993 election two values are presented: with and without the protected constituencies included in the calculation. On either measure, the 1991-1992 electoral redistribution significantly enhanced the relative parity of voting power in Nova Scotia.

It remains to be noted that the commission was unable to proceed with the establishment of a district representing the Mi’kmaq community. Members of the community discussed the idea but they could not agree on its desirability at the time.²⁸

Table 2

Nova Scotia Gini Indices – 1960 to 1993*	
Year of Election	Gini Index
1960	.261
1963	.270
1967	.209
1970	.212
1974	.225
1981	.156
1984	.164
1988	.175
1993	.094, .059

- * The Gini indices were calculated using electoral populations during provincial general elections. For 1993, the left-hand figure represents the index for all 52 constituencies, while the right-hand figure is based on the 47 unprotected constituencies. For the 1960-1984 elections, the data are from Harvey E. Pasis, "Electoral Distribution in the Canadian Provincial Legislatures," pp. 251-253 in J. Paul Johnston and Harvey E. Pasis (eds.), *Representation and Electoral Systems: Canadian Perspectives* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1990). The Gini indices for 1988 and 1993 were calculated by Gerald Baier of Dalhousie University, based on the official election returns as presented in the *Reports* of the Chief Electoral Officer of Nova Scotia for the Thirty-Second and Thirty-Third General Elections.

Advantages of the Entitlement Model

Even when legislatures are less demanding about non-population considerations than the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, boundaries commissions often are obliged to weigh citizens' claims of community of interest or minority representation against the principle of voter parity. In the face of such claims, the entitlement model offers three advantages over the alternative model of specified variances. The advantages are rigour, transparency and the requirement of explicit justification. Beginning with rigour, the method provides an accurate account of the representation entitlement of any geographically-delineated part of the province on the basis of population alone. Thus, in the case of Nova Scotia, it produced a clear picture of entitlements on a county-by-county basis. Anyone could see what the strict application of the principle of voter parity would mean for Halifax County, home of the province's urban metropolis, and Victoria County, which is geographically large but sparsely populated. By the same token, the method also immediately establishes the significance of departures from voter parity, which points to the next advantage, transparency.

The entitlement method measures departures from voter parity. In other words, if one county is assigned more seats than its population alone would warrant, it becomes easy to see which adjacent counties are paying the price by being assigned fewer seats than their populations warrant. And it is just as easy to see how high or low the price is. Indeed, the method is so transparent that it transforms the assignment of seats into a zero-sum game. The same is not true for the variance model. When variances are used instead, the standard of voter parity, which entails zero variance, recedes from focus, along with the idea of a seat entitlement.

Let us consider the variance level of ± 25 per cent, the most commonly used in Canada. The available inference is that constituency populations that fall within this range are more or less acceptable. The very notion of an under-represented constituency versus an over-represented constituency, which must be calculated on the basis of voter parity, loses force. Thus, an under-represented constituency appears to pay no price for an over-represented constituency. And if there is no real price, then there is no urgent need to justify departures from voter parity, so long as they remain within the established variance limits. The limits become their own justification. With the entitlement system, by contrast, there is every need of justification. Once the assignment of seats on the basis of population is demonstrated, then proposals to depart from it must be defended, particularly to those who live in areas that, by consequence, stand to lose seats. But why is the need of justification an advantage?

One answer is that Canadian jurisprudence demands it. As noted earlier, Justice McLachlin determined that the purpose of the right to vote is effective representation, and that the principal condition of effective representation is voter equality, modified by competing considerations like community of interest, where such considerations can be shown to contribute to effective representation. The logic of the entitlement system, including the concept of the protected constituency, is consistent with the requirement of justification. Each proposal of a protected constituency needs to be justified as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of the effective representation of the population in question. In the case of Nova Scotia, the justification was implied in the commission's terms of reference. The legislature clearly had decided, for example, that the effective representation of the Acadian community might well require a departure from voter parity. However, legislative terms of reference are not usually as didactic as Nova Scotia's, and commissions might arrive at such judgements on their own. If they do, then they need to be explicit about the reasons for their judgements. The entitlement system encourages such explicitness.²⁹

A second likely advantage of the requirement of justification — explicit justification — is to diminish departures from voter equality. In the harsh light of the public's gaze, only convincing and compelling justifications for abridging voter equality are likely to succeed, as opposed to weak and

uncertain ones. And this line of thought leads to the reason why the need for justification is an advantage, that is, the public legitimacy of an electoral map. Since the establishment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, Canadians have become more conscious of themselves as bearers of equal rights.³⁰ Thus, the right to vote is understood to be the right to an equal vote, or an equally-weighted vote. Those who find that the value of their vote is diminished by comparison with the vote of those in smaller constituencies need to be convinced that there are good reasons for the situation. They need to be convinced that, unless the Black voters in the Preston area comprise a protected constituency, they may never have a chance to nominate and elect someone from their own community, and therefore never attain effective representation. The public process of argument and persuasion is critical to the legitimacy of an electoral map, itself an important component of the electoral system as a whole.

Conclusion

The electoral system of territorial representation is a very old one. In a number of countries it has been superseded by systems of proportional representation (PR) designed to ensure that the vote of each individual counts equally, or contributes equally to the outcome of the electoral competition. It is unlikely that Canada will hurry to PR, and so it remains equipped with a territorial system that must be made responsive to twin *desiderata*, namely, the principle of voter equality and the claims of community of interest, including minority representation. The trouble, of course, is that these elements typically conflict with each other. By definition, a response to the claim of minority representation requires that voter equality be potentially compromised.

The Canadian Supreme Court has tried to resolve the conundrum by blending the two elements in the overall objective of effective representation. But the approach is not without its critics. For example, Ronald Fritz argues that by defining the right to vote in terms of effective representation, the court has essentially mandated the consideration of factors, like community of interest, that are exceedingly difficult to define.³¹ Robert G. Richards and Thomas Irvine disagree, arguing instead that the court simply is seeking to accommodate such factors should claims based on them arise. Still, Richards and Irvine concede that the concept of effective representation is subject to ambiguity. They point out that the court did not provide an exhaustive list of the factors justifying a departure from strict equality, nor did it indicate the outer limits, if any, of such a move.³² David Johnson, a fierce critic of the court's decision, goes much further. He argues that the concept of effective representation reflects a "pluralist" approach on the part of the court, an approach that wrongly minimizes the clear principle of voter equality while at the same time maximizing factors like geography and community of interest, which are not principles at all.³³

The critics raise important concerns about the court's concept of effective representation. Still, the concept has its defenders, among them Kent Roach, who applauds the court's appreciation of the fact that a simple one person-one vote rule can prove disadvantageous to the political representation of minorities.³⁴ Moreover, it can also be argued, as we do, that the court's approach to the matter is a creative one. It is noteworthy that the court used forward-looking language to elaborate it. Justice McLachlin wrote that non-population factors like geography, community history and minority representation might require consideration to ensure that "our legislative assemblies effectively represent the diversity of our social mosaic."³⁵ Canada's social mosaic is indeed diverse, and it can be expected that claims of minority representation will continue to be pressed. As a result, the existing system of territorial representation needs to be responsive to those claims. Otherwise, there will be demands to replace it with a different system altogether.

One proposal of many in the United States is that of Lani Guinier,³⁶ who urges abandoning the single-member district which, owing to the plurality rule, is a winner take-all system, and replacing it with a multi-member district scheme featuring preferential voting. Given that Canadians and Americans use the same type of electoral system, her position deserves consideration.

Guinier observes that electoral districting continues to under-represent racial and language minorities *despite* the availability of explicitly race-based remedies under federal law, many of which revolve around the drafting of electoral boundaries. Obviously, the federal judiciary is increasingly reluctant to resort to these remedies. And it is reluctant, she argues, because it cannot reconcile them with the principle of one vote-one value, which is thought to be race neutral. Thus, Guinier is searching, in her words, "to reconcile the race consciousness of the [federal Voting Rights] Act with the rhetoric of race-neutrality."³⁷ She hits upon the multi-member district, a system of proportional representation, precisely because it appears to dissolve the dilemma of race versus the equal vote: "Voters within that multi-seat district would essentially subdistrict themselves by the way they cast their ballots; the allocation of political power between blacks, Latinos, and whites would depend *at each election* on the organization and mobilization efforts of each group. Individual members of a racial group who did not feel aligned with that group in that particular election would be free to express their preferences by voting with other groups."³⁸

As far as the existing territorially-based system of representation is concerned, Guinier, herself, can reconcile remedies like race-based boundaries with the principle of voter equality. In her view, such remedies are the basis of real voter equality. But such a view needs demonstration, whereas the formal principle of voter equality, or one person-one vote, requires no explanation, hence its rhetorical force. Thus we return to the

entitlement-protected constituency scheme advanced in this article. The need to respond to the claims of minority representation is unlikely to abate. On the contrary, it is more likely to intensify. The mechanics of the entitlement scheme, developed to deal with these claims alongside the principle of voter equality, require that the proposals of protected constituencies be clearly and compellingly defended as a necessary condition of the effective representation of the members of the constituencies in question. In our view, the requirement of publicly defensible proposals contributes to a better understanding of the objective of effective representation, and ultimately to the legitimacy of the electoral system itself.

Notes

1. *Constitution Act, 1867*, ss. 51 and 52.
2. Keith Archer, "Conflict and Confusion in Drawing Constituency Boundaries: The Case of Alberta," *Canadian Public Policy* XIX:2 (1993), 178. Compare the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, *Final Report, Vol. 1, Reforming Electoral Democracy* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991), 144-53.
3. Given our positions on the Nova Scotia Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission, we recognize that our view of what the commission attempted to do might not be the same as the assessment of a non-participant observer. Second, the competing models of seat allocation are constructs used to highlight what we came to regard as two rather distinct approaches. In reality, of course, the differences between the variance and entitlement models might be seen more as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. A variance model with a very low \pm factor might produce a higher degree of relative parity of voting power than an entitlement model with numerous protected constituencies. However, because this article is introducing new concepts into the discussion of electoral redistributions, we think it is justifiable to present the alternatives as competing and contrasting models of seat allocation. Finally, the entitlement model approach, quite literally, "emerged" during the actual process of electoral redistribution, as a practical and pragmatic way of resolving a theoretical paradox. The application of Charter rights and Supreme Court imperatives cannot be predetermined by a precisely legislated political recipe.
4. *Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, 1986*, Chapter E-2 of the Revised Statutes of Canada 1970, as amended (Office Consolidation, published by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada), ss. 13 and 5-6.
5. The excessive pattern of malapportionment resulted from the large \pm factor of one-third, combined with its use inside county boundaries. Until the 1991-1992 redistribution in Nova Scotia, no constituency boundary had ever crossed a county boundary. Thus, counties with a low population base were greatly over-represented in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly.
6. John Courtney, "Drawing Electoral Boundaries" in A. Brian Tanguay and Alain G. Gagnon, eds., *Canadian Parties in Transition*, 2nd ed. (Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1996), 334, 336-7.
7. *Report*, 1992.
8. *Report*, 1994, 2-3.

9. The first case involved British Columbia's electoral boundary system, which the B.C. Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional in *Dixon v. British Columbia (A.G.)* (1989) 35 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273. The second and third cases involved the constitutional validity of Saskatchewan's electoral map and the general mandate of the commission that produced it. In *Reference Re Electoral Boundaries Commission Act (Sask)* (1991), 78 D.L.R. (4th) 449, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal ruled both to be unconstitutional. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which reversed the appeal court's decision in *Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask)* (1991) 81 D.L.R. (4th) 16.
10. *Reference Re Electoral Boundaries Commission Act (Sask)* (1991), 460.
11. *Ibid*, 480.
12. *Dixon v. British Columbia (A.G.)* (1989), 261-7.
13. *Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask)* (1991), 36.
14. *Ibid*.
15. See *Ibid*, where Justice McLachlin accepts the justification of geographic obstacles to effective representation. The decision is reviewed critically by David Johnson in his "Canadian Electoral Boundaries and the Courts: Practices, Principles and Problems," *McGill Law Journal*, Vol. 39 (1994), 224-247.
16. Nova Scotia, *Report*, 1991, 7. While it is not entirely clear why the Select Committee on Establishing an Electoral Boundaries Commission did not specify either a specific rural/urban split or a precise \pm factor, our interpretation is as follows. The work of the Select Committee was close to completion, with its mandate specifying a report to the Nova Scotia House of Assembly by June 14, 1991, or as soon as possible thereafter. Public hearings began on May 28. The *Carter* decision of June 6, 1991 had to be "grafted on" to the existing report in such a way as to avoid a constitutional challenge. Since it was unclear what the impact of *Carter* would be, the Select Committee avoided the issues of a specific rural-urban split or a precise \pm factor.
17. *Ibid*, 6-7.
18. *Ibid*, 7-8.
19. Stewart Hyson has written a valuable comparative account of recent developments related to electoral boundaries in the three Maritime provinces. See his "The Electoral Boundary Revolution in the Maritime Provinces," *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 25, Nos. 2 and 3 (1995), 285-299.
20. In fact, when the actual 1991 figures were later released, the province-wide population estimate for Nova Scotia based on the 1986 census and the actual 1991 numbers were almost identical: 899,900 versus 899,942, respectively.
21. The entitlement model was created by Mr. Alan Hall, who served as the Research Officer for the Nova Scotia Provincial Electoral Boundaries Commission. Mr. Hall was seconded to the Nova Scotia Commission by the Office of the Chief Election Officer of Ontario.
22. The initial allocation of three additional seats for Halifax County might seem at odds with the seat entitlement of the County as shown in Table One. Why would Halifax County not get five additional seats? The Commission believed that the final total for Halifax County could only be determined after other crucial decisions had been made. Moreover, while the Commission had no predetermined rural-urban split, most of the seats in Halifax County in the urban areas of Halifax, Dartmouth, Cole Harbour, Sackville, and Bedford would be somewhat larger in population size than their rural counterparts, thus reducing the number of seats to be added for Halifax County. Although it is difficult to calculate the number of additional seats precisely, because county boundary lines were crossed in several

constituencies, Halifax County, in fact, gained almost four seats in the redistribution.

23. *Report*, 1992, 24.
24. *Ibid.*
25. For recent evidence, see Charles Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 4 (1996), 794-812. It should be stressed that the Preston constituency in Nova Scotia, in contrast to the American practice of majority-minority districts, only encourages minority representation. This point has been misunderstood by a number of observers, including several editorials in Canada's so-called national newspaper, *The Globe and Mail*. For the debate surrounding the Preston riding, see the following sources: Editorial, *The Globe and Mail* (May 27, 1993: A16): "The Politics of Colour"; Editorial, *The Globe and Mail* (July 3, 1993: D6): "Gerrymandering by Race and Place"; Charles Saunders, "Canada's Irrational Newspaper," *The Daily News* (July 12, 1993: p. 14).
26. All three major parties (Tory, Liberal, NDP) nominated members of the Black community. In addition, a member of the White community (and former Tory) also ran as an independent. The election result was a victory for the Liberal party's candidate, Wayne Adams, who became the first member of the Black community elected to the legislature and, shortly thereafter, the first Black selected for the Nova Scotia cabinet.
27. *Report*, 1992, 30, 34-35.
28. *Ibid.*, 32-33. The legislation implementing the 1992 provincial electoral redistribution (Bill Number 203, "An Act to Amend Chapter 210 of the Revised Statutes, 1989, The House of Assembly Act") did contain, in section 6, a declaration indicating that the House "hereby declares its intention to include as an additional member a person who represents the Mi'kmaq people, such member to be chosen and to sit in a manner and upon terms agreed to and approved by representatives of the Mi'kmaq people."
29. Janet Hiebert makes a similar argument in favour of the need for explicit justification, albeit in connection with a different issue, namely, the limitations clause of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She urges legislators to be clear and open about their reasons for choosing to limit rights or freedoms in the name of a particular policy objective. See her *Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of Judicial Review* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).
30. Alan Cairns elaborates this point with great insight. See his "Constitutional Minoritarianism in Canada" in Douglas E. Williams, ed., *Reconfigurations. Canadian Citizenship and Constitutional Change. Selected Essays by Alan C. Cairns* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, Inc., 1995), 119-141.
31. Ronald E. Fritz, "The Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Case and Its Implications," pp. 70-89 in John C. Courtney et al., *Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts, and Electoral Values* (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Fifth House Publishers, 1992).
32. Robert G. Richards and Thomas Irvine, "Drawing Boundaries: The Saskatchewan Case," pp. 48-69 in John C. Courtney et al., *Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts and Electoral Values* (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Fifth House Publishers, 1992).
33. David Johnson, "Canadian Electoral Boundaries and the Courts: Practices, Principles and Problems," *McGill Law Journal*, Volume 39 (1994), 224-247.

34. Kent Roach, "Chartering The Electoral Map into the Future," pp. 200-219 in John C. Courtney et al., *Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts, and Electoral Values* (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Fifth House Publishers, 1992), pp. 200-219, Roach also argues that the court's decision is consistent with the country's antimajoritarian electoral traditions and its present minoritarian political culture.
35. *Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask)* (1991), 36.
36. The nomination of Lani Guinier to the position of Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division in the American Justice Department by President Bill Clinton in 1993 brought her views on electoral redistricting to the forefront. Having written widely on this issue as a Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, Lani Guinier's views on minority representation became a means by her critics to derail her nomination, which they did when President Clinton later withdrew her nomination. Ms. Guinier was dubbed the "quota queen," because of her proposals for minority representation.
37. "[E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 108 (1994), 137. See also Lani Guinier, *The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1994).
38. *Ibid*, 136.

William Cross

**The Conflict Between Participatory and
Accommodative Politics:
The Case for Stronger Parties**

Abstract

This article argues that the traditional Canadian political parties have emphasized their role as consensus-builders at the expense of offering meaningful participation in intra-party affairs to their grassroots activists. Two results of this are: 1) considerable voter dissatisfaction with public decision-making processes; and, 2) voter rejection of consensuses that result from elite-dominated decision-making. Using data collected from a national mail survey of party riding association presidents, this article illustrates how the brokerage parties offer little opportunity for meaningful grassroots participation in candidate nomination, leadership selection and policy study and development. It contends that political parties can increase opportunity for meaningful participation in these areas without jeopardizing their consensus-building capacity. Finally, the Reform Party is shown to differ significantly from the brokerage parties in terms of both the quality and quantity of grassroots participation.

Résumé

Cet article soutient que les partis politiques canadiens traditionnels ont valorisé leur capacité de dégager des consensus aux dépens d'une participation significative de leurs militants de la base à leurs affaires de politique interne. Il en a résulté deux conséquences : 1) un mécontentement considérable de l'électorat envers les processus de prise de décision politique; et 2) le rejet par l'électorat de consensus résultant d'une prise de décision dominée par l'élite politique. Au moyen de données recueillies dans le cadre d'un sondage postal national mené auprès de présidents d'associations de comté de divers partis politiques, l'article montre que les partis de médiation n'offrent que peu d'occasions à leurs militants de la base de participer véritablement aux investitures, au choix du chef et à l'étude et l'élaboration des politiques. Il soutient que les partis politiques pourraient permettre à leurs militants d'exercer davantage d'influence dans ces secteurs sans pour autant compromettre leur capacité de dégager des consensus. Enfin, il montre que le Parti réformiste se démarque clairement des partis de médiation au plan tant de la qualité que de l'ampleur de la participation de la base.

Introduction¹

Much of the recent conflict surrounding Canadian democratic practice results from differing views concerning the primary objective of public decision-making. There appears to be two competing views: 1) that the primary emphasis should be on accommodation and consensus-building; and 2) that the decision-making process should be participatory and its outcomes reflect the majority opinion. This article refers to these two perspectives of public decision-making as accommodative and participatory, respectively.

In the Canadian experience, these two perspectives have often been viewed as competing in something approaching a zero sum game (i.e., accommodation is gained at the expense of participation and vice versa). The result has been the development of an elite-dominated political process in which average citizens are given little opportunity for meaningful participation.

While successful governance in Canada unquestionably requires accommodation, whether this is possible in the absence of ongoing opportunity for meaningful citizen participation is doubtful — especially in regard to participatory opportunities that have real influence on policy outcomes. Consensuses reached through methods of elite accommodation are increasingly viewed as illegitimate by Canadian voters. At the same time, the definitive participatory method — the referendum — offers too few possibilities for the necessary consensus-building. Thus, the challenge is to develop political practices that both facilitate accommodation and encourage meaningful public participation. While many will argue correctly that this inevitably makes it more difficult to reach a consensus, recent evidence suggests that voters will accept nothing less than these hard-won accommodations.

While efforts to increase meaningful public participation in policy making may involve an array of reforms, including changes to parliamentary practice and structure, new institutions such as constituent assemblies and reforms to the electoral process, this paper concentrates on the role of the political parties.

Political parties may be the best existing institutions for combining mass participation into consensus-building activities. The traditional Canadian brokerage parties have been the principal entities capable of bridging the many different interests, particularly those of region and language, found in Canada. Consensus-building is not an integral function of interest groups, the courts or the civil service, all alternative avenues of participation and of influence on public policy. Because parties seek to govern, and because governance in Canada requires building accommodative bridges, the traditional parties expend great effort in uniting divergent interests.²

As the traditional brokerage parties are increasingly challenged by other groups and emerging parties, their prominence in the political process is undermined and with it the brokering of interests that they facilitate. As citizens demand more effective participation and seek it outside of the traditional parties, the legitimacy of the parties and the results of their efforts at elite accommodation are jeopardized. Thus, the argument to strengthen the participatory capacities of political parties is justified not only in its own right but also in order to increase the legitimacy of the parties' efforts at accommodation.

The parties are easily accessible to voters. Party constituency associations exist in every riding and are run by local citizens who are not likely intimidating to voters. This apparent easy accessibility notwithstanding, this article argues that the traditional Canadian parties have purposefully offered little opportunity for meaningful participation for fear that it would undermine their elite dominated, consensus-building activities.

In order to examine how opportunities for voter participation might increase without diminishing the parties' accommodative capacities, this article surveys three primary areas of party life: leadership selection, candidate nomination and policy study and development. The existing literature concerning these activities is drawn upon and supported by data the author collected from a survey of local party associations following the 1993 election. Party constituency association presidents from the three parties that received the most votes — the Liberals, Reform and Progressive Conservatives (PCs) — were surveyed.³ The data gathered is unique in that it provides not only quantitative information but qualitative information concerning the association presidents' views on the effectiveness of their members' participation.⁴

The Participation – Accommodation Dilemma

Canadian politics and political parties have traditionally been described in terms consistent with the accommodative model. Siegfried was among the first to observe how Canadian parties lacked strong ideological foundations, shifted policy positions rather routinely and sought power by stitching together coalitions crossing a strong “racial” divide.⁵ Siegfried identifies ethnicity and religion as the principal factors in Canadian politics and as the primary chasms that parties have to bridge in order to achieve electoral success. Dawson, in his classic treatise on Canadian government, concurs with these observations as he describes parties as brokers that attempt to accommodate the interests of dissident, often regionally based, forces.⁶ As Thorburn observes, this brokering of interests has traditionally taken place among elites within each parties' leadership.⁷

Many of the traits of the participatory model are also present in Canada. Virtually all adult Canadians are able to vote in federal elections and the

votes cast are meaningful in that they determine which political party forms the government.⁸ The essential shortcoming of the Canadian process, from a participatory perspective, is the weak connection between the opinions expressed by voters and public policy outcomes.

Strong evidence suggests that Canadians are dissatisfied with the current relationship. The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Royal Commission) found evidence that “many Canadians are critical of their existing political institutions. Many are concerned that these institutions are not sufficiently responsive to their views and interests.”⁹ Polling numbers recounted in a study by Dobell and Berry substantiate these findings, leading the study’s authors to conclude that:

If Canadians have traditionally been Burkeans inclined to invest power and responsibility in their elected representatives, they appear now to be becoming Jeffersonians, constitutionally distrustful of government and insistent that their representatives respond more sensitively and directly to the voice of the people.¹⁰

Seidle points to the 1993 federal election result as evidence of voters’ dissatisfaction with existing political practices.¹¹ He concurs with the argument that these sentiments are substantially the result of an increasing concern by voters that policy outcomes and governmental actions are inconsistent with their wishes. Seidle concludes that government must consult the public more frequently to restore voter confidence in our public institutions.¹²

Cairns refers to the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords as important events in fuelling this voter disillusionment. During these two rounds of constitutional negotiations, voters strongly and openly questioned the legitimacy of behind-closed-doors decision-making by governmental representatives with little or no allowance for public consultation and functional representation. The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Cairns claims, encourages Canadians to view themselves as both individuals and as members of non-territorial, functional groups who do not see themselves represented in first ministers’ meetings.¹³ In the forum of constitution-building, closed, elite-dominated politics are being challenged as illegitimate.

Cairns has further noted that these sentiments extend beyond the constitutional realm. In an article considering various explanations for the 1993 federal election result, Cairns mentions a rejection of elite-dominated brokerage politics and a desire by voters to play a more participatory role in public decision-making as two important contributing phenomena.¹⁴

One method of ensuring a stronger connection between voters’ desires and policy outcomes would be to use methods of direct democracy more often. Evidence points to substantial public support for increased use of referenda and citizens’ initiative.¹⁵

Lemieux has argued that referenda are sometimes needed to determine the public will on policy issues as “an election does not permit citizens to express their opinions on specific problems.”¹⁶ Others such as Morton explain support for direct democracy as based upon a fear that the will of the people is thwarted in representative democracy by “moneyed powers and privileged interests.”¹⁷

Many analysts, however, reject increased use of direct democracy in Canada. The Royal Commission, after noting the rise in public support for direct democracy, dissents on accommodative grounds, “[a]lthough the instruments of direct democracy may provide citizens with more opportunities to express policy preferences...they are far less suited to accommodating and representing the many different interests of citizens. Effective reconciliation of these interests is crucial for any democratic government.”¹⁸

In the 1978 debate in the House of Commons concerning the Canada Referendum Act, several speakers raised concern that the increased use of direct democracy would result in a more divided populace. Much of the opposition to the increased use of referenda was stated in accommodative terms, including that of PC MP Flora MacDonald who argued that referenda serve only to further divide citizens;¹⁹ and NDP Leader Ed Broadbent who argued that as elected representatives “it is our responsibility to face immensely complicated issues and to work out answers and compromises, because that is essential in a democracy, and normally referenda do not provide for compromise.”²⁰

None of the Canadian experiences of national referenda offer any evidence of direct democracy bringing Canadians together. Rather, they illustrate the referendum’s proclivity to focus on existing differences rather than build bridges between them. All three Canadian experiences with national referenda support this contention: prohibition in 1898, conscription in 1942 and the Constitution in 1992.²¹ This characteristic of referenda supports the common criticism that direct democracy is completely driven by the principle of majority rule at the expense of consensus-building.²²

The regional and linguistic tensions that initially made accommodative politics necessary in Canada remain strong today. The continued success of the Parti Québécois and Bloc Québécois, and of the Reform Party in Western Canada, illustrates the ongoing salience of regional and linguistic differences. At the same time, the traditional, accommodative practices are found widely lacking in effective participatory opportunities. Likewise, instruments of direct democracy are not subtle enough to find common interest among Canada’s disparate communities.

Such is the dilemma facing reformers of the Canadian political system: a need to increase the effectiveness of citizen participation while preserving,

and perhaps strengthening, the political system's ability to reconcile regional and ethnic differences in pursuit of the national interest.

Parties' Capacities to Bridge Participatory and Accommodative Decision-Making

Students of the political process have long attributed a participatory role to parties. The Royal Commission made a convincing argument for parties as the primary political actors in Canadian democracy. Consistent with much of the literature in the field, the Commission argued that one of the fundamental responsibilities of parties is to channel public opinion from voters to the political elites.²³ This area is where the parties have largely failed — by ignoring citizen demands for greater participation — thereby fuelling the voter angst outlined above. As Brodie and Jenson suggest, the brokerage parties have been slow in responding to “increasing demands for the democratization of politics.”²⁴

The data collected for this paper indicate that the traditional parties offer their membership little opportunity for meaningful participation in three key areas of party activity: candidate nomination, leadership selection and policy study and development. The parties' concern with preserving their accommodative capacity is largely responsible for this.

The Reform Party, affirmatively uninterested in the politics of accommodation and with a platform calling for more frequent use of participatory methods such as referenda, is in fact quite different in terms of both the quality and quantity of the participatory opportunities it offers its grassroots supporters. Of course, this likely relates to the fact that the Reform party had little or no chance of forming a government after the 1993 election. Duverger among others has illustrated how parties with no reasonable chance of forming a government are traditionally more amenable to offering meaningful participatory opportunities to their grassroots because they are unlikely to later face a conflict between their members' views and those of the government.²⁵ As Reform becomes entrenched as a parliamentary party and sets its sights on forming a government, it will be interesting to observe whether it can remain true to its roots in this regard.

Candidate Nomination

Candidate nomination is a central feature of party democracy. The nomination process has the potential to be easily accessible to party members since it occurs at the riding level. Given that all of the evidence indicates that voters choose among the nominated candidates primarily on the basis of party affiliation, the nomination contest offers the only opportunity for voters to express their opinion on the type of person they want to be their MP and, more importantly, the type of relationship they want with their representative. MPs play a role, through the party caucuses,

in determining party policy; on the government side, they form the body from which the cabinet is selected. The nature of the nomination process influences the relative importance of MPs in the policy process — the more participatory the process, the greater the MPs' influence.

Candidate nominations offer little opportunity for meaningful participation by the grassroots party membership. Several factors support this conclusion: 1) a large portion of nominations are uncontested; 2) the central parties are playing an increasingly important role in the selection process; 3) policy positions are virtually unimportant in the selection of candidates; and 4) the costs of participation are high.

In almost half of all associations, voters had no choice in selecting their local candidate. One-fifth of 1993 Reform nominations were uncontested compared with one-half of PC and Liberal nominations. The difference between the three parties largely results from their different number of incumbent candidates. As illustrated in Table 1, incumbent candidates are rarely challenged. This norm presents the largest obstacle to increasing the number of contested nominations.

Table 1

Percentage of contested nominations for associations with and without an incumbent MP seeking renomination by party affiliation. N=392.

	Liberal	PCs	Reform
Incumbent MP seeking renomination	13%	5%	0%
No incumbent MP seeking renomination	66%	73%	80%
Overall	52%	41%	80%

The 1993 election marked a rise in the use of central party authority in the nominating process. By virtue of 1970 amendments to the *Canada Elections Act*, party leaders have ultimate authority over the selection of local candidates.²⁶ This power was used by all three parties in 1993. Kim Campbell refused the nominations of three incumbent MPs who were charged with criminal offenses related to their service as MPs.²⁷ Liberal Leader Chrétien both refused some prospective candidates the right to run,²⁸ and in 14 ridings appointed the party's candidate without a vote of the local membership.²⁹

The Reform Party has effectively stripped its leader of the power to veto nominations and vested such power in the party's Executive Council.³⁰ In 1993, the Council refused the nomination of the Don Valley West riding association's chosen candidate, former PC MP John Gamble, arguing that

he was too right-wing for the party.³¹ In all, one-quarter of associations report some central party interference in their candidate selection process.

Chrétien justified his appointment of candidates as a measure aimed at increasing female representation in the Liberal Caucus.³² This rationale is consistent with the accommodative tenet that all significant societal groups must be represented in the decision-making bodies — caucus and cabinet. It reflects an evolution in the conception of which groups are significant, as the representation of women in caucus and cabinet was not believed necessary until relatively recently. The appointment of Marcel Massé (Hull-Aylmer) reflects the more traditional concern with representation of Francophone federalists within the government.

The data do not clearly show that appointment is necessary to increase the number of female candidates. While it is true that far fewer women than men challenge nomination contests,³³ women who seek nominations fare well — at least in the Liberal and PC parties. In 69 percent of the PC associations in which a woman sought the nomination, one was nominated; the same is true for 64 percent of Liberal and 35 percent of Reform associations. This finding is consistent with that of Carty and Erickson who found that women were nominated in 61 percent of the 1988 contests they entered.³⁴ Thus, with no evidence that women are discriminated against by local party members in nomination contests, the objective of having more women candidates can be met by encouraging more women to seek nominations — without eliminating the right of local activists to choose their own candidate.

Little in the voter nomination process makes it relevant to public policy outcomes. The traditional parties, to avoid adversely affecting subsequent consensus-building practices, make little effort to increase the importance of policy in nomination contests. The nomination process offers party members scant opportunity to consider the various policy positions of candidates before the nominating election. With small difference among parties, three-quarters of associations with competitive 1993 nominations report that policy differences played no role in their nomination contests. In the Liberal and PC parties, policy differences were side-stepped as a majority of local associations with contested nominations did not hold a candidates' debate. The Reform Party differs significantly in this regard considering that four-fifths of its associations with contested nominations held candidate debates. Reform Party members are often able to question the candidates directly during these events — in sharp contrast to the prepared speeches of Liberal and PC candidates at their nomination meetings.

The timing of nomination campaigns further obscures the role of policy issues. Nomination meetings are usually held before a federal election is called.³⁵ This means that nomination campaigns often take place up to a year before the general election — before the campaign's key policy issues

are decided. Similarly, one-half of local party associations require that nomination voters belong to the party for at least one month prior to the nomination contest. Potential voters whose interest is captivated during the nomination contest cannot vote unless they joined the party at least a month earlier—often before the public phase of nomination campaigns begins.³⁶

The brokerage parties have little interest in having members nominated on the basis of their individual policy preferences. Important government decisions are largely made by the cabinet, whereas a caucus filled with individual members practicing the participatory-style politics of representing their constituents' interests could undermine the traditional practice of elite-accommodation.

Few Canadians participate in nomination votes. Half of all associations reported 200 or fewer participants at their 1993 nomination meetings. This is not surprising considering that voters must first join the party (subject to a membership fee) and then spend an evening at a nomination meeting in order to participate. As long as few voters participate in nomination contests and these contests are removed from policy, individual MPs have little legitimacy to claim a mandate from their constituents on any specific policy issue—a result favoured by the traditional parties.

Leadership Selection

Leadership selection is one of the most important and consequential functions of Canadian political parties. Leaders dominate the political campaigns, largely determine which issues will be discussed during the course of campaigns, have significant influence over their party's parliamentary agenda and, when forming a government, become Prime Minister and select cabinet members. It is difficult to argue that the identity, and thus the policy preferences, of a party leader (particularly the Prime Minister) does not have an important affect on public policy.

In establishing a benchmark, this discussion considers opportunities for meaningful grassroots participation within the traditional leadership convention. This leader selection method is one source of dissatisfaction among party members with existing participatory opportunities.³⁷

Only a few thousand party members actually attend leadership conventions and cast votes for their preferred candidate.³⁸ The primary method of participation available to most party members is participation in delegate selection meetings. As illustrated in Table 2, relatively few voters participate in these meetings. In one-half of local associations, less than 100 members attended the most recent delegate selection meetings, and the mean attendance was just slightly over 200. Only three percent of associations had more than 1,000 members participate.

Table 2

Mean and median attendance numbers at delegate selection meetings by party affiliation for the 1990 Liberal and 1993 PC leadership contests.
 N=228.

	Mean	Median
Liberals	266	150
PCs	142	100
Overall	206	100

Because delegate selection has virtually nothing to do with policy preferences, participation in these meetings is not very meaningful. Party members have no opportunity to vote directly for their preferred leadership candidate. In one-fifth of Liberal and PC associations, delegate candidates do not even disclose which leadership candidate they prefer prior to the selection of delegates.³⁹ As illustrated in Table 3, even in those associations where it is customary for delegate candidates to disclose which leadership candidate they prefer, this information is not a particularly significant factor in the selection of delegates.

Table 3

Association presidents' view of which factor is most consequential in determining which delegate candidates are chosen to attend a leadership convention by party affiliation. Actual number and column percentages reported. N=240.

	Liberals	PCs	Totals
Length of time delegate candidate has been a party member	8 6%	5 5%	13 5%
Declared support for a leadership candidate	44 33%	25 23%	69 29%
Number of new party members signed up	19 14%	20 19%	39 16%
How active the delegate candidate has been in party affairs	61 46%	58 54%	119 50%
Total	132	108	240

The weakness in the relationship between voting for delegate candidates and preferring particular leadership candidates may partly result from a lack of information concerning the leadership candidates available to party

activists at the time of delegate selection. While parties now routinely sponsor debates among their leadership hopefuls, they are normally held after the selection of delegates. In 1990, the Liberals held four of their six leadership debates after local associations began selecting their delegates. In 1993, after much internal party discussion over timing, two of five PC leadership debates were held during the delegate selection period and the other three afterwards. Unsurprisingly, only one-quarter of Liberal and PC presidents strongly agree with the following statement: “A leadership candidate’s policy positions play a significant role in the outcome of our local association’s election for leadership convention delegates.”

A majority of association presidents in all three parties support strengthening the connection between party members’ leadership preferences and the selection of a leader. Half of Liberals, two-thirds of Reformers, and three-quarters of PCs believe that their parties should replace the delegate convention method of leadership selection with election by a direct vote of all party members. These findings help to explain recent decisions by the three parties to adopt varying forms of direct election procedures for selecting their future leaders.⁴⁰

Support for direct election can be seen as a movement toward more participatory decision-making. In direct election processes, leadership candidates address their campaign communications to the party membership at large. Policy debates occur before party members cast their ballots, and the expression of leadership preference is not clouded by other issues such as preference for particular convention delegates.

The principal opposition to direct election has centered around a concern for maintaining the consensus-building possibilities of a convention. Two specific concerns from an accommodative view have been raised by opponents of direct election. Firstly, some party members contend that more voters from a particular region will participate in direct elections, thereby threatening the convention practice of ensuring equitable voting representation for all regions.⁴¹

The PCs considered this dilemma when adopting direct election. Concern was expressed that a purely direct election would deny sufficient voice to regional and linguistic interests in areas where the party was not strong and would not likely attract large numbers of voters. The PCs were concerned that candidates in a direct election would neither spend sufficient time attempting to understand the concerns of Québécois nor work towards building electoral strength in the province because the time and resources involved would not likely be rewarded with commensurate leadership votes. To address this concern, the party adopted rules providing for the allocation of an equal number of votes to each riding and for those votes to be cast in proportion to the preferences of voters within the riding.

The second concern is the lack of opportunity that direct election processes offer for brokering interests and consensus-building. This

concern revolves around the lack of opportunity for face-to-face discussion among voters while making the leadership decision. Convention delegates mingle in the same hotels and convention halls for several days, sharing opinions on the leadership candidates in both formal and informal meetings. Delegates have the opportunity to hear and consider the concerns of others from different socio-economic backgrounds and from different regions of the country. When voting day arrives, all delegates assemble in one hall, and a sense of collective decision-making can develop. In parties with deep regional, linguistic or rural/urban cleavages, the loss of this collective decision-making opportunity may seriously thwart attempts to build consensus.

Without the opportunities provided by the convention, leadership voters are unlikely to have as much opportunity to assess a candidates' responsiveness to regional interests. For example, the relatively high number of PC delegates concerned with regional inclusiveness at the 1983 convention, 45 percent,⁴² likely related to John Crosbie's difficulty in attracting Quebec support. While English-speaking Canadians may not have shared the concerns of Quebec delegates, the convention highlighted Crosbie's deficiencies and certainly brought them into focus for many delegates.

Policy Study and Development

To some extent, all parties attempt to communicate directly with their members on policy questions and to give them a formal role in their policy-making process. These efforts can range from encouraging their membership to consider policy issues to holding policy conferences where membership representatives determine party policy.

The data illustrate significant differences between the three parties in both the opportunities afforded activists and the activists' opinions as to the effectiveness of their participation. Generally, Reform Party members are given more opportunity to participate in policy study and development, and believe that they play a more significant role in developing their party's policy positions than do activists in the two old-line parties.

One-half of PC, one-third of Liberal and only one in ten local Reform associations report holding no events in a typical year at which a substantial amount of time is devoted to policy study. A majority of riding presidents in the Liberal and PC parties indicate that their members are not satisfied with the opportunities available to them for policy study, and more than four-fifths indicate that their members would like to spend more time considering matters of public policy.

A significant reason why many local party associations spend such little time and effort on considering public policy issues appears related to their perception that these efforts have no effective impact on their parties' policy decisions. A majority of PC associations report having no

mechanism to allow local associations to contribute their views on policy matters to their national party, compared to one-third of Liberals and only 5 percent of Reformers.

The variance in the responses likely results from differing views concerning the receptiveness of party officials to the policy opinions of local activists. These differences emerge in answers to a series of Likert scale questions. For example, 9 out of 10 Reform presidents believe their national party carefully considered the views of local associations like theirs in drafting its 1993 election platform, compared to one-half of Liberals and only one in 20 PCs.⁴³ The Reform Party has placed explicit priority on communication between its national office and its membership. The party constitution establishes an “Executive Council– Party Caucus Liaison Committee.” This committee’s mandate is to “ensure a close and harmonious working relationship between the Reform Party grassroots membership and the caucus of Reformers elected to the House of Commons.”⁴⁴

As Table 4 illustrates, a significant, positive relationship exists between an association’s perception of whether its national party considers the views of local associations and the frequency with which local activists meet to discuss policy issues. When party affiliation is controlled for, this relationship remains meaningful.

Table 4

The number of yearly meetings sponsored by local party associations for policy study and development, by response to “Our national party carefully considered the views of local associations like ours in the drafting of its 1993 election platform.” Actual cases and column percentages reported. N=387.

	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Undecided	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
6 or more	24 24%	14 15%	3 9%	5 9%	8 8%
4-5	12 12%	9 10%	6 17%	2 4%	3 3%
2-3	33 32%	24 25%	4 11%	12 21%	16 16%
1	22 22%	22 23%	9 26%	14 25%	24 24%
0	11 11%	26 27%	13 37%	23 41%	48 49%
Totals	102	95	35	56	99

chi square = 58.56 significance = .000 gamma = .36

All three parties hold conventions at which, to varying degrees, policy matters are discussed and voted upon by the membership. Reform respondents universally agreed that their association's delegates found these meetings worthwhile and believed that their opinions were carefully considered, compared to three-quarters of Liberals and less than one-half of PCs. These findings likely reflect the varying effectiveness of policy conventions in setting party policy. As a non-government party, Reform has been more successful than its competitors in establishing an effective voice for its membership in policy development.

These findings likely also reflect the significant efforts of individual Reform MPs to gather the views of their constituents on specific policy questions. These measures have included using the Internet to poll constituents, using telephone technology to have voters register their opinion on specific issues, and purchasing time on cable television to air debates on issues and encouraging viewers to telephone in their views after the program.⁴⁵

Activists would likely challenge elite accommodation processes resulting in outcomes that differ from those arrived at by an engaged party membership. In order to prevent these difficult situations that undermine their consensus-building capacity, the data indicate that the brokerage parties have largely ignored their grassroots membership in the policy development process.

Conclusion

Both the secondary data reviewed and the survey findings clearly show that a substantial number of voters are suspicious of elite-driven accommodative processes and would prefer to engage in more participatory activity. Given the low level of meaningful participatory opportunities currently afforded political party members, it is easy to imagine ways in which the parties might offer more participatory opportunities. The real challenge is for parties to do so without diminishing their capacity for consensus-building.

A successful example of a party uniting more effective voter participation with opportunity for consensus-building is the case of leadership selection in the Ontario Liberal Party. The party has adopted a hybrid system of leadership selection — using the direct election principle while maintaining the leadership convention. In this process, all party members vote for both convention delegates and for their preferred leadership candidate. The leadership choice is then made at a convention where delegates are compelled, on the first ballot, to vote in accordance with the views expressed by local party members. The possibility for accommodation exists in subsequent balloting when delegates are freed from the obligation to reflect local sentiment.

Not burdened by a desire to broker regional interests into national consensus, the Reform Party has led the way in exploring how grassroots activists may participate directly in the policy development process. By doing so, Reform MPs are acknowledging their interest in determining and then reflecting the views of their constituents within Parliament. In contrast, a large majority of PC activists believed that their party was completely uninterested in their policy preferences prior to the 1993 election.

Certainly, a middle ground exists. Parties can involve their grassroots in meaningful policy discussions without completely abandoning their representative responsibilities. Most issues do not jeopardize national unity and, even if they did, all concerned would benefit from more comprehensive, ongoing communications between MPs, party officials and voters. Such processes would likely have greater legitimacy, making the resulting compromises more acceptable to voters.

Some movement has been made in this direction. Direct election of party leaders is clearly a step toward enhanced participation. As well, all parties now routinely issue detailed policy booklets during election campaigns, and the public increasingly looks to these as a contract between voters and their elected representatives. Perhaps responding to the electoral success of the Reform Party, the PCs have made some further steps in this direction. The party established a President's Council in 1995 with its principal mission to facilitate communication between the grassroots and the national office. The party has also considered establishing a permanent policy foundation to encourage ongoing policy discussion among the grassroots membership.⁴⁶

Making political parties more participatory will not completely restore voter confidence in Canadian political practices and institutions. The data presented in this paper, however, illustrate how Canadian parties have traditionally been concerned with accommodative practices at the expense of meaningful citizen participation. Reinvigorating our political parties is one significant step toward offering voters more meaningful participatory opportunities in public life.

Elkins has suggested that parties cannot solve our national unity problems, and that if we expect them to be confederal and to represent both sides of our fundamental cleavages, they are doomed to failure.⁴⁷ Surely he is right, insofar as the parties cannot themselves create national unity through the practices of elite accommodation. However, if our parties become more participatory and responsive while maintaining an ability to accommodate interests, the outcomes will likely be seen as more legitimate. If meaningful public participation significantly influences the actions of elites and makes the accommodative processes more transparent, voters will likely have more confidence in those processes and their outcomes.

The reason Canadians ask so much from their parties is because there are no alternative institutions more capable of succeeding at their difficult tasks.

Notes

1. The author wishes to thank R. Kenneth Carty, S.J.R. Noel, Lisa Young and the journal's anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Funding in support of this research was received from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada in the form of a post-doctoral fellowship.
2. See for example, Mildred Schwartz, *Public Opinion and Canadian Identity* (Scarborough, Ontario: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1967). Schwartz writes that: "It is political parties in a homogenous society which may overcome the critical cleavages and help build a sense of national identity," 127.
3. Alternatively a sample might have been drawn of all party members. This, however, was impossible as the Liberal and PC parties had no centralized membership lists (the PCs now do). And even if this was possible the information received would not likely be useful as many party members join solely to attend a candidate nomination meeting or delegate selection meeting and would not have a good sense of the association's activities. Given the commitment that association presidents have made to their party, any impact of this sampling decision should be in favour of the parties.
4. A mail survey was administered in January 1995. Four hundred completed surveys were received for a response rate of 52 percent. Respondent associations are representative in terms of their performance in the 1993 election. Responses for all three parties were received from all provinces, though the response rate was lower for associations in the province of Quebec than for those in English-speaking Canada.
5. André Siegfried, *The Race Question in Canada*, Frank A. Underhill, ed., (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966, original 1904). Consistent with the language of the day, Siegfried describes the cleavage between English-speaking and French-speaking Canada, as a "racial" divide.
6. R. MacGregor Dawson, *The Government of Canada*, revised by Norman Ward, (6th ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 7.
7. Hugh G. Thorburn, ed., *Party Politics in Canada* (6th ed.; Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1991), 2.
8. For a discussion of how votes cast translate into seats in Parliament, see Alan C. Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1 (1968), 55-80.
9. *Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing*, volume 2 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 229.
10. Peter Dobell and Byron Berry, "Anger at the System: What Canadians Think About Their Political System," *Parliamentary Government* 39 (1992), 3-20, 19.
11. F. Leslie Seidle, "The Angry Citizenry: Examining Representation and Responsiveness in Government," *Policy Options* 15:6 (1994), 75-80.
12. *Ibid.* Similar conclusions are reached in a study conducted by Blais and Gidengil for the Royal Commission. They found that 70 percent of Canadians agree with the statement, "I don't think that the government cares much what people like me think." This is a significant increase from the 49 percent who felt this way in 1965. An even higher 79 percent agreed that "[g]enerally, those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people." This marks a 19 point increase from 1965. André

- Blais and Elisabeth Gidengil, *Making Representative Democracy Work: The Views of Canadians* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991).
13. Alan C. Cairns, "Citizens (Outsiders) and Government (Insiders) in Constitution-Making: The Case of Meech Lake," *Canadian Public Policy*, special edition (1988), 121-145.
 14. Alan C. Cairns, "An Election to be Remembered: Canada 1993," *Canadian Public Policy* 20 (1994), 219-234.
 15. For example, British Columbia voters overwhelmingly endorsed the use of referendum and citizen initiative in an advisory referendum on 17 October 1991. In response to the question: "Should voters be given the right, by legislation, to propose questions that the government of British Columbia must submit to voters by referendum?" 83 percent voted yes. See Norman Ruff, "Institutionalizing Populism in British Columbia," *Canadian Parliamentary Review* 4 (1993-94), 24-32.
 16. Vincent Lemieux, "The Referendum and Canadian Democracy," in Peter AuCoin, ed., *Institutional Reforms for Representative Government* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 111-159, 111.
 17. W.L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 15.
 18. *Report of the Royal Commission*, volume 2, 229.
 19. *House of Commons Debates*, 1978, volume 2, 12 December, 2039.
 20. *Ibid*, 2043.
 21. A good discussion of the tensions between English- and French-speaking Canada over the conscription issue is found in Bruce Hutchison, *The Incredible Canadian: A Candid Portrait of Mackenzie King, His Work, His Times and His Nation* (Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1952).
 22. For a discussion of this, see Thomas Cronin, *Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
 23. See, for example, William M. Chandler and Allen Siaroff, "Parties and Party Government in Advanced Democracies," in Herman Bakvis, ed., *Canadian Political Parties: Leaders, Candidates and Organization* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 191-263; Anthony King, "Political Parties in Western Democracies," *Polity* 2 (1969), 111-41; and Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
 24. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen: Stability and Change in Brokerage Politics," in A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds., *Canadian Parties in Transition*, 2nd edition (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1996), 52-72, 67.
 25. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (London: Methuen, 1964).
 26. *Canada Election Act*, sections 81.(1)(h) and 82.(1).
 27. The three MPs were Gilles Bernier, Carole Jacques and Gabriel Fontaine. See "Campbell Won't Sign Nomination Papers," *Halifax Chronicle Herald* (29 July 1993), A7.
 28. None of these occasions were made public, but Chrétien told reporters: "I denied some people the right to run. I said: if you run, I will not sign your papers." "Bad Apples Can't Run," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), (29 July 1993), A9.
 29. While the party has not released a full list of candidates appointed, several newspaper stories report that Chrétien claimed to have made 14 appointments.

- See, for example, "Chretien Parachutes in Hull-Aylmer Candidate," *Ottawa Citizen* (29 July 1993), A7; and "Chretien Defends Right to Appoint Candidates," *Winnipeg Free Press* (29 July 1993), A9.
30. *Reform Party of Canada Constitution*, section 4. Candidate Recruitment, Nomination and Development, subsections (c) and (e).
 31. "Reform Annuls Nomination," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto) (3 April 1993), A10.
 32. Nine of the appointed candidates were women: Jean Augustine (Etobicoke-Lakeshore), Eleni Bakopanos (Montréal-St. Denis), Margo Brousseau (Louis-Hébert), Raymonde Falco (Laval East), Janice Laking (Simcoe Centre), Rita Lavoie (Manicouagan), Maria Minna (Beaches-Woodbine), Céline Hervieux Payette (Ahuntsic) and Georgette Sheridan (Saskatoon-Humboldt).
 33. Two-thirds of associations in all three parties report having no female candidates seek their 1993 nomination.
 34. R. K. Carty and Lynda Erickson, "Candidate Nomination in Canada's National Political Parties," in Herman Bakvis, ed., *Canadian Political Parties: Leaders, Candidates and Organization* (Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1991), 97-189.
 35. Carty and Erickson found that "fully 80 per cent of the party nominations had been completed by the time the election was called." *Ibid*, 112.
 36. Nomination candidates will routinely sell hundreds of association memberships before the membership closing date. These recruitment campaigns, however, are not normally generally publicized and are often restricted to the candidates' friends, family and ethnic and professional communities to which they belong.
 37. The data reported in this section is reflective of responses from the PC and Liberal associations only as the Reform Party has not held a formal leadership convention.
 38. There were 3,469 voting delegates at the PC June 1993 convention and 4,658 at the Liberal June 1990 convention. John C. Courtney, *Do Conventions Matter? Choosing National Party Leaders in Canada* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 304 and 307.
 39. Data from other sources support this finding. Courtney reports that 83 percent of successful delegate candidates for the 1990 Liberal convention disclosed who their preferred candidate was before being selected as did 58 percent of delegates to the 1993 PC convention. A significantly lower percentage of delegates did so for the parties' previous leadership conventions in 1983 and 1984 respectively. *Ibid*, 326.
 40. See, *The Liberal Party of Canada Constitution* article 17(8) (9); *Reform Party of Canada Constitution* section 6(a) (b); and *The New Constitution of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada* section 11.4.6. For a full discussion of provincial party experiences with direct election and implications for the federal parties, see William Cross, "Direct Election of Provincial Party Leaders in Canada, 1985-1995: The End of the Leadership Convention?," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 29 (1996), 295-315.
 41. Courtney, *Do Conventions Matter?*, 246.
 42. Courtney, *Do Conventions Matter?*, 278.
 43. While a perceived lack of responsiveness does not necessarily indicate an actual lack of responsiveness, the perception is important to the argument that Canadians view their political institutions as being unresponsive and that parties are no exception to this.
 44. *Reform Party of Canada Constitution*, section 5A.
 45. For example, former Reform MP Bob Ringma used the Internet to solicit constituents' opinions on issues such as whether a referendum should be held on

reinstatement of capital punishment; MP Ted White conducted an elaborate telephone poll of his constituents on issues relating to reform of the Young Offenders Act (voters received informational material from White's office and called a 1-900 number to register their opinion); and, a group of five Calgary MPs organized a telephone vote of their constituents, in conjunction with a party-sponsored cable television program, on the issue of doctor-assisted suicide.

46. The party's restructuring task-force suggested the creation of a permanent policy foundation to act as "a mechanism for Party member and riding level involvement in, and input to, the policy process." See, Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, "Background Paper on Party Restructuring," (1994), 2.
47. David J. Elkins, "Parties as National Institutions: A Comparative Study," in Bakvis, *Political Parties*, 3-62.

A. Brian Tanguay and Barry J. Kay¹

Third-Party Advertising and the Threat to Electoral Democracy in Canada: The Mouse that Roared

Abstract

To date, much of the debate in Canada over the effects of third-party election spending has been conducted at a theoretical or normative level. This paper seeks to fill the gap in our knowledge about the empirical effects of third-party spending by examining four different campaigns waged by the National Citizens' Coalition (1988, 1997) and Campaign Life (1988, 1997) to target or endorse candidates or parties in federal elections. We find that these efforts have had very little success, despite the bold claims made by the interest group leaders themselves (and repeated as fact by some in the media). Merely citing the example of the pernicious influence of interest groups south of the border does not by itself prove the case that comparable influence, either actual or potential, has been or will be established in Canada. We contend that a number of crucial institutional differences between the two countries make it unlikely that interest groups will ever be as big a threat to electoral democracy in Canada as they are in the United States.

Résumé

Jusqu'à maintenant, une bonne partie du débat mené au Canada au sujet des effets des dépenses de tiers dans le cadre des campagnes électorales se situait à un niveau théorique ou normatif. Cet article tente de combler un vide dans nos connaissances en ce qui a trait aux effets empiriques des dépenses d'un tiers en étudiant quatre campagnes différentes menées par la National Citizens' Coalition (1988, 1997) et la Coalition Campagne Vie (1988, 1997) afin de cibler ou d'endosser des candidats ou des partis lors des élections fédérales. Les auteurs concluent que les efforts déployés n'ont guère porté fruit, en dépit des prétentions audacieuses des dirigeants des groupes de pression (des prétentions reprises par certains médias comme s'il s'agissait de faits avérés). Il ne suffit pas d'évoquer l'exemple de l'influence pernicieuse des groupes de pression chez nos voisins du sud pour prouver qu'une influence comparable, réelle ou potentielle, s'est déjà exercée ou s'exercera un jour au Canada. Nous soutenons que plusieurs des différences institutionnelles essentielles entre les deux pays font qu'il est improbable que les groupes de pression représenteront jamais une aussi grave menace à la démocratie électorale canadienne que ce n'est le cas aux États-Unis.

On June 2, 1997, as soon as the federal election results had been tabulated, the National Citizens' Coalition (NCC) issued a press release proclaiming the resounding success of "Operation Pork Chop." This \$200,000 advertising campaign had been designed to defeat forty first-plated MP

pension plan” had they been re-elected. David Somerville, NCC President, claimed that “[o]ur campaign convinced voters to give 9 MPs the ‘Pork Chop’ ... That means they won’t qualify for the lavish MP pension and they won’t cost taxpayers millions [sic] of dollars in pension payouts ... During the election we went into selected ridings and urged voters to defeat these MPs ... The voters listened” (NCC, 1997c).

Somerville’s view, no matter how self-serving and *ex parte* in reality, plays upon the deepest fears of many academics, bureaucrats and politicians in Canada. For almost two decades now, Canadians have been warned that interest groups constitute a grave threat to electoral democracy. The NCC’s press release merely confirms the worst suspicions of many scholars: wealthy interest groups are taking advantage of a legislative and regulatory vacuum to subvert the fair, balanced and meaningful competition among political parties that is supposedly the hallmark of our electoral system. What is worse, according to many of these critics of interest group influence, is that the invocations of freedom of expression and the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* uttered by interest group leaders to justify their untrammelled activities at election time are based on a fundamental misconception: freedom of speech should in no way be confused with, or reduced to, freedom to spend.

An intrinsic logic resides in the claim made by various scholars (Hiebert, 1989-90; Hiebert, 1991; Hiebert, 1998; Bakvis and Smith, 1997) that moneyed interest groups like the NCC have the capacity to abuse and contaminate the fairness and financial equilibrium among political parties mandated by the *Canada Elections Act*. And there is no denying that the American political system serves as a powerful, negative example of what our own system could devolve into, in the absence of any legislative restraints on interest group or “third party”² spending at election time. Plenty of evidence from the American case supports the contention that interest groups can have a malignant influence on electoral outcomes; witness the activities of the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) in the 1980 campaign, when it successfully targeted a number of liberal Senators — Frank Church, George McGovern and Birch Bayh among them — for defeat (Jacobson, 1984: 52-55).³ Electoral democracy in the United States appears to have become mostly a matter of which candidate or party can raise the most money to conduct a campaign; ideas, policies and issues routinely take a back seat to the never-ending quest for dollars.

While it would be foolhardy to deny that there are grounds to be concerned about the impact of interest group spending on elections in Canada, much of the debate over this issue has been characterized by the virtual absence of *any* actual empirical evidence drawn from the Canadian experience. This paper seeks to fill this gap in our knowledge about the real impact of third-party election expenses. Our examination of actual attempts by interest groups like the National Citizens’ Coalition (in 1988 and 1997)

and Campaign Life (1988, 1997) to target or endorse candidates and parties during federal elections demonstrates that these efforts have had very little success, despite the bold claims made by group leaders. This fact, combined with the modest, low-profile advertising campaigns waged by interest groups in the 1984 and 1993 federal elections, leads us to question the need for a highly stringent regulatory regime for third-party spending, such as the one proposed by the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (RCERPF) in its 1991 report.⁴ Merely citing the example of the pernicious influence of interest groups south of the border does not, *ipso facto*, prove the case that comparable influence, either actual or potential, has been or will be established in Canada. It is our contention that a number of crucial institutional differences between the two countries make it unlikely that interest groups will ever be as big a threat to electoral democracy in Canada as they are in the United States.

If, as we argue, interest groups have to date been little more than an electoral mouse in terms of their ability to punish or reward candidates, then why have they engendered such fear and loathing among academics and party representatives? In a brief concluding section we discuss the reasons why the mouse's sound is perceived to be so ferocious.

Before proceeding to our empirical analysis, we provide a bit of context to situate the debate over interest group spending in elections.

Legislative Background to the Controversy

In order to understand why third-party election spending has become such a hotly debated topic in the 1990s (the era of Charter politics), we provide a brief overview of the evolution of the regulatory regime for election finance at the federal level.⁵ From the passage of the *Canada Elections Act* in 1974 until 1983, a legal prohibition prevented election spending by any individual or group in order to promote or oppose a candidate or party. This reflected the concern of parliamentarians and academic researchers alike that failure to regulate the spending of interest groups during elections would inevitably undermine any legislative restrictions on parties and candidates, thereby tilting the field of electoral competition in favour of candidates with wealthy backers. The Committee on Election Expenses, better known as the Barbeau Committee (after its chair, Montreal lawyer Alphonse Barbeau), had recommended in its 1966 report that “[n]o groups or bodies other than registered parties and nominated candidates be permitted to purchase radio and television time, or to use paid advertising in newspapers, periodicals, or direct mailing, posters or billboards, in support of, or opposition to, any party or candidate ...” (Canada, 1966: 50). The Committee argued that without this restriction, “any efforts to limit and control election expenditure would come to nothing,” since interest groups could pool their resources to support or oppose particular candidates.⁶

An important escape clause was included in the legislation, however: interest groups could incur election expenses in order to promote or oppose a candidate or party if they could establish that they had acted *in good faith* in order to gain support for their views on an issue of public policy. This good faith clause created a legislative and regulatory distinction between the partisan or direct spending of interest groups at election time (in order to promote or oppose candidates or parties), which was prohibited, and advocacy or indirect spending (to promote their stances on particular issues), which was allowed. Almost immediately after the adoption of the *Canada Elections Act*, however, the Chief Electoral Officer voiced his concern that the good faith defence allowed interest groups or individuals to circumvent the spirit of the law. His concerns stemmed in large part from a 1978 court case (*R. v. Roach*) in which the government sought to prosecute Donald Roach, the president of the Ontario Housing Corporation Employees' Union, CUPE Local 767. During a 1976 by-election in Ottawa-Carleton, Roach had hired an airplane to tow a banner registering his disgust with the Trudeau government: "OHC Employees 767 CUPE vote but not Liberal" (Hiebert, 1989-90: 73; Canada, RCERPF, 1991: v.1: 331). The banner made no obvious reference to a policy issue, and so Roach was charged with violating the third-party spending restrictions contained in the *Canada Elections Act*. At trial, the judge acquitted Roach, arguing that the airplane banner "was a legitimate attempt to oppose the [Liberal] government's anti-inflation program ..."⁷

In 1983, after very little parliamentary debate, all three parties in the House of Commons unanimously approved Bill C-169, which removed the good faith defence from the *Canada Elections Act*. Interest group spending to promote or target candidates or parties was henceforth outlawed. The National Citizens' Coalition challenged the legislation in the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, characterizing the restrictions on third-party spending as violations of the freedom of expression guaranteed by the newly minted *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Furthermore, the NCC contended, the regulations covering interest groups were misguided, since they would do little to facilitate the entry of new parties or independent candidates into the electoral arena and at the same time would discourage public participation in the political process (Hiebert, 1989-90: 74). Justice Donald Medhurst upheld the NCC challenge, claiming that the federal government had signally failed to demonstrate any actual harm, or likelihood of harm, caused by third-party election spending. In Medhurst's view, the prohibition on third-party spending could not be "saved" by reference to s.1 of the *Charter*, namely that it was a "reasonable limit ... demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."⁸

The federal government chose not to appeal this ruling, and elected not to enforce the third-party spending restrictions outside of Alberta (technically, the ruling applied only to that province). The federal elections of 1984 and 1988, therefore, were contested without any legal restrictions

on third-party spending. While the 1984 election witnessed very few attempts by interest groups to target candidates or parties,⁹ the 1988 election produced an orgy of third-party advertising on the issue of free trade. Because the positions of the three major parties on free trade were so clearly demarcated, the distinction between advocacy and partisan advertising was rendered moot. Hiebert concludes that “[t]he 1988 election experience suggests that, without legislative redress, there is no way of guarding against the impact of unaccountable and unregulated campaign spending by wealthy interest groups” (1989-90: 82).

A second attempt at regulating the election activities of interest groups was made in 1993, as part of Bill C-114, *An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act*, which received royal assent on May 6, 1993. This bill was introduced in the wake of the Lortie Commission report, which had recommended that third parties be allowed to incur no more than \$1,000 in election expenses, and that individuals and groups be prevented from pooling their financial resources to circumvent the spending limit (Canada, RCERPF, 1991: v.1: 350-56). The Royal Commission made no distinction between partisan and advocacy spending, since “individuals and groups that seek to advocate a position on an issue must also be able to link candidates and parties with the issue” (*ibid.*, v.1: 351). Bill C-114, however, applied the \$1,000 limit to partisan spending only, leaving interest groups free to spend as they liked to promote their positions on public policy issues. As the Lortie Commission had recommended, Bill C-114 prohibited individuals and groups from pooling their financial resources to endorse or oppose candidates or parties.

The NCC launched a court challenge of Bill C-114 in 1993, again in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. Again, the restrictions on third-party spending were found to be in breach of sections 2(b), 2(d) and 3 the *Charter*. In June 1996, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the lower-court decision, and again the federal government chose not to appeal the verdict. Yet, in October 1997, in the course of striking down the restrictions on third-party spending contained in Quebec’s *Referendum Act*, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that it could not accept the Alberta Court of Appeal’s point of view, because it “disagree[d] with its conclusion regarding the legitimacy of the objective of the [restrictions]” (Fraser, 1997a, 1997b; *Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, 1997). The Chief Electoral Officer (1997: 6-7) has proposed that Parliament introduce new regulations to deal with the existing “anomaly” whereby spending restrictions are imposed on candidates and parties while third parties are left free to do as they wish. In his report, the Chief Electoral Officer recommends using the federal *Referendum Act* as a legislative template: all groups or individuals intending to spend over a certain amount, say \$5,000, in an election would have to register with the CEO and receive his authorization to conduct their campaigns.

The Chief Electoral Officer will publish all authorizations, as they are issued, so that all Canadians can be aware of the activities of these third parties. Consideration should also be given to establishing legislated spending limits for advertising to support or oppose a political party or candidate. The limits might take into account the average amounts that the various political parties and candidates normally spend on advertising and *will be lowered accordingly*. This would make it possible to reach the objective of a level playing field that underlies the financial provisions of the present Act (*ibid.*, p.7; emphasis ours).

The Chief Electoral Officer does not indicate in his report what he considers to be a “Charter-proof” limit for third-party expenditures, although it will certainly have to be substantially higher than the \$1,000 recommended by the Lortie Commission and included in Bill C-114, for this very low limit effectively ensured that interest group involvement in national election campaigns would be insignificant.

The issue of third-party spending has clearly generated an enormous amount of legal activity and scholarly commentary. But what, precisely, is the nature of the threat that these groups pose to electoral democracy? We turn now to an empirical examination of the effectiveness of third-party campaigns to target candidates and parties in federal elections.

The Impact of Third-Party Election Spending in Canada

Four federal elections — 1984, 1988, 1993 and 1997 — have been contested since the National Citizens’ Coalition first successfully challenged the legislative prohibitions on third-party election spending. During this time, interest groups and individuals have essentially been free to spend as they wish, either to promote their particular policy stances or to target candidates and parties. Remarkably, despite the dire predictions of assorted academic experts and party representatives, interest groups have either refrained from well-orchestrated campaigns to target parties and candidates (as in 1984 and 1993), or, when they have done so (as with the NCC in 1988 and 1997, and Campaign Life in 1988), their efforts have met with little success. Of course, the 1988 free trade election remains an anomaly — apparently not the start of a “general election trend,” as Hiebert (1989-90: 81) had warned earlier — which we will discuss in greater detail at the end of this section.

a) The National Citizens’ Coalition

The NCC has been by far the most visible and persistent interest group seeking to influence election outcomes in Canada. Founded in 1967, the NCC describes itself as a non-profit organization with 45,000 “supporters,” about half of them in Alberta and British Columbia (Ovenden, 1997). One finds the following “mission statement” at the NCC’s website: “The National Citizens’ Coalition ... is Canada’s foremost organization for the

defence of our basic political and economic freedoms. We promote free markets, individual freedom and responsibility under limited government, and a strong defence. ... The supporters of the NCC across Canada share a belief in 'more freedom through less government.' On principle the NCC neither seeks nor would accept *any* government funding."¹⁰ Despite the obvious ideological affinities between the NCC and the Reform Party, the group claims to be non-partisan. According to Gerry Nicholls (1997), its Communications Director, NCC activists are "street fighters ... We just get out and ... roll up our sleeves and we slug it out; we've taken on virtually every political party, and virtually every political party has hated us at one time or another."

Although the NCC has spent large sums of donated money (usually upwards of \$150,000) in every federal election since the late 1970s, only its campaigns in 1988 and 1997 represented large-scale efforts to defeat significant numbers of incumbent MPs. In 1984, the NCC was active in the election campaign, but most of its published material consisted of issue advertising; according to Ovenden (1997), the group spent almost \$700,000 in 1984 on advertisements attacking the National Energy Program. Another of its main efforts that year was to compile a voters' guide which compared the stances of the various parties on certain key issues. In 1993, the group adopted much the same strategy as in 1984 (Nicholls, 1997). However, the NCC did intervene late in the campaign with an \$80,000 media blitz warning voters not to elect a majority Liberal government. NCC president David Somerville claimed that "[a] vote for Chrétien is a vote for the failed big government, tax and spend policies of the past ..." (Canadian Press, 1993; Kendall, 1993). In addition, the NCC spent \$50,000 trying to unseat Tory MP Jim Hawkes in the riding of Calgary West. Hawkes had been the chair of the all-party parliamentary committee which had drawn up Bill C-114, the so-called "gag law" limiting third-party election expenditures to \$1,000. A typical NCC newspaper advertisement read: "Jim Hawkes tried to outlaw this ad. *Defeat Jim Hawkes* ... Maybe Hawkes didn't want you to know that he supports the GST and his gold-plated, 1.2 million dollar MP's pension. No wonder he led the fight to pass the election gag law ..."¹¹ Hawkes was indeed defeated by one of the Reform Party's star candidates, Stephen Harper. However, when one controls for the party "swing" (the average movement away from the Progressive Conservatives on a province-wide basis), Hawkes actually did better than many of his fellow Tory candidates in Alberta.

In the 1988 election, the NCC launched an expensive public relations effort to discredit the NDP and its leader, Ed Broadbent.¹² In mid-campaign, the NCC switched tactics and focus, largely abandoning its anti-NDP advertisements in favour of pro-free trade ones. According to the group's Communications Director, "everyone was taken by surprise by how free trade really took off as the issue, including us, so we had to switch [targets] ..." (Nicholls, 1997). A partisan cast still tinged the pro-free trade

advertising, however: in some of its ads, the group attacked the credibility of both the NDP's Ed Broadbent — because he was, in its view, a “scary socialist” — and Liberal leader John Turner, who was portrayed as an opportunistic politician whose opposition to free trade was motivated more by a desire to salvage his career than by a principled stance on the merits of continental economic integration. In spite of the expensive negative advertising campaign, however, the NCC's efforts failed to achieve their objective: in the 41 western ridings targeted by the NCC, the NDP actually performed on average 1.8 percent *better* than in the 19 remaining ridings not targeted in those provinces (Tanguay and Kay, 1991: 95). NDP officials acknowledged during the campaign that the NCC efforts were likely to have unintended consequences or perverse effects: according to federal party secretary Bill Knight, the NCC's attacks against Broadbent in Oshawa “resulted in an ‘overwhelming response’ from NDP supporters volunteering to help the Broadbent cause ... ‘I think a Toronto-based crowd attacking us in the West won't go very far ...’” (quoted in Burton 1988).

In 1997, the NCC launched “Operation Pork Chop,” a \$200,000 media campaign “which feature[d] hard hitting radio commercials, newspaper ads and direct mail blitzes” (NCC, 1997a, 1997b), all designed to convince voters to turf out 40 incumbent MPs — 39 Liberals and 1 Reformer.¹³ According to NCC President David Somerville, “[o]ur plan is simple ... We will go into these ridings and let voters and taxpayers know how much it will cost them in rich MP pension payouts if they re-elect their incumbent first-termers” (NCC, 1997a). As noted earlier, the NCC immediately proclaimed the success of its campaign once the election results were in, boasting that it had “knocked off” nine incumbent MPs, all Liberals. The NCC's claims were accepted as fact in the popular press, reinforcing the popular and widespread notion of interest group power and malevolence: “The ad blitz against [Anne] McLellan and fellow Edmonton Liberal Judy Bethel is credited for Bethel's defeat and the victory of Reformer Peter Goldring, who was helped by the anti-Liberal ads” (Ovenden, 1997).

Exactly how effective was Operation Pork Chop — in reality, rather than rhetoric? Was it anything more than a public relations exercise? In Table 1 we examine the performance of the 39 candidates targeted by the NCC.¹⁴ We calculated the percentage change in the vote for each candidate between 1993 and 1997, and subtracted from that figure the province-wide swing for the *party* between the two elections.¹⁵ This was done to determine the change in vote for the targeted candidates, after controlling for their party's performance in their respective provinces (this *net result* for each of the candidates can be found in the final column of Table 1). To take an example: the lone Reform MP targeted by the NCC was John Cummins, in the British Columbia riding of Delta-South Richmond. In the 1993 federal election, Cummins took 37.4 percent of the vote,¹⁶ versus 46.5 percent in 1997, a difference of 9.1 percentage points. Cummins' party, however, improved its share of the vote by 6.7 percent between 1993 and 1997, and thus his net

result is 2.4 percent (9.1 - 6.7). That is to say, Cummins actually performed 2.4 percent *better* than the average Reform Party candidate in BC. By contrast, Harry Verran, the Liberal candidate in the riding of West Nova, ran 5.6 percent behind his party swing in Nova Scotia.

What is remarkable about the results in Table 1 is that 36 of the 39 targeted candidates actually *improved* their performances over 1993, after controlling for party swing. The only candidates whose results were worse in 1997 were Verran in Nova Scotia, Gar Knutson in Elgin-Middlesex, and Tony Ianno in Trinity-Spadina. If the NCC's Operation Pork Chop had had no effect whatsoever, one would have expected an approximately even distribution of positive and negative results in Table 1. Instead, the 39 targeted candidates performed on average 5.1 percent *better* than they had in 1993, after taking party swing into account.¹⁷

Table 1

Electoral Performance of Candidates Targeted by NCC in 1997
Standardized by Average Swing by Party Candidates in Province

Party	Riding	1997 Vote (%)	1993 Vote (%)	Net Change (%)	Prov. Party Avg. Change (%)	Net Result (%)
LIB	Cumberland- Colchester, NS	25.8	42.6	-16.8	-23.6	6.8
LIB	Halifax West	30.9	45.2	-14.3	-23.6	9.3
LIB	Kings-Hants	30.3	47.0	-16.7	-23.6	6.9
LIB	South Shore	29.0	39.6	-10.6	-23.6	13.0
LIB	West Nova	25.7	54.9	-29.2	-23.6	-5.6
LIB	Charlotte, NB	25.7	44.7	-19.0	-23.1	4.1
LIB	Tobique- Mactaquac	30.2	46.0	-15.8	-23.1	7.3
LIB	Beaches- East York, ON	47.9	42.1	5.8	-3.4	9.2
LIB	Bramalea-Gore- Malton	46.4	43.0	3.4	-3.4	6.8
LIB	Brampton Centre	48.9	50.3	-1.4	-3.4	2.0
LIB	Brampton West	60.0	57.6	2.4	-3.4	5.8
LIB	Burlington	44.1	44.0	0.1	-3.4	3.5
LIB	Cambridge	36.7	38.2	-1.5	-3.4	1.9
LIB	Don Valley West	52.8	51.6	1.2	-3.4	4.6
LIB	Dufferin-Peel- Wellington	42.6	35.2	7.4	-3.4	10.8
LIB	Elgin-Middlesex	40.0	44.0	-4.0	-3.4	-0.6
LIB	Etobicoke Centre	54.6	56.2	-1.6	-3.4	1.8
LIB	Etobicoke- Lakeshore	46.2	42.5	3.7	-3.4	7.1
LIB	Guelph-Wellington	47.7	40.1	7.6	-3.4	11.0

Table 1 continues on next page

Table 1 (Contd)

Electoral Performance of Candidates Targeted by NCC in 1997
Standardized by Average Swing by Party Candidates in Province

Party	Riding	1997 Vote (%)	1993 Vote (%)	Net Change (%)	Prov. Party Avg. Change (%)	Net Result (%)
LIB	Halton	47.2	40.9	6.3	-3.4	9.7
LIB	Kitchener-Waterloo	47.7	42.6	5.1	-3.4	8.5
LIB	Mississauga Centre	65.0	58.8	6.2	-3.4	9.6
LIB	Mississauga South	49.9	47.1	2.8	-3.4	6.2
LIB	Oakville	47.7	45.9	1.8	-3.4	5.2
LIB	Oshawa	37.7	38.8	-1.1	-3.4	2.3
LIB	Parry Sound- Muskoka	41.6	44.2	-2.6	-3.4	0.8
LIB	Perth-Middlesex	44.0	45.0	-1.0	-3.4	2.4
LIB	Scarborough Centre	57.4	53.0	4.4	-3.4	7.8
LIB	Simcoe North	44.4	40.9	3.5	-3.4	6.9
LIB	Toronto Centre- Rosedale	49.2	50.4	-1.2	-3.4	2.2
LIB	Trinity-Spadina	45.3	51.6	-6.3	-3.4	-2.9
LIB	Wentworth- Burlington	41.6	41.0	0.6	-3.4	4.0
LIB	York Centre	72.1	71.7	0.4	-3.4	3.8
LIB	Edmonton East, AB	34.6	33.8	0.8	-1.1	1.9
LIB	Edmonton West	43.4	36.2	7.2	-1.1	8.3
REF	Delta-South Richmond, BC	46.5	37.4	9.1	6.7	2.4
LIB	Richmond	43.8	37.7	6.1	0.7	5.4
LIB	Vancouver Centre	40.8	31.5	9.3	0.7	8.6
LIB	Vancouver East	37.1	35.2	1.9	0.7	1.2
	Average					5.1

1993 Election statistics drawn from the *Report of the Chief Electoral Officer*.
1997 Election statistics drawn from figures published in the *Globe and Mail*, June 4, 1997.

How can we explain these unexpected and surprising results? While we cannot rule out the possibility that the NCC's Operation Pork Chop actually had the unintended consequence of helping the targeted candidates, a more plausible explanation is that another factor (or factors) neutralized the effects of the NCC's negative advertising campaign. In particular, we may have witnessed a "sophomore surge" among the 39 candidates listed in Table 1. Studies of American congressional careers have suggested that legislators benefit electorally from the advantage of incumbency in their second election, an advantage which was not present in their first election campaign (Hibbing, 1991: 28). Even in Canada, where parties and their

leaders are far more important than individual candidates in the voting calculus, it is not at all implausible that candidates might derive the benefits of name recognition that incumbency confers.¹⁸

b) Campaign Life

Another interest group that has been quite active and visible in past federal elections is the Campaign Life Coalition, an organization dedicated to protecting human life from conception to natural death, and to fostering “respect for life through adequate legal protection from abortion, infanticide, euthanasia and other life threatening social and moral trends.” Politically, the group has sought to identify pro-life candidates of any federal party¹⁹ and to urge its members and sympathizers to vote for these targeted candidates. Dismissing the conventions of British-style parliamentary government and the primordial role it assigns to disciplined parties and their leaders, Campaign Life exhorts its members to vote *only* for the individual candidate, whatever the policies of his or her party or party leader might be.²⁰

Campaign Life’s electoral activities reached their peak in the 1988 federal election, when the abortion issue was prominent because of the Supreme Court decision in January of that year striking down the federal government’s abortion law and effectively instituting a policy of abortion on demand. Campaign Life published a special election edition of its newsletter, *Vitality*, listing the positions on abortion of candidates from all parties in every riding, except those in New Brunswick and the Territories. It endorsed 125 candidates: 74 Conservatives, 50 Liberals, and 1 New Democrat. However, an analysis of the performance of these targeted candidates, controlling for the province-wide swings for their parties, indicates that Campaign Life’s endorsement provided very little benefit, .35 of one percent to be precise.²¹

Since 1988, the issue of abortion has gradually receded into the background of political life in Canada, and Campaign Life’s electoral activities have similarly become less visible. However, the group still publishes its *Voters’ Guide*, providing detailed information on the positions of the various candidates, parties and leaders, not only on the issue of abortion but on the questions of doctor-assisted suicide, experimentation on human embryos, and the use of the so-called “abortion drug,” RU486 (Mifepristone) as well. An examination of the performance of those candidates who received Campaign Life’s endorsement in the 1997 election, however, demonstrates that the group is no more capable of mobilizing voters now than it was in 1988. Of the 68 candidates who received Campaign Life’s endorsement in 1997 (see the note to Table 2 for a discussion of the criteria for inclusion) — 43 Reformers,²² 18 Progressive Conservatives, 6 Liberals, and a lone member of the NDP — more than half ran behind their party swing in their respective provinces. When the adjusted percentage swing for all 68 pro-life candidates was averaged, the mean was a negligible -0.1 percent.

Table 2

Electoral Performance of Candidates Supported by Campaign Life
 Coalition 1997 Voters' Guide*

Party	Riding	1997 Vote (%)	1993 Vote (%)	Net Change (%)	Prov. Party Avg. Change (%)	Net Result (%)
PC	St. John's East, NF	39.0	42.2	-3.2	10.1	-13.3
PC	Bras d'Or, NS	20.3	13.1	7.2	7.3	-0.1
REF	Dartmouth	11.7	15.8	-4.1	-3.6	-0.5
REF	Halifax West	10.5	19.0	-8.5	-3.6	-4.9
REF	Beausejour, NB	10.2	4.7	5.5	4.6	0.9
REF	Charlotte	21.1	14.1	7.0	4.6	2.4
REF	Moncton	13.0	11.3	1.7	4.6	-2.9
REF	Tobique-Mactaquac	27.7	11.6	16.1	4.6	11.5
PC	Lac St. Jean, PQ	14.3	8.7	5.6	8.7	-3.1
PC	Outremont	12.1	8.5	3.6	8.7	-5.1
PC	Repentigny	21.0	11.3	9.7	8.7	1.0
PC	St. Hubert	20.1	8.0	12.1	8.7	3.4
LIB	Cambridge, ON	36.7	38.2	-1.5	-3.4	1.9
LIB	Erie-Lincoln	42.8	46.3	-3.5	-3.4	-0.1
LIB	Mississauga South	49.9	47.1	2.8	-3.4	6.2
LIB	Scarborough Rouge River	74.8	68.2	6.6	-3.4	10.0
LIB	Scarborough Southwest	53.4	54.1	-0.7	-3.4	2.7
LIB	Timiskaming- Cochrane	59.4	62.1	-2.7	-3.4	0.7
PC	Davenport	10.1	4.6	5.5	1.2	4.3
PC	Etobicoke Centre	22.0	17.1	4.9	1.2	3.7
PC	Etobicoke North	11.9	9.3	2.6	1.2	1.4
PC	Halton	25.0	28.3	-3.3	1.2	-4.5
PC	Hamilton Mountain	19.2	11.7	7.5	1.2	6.3
PC	Hamilton West	15.5	15.0	0.5	1.2	-0.7
PC	Renfrew-Nipissing	25.4	13.7	11.7	1.2	10.5
PC	Whitby-Ajax	20.5	19.9	0.6	1.2	-0.6
REF	Beaches	14.3	16.5	-2.2	1.2	-3.4
REF	Bramalea-Gore	21.3	29.3	-8.0	1.2	-9.2
REF	Brampton West	16.6	22.2	-5.6	1.2	-6.8
REF	Carleton-Gloucester	14.6	14.5	0.1	1.2	-1.1
REF	Don Valley East	12.0	17.3	-5.3	1.2	-6.5
REF	Haldimand-Norfolk	27.1	23.4	3.7	1.2	2.5
REF	Hastings-Frontenac	25.8	18.4	7.4	1.2	6.2
REF	Lanark-Carleton	27.0	21.9	5.1	1.2	3.9
REF	Perth-Middlesex	20.6	24.8	-4.2	1.2	-5.4
REF	Simcoe North	28.0	30.6	-2.6	1.2	-3.8
REF	Waterloo-Wellington	31.1	30.4	0.7	1.2	-0.5

Table 2 continues on next page

*Third-Party Advertising and the Threat to Electoral Democracy in Canada:
The Mouse that Roared*

Table 2 (Contd)

Party	Riding	1997 Vote (%)	1993 Vote (%)	Net Change (%)	Prov. Party Avg. Change (%)	Net Result (%)
REF	Windsor-St. Clair	14.2	10.0	4.2	1.2	3.0
NDP	York West	9.9	3.7	6.2	4.7	1.5
REF	Brandon-Souris, MA	32.0	30.9	1.1	1.3	-0.2
REF	Portage-Lisgar	40.2	39.1	1.1	1.3	-0.2
REF	Provencher	35.1	37.2	-2.1	1.3	-3.4
REF	St. Boniface	18.1	15.5	2.6	1.3	1.3
REF	Winnipeg North- St. Paul	19.6	18.9	0.7	1.3	-0.6
REF	Winnipeg South	19.8	25.5	-5.7	1.3	-7.0
REF	Winnipeg South Centre	12.5	11.9	0.6	1.3	-0.7
PC	Dauphin-Swan River	21.6	17.4	4.2	5.9	-1.7
REF	Blackstrap, SK	36.9	28.8	8.1	8.8	-0.7
REF	Palliser	29.2	21.8	7.4	8.8	-1.4
REF	Prince Albert	38.1	27.1	11.0	8.8	2.2
REF	Saskatoon-Humboldt	33.1	27.1	6.0	8.8	-2.8
REF	Saskatoon-Rosetown	32.6	24.7	7.9	8.8	-0.9
REF	Wanuskewin	39.2	31.6	7.6	8.8	-1.2
PC	Wascana	7.4	13.5	-6.1	-3.5	-2.6
REF	Calgary Southeast, AB	55.0	63.3	-8.3	2.3	-10.6
REF	Calgary West	47.2	52.3	-5.1	2.3	-7.4
REF	Crowfoot	71.0	64.2	6.8	2.3	4.5
REF	Edmonton North	44.3	38.8	5.5	2.3	3.2
REF	Elk Island	60.6	56.9	3.7	2.3	1.4
REF	Lakeland	59.3	54.8	4.5	2.3	2.2
REF	Macleod	68.0	63.0	5.0	2.3	2.7
REF	Wild Rose	63.8	63.8	0.0	2.3	-2.3
REF	Dewdney-Alouette, BC	47.3	37.4	9.9	6.7	3.2
REF	Kamloops	28.9	26.7	2.2	6.7	-4.5
REF	Port Moody- Coquitlam	43.6	34.6	9.0	6.7	2.3
REF	Richmond	36.0	30.9	5.1	6.7	-1.6
PC	Kelowna	16.8	19.4	-2.6	-7.3	4.7
PC	Nanaimo-Cowichan	4.2	8.7	-4.5	-7.3	2.8
	Average					-0.1

* Those included in this table were the only major party candidates in their riding who had completed the Campaign Life Questionnaire and were specifically committed to protecting every preborn child from the time of conception. Constituencies which featured more than one major party candidate with this commitment were not included. Christian Heritage Party candidates were also excluded.

In Table 3, we also examined the performance of 21 incumbents running in the 1997 election (15 Liberals, 5 Reformers, and one Progressive Conservative) who received an endorsement from *Catholic Insight* for their opposition to the extension of gay rights and to the abolition of “constitutionally guaranteed religious education rights in Newfoundland.”²³ In this case, overall, there was a very modest — 1.9 percent on average — positive effect for the 21 “pro-family” candidates endorsed by *Catholic Insight*. Nevertheless, it is far more likely that this modest electoral bonus can be explained by the fact that these candidates were all incumbents (recall the sophomore surge exhibited by the 39 incumbents targeted in the National Citizens’ Coalition’s “Operation Pork Chop”), rather than their endorsement by *Catholic Insight*.

c) Other Interest Groups in the 1997 Election

In addition to the NCC and Campaign Life, several other interest groups spent money to endorse or target candidates and parties during the 1997 federal election. These included the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC), which placed ads in newspapers in certain regions of the country — the National Capital and British Columbia, for instance — urging its members to vote for the NDP, in order to protest the Liberals’ broken promises on restoring free collective bargaining in the public service. According to a PSAC spokesperson, however, partisan advertising did not play “a large role” in the union’s activities during the election.²⁴

A billboard campaign by the Canadian Police Association and the British Columbia Federation of Police Officers echoed the Reform Party’s hard line on law and order, and specifically attacked eight Liberal MPs who had voted against a private-member’s bill to eliminate section 745 of the Criminal Code. (The so-called “faint-hope clause” allows convicted murderers to seek parole after serving 15 years of their sentence, rather than the full 25.) One billboard, placed in Liberal cabinet minister David Anderson’s Victoria riding, featured photographs of Anderson and three infamous killers — Clifford Olson, Paul Bernardo, and Clinton Gayle (who shot and killed a police officer in 1994). The caption read, “David Anderson voted to give these killers a chance at early parole. On June 2, it’s your turn to vote” (Howard 1997b). Anderson bitterly denounced this “stunt” as representing a “new low in public debate” (*ibid.*). Anderson, it should be noted, was re-elected, although he did run 3.6 percent behind his party swing.

Table 3

Electoral Performance of Candidates endorsed by *Catholic Insight**

Party	Riding	1997 Vote (%)	1993 Vote (%)	Net Change (%)	Prov. Party Avg. Change (%)	Net Result (%)
LIB	Gander, NF	52.2	78.4	-26.2	-29.4	3.2
LIB	West Nova, NS	25.7	54.9	-29.2	-23.6	-5.6
PC	St. John, NB	63.1	43.1	20.0	7.1	12.9
LIB	Broadview- Greenwood, ON	49.8	60.1	-10.3	-3.4	-6.9
LIB	Dufferin-Peel- Wellington	42.6	35.2	7.4	-3.4	10.8
LIB	Huron-Bruce	51.3	44.1	7.2	-3.4	10.6
LIB	London Fanshawe	51.2	58.1	-6.9	-3.4	-3.5
LIB	Mississauga East	59.9	63.9	-4.0	-3.4	-0.6
LIB	Mississauga South	49.9	47.1	2.8	-3.4	6.2
LIB	Niagara Falls	38.4	47.3	-8.9	-3.4	-5.5
LIB	Pickering-Ajax	52.1	43.3	8.8	-3.4	12.2
LIB	Scarborough Southwest	53.4	54.1	-0.7	-3.4	2.7
LIB	Timiskaming- Cochrane	59.5	62.1	-2.6	-3.4	0.8
LIB	Thunder Bay- Nipigon	51.8	65.7	-13.9	-3.4	-10.5
LIB	Provencher, MN	40.0	40.9	-0.9	-10.7	9.8
LIB	Souris-Moose Mount, SK	27.2	32.4	-5.2	-7.4	2.2
REF	Elk Island, AB	60.6	56.9	3.7	2.3	1.4
REF	Wild Rose	63.8	63.8	0.0	2.3	-2.3
REF	Delta-South Richmond, BC	46.5	37.4	9.1	6.7	2.4
REF	Port Moody- Coquitlam	43.6	34.6	9.0	6.7	2.3
REF	Vancouver Island North	47.5	42.8	4.7	6.7	-2.0
Average						1.9

* These endorsements made in the July-August 1996 issue of *Catholic Insight* are based upon support of the traditional church position in opposition to extension of human rights for sexual orientation, as well as ending church schools in Newfoundland.

Among the most visible — and nasty — of the interest groups involved in the 1997 election were those protesting the Liberal government's gun control legislation, Bill C-68. One enterprising individual sold car bumper stickers sporting the slogan, "Piss off a Liberal, buy a gun." The Ontario

Federation of Anglers and Hunters (OFAH) distributed 100,000 bumper stickers saying "Remember Bill C-68 When You Vote," along with 300,000 smaller stickers and bag signs (which are placed over the frame of a lawn sign). But nothing in the OFAH literature explicitly told its members how to vote; the group employed advocacy advertising, detailing the different parties' positions on the issues, rather than targeting specific candidates and parties (although its distaste for the Liberals was clear). The National Firearms Association was very active in the 1997 campaign. Purporting to represent "the interests of Canada's 7 million firearms owners,"²⁵ the NFA published numerous bulletins during the election that assailed the Liberals and especially then Justice Minister Allan Rock for the "totalitarian" undertones of their proposed gun registry. While the NFA did target some incumbent Liberals in mainly rural ridings across the country (it was unwilling to divulge its complete "hit list"), the issue of gun control energized only a tiny minority of voters.²⁶ Moreover, negative advertising was not the only, or even the primary tool adopted by the NFA in its efforts to sway voters. The organization has a distinctly long-term perspective, and places a great deal of emphasis on infiltrating the riding associations of the various parties. According to NFA President David Tomlinson, "less than 3 percent of Canadians belong to a political party ... if the NFA can get even 10 percent of its members to join a party, it would be able to form a majority in all riding associations."²⁷

In sum, then, the 1997 federal election did not signal a giant step down the road toward "an Americanized system ... of political action committees' made up of like-minded interests and politicians hiding behind third-party ads."²⁸ Since 1984, when the legislative restraints on third-party spending were first struck down, interest groups have remained, in electoral terms, a mere mouse, albeit one with a ferocious roar and a tendency to boast about its ability to "knock off" parties and their candidates.

The one obvious exception to the trends identified in our analysis was the 1988 free trade election. This campaign has been singled out by critics of interest-group election spending as a perfect illustration of how moneyed interests can distort and manipulate the electoral process. Nonetheless, in spite of the enormous sums of money spent by a variety of pro-free trade organizations during that election, the jury is still out on the *net* effect of this spending. The most exhaustive study to date (Johnston et al., 1992: 163) is inconclusive: "Third-party advertising coefficients defy substantive interpretation: some are large and significant but the pattern is offsetting and the total coefficient effectively zero." Bakvis and Smith (1997: 171) are at pains to point out that "while it is true that the data [on the 1988 election] disclose nothing firm about the effects of third-party advertising, still from a social-science perspective it would be unwise to reject altogether the possibility of such effects." This is true. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that other factors — the Conservatives' attack ads against John Turner's credibility, for instance — may have played a more important role than

third-party spending in handing Brian Mulroney and the free trade forces their election victory.

In short, the surge of interest group activity in 1988 was *not* a harbinger of a general trend in Canadian electoral democracy, or an imminent Americanization of our political system, in spite of the dire predictions of the doomsayers. Among the substantial institutional differences between the Canadian and American political systems, which more or less guarantee that interest groups will always be less pernicious in Canada than they are south of the border, is that parliamentary elections are fought largely as national campaigns and specific constituency results usually vary with regional, even national voting swings. By contrast, the American experience is typified by congressional contests that are frequently quite distinct from each other and are more likely to be differentiated by candidate and other local factors. In such a context, the opportunity for third-party interest groups to concentrate resources selectively and to “cherry pick” electoral contests is much more evident. Moreover, negative third-party advertising is likely to be far less effective in a multiparty setting (as in Canada) than it is in a two-party contest, as one NDP strategist has noted: “When you run heavily negative ads, you shake loose some voters, but you can’t be sure where they’ll go ... The U.S. is a different case. Knocking one candidate delivers voters to the only other choice” (quoted in Howard, 1997a). We do acknowledge, however, that at this stage our argument remains somewhat speculative. A great deal more research needs to be done before we can fully substantiate the hypothesis that it is primarily institutional variables that determine the different levels of interest group activity in Canada and the United States.

Conclusion: The Mouse That Roared

Why have so many Canadian academics and party representatives overestimated the influence of third-party spending and its threat to electoral democracy? To continue with the metaphor at the heart of this paper, why have the critics focused on the mouse’s boastful roar rather than its puny size? There are three related responses to this question. First, the most vocal critics of third-party spending argue explicitly that parties *ought* to be the primary vehicles for representing the views and demands of individual citizens (Canada, RCERPF, 1991: v.1: ch. 5; Hiebert, 1989-90; Hiebert, 1991; Hiebert, 1998; Bakvis and Smith, 1997). From this perspective, interest groups, when they enter the electoral arena, constitute a threat to the primacy of parties and must therefore be strictly controlled. This is especially the case, these critics argue, with wealthy corporate interests, which have the money to sway electoral outcomes. Yet, as we have seen, it is not only, or even primarily, the wealthy corporate interests that have been targeted by the restrictions on third-party spending in the *Canada Elections Act*; it is just as likely to be the eccentrics, the crackpots and the disenfranchised who are muzzled by these constraints.²⁹

Secondly, Hiebert and others unfairly downplay the crucial role sometimes played by interest groups and social movement organizations in raising issues ignored by the major parties. One could cite as examples the party unanimity on the Meech Lake Accord, the Charlottetown agreement, or, provincially, the decision in Ontario to extend full funding of Catholic schools to Grade 13. In cases like these, interest groups — or regional protest parties like the Reform Party — are absolutely necessary to put pressure on the established political order and to represent views of those segments of the electorate that feel themselves effectively to be disenfranchised.

Finally, the party-centred vision of the critics of interest groups makes them grossly overestimate the extent to which competition among the established parties has ever been *meaningful* in any real sense. One of the principal features of Canada's brokerage-style electoral system has been the scarcity of such clashes of world views. It is curious to note that the elections cited by Hiebert (1991: 20-29) as the most egregious examples of uncontrolled interest group activity — the 1988 federal free trade election, and the 1990 provincial election in Ontario — have been among the few in recent memory to generate intense public interest.³⁰

While the threat to electoral democracy posed by third-party advertising remains for now more of a theoretical possibility than an imminent reality, this does not mean that the federal government should simply allow electoral *laissez-faire* to prevail. As many critics of third-party election spending have pointed out, it is inconsistent and inequitable from a legal standpoint to impose restrictions on parties and candidates while allowing interest groups untrammelled freedom to spend. Nevertheless, the various legislative attempts to regulate this area of election finance have thus far betrayed a remarkable lack of political imagination, seeking more to throttle interest group activity and defend the traditional parties' monopoly on representation than to create a true balance between these different organizations. Although we do not share Filip Palda's public-choice perspective on elections and party competition, we do concur with his complaint about the heavy hand of bureaucratic regulation that seems to be the favourite strategy of political elites in Canada: "The tendency Canadians have to regulate anything noisy or brash finds unpleasant and dangerous expression in the move to restrict advertising to political parties during election campaigns" (1991: 70).³¹

Notes

1. The authors wish to thank the two anonymous referees for this journal, and Tony Coulson and John Trent for their comments on a previous draft of this article. Naturally, all errors remain our sole responsibility.
2. Third parties are defined as "individuals and groups who are neither candidates nor political parties" (Canada, Chief Electoral Officer, 1997: 6). In common usage, the term can be taken as more or less synonymous with interest groups.

3. Jacobson (p. 55) notes, however, that interest groups are not automatically successful when they target incumbents for defeat: "... only one (Senator [Howard] Cannon of Nevada) of the nine incumbents who made NCPAC's final 1982 hit list was defeated, and he had more serious problems. There is considerable evidence that NCPAC's tactics actually backfired in 1982 as targeted candidates used the specter of NCPAC to raise money and rally support."
4. Better known as the Lortie Commission, after its chair, Pierre Lortie.
5. More detailed treatments of this subject can be found in Hiebert, 1989-90; Hiebert, 1991; Cross, 1994; and Bakvis and Smith, 1997.
6. See Hiebert (1991: 12-13) and Canada, RCERPF (1991: v.1: 327-28) for more in-depth discussions of the early attempts to regulate election finance in Canada. The authors acknowledge that this search for equity was, and should be, a legitimate objective of election expense legislation, although we have doubts that this has been the sole concern of regulators at the federal level (see our conclusion, below).
7. Cited in Hiebert (1991: 14). It is surely worth noting here that Roach was hardly the embodiment of the well-heeled plutocrat seeking to "buy" an election outcome. Indeed, in the three attempts to prosecute violations of the third-party spending restrictions between 1974 and 1983, not one of the defendants resembles the profile of the "wealthy" interests supposedly targeted by the regulations. Aside from Roach, Brian Risdon was charged (*R. v. Risdon*, 1978) for distributing leaflets during a by-election which denounced David Crombie for allegedly being dishonest. Crombie, as Mayor of Toronto, had fired Risdon from his job as the city's chief plumbing inspector. Risdon was found guilty and fined \$50. In 1980, an advertising firm, Publicis communicateur conseil, pleaded guilty to violating the *Canada Elections Act* for having sponsored six billboards bearing the message "Oui à Trudeau" during the federal election that year. It was fined \$600. See the discussion in Canada RCERPF (1991: v.1: 419n.). We mention these cases simply to point out that while the plutocratic big fish may be the stated targets of the election finance regulatory net, it is often paradoxically the eccentric, crackpot or malcontent minnows that are the easiest to catch.
8. It is interesting to note the examples of the harmful effects of third-party spending adduced by the federal government before Judge Medhurst (all cited in Hiebert, 1989-90: 84n.): an advertisement attacking a Liberal candidate by the Jewish Public Relations Committee in the riding of Kitchener-Waterloo during the 1980 election, at a time when the candidate could not respond; a threat by the International Fund for Animal Welfare to spend \$3 million to defeat Liberal candidates in Metropolitan Toronto who did not support the organization's position on ending the seal hunt; advertisements by the NCC during the 1979 and 1980 elections targeting registered candidates, and costing \$150,000 and \$160,000 respectively; billboards, signs, and flyers sponsored by a coalition opposing Jim Coutts, Liberal candidate in Spadina-Toronto in a 1981 by-election. Apart from the NCC, it would be difficult to describe any of these groups as examples of the "monied corporate interests" about which the proponents of strict spending regulations are so worried. Even the NCC, we would argue, has more of a *poujadiste*, or populist flavour than a group like, for example, the Business Council on National Issues.
9. Hiebert (1989-90: 79) acknowledges that "the threat interest groups were thought to impose [sic] did not materialize in the 1984 election." She speculates that this was because the groups had little time to organize after the Medhurst decision (and after the federal government announced in mid-campaign that it would not

prosecute violations of the *Act* outside of Alberta), and they had been warned by then Justice Minister Donald Johnston that election spending would be “closely monitored.” In fact, the 1993 and 1997 federal elections reinforce our view that the “threat” posed by interest groups in Canada has always been exaggerated.

10. Emphasis in the original. The NCC website is <http://www.citizenscoalition.org/about.html>. While it is true that the NCC receives no government funding, the source of its contributions remains a closely guarded secret. In an interview with the authors, Nicholls claimed that his group receives “mainly individual contributions,” with some corporate (especially small business) backing. Faced with the Chief Electoral Officer’s recently stated intention to require disclosure of third-party contributions, NCC president David Somerville affirmed belligerently that “[w]e have absolutely no intention of getting the permission of the state in order to exercise our freedom of speech.”
11. A photocopy of the ad was provided to us by the NCC’s Communications Director, Gerry Nicholls.
12. Hiebert (1991: 27-28), based on interviews with David Somerville, estimates that the NCC spent \$700,000 on its anti-NDP campaign *before* the election was called, and another \$150,000 during the campaign itself. Newspaper accounts of that period put the total figure at \$500,000 (MacQueen, 1988).
13. The Reform Party MP was John Cummins, representing the riding of Delta-South Richmond in British Columbia. Cummins was the only member of his caucus not to opt out of the parliamentary pension plan.
14. The results from the Ontario riding of Markham were excluded from the analysis, since the candidate, Jag Bhaduria, had been expelled from the Liberal caucus and not renominated by the party. He ran as an independent in the only riding won by the Progressive Conservatives in the province. We are grateful to Gerry Nicholls of the NCC for providing us with a list of the candidates targeted during the 1997 election.
15. The use of the provincial party vote swing control reflects the importance of regional considerations in Canadian voting. The mean variance in provincial swing by party was 7.5 percent. However this figure was skewed by a disproportionately greater swing in the Atlantic region. The mean variance in the other six provinces was 4.4 percent, a figure comparable to mean swings in Britain and the United States as reported in Donald E. Stokes, “Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces,” in W.N. Chambers and W.D. Burnham, *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 192.
16. Electoral redistribution was implemented between the 1993 and 1997 elections, but Elections Canada made available the 1993 results transposed into the newly redistributed boundaries.
17. Had the mean national party vote swing been used as the control instead, the figure would have been a directionally consistent but weaker 1.5 percent.
18. It seems counterintuitive that interest groups like the NCC would continue to spend large sums of money at election time when these campaigns have little or no success (or, in the extreme, are counterproductive). We would suggest, however, that campaigns like Operation Pork Chop are geared as much toward publicizing the aims and objectives of the group as they are at “knocking off” candidates and parties. Moreover, the NCC has been able to create the widespread *perception* of its electoral strength, aided by the uncritical attitude of the media and some academic observers. Testing this hypothesis, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

19. Apart from the NDP, which it describes as “openly and aggressively anti-life. Despite the fact that there are a few good pro-life people in its ranks, the [NDP] as a whole is closed to the pro-life movement” (Campaign Life Coalition, 1997: 2).
20. “There are many genuinely pro-life politicians in anti-life parties who have had the courage to act according to their consciences, even when it has meant defying their parties and party leaders, and who have willingly suffered the consequences ... There should be no question that these people are deserving of the continued support of pro-life voters ...” (Campaign Life Coalition, 1997: 16).
21. See Kay et al. (1991: 146-149) for a more detailed discussion of the effectiveness of Campaign Life’s electoral intervention in 1988.
22. Campaign Life’s attitude towards the Reform Party was instructive: while a significant number of individual Reform candidates were described as “solidly pro-life,” they did not receive the group’s endorsement because they “supported Reform Party policy,” which Campaign Life dismisses as “wrong-headed” and “disastrous.” On the issues of abortion and euthanasia, Reform “requires individual MPs to vote according to ‘consensus’ (simple majority opinion) in their ridings — even if to do so would be to go against their consciences ...” (Campaign Life Coalition, 1997: 2).
23. The information is taken from Campaign Life’s website, http://www.lifesite.net/election_97. The gay rights issue centred on Bill C-33, which added sexual orientation to the Human Rights Act and “was strongly opposed by a wide coalition of pro-family groups and others across the nation.” The Catholic Insight survey was also included in Campaign Life’s 1997 Voters’ Guide.
24. Louise Laporte, Resource Officer. A newspaper report (Howard 1997a) indicated that PSAC had “committed \$300,000 in advertising to steer voters away from the Liberals.”
25. A mission statement of sorts can be found at the NFA’s website, <http://www.nfa.ca> — which boasts that it “captured 47.9% of votes in Yahoo! Canada Readers’ Choice Poll.” Like the Reform Party, the NFA has been quick to exploit the World Wide Web as an instrument of political communications, and its website displays a greater degree of sophistication (to our admittedly untrained eyes) than many of its competitors.
26. According to Allan Rock himself, “[a] lot of people have been upset about C-68, fundamentally because of the lies told by the Reform party and their fellow travellers, but my sense from speaking with candidates is that it’s not a vote-determining issue ... I don’t think it’s going to decide any election” (cited in Campbell, 1997).
27. Tomlinson (1997); see also Tomlinson (n.d.). In the interview, Tomlinson explained that his organization was practising “21st century politics,” much like Newt Gingrich and his fellow Republicans in the United States. He placed special emphasis on the NFA’s “Simon Jester Program” (the name, apparently, is taken from a character in a science fiction novel by Robert Heinlein, *The Moon is a Harsh Mistress*), which refers to individuals who join one of the mainline parties and try to return it to its roots (classical liberalism or classical conservatism). Admittedly, this kind of rhetoric seems just a step up from the proliferating New Age conspiracy theories that typify our era. Trying to ban it, however, would in all probability simply provide the NFA and its ideological fellow travellers with a handy martyr.
28. Howard (1997a). Howard is quoting Professor Robert Hackett of Simon Fraser University.

29. In a study for the Lortie Commission (Tanguay and Kay, 1991), we found evidence at the constituency level to suggest that the interest groups themselves had perceptions of the issue of third-party funding quite at odds with the stereotypical views that the intellectual elite frequently ascribe to them.
30. We heartily endorse Rick Salutin's assessment of the 1988 election (and it should be remembered that Salutin was on the losing side of the free trade debate): "... for long moments the Canadian election of 1988 felt strangely Athenian, because the people kept trying to vote on issues rather than candidates, and to enter the fray directly themselves, even as the custodians of political realism strove mightily to shift them back to their traditional role as mere voters for leaders and parties. We went to an election, and politics kept breaking out" (1989: 9).
31. It is probably dangerous to be quoting approvingly from a monograph published by the Fraser Institute, since the defenders of the conventional wisdom tend to portray their opponents as closet Reformers, neo-liberals, or worse. This issue, we contend, is too complex to fit neatly into the Procrustean bed of right-left ideology. One of the few academic pieces to take the positive role of interest groups seriously is Cross (1994).

References

- Bakvis, Herman and Jennifer Smith. (1997). "Third-Party Advertising and Electoral Democracy: The Political Theory of the Alberta Court of Appeal in *Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General)* [1996]," *Canadian Public Policy* 23:2 (June), 164-178.
- Burton, Randy. (1988). "Coalition Down on Broadbent," *Saskatchewan Star-Phoenix*, August 24.
- Campaign Life Coalition. (1997). *Voters' Guide*. June.
- Campbell, Murray. (1997). "Gun control triggers emotions," *The Globe and Mail*, May 23.
- Canada. (1966). *Report of the Committee on Elections Expenses* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer).
- Canada. Chief Electoral Officer. (1997). *Report on the 36th General Election* (Ottawa).
- Canada. Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing [RCERPF]. (1991). *Reforming Electoral Democracy*, Volume I (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services).
- Canadian Press. (1993). "Citizen's Coalition plans to campaign against 'big government' Liberals," *Halifax Daily News*, October 20.
- Cross, William. (1994). "Regulating Independent Expenditures in Federal Elections," *Canadian Public Policy* 20:3, 253-64.
- Fraser, Graham. (1997a). "Quebec referendum rules quashed," *Globe and Mail*, October 10.
- Fraser, Graham. (1997b). "'Gag-law' ruling infuriates citizens coalition," *Globe and Mail*, October 13.
- Hibbing, John R. (1991). *Congressional Careers* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press).
- Hiebert, Janet. (1989-90). "Fair Elections and Freedom of Expression Under the Charter," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 24:4 (Winter), 72-86.
- _____. (1991). "Interest Groups and Canadian Federal Elections," in F. Leslie Seidle, ed., *Interest Groups and Elections in Canada* [Volume 2 of the Research Studies for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing] (Toronto: Dundurn Press), 3-76.
- _____. (1998). "Money and Elections: Can Citizens Participate on Fair Terms amidst Unrestricted Spending?," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* XXXI:1 (March), 91-111.
- Howard, Ross. (1997a). "Interest-group ads enter campaign war," *The Globe and Mail*, May 10.
- _____. (1997b). "Police billboards featuring murderers stir strong protest," *The Globe and Mail*, May 22.
- Jacobson, Gary C. (1984). "Money in the 1980 and 1982 Congressional Elections," in Michael J. Malbin, ed. *Money and Politics in the United States* (Chatham NJ and Washington DC: Chatham House Publishers and American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research), 38-69.
- Johnston, Richard, André Blais, Henry E. Brady, and Jean Crête. (1992). *Letting the People Decide* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press).
- Kay, Barry J., Ronald Lambert, Steven Brown and James Curtis. (1991). "Single-Issue Interest Groups and the Canadian Electorate: The Case of Abortion in 1988," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 26:2 (Summer), 142-154.
- Kendall, David. (1993). "TV ads rip into Liberals," *The Toronto Sun*, October 20.
- MacQueen, Ken. (1988). "Lobby group launches anti-NDP campaign," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, August 4.

*Third-Party Advertising and the Threat to Electoral Democracy in Canada:
The Mouse that Roared*

- National Citizens' Coalition [NCC]. (1997a). "NCC Announces Targets for 'Operation Pork Chop,'" *News Release*, May 5.
- _____. (1997b). "NCC Takes Operation Pork Chop to New Brunswick," *News Release*, May 22.
- _____. (1997c). "Operation Pork Chop Saves Taxpayers Money," *News Release*, June 2.
- Nicholls, Gerry [NCC Communications Director]. (1997). *Personal Interview*, Toronto. October 10.
- Ovenden, Norm. (1997). "Targets of NCC want financial backers named," *Edmonton Journal*, October 21.
- Palda, Filip. (1991). *Election Finance Regulation in Canada: A Critical Review* (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute).
- Salutin, Rick. (1989). *Waiting for Democracy* (Markham: Viking).
- Stokes, Donald E. (1967). "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces," in W.N. Chambers and W.D. Burnham, *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Tanguay, A. Brian, and Barry J. Kay. (1991). "Political Activity of Local Interest Groups," in F. Leslie Seidle, ed. *Interest Groups and Elections in Canada* [Volume 2 of the Research Studies for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing] (Toronto: Dundurn Press), 77-115.
- Tomlinson, David A. (1997). *Telephone Interview*. May 28.
- _____. (n.d.). *Party Time! An Irreverent Guide to Political Activism for the Canadian Firearms Community* (Calgary: The National Firearms Association).

Manon Tremblay*

Femmes et représentation à la Chambre des communes du Canada : un modèle des orientations du rôle de représentation des femmes

Résumé

L'objectif de cette recherche vise à mieux comprendre de quelle façon les élu·es fédérales au Canada envisagent leur rôle de représentation par rapport à la population féminine. En vue de saisir les orientations que les députées canadiennes donnent à leur rôle de représentation de la population féminine, l'auteure a élaboré un modèle composé de quatre types-idéaux qui reflètent autant de façon d'envisager la citoyenneté politique des femmes : les traditionnelles, les humanistes, les égalitaires, les féministes. Les données présentées proviennent d'une série d'entrevues réalisées avec 44 des 53 femmes élues à la Chambre des communes du Canada en octobre 1993. Une mise en perspective est aussi effectuée avec les résultats obtenus d'une recherche similaire menée en 1990-1991 auprès de députées du Québec à la Chambre des communes et à l'Assemblée nationale. Une très nette majorité des députées interviewées en 1994 ont dit se reconnaître une responsabilité de représenter les femmes. Toutefois, par-delà cette unité d'acquiescement, ces dernières donnent des orientations très diversifiées à leur rôle de représentation, diversité dont rendent compte les types-idéaux développés pour cette recherche. La conclusion aborde certaines questions liées aux tensions entre représentation dite « générale » et représentation des femmes.

Abstract

The aim of this study is to better understand how women elected as MPs in Canada perceive their role as representatives of the female population. In order to grasp the way in which women MPs define their role as representatives of the female population, the author has developed a model comprising four ideal types reflecting as many different ways of understanding the political citizenry of women : traditionalist, humanist, egalitarian, feminist. The data used in this study are drawn from a series of interviews conducted with 44 of the 53 women elected to the House of Commons in October 1993. Those data are put in perspective by means of a comparison with the findings of a similar study made in 1990-1991 on women elected as MPs and MLAs at the House of Commons and the Québec National Assembly. A clear majority of the women interviewed in 1994 acknowledge that they have a responsibility as representatives of the female population. However, beyond this apparent unanimity, they entertain a wide variety of views on the exact nature of this representative role, and the ideal-types developed for the purpose of this study account for this variety. The conclusion addresses certain issues surrounding the tensions between the

so-called "general" representation of the public and the representation of the female population.

Il circule une idée à l'effet que les femmes en politique entretiendraient une relation privilégiée avec la population féminine. Plusieurs arguments ont été avancés pour alimenter cette idée. L'un de ceux-ci veut que les femmes politiques soient plus en mesure que les hommes politiques de parler et d'agir au nom des femmes parce qu'elles sont issues d'une catégorie sociale désavantagée et qu'elles ont subi certaines discriminations, (Bachrach 1967, Klein 1984, Sigel 1996). Un deuxième argument suggère que les politiciennes et la population féminine entretiennent une relation privilégiée par l'entremise des groupes de femmes : plusieurs femmes politiques ont été membres de groupes de femmes qui les solliciteraient par le moyen d'interpellations diverses (Boles 1991; Carroll 1992; Dodson et Carroll 1991 : 95; Thomas 1994 : 55-84). Un troisième argument laisse entendre que les politiciennes auraient une relation privilégiée aux autres femmes en raison des dossiers dans lesquels elles s'impliquent — ou des dossiers que la classe politique masculine leur confie — et pour lesquels elles sont vues comme plus compétentes : la famille et les enfants, l'éducation, la santé, l'aide sociale, etc. (Burrell 1994 : 162; Darcy, Welch et Clark 1994 : 16-17; Huddy et Terkildsen 1993). Un quatrième argument propose que les femmes politiques elles-mêmes verraient dans leurs électrices une source d'intérêt et de soutien qui n'a pas de commune mesure chez les hommes (Fox 1997 : 46; Reingold 1992). Parallèlement, nombre d'études issues de différents pays ont montré que des femmes politiques évoluant à différents paliers de gouvernement se reconnaissent la responsabilité de représenter les femmes (Burrell 1994 : 163; Mezey 1980; Reingold 1992; Sawyer et Simms 1984 : 127; Thomas, 1994 : 55-84; Thompson 1980; Vallance 1979 : 83-96).

Qu'en est-il au Canada? Les femmes politiques canadiennes se reconnaissent-elles une responsabilité de représenter les femmes? Et, le cas échéant, que signifie pour elles cette représentation? L'objectif de cette recherche est de mieux comprendre de quelle façon les élues fédérales au Canada envisagent leur rôle de représentation par rapport à la population féminine. Une telle compréhension ne peut faire l'économie d'une réflexion sur la notion de représentation en général et son rapport avec les femmes en particulier.

Femmes et représentation politique : une alliance problématique

De façon générale, la représentation politique « [...] means the making present *in some sense* of something which is nevertheless *not* present literally or in fact. » (Pitkin 1967 : 8-9; les italiques sont de l'auteure) Cette « présence » peut passer par des mots ou des images, comme elle peut aussi passer par des personnes qui agissent à la place d'autres personnes. Dans ce dernier cas, la représentation politique recouvre au moins deux lectures,

l'une descriptive (ou *standing for*), l'autre substantive (ou *acting for*) : la première repose sur ce qu'est cette personne qui représente (en d'autres mots ses caractéristiques sociales comme le sexe, l'âge, la race, etc.), l'autre sur ce qu'elle dit et fait (soit son activité de représentation). Alors, la personne qui représente peut adapter son rôle de représentation de différentes façons : elle peut être déléguée ou *trustee*, ou elle peut adopter un rôle mixte nommé *politicos* (Birch 1964; Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan et Ferguson 1962).¹

Au premier abord, la représentation substantive semble répondre davantage aux objectifs de certains groupes de femmes au Canada que la représentation descriptive.² Pourtant, ces deux conceptions — l'une qui privilégie le corps, l'autre les idées — sont intimement liées, comme en témoignent certains arguments avancés pour augmenter le nombre de femmes en politique : un plus grand nombre de femmes élues permettra non seulement de légitimer des institutions démocratiques, mais de réduire l'écart présent entre représentation et participation; il en va d'une simple question de justice et d'équité, les femmes constituant plus de la moitié de la population mais moins du quart des membres des Parlements; il s'agit d'offrir aux filles et aux femmes non seulement des modèles de femmes activement engagées en politique, mais, sur le plan symbolique, de marquer les luttes féministes et de signifier la fin d'une exclusion historique des femmes de la *polis*. Un dernier argument — qui retiendra davantage mon attention dans le cadre de cet article — veut qu'en raison de leur socialisation, de leurs valeurs et de leurs expériences de vie, les femmes amèneraient en politique des perspectives uniques. Dès lors, la sous-représentation des femmes en politique signifierait non seulement que la gouverne politique se prive de points de vue et de compétences spécifiques, mais que les besoins ou les intérêts des femmes ne trouveraient actuellement pas d'expression et de satisfaction dans la sphère publique. Ce lien ainsi établi entre élites politiques féminines et population des femmes a suscité plusieurs débats, particulièrement en théories féministes,³ qui ont mis au jour les difficultés nombreuses à penser la représentation politique des femmes. Je mentionne ici seulement quelques points soulevés par ces débats.⁴

Un premier ordre de questionnements attirera l'attention sur la notion même de représentation politique. Puisque les demandes d'inclusion à l'espace politique ont surtout été formulées et portées par les nouveaux mouvements sociaux, il est permis de poser la question suivante : les mouvements sociaux seraient-ils des porte-parole plus appropriés à la représentation politique des femmes que les Parlements? La notion d'« intérêts », inhérente à l'idée de représentation politique, a aussi fait l'objet de questionnements. Telle qu'elle est définie et habituellement appliquée par les sciences politiques, cette notion est étrangère aux expériences des femmes en ce sens qu'elle s'inscrit dans des prémisses individualistes qui expriment une conception androcentriste de l'être

humain; d'où une préférence pour la notion de besoins, moins conflictuelle et plus orientée vers une vision humaniste. Qui plus est, en vertu de sa logique même, l'intérêt réduit et normalise. Or, les expériences des femmes se pensent bien davantage en termes de diversité que d'unicité.

Ce qui amène à un second ordre de questions, concernant les femmes politiques et, notamment, leur capacité de représenter les femmes. Si, en raison de leur socialisation, de leurs valeurs et de leurs expériences de vie, les femmes sont mieux en mesure que les hommes de représenter la population des femmes, alors comment des élues majoritairement blanches, hétérosexuelles, de classe moyenne-supérieure, avec un haut degré de scolarité (pour ne nommer que ces critères) peuvent-elles prétendre représenter les femmes issues de minorités raciales et ethniques, les lesbiennes, les femmes appartenant à des groupes économiquement et culturellement défavorisés, bref, comment ces élues — elles-mêmes fort diversifiées — peuvent-elles représenter le réseau complexe des diversités qui tisse la population féminine? Toute la question de l'identité et de l'expérience est ainsi posée et son lien avec la représentation politique — non sans éveiller, par ailleurs, certaines réserves face à ce qui pourrait être interprété comme une pensée essentialiste. En outre, quelles pourraient être les modalités de communication entre les élites politiques féminines et les femmes? Ces premières seraient-elles « imputables » à ces secondes et, le cas échéant, selon quels mécanismes?

Un troisième ordre de réflexions porte sur la notion de groupes. Si l'on accepte le groupe comme base de représentation politique, comment celui-ci serait-il défini? Quels critères inspireraient la sélection de ces groupes sujets à une telle représentation? Qui aurait la capacité de définir ces critères de sélection? Qui participerait à cette sélection des groupes et quels processus l'encadreraient? Quels mécanismes permettraient d'identifier ce que veulent ou pensent ces groupes propres à une représentation politique? Comment la ou, peut-être les personnes responsables de représenter un groupe seraient-elles sélectionnées? Dans l'hypothèse où une pluralité de groupes se « qualifieraient » pour une représentation au sein d'une société politique, auraient-ils tous le même statut, les mêmes pouvoirs, les mêmes obligations? Young (1989) suggère, par exemple, que les groupes désavantagés socialement disposent de certains mécanismes (comme un droit de veto sur les politiques les concernant) qui leur permettraient d'exprimer leurs expériences et leurs perspectives distinctes. Ces questions sont importantes, car elles posent le problème de l'exclusion/inclusion de certains groupes à la société politique.

En somme, ce lien — souvent posé mais rarement questionné — entre l'élection de femmes et l'expression dans la sphère publique des besoins ou des intérêts des femmes est riche de défis théoriques et pratiques eu égard à la représentation des femmes. Pourtant, en dépit des questionnements nombreux évoqués à l'instant, il ne semble pas pour autant qu'il faille

désertent les institutions politiques : d'abord, parce que la représentation politique des femmes implique *aussi* — mais pas seulement — la présence de femmes dans les institutions démocratiques (ce que Phillips, 1995, nomme une « politique d'inclusion »); ensuite, parce que les décisions politiques seraient alors prises sans les femmes et que ces décisions peuvent avoir des retombées importantes pour elles; enfin, parce que les politiciennes intègrent les femmes à leur rôle de représentation politique, et ce, de façon fort diversifiée, diversité qui, au demeurant, reflète le fait qu'elles n'ont pas toutes la même compréhension de la citoyenneté politique des femmes. C'est l'idée que défend le présent article.

Un modèle des orientations du rôle de représentation politique des femmes

Comme il a été mentionné déjà, plusieurs études ont montré qu'une majorité de femmes en politique se reconnaissent la responsabilité de représenter les femmes. D'autres travaux ont approfondi cette problématique, mettant au jour la diversité des orientations que les politiciennes adoptent dans leur rôle de représentation des femmes. En d'autres mots, par-delà un acquiescement à l'idée de représenter la population féminine, les femmes politiques envisagent de façon fort diversifiée leur rôle de représentation : certaines valorisent les rôles traditionnels des femmes, d'autres pensent en termes de droits de l'Homme, d'autres font de l'égalité formelle des sexes leur cheval de bataille, alors que d'autres guident leur rôle de représentation du principe d'égalité substantive des femmes et des hommes.

L'objectif de la présente section est de construire un modèle théorique inspiré des résultats d'études effectuées tant dans des régimes politiques présidentiel que parlementaire⁵, modèle par lequel je cernerai ensuite les orientations que les députées canadiennes donnent à leur rôle de représentation de la population féminine. Le modèle proposé comporte quatre types-idéaux qui reflètent autant de façon d'envisager un rôle de représentation des femmes : les traditionnelles, les humanistes, les égalitaires et les féministes.

Les traditionnelles : Elles interprètent leur rôle de représentation des femmes en termes maternels, l'articulant autour du principe de la division traditionnelle des rôles selon les sexes, division elle-même légitimée par une argumentation à saveur naturaliste : aux hommes le public, aux femmes le privé. Leur représentation des femmes consiste alors en une valorisation des rôles traditionnels féminins en tant qu'épouses, mères et ménagères, rôles en vertu desquels les femmes entretiennent un rapport privilégié au quotidien. Ces rôles féminins ne sont toutefois pas pensés en termes d'infériorité, mais bien de complémentarité avec leur nécessaire contre-partie, les rôles masculins traditionnels. En termes d'argumentation, les traditionnelles actualisent leur représentation des femmes, par exemple, en préférant le mariage à l'union de fait, en plaidant

pour un salaire au travail ménager ou en imputant la criminalité juvénile à la désagrégation du tissu familial. Ceci dit, les traditionnelles n'ont pas le monopole du discours sur les rôles maternels; les féministes peuvent aussi intervenir à cet égard, par exemple en plaidant pour la reconnaissance de la diversité des nouvelles formes familiales.

Les humanistes : L'essentiel de ce type-idéal est rendu par l'idée « Les femmes sont des Hommes comme les autres ». Les humanistes articulent leur rôle de représentation des femmes autour de la notion des droits de l'Homme : il ne s'agit pas de représenter des femmes en tant que femmes, mais des humains et, conséquemment, les femmes. Or, tous les Hommes doivent pouvoir jouir de Justice, de Liberté, d'Égalité, doivent pouvoir être évalués selon leurs capacités, etc., et ce, sans discriminations associées aux caractéristiques de l'un ou de l'autre sexe. Les humanistes représentent les femmes par défaut: il s'agit de prendre la défense des personnes les plus démunies, où se retrouvent des femmes, de lutter contre toutes les formes de discrimination parce qu'il s'agit de traitements injustes, etc.

Les égalitaires : « Je ne suis pas féministe, mais... » résume le contenu de ce type-idéal. Reflétant la première vague du mouvement des femmes, les égalitaires adoptent la perspective libérale des droits des femmes; elles font de l'égalité de principe — c'est-à-dire devant la loi — des femmes et des hommes une composante centrale de leur rôle de représentation. Celui-ci consiste en une valorisation des rôles publics indifférenciés sur la base du sexe ce qui, dans les faits, pose le masculin comme étalon de mesure : il s'agit de placer les femmes sur un pied d'égalité avec les hommes, de les faire accéder au statut dont ils jouissent, l'inverse n'étant pas problématisé. Lorsqu'elles seront plus présentes sur la scène publique, les mentalités à l'égard des femmes changeront et, partant, les discriminations qui les frappent aujourd'hui disparaîtront. Pour cela, les égalitaires insistent sur l'importance d'offrir des modèles de femmes publiques, révélant par là l'orientation d'abord individualiste de leur analyse des droits des femmes. En termes d'argumentation, les politiciennes qui pensent leur rôle de représentation des femmes selon une telle orientation lutteront contre le sexisme, revendiqueront le droit pour les femmes d'accéder comme les hommes à l'éducation supérieure et aux postes réservés traditionnellement aux hommes (dans la haute fonction publique, la magistrature, etc.), de recevoir un salaire égal pour un travail identique, etc.

Les féministes : Elles s'inscrivent dans le discours de la deuxième vague du mouvement des femmes; elles se nomment féministes. En effet, si comme les égalitaires elles endossent le principe de l'égalité entre les sexes, c'est pour l'interpréter différemment, soit en termes d'équité : moins qu'une égalité de principe, les féministes recherchent une égalité dans les faits. Pour elles, l'égalité ne signifie pas « mêmété » — ou traitement identique —, mais sensibilité aux différences, c'est-à-dire compréhension du fait que les femmes et les hommes connaissent des modalités différentes d'insertion à la société politique, et que ces modalités varient aussi parmi les

femmes elles-mêmes et les hommes eux-mêmes; elles inscrivent ainsi leur analyse de la situation des femmes dans une perspective sociétale qui est sensible à la diversité. En d'autres mots, au lieu de traiter de la même façon des unités au départ inégales — ce qui reproduit l'inégalité sous le couvert de l'égalité —, les féministes proposent de traiter de façon différente des unités au départ inégales, et ce, pour arriver à une égalité de finalité. Elles sont conscientes que cet objectif signifie aussi de questionner les rapports que les hommes entretiennent au privé; dans l'état actuel des rapports femmes-hommes, les rôles privés féminins sont sources de discriminations systémiques et influent sur l'insertion sociale des femmes. En termes d'argumentation, les féministes voient leur rôle de représentation des femmes comme un tremplin pour dénoncer les discriminations systémiques envers les femmes, pour valoriser différentes formes d'action positive, pour revendiquer un salaire égal pour un travail équivalent et des garderies afin que les femmes puissent réellement accéder aux marchés des études et du travail, etc.

Bien sûr, il s'agit de types-idéaux; aucune députée n'y correspondra tout à fait, mais toutes s'en rapprocheront plus ou moins. En outre, ces types se chevauchent; une élue peut rejoindre le type de la « traditionnelle » lorsqu'elle valorise le rôle traditionnel des mères, mais celui de l'« égalitaire » lorsqu'elle prend position en faveur de l'accès d'un plus grand nombre de femmes en politique et celui des « féministes » si, en plus, elle se prononce pour l'adoption de mesures d'action positive pour arriver plus rapidement à la parité des sexes en politique. Ces chevauchements expliquent que la somme du nombre des députées pour chacune des catégories du tableau 1 excède le nombre des élues interviewées pour cette recherche.

Enfin, ce modèle en quatre types-idéaux semble pouvoir rejoindre la diversité partisane qui caractérisait la Chambre des communes au lendemain de l'élection de 1993. Si celle-ci a pratiquement éclipsé le Nouveau Parti démocratique (NPD) de la Chambre des communes (un parti traditionnellement allié des groupes de femmes), elle a aussi signifié l'entrée de plusieurs députées, au Bloc québécois (BQ) ou au Parti libéral du Canada (PLC), qui avaient une expérience avec les groupes de femmes (donc susceptibles de rejoindre les types « égalitaires » et « féministes »). Par ailleurs, en dépit du fait que le Parti conservateur soit pratiquement décimé après l'élection de 1993, les idées conservatrices, elles, entrent en force à la Chambre, avec l'élection de 52 députées et députés du Parti réformiste. Ce parti ne cache pas ses orientations pro-familiaristes (notamment, la famille nucléaire traditionnelle — et hétérosexuelle), une préférence associée au type-idéal des « traditionnelles ». Quant au type-idéal des « humanistes », par sa valorisation du Citoyen générique (auquel font référence les députées lorsqu'elles disent être en politique pour représenter leur circonscription),

il semble susceptible d'inspirer des élues de toutes les formations partisanses.

Tableau 1

Principales composantes du modèle des orientations du rôle de représentation des femmes, nombre et parti des députées rejoignant chaque type-idéal

Types-idéaux	Composantes	Nb (/44)*	Parti**
Traditionnelles	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Citoyenneté politique des femmes interprétée en termes maternels•Valorisation des rôles traditionnels féminins	4	1 PC 3 PLC
Humanistes	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Citoyenneté politique des femmes interprétée en termes des droits de l'Homme•Valorisation de valeurs exemplaires	18	2 BQ 14 PLC 2 PR
Égalitaires	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Citoyenneté politique des femmes interprétée en termes des droits des femmes•Égalité de principe des femmes et des hommes•Traiter les femmes comme des hommes	26	7 BQ 17 PLC 2 PR
Féministes	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Citoyenneté politique des femmes interprétée en termes des droits des femmes•Égalité de fait des femmes et des hommes•Traiter différemment les femmes et les hommes	10	2 BQ 1 NPD 7 PLC

* Ce résultat doit être interprété de la façon suivante : des 44 femmes interviewées dans le cadre de cette recherche, 4 ont exprimé des idées quant à l'orientation de leur rôle de représentation des femmes qui rejoignaient certains des indicateurs associés au type-idéal des « traditionnelles ».

** BQ : Bloc québécois; NPD : Nouveau Parti démocratique du Canada; PC : Parti conservateur; PLC : Parti libéral du Canada; PR : Parti réformiste.

Méthodologie

Cette recherche repose sur une série d'entrevues effectuées avec 44 des 53 députées élues à la Chambre des communes du Canada en octobre 1993.⁶ Le

taux de participation des élues s'élève à 83 p. 100. La plupart des entrevues ont eu lieu entre les mois de février et novembre 1994, le plus souvent au bureau des députées à Ottawa. De type semi-directif et d'une durée moyenne de 50 minutes, toutes les entrevues ont été enregistrées (sauf une), puis retranscrites intégralement. La thématique centrale de l'entrevue était, de façon générale, la représentation politique et, de façon plus particulière, la représentation politique des femmes. Plusieurs questions ont alors été posées, mais les résultats à deux d'entre elles seulement seront ici analysés : a) « Nous parlions de représentation politique tout à l'heure. Personnellement, croyez-vous avoir la responsabilité particulière de représenter la population féminine? »⁷; b) Si la députée acquiesçait à une telle responsabilité, alors la question suivante lui était soumise : « Que signifie pour vous représenter les femmes? Autrement dit, quel sens attribuez-vous au fait de représenter les femmes? »

L'analyse des résultats à ces deux questions sera mise en perspective avec les résultats obtenus à l'occasion d'une étude similaire menée en 1990-1991 auprès de 24 députées du Québec à la Chambre des communes du Canada et à l'Assemblée nationale du Québec (Tremblay et Pelletier 1995).⁸ Cette mise en perspective a pour objectif d'élargir la portée des observations qualitatives faites lors de l'étude de cas — somme toute relativement restreinte — que constitue les élues fédérales en 1994.

Des orientations plurielles en vue de représenter les femmes

Une très nette majorité des 44 députées qui ont participé à cette recherche ont dit se reconnaître une responsabilité de représenter les femmes, soit 35 (ou 79,5 p. 100).⁹ Cette proportion est non seulement supérieure à celle obtenue lors de la recherche effectuée auprès de députées québécoises en 1990-1991 (soit 66,7 p. 100 ou 16 des 24 femmes parlementaires; voir Tremblay et Pelletier 1995 : 139), mais rejoint les chiffres de recherches effectuées aux États-Unis (Reingold 1992; Thompson 1980) et en Europe (Hedlund 1988; Phillips 1980 : 159-160). Une explication possible de l'écart entre les résultats de 1990-1991 et ceux de 1994 pourrait résider dans le *membership* à des groupes de femmes. Aux États-Unis, des recherches ont montré que les femmes politiques qui sont — ou qui ont été — membres de groupes de femmes sont plus sensibles aux thématiques qui concernent les femmes que les politiciennes qui n'ont pas connu un tel engagement (Carroll 1992; Dodson et Carroll 1991 : 44-45). Or, 30 des 44 députées (ou 68,2 p. 100) interrogées en 1994 avaient été membres de tels groupes. Il n'est toutefois pas possible d'aller plus loin avec cette hypothèse, la question de l'appartenance à un groupe de femmes n'ayant pas été posée en 1990-1991.

Ces 35 femmes qui se reconnaissent une responsabilité personnelle de représenter les femmes donnent toutefois à leur rôle de représentation des orientations très diversifiées. Les quatre types-idéaux élaborés plus tôt sont sollicités — quoique de façon inégale — par les perceptions qu'ont ces

élues de leur rôle de représentation des femmes : le modèle des égalitaires est celui qui, de loin, inspire le plus grand nombre de députées dans leur rôle de représentation des femmes (26 des 35 députées qui se reconnaissent une telle responsabilité), ensuite c'est le type-idéal des « humanistes » (18/35), puis celui des « féministes » (10/35), finalement des « traditionnelles » (4/35). Les députées libérales, qui sont les plus nombreuses en Chambre, sont aussi celles qui offrent la plus grande diversité intra-partisane en termes d'orientations du rôle de représentation politique des femmes; des libérales se retrouvent dans tous les types-idéaux. Des députées du Bloc québécois se retrouvent dans tous les types-idéaux, à l'exception du type des « traditionnelles », alors que des députées réformistes se retrouvent dans les types « humanistes » et « égalitaires ». ¹⁰ Sans étonnement, la seule députée conservatrice s'est retrouvée dans le type-idéal des « traditionnelles », alors que la députée néo-démocrate a rejoint le camp des « féministes ».

Les traditionnelles

Assurément, elles étaient minoritaires — mais tout de même présentes — à la Chambre des communes du Canada au lendemain de l'élection de 1993. Elles ne s'étaient guère manifestées davantage en 1990-1991. À ce moment, il avait été noté que des députées interprétaient leurs rôles politiques en termes maternels, qu'il y en avait pour endosser une conception spécialisée des rôles selon les sexes, ainsi qu'une conception naturaliste et essentialiste de la présence des femmes en politique (Tremblay et Pelletier 1995 : 157-159).

Certains de ces éléments se retrouvent aussi dans les propos de quelques élues fédérales en 1994. Ainsi, pour l'une d'entre elles, c'est naturellement que les femmes représentent les femmes : « Je pense que cela va sans dire que le simple fait d'être femme vous donne automatiquement une responsabilité, une imputabilité, supplémentaire. Je pense que l'un vient naturellement avec l'autre. » Ce raisonnement s'inscrit dans une conception descriptive de la représentation politique : en raison de ce qu'elles sont — c'est-à-dire des femmes —, les élues représentent celles qui leur ressemblent, c'est-à-dire les femmes. Il s'agit d'une représentation passive qui n'interpelle aucune activité ou aucun projet de représentation et dont la légitimité repose sur la conformité physique.

Le corps lie les députées aux femmes; mais le corps en tant qu'il se pose dans ses fonctions de maternité et de maternage devient aussi le médium qui permet de penser la citoyenneté des femmes (voir à cet effet Burt 1988; Dufresne 1997) :

même le fait que les femmes ont le droit d'être mères et de mettre des enfants au monde, même les mères qui désirent rester au foyer et élever leurs enfants, selon moi, sont défavorisées sur le plan financier et il faudrait changer nos lois pour qu'elles aient des avantages. Au lieu de payer par exemple les garderies, nous

devrions leur accorder un supplément de revenu pour qu'elles puissent rester chez elles et élever les enfants. Je pense qu'une des choses qui me préoccupent le plus en ce qui concerne la situation des femmes et des mères en particulier est que nous ne reconnaissons pas la maternité ou nous ne lui accordons pas la valeur que nous devrions sur les plans financier, politique et moral. Pour moi, c'est très important.

Les traditionnelles traduisent leur rôle de représentation des femmes en valorisant les rôles traditionnels féminins. Toutefois, dans une société qui fait de l'Économie un garant méta-social, cette valorisation ne passe plus par un discours sur l'instinct maternel, mais par des mesures de redistribution qui permettent aux femmes, qui le désirent, de rester à la maison pour élever leurs enfants. Une telle position a pour toile de fond le mouvement néo-conservateur qui a pris en force au Canada, particulièrement au cours des années 1980 (Bashevkin 1996). Outre de valoriser une conception passéiste des rôles selon les sexes, ce mouvement s'est aussi attaqué aux acquis des luttes féministes :

ces femmes qui sont restées au foyer et ont élevé leurs enfants et ont été fidèles à leurs maris durant 20 à 25 ans de mariage sont très désavantagées par notre Loi sur le divorce. Elles paient le prix de cette soi-disant libération des femmes. Je pense que cela aurait pu se faire d'une manière qui nous aurait permis de conserver tous nos avantages et de travailler très fort pour chercher à en obtenir plus, mais sans laisser aller ce que nous avons et sans perdre notre identité en tant que femmes. Je me sens très émotive à ce sujet parce que je pense que notre identité de femmes a été grandement compromise par les efforts que les femmes ont faits pour avoir des avantages financiers, sociaux et juridiques.

Les traditionnelles ne voient pas les rôles féminins en termes d'infériorité, mais de complémentarité avec les rôles masculins; ils interagissent dans une dynamique d'équilibre. Les luttes pour l'émancipation des femmes sont toutefois venues brouiller les cartes, allant jusqu'à remettre en question l'identité féminine, cette identité d'où les femmes tirent des compétences pouvant être bénéfiques à la gouverne politique : « Nous [les députées] comprenons peut-être davantage ce qu'il faut pour la famille, parce que nous la voyons sous un autre aspect. Les hommes ont toujours été ceux qui gagnaient le revenu et les femmes étaient supposées s'occuper de tout le reste, et ainsi de suite. Alors, nous la voyons différemment. » Des élues québécoises interrogées en 1990-1991 établissaient aussi un lien entre les expériences familiales des femmes et certaines retombées sur la gouverne politique. Une première députée s'était ainsi exprimée : « Notre expérience d'épouses, de mères, ou nos expériences tout à fait féminines — parce qu'on en a —, font qu'on est peut-être plus sensible à l'élément humain dans nos décisions. » (Tremblay et Pelletier 1995 : 158) Une seconde avait soutenu :

[...] nous les femmes, on est capable de coudre un bouton, on est capable de tenir une casserole, de prendre soin d'un petit, de consoler quelqu'un qui est mal pris et, en même temps, de décider des grandes affaires. On est capable de tout faire ça. Mais le quotidien est notre lot et donc on devient très utilitaire dans le sens d'être capable d'identifier les problèmes concrets que l'on a et de trouver des solutions concrètes. (Tremblay et Pelletier 1995 : 75)

Les humanistes

À la « femme-sexuée » (c'est-à-dire maternelle) des traditionnelles correspond la « femme-asexuée » (ou l'Homme) des humanistes. Ces dernières étaient non seulement très présentes à la Chambre des communes en 1993 (voir le tableau 1), mais le plus souvent leurs arguments s'entremêlaient avec ceux des égalitaires, moins souvent des féministes. Les humanistes ne représentent pas les femmes; elles représentent des êtres humains, c'est-à-dire toutes les personnes qui vivent dans leur circonscription électorale (parfois la nation entière). Cette vision n'est pas propre aux élues fédérales, ayant aussi été exprimée par des députées québécoises en 1990-1991 : « Je pense qu'on représente la population des êtres humains, que ce soit des hommes ou des femmes. » (Tremblay et Pelletier 1995 : 160) C'est par défaut que les femmes sont concernées, comme conséquence d'une activité ou d'un intérêt plus vaste de représentation politique :

Je crois personnellement [que] j'ai été élue par toutes les personnes de ma circonscription et que je les représente toutes. Qu'il s'agisse d'hommes ou de femmes. Je sais que j'apporte un aspect féminin, mais, personnellement, je crois que je représente tout le monde et [...] je m'aperçois que je sens ou je sais que les femmes sont encore l'objet de préjugés et qu'il faut apporter des correctifs. Mais cela fait partie de la tâche générale de représentation. Je ne serais pas ici aujourd'hui si je pensais que je ne représente qu'un seul groupe.

La représentation politique est posée en termes d'universalité (c'est-à-dire l'univers des Hommes de tous sexes, de toutes ethnies ou races, etc.) et de généralité : elle concerne une volonté générale qui transcende les différences particulières issues de l'appartenance à des groupes, à des situations ou à des intérêts (Young 1989). Une autre élue emprunte aussi à ce raisonnement :

Je ne le vois pas en termes d'une responsabilité particulière. Je ne pense pas avoir ici un rôle précis par rapport à la représentation des femmes. Je pense qu'en représentant toutes les personnes de ma circonscription et ce qui constitue l'intérêt collectif ou le bien commun, il en découle tout naturellement que de représenter ou de considérer les intérêts des femmes sur les plans juridique, politique et financier est avantageux pour l'ensemble de notre société.

Dans cette perspective, la représentation générale et la représentation de groupes entretiennent des rapports paradoxaux. D'une part, derrière une

vision en apparence inclusive (le « Bien » pour toutes et pour tous) se cache une réalité profondément exclusive. En effet, que signifie le « meilleur intérêt du Bien commun »? Dans une démocratie libérale pluraliste comme le Canada, quelles valeurs et quels acteurs concourent à la définition de ce « meilleur intérêt » et de ce « Bien commun »? Sont-ce les valeurs et les acteurs de la majorité, mais alors le principe majoritaire porte en lui un potentiel profondément non démocratique (Guinier 1994; Lijphart 1984). Le « meilleur intérêt du Bien commun » consiste peut-être en une approche, en une façon « objective » de regarder, comme le suggère cette députée : « Je ne donnerais pas la priorité aux femmes par rapport à aucun de mes autres groupes. J'essaierais de les examiner tous objectivement. » Young (1990 : 104) voit dans une telle lecture de l'impartialité une « fiction idéaliste », où une personne serait en mesure de faire fi de ses expériences passées pour atteindre à un point de vue universel. Quoi qu'il en soit, la conséquence est la même : faisant fi des différences issues du sexe, de l'ethnie ou de la race, etc., cet argumentaire d'un « meilleur intérêt du Bien commun » homogénéise la société en imposant un modèle « neutre » du citoyen, modèle qui, dans les faits, ne rejoint pas l'identité et les expériences d'un bon nombre de femmes et d'hommes. D'autre part, lorsque la représentation de groupes entre en ligne de compte, c'est au nom de la représentation générale : il en va aussi du « Bien commun » de représenter les femmes, car, au bout du compte, c'est la société entière qui en bénéficie. Dès lors, il n'y a plus de « questions de femmes », mais seulement des « questions de société ». Autre façon de signifier la mort du féminisme...

Le « meilleur intérêt du Bien commun » n'est pas la seule valeur exemplaire dont se réclament les humanistes pour justifier l'orientation de leur rôle de représentation; le Mérite et le Besoin en sont aussi, ainsi que l'Égalité, l'Équité et la Justice, comme l'exprime cette députée :

[...] là où il est question d'équité. Mais je ne vois pas ceci comme la toute première chose pour moi parce qu'en ce moment, mon intérêt fondamental est l'équité et la justice pour tout le monde. Alors les femmes sont automatiquement comprises là-dedans parce qu'en ce moment elles n'ont pas accès à ce genre de justice. Mais j'inclus aussi de façon générale les questions d'orientation sexuelle, des minorités de toutes sortes.

Nombre de questionnements émergent de cette citation : comment ce « public hétérogène » interagit-il avec la Justice? Celle-ci est-elle sensible aux diversités sociales ou, autrement dit, la Justice est-elle la même pour toutes et pour tous? Et d'ailleurs, de quelle Justice est-il question?

Les égalitaires

Comme elles se démarquaient largement de l'étude de 1990-1991, les égalitaires dominaient à la Chambre des communes en 1993 (voir le tableau 1). Leur place manifeste dans les deux législatures n'étonne pas, la façon dont elles interprètent leur rôle de représentation des femmes rejoint le

discours du féminisme libéral, lequel voit dans l'État un agent de promotion sociale pour les femmes. Leur projet de faire accéder les femmes au même statut social que celui des hommes s'exprime de diverses façons. D'abord, il s'agit de dénoncer les discriminations dont les femmes font les frais dans la société. Il n'est pas nécessaire d'en dresser ici la liste, présentons plutôt un extrait d'entrevue qui donne le ton général de ces prises de position :

Les femmes sont défavorisées et plus une femme grimpe d'échelons, plus elle doit se battre plus fort. [...] Il va falloir travailler encore énormément pour que les femmes puissent avoir leur place dans tous ces domaines là, dans tous les milieux — et dans le milieu politique aussi. Ce n'est pas fait encore le chemin pour les femmes. On a cinquante-trois (53) femmes au Parlement, en 1994, et il y a deux cent quatre-vingt-quinze (295) parlementaires, ce n'est pas même le tiers des parlementaires.

Ensuite, il s'agit de souhaiter que chaque femme puisse jouir des mêmes possibilités que celles qui sont offertes aux hommes :

Je suis une libérale. Et l'un des principes du libéralisme est que chaque être humain, chaque individu, a la même valeur et la même dignité. Et de créer une société où chaque personne a la même possibilité de s'épanouir. [...] Je pense que nous savons, par exemple, que les femmes sont plus pauvres que les hommes. Pourquoi? Elles ne sont pas moins capables, moins instruites. Elles sont simplement plus pauvres. Elles n'ont pas toutes les possibilités que les hommes ont sur le plan financier.

L'égalité n'est pas un concept univoque : il peut signifier de traiter les personnes différemment ou de les traiter *comme si* elles étaient semblables (Bacchi 1990 : x-xx). Dans ce cas, la société politique est pensée en termes de marché, où prévaut une norme qui s'applique également à tout le monde. Si cette société est phalocratique, la norme est masculine et les femmes sont traitées comme si elles étaient des hommes (Eisenstein 1989). Un tel point de vue libéral implique d'évacuer les différences (des femmes puisque les hommes sont la norme), c'est-à-dire de les poser comme incompatibles avec l'égalité; il s'agit de placer celle-ci en position d'indépendance par rapport aux différences issues de modalités d'insertion distinctes des femmes et des hommes à la société politique. Pourtant, dans une société où certains groupes sont privilégiés et d'autres opprimés, appliquer une norme commune revient à renforcer les privilèges des uns et les infortunes des autres (Young 1989).

La loi — système normatif pensé comme neutre car il s'applique de la même façon à tout le monde — apparaît comme un véhicule privilégié par les égalitaires pour faire accéder les femmes au statut des hommes, ce qu'expliquait une élue interrogée en 1990-1991 : « [c]omme participante à un gouvernement, on se doit d'essayer de faire avancer les choses en matière de condition féminine en fonction de législations. » (Tremblay et Pelletier 1995 : 162) L'éducation et l'information se posent aussi comme des démarches privilégiées en vue d'une transformation progressive des

mentalités. Une première députée affirme : « [a]lors, moi, je pense que, au départ, c'est par l'éducation. C'est par l'éducation qu'on va réussir à changer les mentalités, à éliminer les stéréotypes et à faire en sorte que les femmes puissent prendre leur place dans la société, et surtout dans les lieux de pouvoirs. » Pour une seconde :

Nous espérons réaliser cette égalité sans une guerre, mais il va falloir les efforts concertés de beaucoup de gens. Et cela prend aussi un niveau de conscience. Il y a beaucoup de femmes qui n'ont aucune idée qu'elles n'ont pas le même statut que les hommes, etc., elles pensent que la situation est parfaite comme ça. Alors, c'est un long processus.

Bien sûr, la référence à la guerre renvoie au spectre de la guerre des sexes, celui-là même qui faisait dire à beaucoup de femmes politiques en 1990-1991 : « Je ne suis pas féministe, mais... » (Tremblay et Pelletier 1995 : 179).

Pour plusieurs égalitaires, le modèle — et particulièrement celui de femmes activement engagées sur la scène publique qu'elles-mêmes incarnent — est un tremplin pour actualiser leur rôle de représentation des femmes :

C'était très clair, pour moi, que le fait que je sois une femme a été un élément déterminant. Parce que je pense que les femmes ont besoin d'avoir comme des modèles, de reconnaître dans des femmes qui accèdent à des responsabilités [...] de reconnaître des femmes ordinaires là-dedans. Et de se dire qu'une femme ordinaire peut très bien représenter, de façon très correcte, des citoyens et faire un travail comparable et ma foi, quelques fois, bien mieux à certains — en tout cas supérieur — à certains de ses collègues. Alors, il y avait là-dedans, en tout cas pour moi, c'était très, très clair, si je n'avais pas été femme, je ne me serais pas présentée en politique à ce moment-ci, c'est très clair.

Une autre députée insiste aussi sur son rôle en tant que modèle en regard de la représentation politique des femmes, étant peut-être plus explicite quant aux dimensions individualistes de cette orientation :

Je me considère aussi comme un modèle pour les autres femmes. [...] Les femmes sont au centre de mes préoccupations. Il n'y a pas de doute là-dessus, mais seulement dans la mesure où je me considère comme un modèle, quelqu'un qui peut vraiment les encourager à faire mieux. Si elles ont le désir de faire davantage, alors je serai la première à les appuyer. Je vois cela comme une responsabilité que j'ai.

Cette philosophie du « qui veut peut » occulte le jeu complexe des forces qui structurent l'insertion des personnes dans la société politique; elle rejette sur les épaules de chacune et de chacun une responsabilité qui, du moins en partie, lui échappe : celle de sa position sociale.

Les féministes

L'élection fédérale d'octobre 1993 a fait entrer des féministes à la Chambre des communes du Canada, comme il y en avait avant elles, en 1990-1991. Si, comme les égalitaires, elles parlent en termes de droits des femmes, elles y ajoutent une variante : celle des différences. Les femmes et les hommes diffèrent, les femmes diffèrent entre elles, comme les hommes diffèrent entre eux. Comme les égalitaires, les féministes sont sensibles au fait que les « différences » des hommes sont posées en termes de norme, mais, au contraire d'elles, elles ne l'idéalisent pas. Elles y voient plutôt une source de discrimination systémique envers les femmes et y trouvent l'occasion d'une valorisation de leurs « différences » :

Cela [la représentation politique des femmes] signifie de ne pas oublier que mon expérience et ma perspective en tant que femme sont importantes. Que je n'ai pas à les sublimer. Cela signifie que, lorsque nous trouvons encore des situations de discrimination systémique, il faut les éliminer. Je suis vraiment convaincue que nous devons avoir des lois qui sont équitables. [...] Je crois que nous devons faire ce que nous pouvons pour nous assurer que les lois existantes reflètent les perspectives et les réalités présentes dans notre pays.

Non seulement les femmes n'ont pas à se travestir en hommes pour accéder à l'égalité, mais leurs expériences et leurs perspectives servent à interpréter les discriminations envers elles. Comme les égalitaires, les féministes croient aux possibilités qu'offre la Loi (elles sont aussi au Parlement...), mais une Loi soucieuse d'équité, où l'objectif d'égalité n'est pas antinomique aux différences — en fait, l'égalité elle-même dépend de la reconnaissance des différences (Scott 1988). Dès lors qu'il est admis que les femmes n'ont pas à s'adapter à des structures sociales pensées en fonction des réalités des hommes mais bien l'inverse, des mesures extraordinaires deviennent légitimes :

Je suis en faveur, bien sûr, de ce qu'on appelle les mesures de discrimination positive, d'accord. Ça, c'est évident, pour moi, c'est clair dans mon esprit. Tant que les femmes ne parviendront pas à occuper — dans la société à quelque niveau que ce soit, au niveau scolaire, au niveau municipal, je parle en termes de paliers de gouvernement, de lieux de pouvoir là — tant que les femmes n'atteindront pas le 50 p. cent qu'elles représentent, le pourcentage qu'elles représentent dans la population, moi, je pense qu'on a pas le choix, il faut que les gouvernements adoptent des mesures de discrimination positive dans tous les domaines.

Lors de la recherche de 1990-1991, des députées s'étaient aussi prononcées en faveur de mesures d'action positive :

Maintenant, je pense que le défi des femmes en politique est encore plus grand : c'est de pouvoir aller au-delà de l'égalité sur papier. Parce que l'égalité juridique des droits, ça fait comme un consensus dans la société. Mais il y a un paradoxe, c'est que les

femmes n'auront jamais été aussi pauvres dans l'histoire de notre société en n'ayant jamais eu autant de droits. Alors c'est vraiment un grand paradoxe! Parce que là, l'étape à franchir va être encore très, très difficile, c'est de faire accepter l'égalité dans la différence. Donc, de faire des législations médiatrices ou d'action positive. (Tremblay et Pelletier 1995 : 164-165)

Pour les féministes, les femmes ne sont pas des citoyennes comme les hommes (ce qui signifierait un traitement identique), mais des citoyennes *au même titre qu'eux*. La recherche de cette égalité dans les faits, ou égalité comme finalité, signifie traiter différemment des unités au départ inégales; et de l'inégalité émergera l'égalité par l'entremise de l'équité.

Outre cette préoccupation des féministes aux différences entre les femmes et les hommes, elles se montrent aussi sensibles aux différences parmi les femmes elles-mêmes : toutes les femmes ne connaissant pas les mêmes modalités d'insertion à la société politique, certaines sont plus désavantagées que d'autres :

Cela [la représentation politique des femmes] signifie aussi pour moi de reconnaître que les femmes ne sont pas toutes semblables et qu'il y en a qui sont doublement ou triplement défavorisées, si elles sont des femmes de couleur ou d'origine ethnique différente, si elles sont handicapées, autochtones. Alors cela signifie être consciente de cette diversité et du fait qu'il n'y a pas de solution unique à ce qui constitue un problème global pour les femmes.

De la même façon qu'il est problématique de traiter les femmes comme si elles étaient des hommes, il l'est tout autant de traiter toutes les femmes comme si elles étaient pareilles, c'est-à-dire, dans le contexte canadien, blanches, d'origine anglo-saxonne, sans handicap physique, etc. Cette critique de la « Femme universelle » constitue un apport important du post-modernisme aux théories féministes (Evans 1995 : 125-142). Cette députée rejoint une telle critique, tout en nommant une réalité problématique qui frappe les femmes, réalité variable selon les caractéristiques des femmes concernées et qui invite à des solutions aussi diversifiées. Ceci n'empêche pas, à l'instar de di Stefano (1990), de poser la question si toutes les différences ont une valeur égale, s'il n'y en aurait pas de plus fondamentales que d'autres.

D'ailleurs, tenir compte de cette diversité parmi les femmes coupe court à toute prétention universaliste en matière de représentation politique des femmes. Ainsi, une élue dit représenter d'abord un point de vue, c'est-à-dire une certaine lecture des faits, lecture que ne partagent pas nécessairement toutes les femmes :

Laissez-moi vous dire que je ne veux pas présumer que je représente toutes les femmes. Je sais qu'il y a beaucoup de femmes qui ne sont pas d'accord avec moi. Il faut bien comprendre cela, je ne dis pas cela avec arrogance. Alors, je ne peux pas supposer que je représente toutes les femmes. Ce que je représente c'est un point

de vue qui vise, je pense, l'égalité pour les femmes. [...] Alors je représente seulement un point de vue et non tous les points de vue des femmes.

Dire représenter un point de vue ne signifie pas qu'aucune femme soit ainsi représentée; par ailleurs, l'inclusion au politique de quelques femmes ne peut non plus signifier que les besoins ou les intérêts des femmes soient pleinement représentés.

Poser la représentation politique des femmes en termes d'idées et/ou d'opinions génère un certain nombre de questionnements. Par exemple, un homme qui partagerait le même point de vue sur les femmes que cette députée pourrait-il prétendre les représenter au même titre que sa collègue féminine? Le cas échéant, outre la dimension symbolique de l'inclusion, à quoi sert-il alors d'élire des femmes? Si un homme ne peut prétendre au même titre que sa collègue représenter les femmes même s'il partage les mêmes idées et/ou opinions qu'elle, alors à quoi tient la spécificité de la représentation politique des femmes — qui serait autre qu'une justification de nature essentialiste bien sûr? Par ailleurs, la représentation politique des femmes peut-elle se satisfaire de la somme d'opinions disparates exprimées sur ce que je nomme — à défaut de mieux — la « condition féminine »? Cette somme d'opinions peut-elle prétendre refléter l'éventail et la complexité des besoins ou des intérêts qui concernent les femmes? Je ne le pense pas. Il me semble que le projet de représentation politique des femmes repose sur quelque chose de plus fondamental qui échappe à ces questionnements, soit la condition de citoyennes de seconde catégorie qui est le lot des femmes, bien que cette condition soit vécue de façon très différente par les unes et par les autres, selon un ensemble de considérations liées à la race et à l'ethnie, à la classe sociale, à la langue, etc. Comment amener ce projet dans les institutions politiques (en supposant, bien sûr, qu'on souhaite qu'il s'y trouve)? C'est là un des débats parmi les plus riches qui anime actuellement les théories féministes.

Conclusion

Cet article visait à explorer les façons par lesquelles les députées fédérales canadiennes en 1994 envisagent leur rôle de représentation de la population féminine. Certes, ce ne sont pas toutes les députées qui se reconnaissent une telle responsabilité de représentation, bien que — comme en 1990-1991 pour le Québec — ce soit là le fait d'une nette majorité d'entre elles. Toutefois, par-delà cette unité d'acquiescement, ces députées fédérales donnent des orientations très diversifiées à leur rôle de représentation. Cette diversité a été saisie à l'aide d'un modèle théorique composé de quatre types-idéaux, types qui reflètent autant de façon d'envisager la citoyenneté politique des femmes : les traditionnelles interprètent leur rôle de représentation des femmes en appréhendant celles-ci comme des mères, les humanistes les voient comme des êtres humains, les égalitaires comme des individus identiques aux hommes, alors que les féministes les voient

comme des personnes égales aux hommes mais différentes d'eux. Ces types non seulement ont occupé de façon inégale les discours des élues à propos de la représentation politique des femmes, mais ont permis de saisir la diversité partisane à la Chambre.

Trois conclusions ressortent de cette recherche. La première veut souligner la diversité des orientations du rôle de représentation politique des femmes dont sont porteuses les députées fédérales, à l'image des députées du Québec en 1990-1991. Ce pluralisme me semble extrêmement positif, parce qu'il reflète un certain éventail des réalités vécues par les Canadiennes. Par exemple, des femmes au Canada souhaitent avoir la possibilité de rester au foyer pour élever leurs enfants, alors que d'autres espèrent que des mesures seront prises afin d'accélérer leur accès à une pleine citoyenneté politique. Ces positions doivent pouvoir trouver écho et coexister au sein des institutions représentatives, et ce, sur la base d'une même légitimité. Ceci dit, outre que le modèle en quatre types-idéaux élaboré ici n'ait pas la prétention de refléter toute la diversité des réalités vécues par les Canadiennes, par ailleurs bien des besoins ou des intérêts des femmes n'ont actuellement pas — ou peu — de voix au Parlement fédéral du Canada (pensons seulement aux problématiques posées par les femmes autochtones; Arnott 1997). Il faut souhaiter non seulement un plus grand pluralisme d'idées et d'expériences parmi les femmes élues à la Chambre des communes du Canada — pluralisme qui devrait élargir les orientations du rôle de représentation des femmes telles que présentées ici —, mais que des mesures soient prises (au niveau de l'État, des partis et des mouvements sociaux) afin qu'il ne s'agisse pas là de vœux pieux sans lendemain.

Une seconde conclusion concerne l'objet d'étude ici privilégié, à savoir les perceptions. On pourrait objecter que l'analyse des perceptions ne dit rien des comportements effectifs; autrement dit, des députées peuvent se reconnaître une responsabilité de représenter les femmes, mais ne rien faire, concrètement, en ce sens. Tel n'est pas le cas des 35 élues fédérales qui ont dit se reconnaître une telle responsabilité. L'analyse d'un certain nombre d'activités déployées en Chambre par ces élues montre qu'elles traduisent empiriquement leur parti-pris en faveur d'une représentation politique des femmes : au cours de la première session du 35^e Parlement, elles ont présenté des projets de loi, elles ont fait des motions et des articles 31, elles sont intervenues lors de la période des questions, etc. (Tremblay 1998)

Que des députées acceptent de représenter les femmes et qu'elles s'engagent dans un certain nombre d'activités conséquentes, ne dit toutefois rien sur leur façon d'aménager un espace pour les femmes dans leur rôle plus large de représentation politique. Autrement dit, comment ces députées négocient-elles les tensions entre une représentation dite « générale » et la représentation des femmes — voire même la représentation d'autres identités? Thomas (1997) s'est intéressée à ce type de problématique auprès de femmes politiques américaines, notamment aux stratégies qu'elles développaient en vue de concilier leur identité de

femmes et leur rôle de représentation. Elle établit ainsi trois types-idéaux : les « femmes qui acceptent » (*accepters*) sont celles qui, se définissant comme féministes, développent des stratégies pour combiner et promouvoir leur identité de femmes et leur rôle de représentation; les « femmes qui évitent » (*avoiders*) nient que le sexe puisse avoir quelque effet que ce soit en politique; les « femmes résignées » (*resigners*) sont celles qui, tout en reconnaissant que leur identité de femmes est problématique en politique, ont perdu tout espoir d'y changer quoi que ce soit. Ces types sont d'une certaine utilité pour saisir les tensions entre une représentation dite « générale » et la représentation des femmes dans le contexte canadien. En 1994, il y avait des *avoiders* à la Chambre des communes. Comme le laissent paraître leurs propos (voir note 9), les députées qui disent ne pas représenter les femmes évitent un éventuel conflit de rôles en privilégiant une lecture « générale » de la représentation politique, une lecture antinomique de tout « particularisme ». S'il ne semblait pas y avoir de *resigners* (du moins, cette recherche n'a pas permis d'en identifier), par ailleurs il y avait plusieurs *accepters*. Maintenant, reste à savoir comment, au sein du parlementarisme canadien, ces députées *accepters* négociaient les dilemmes inhérents à la mise en commun d'attentes, en apparence conflictuelles, associées à un rôle de représentation défini en termes généraux (c'est-à-dire, représenter toutes les personnes de sa circonscription électorale) et plus restreints (c'est-à-dire, représenter les femmes)? L'analyse de telles stratégies — et des rationalisations qui les accompagnent — semble offrir une avenue prometteuse pour une meilleure compréhension du rôle de représentation des femmes, certes, mais aussi des identités multiples qui tissent les sociétés politiques contemporaines.

Notes

- * Le présent article a été rendu possible grâce à une subvention du Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada (#410-96-0322). Je tiens aussi à remercier les évaluatrices/eurs anonymes pour leurs judicieux conseils.
- 1. En tant que déléguée, la personne qui représente assujettit son jugement aux volontés de son électoral, parle et agit selon les désirs de ce dernier et ce qu'il considère être dans son intérêt. Lorsque *trustee*, la personne qui représente substitue son jugement à celui de son électoral : elle parle et agit selon son jugement qui lui indique quels sont les désirs et l'intérêt de son électoral. Le modèle du *politicos* est mitoyen : la personne qui représente subordonne parfois, ou impose à d'autres occasions son jugement.
- 2. Il n'y a pas unité au sein des groupes de femmes canadiens quant à cette question de la représentation politique des femmes. Selon Vickers (1997a : 107), les féministes au Canada ont adopté trois approches par rapport à cette thématique : a) augmenter le nombre de femmes en politique; b) améliorer les conditions d'exercice de la représentation politique; c) rejeter la possibilité d'une représentation politique qui soit authentique.
- 3. Les contributions de Irene Diamond et Nancy Hartsock (1981), Anna G. Jónasdóttir (1988), Chantal Mouffe (1992), Carole Pateman (1989), Anne Phillips (1991, 1992, 1995), Virginiaapiro (1981), Jill Vickers (1997b) et Iris Marion

Young (1989, 1990, 1994) ont particulièrement marqué ces débats. Les prochains paragraphes s'inspirent de leurs écrits.

4. Je ne prétends pas présenter ici un éventail exhaustif des critiques féministes à propos de la représentation politique — démarche qui dépasse l'objectif de cet article —, mais, plus simplement, de mettre au jour quelques-unes des principales difficultés inhérentes au fait de lier élites politiques féminines et population des femmes.
5. Ces études auxquelles je puise en vue d'élaborer un modèle qui permette de saisir la réalité canadienne sont, pour l'Australie celles de Sawyer (1986) et de Whip (1991), pour les États-Unis celles de Gertzog (1995), de Kelly, Saint-Germain et Horn (1991) et de Thomas (1997), pour la Grande-Bretagne celle de Vallance (1979), finalement pour la Suède celle de Hedlund (1988).
6. Lucienne Robillard viendra s'ajouter en février 1995.
7. Le guide d'entrevue était structuré sous forme *crescendo* : d'abord des questions générales sur la représentation politique (par exemple « Pour vous, que signifie la représentation politique? »), puis, quelques questions plus loin, une question spécifiquement sur la représentation politique des femmes. D'où l'introduction, sous forme de mise en contexte, « Nous parlions de représentation politique tout à l'heure. »
8. D'ores et déjà, j'insiste pour dire qu'il s'agit d'une « mise en perspective » et non d'une analyse comparative au sens strict du terme. D'abord, même si j'ai dirigé les deux recherches dans un laps de temps relativement restreint, elles n'ont pas moins été menées indépendamment l'une de l'autre, avec des devis différents. Ensuite, la question posée en 1990-1991 n'était pas la même que celles soumises en 1994, bien que s'y apparentant : « Que pensez-vous de cette proposition : "Les femmes élues députées ont la responsabilité particulière de représenter non seulement leurs propres électrices et électeurs, mais les femmes du Québec tout entier." » Troisièmement, une analyse des orientations données par les députées à leur rôle de représentation des femmes avait été effectuée en 1990-1991, le modèle comprenant alors les mêmes types-idéaux qu'en 1994, sauf celui des « humanistes » qui se retrouvait confondu dans les autres types-idéaux (c'est pourquoi les résultats de la recherche de 1990-1991 ne sont pas intégrés au tableau 1). Finalement, alors que le matériel analysé lorsqu'il est question de la recherche de 1994 est de première source, celui pour la recherche de 1990-1991 est de seconde source. Bref, ce sont ces contingences qui invitent à parler de « mise en perspective » plutôt que d'analyse comparative au sens strict du terme.
9. Bien que l'objectif de ce texte ne soit pas de traiter des arguments de rejet d'une représentation politique des femmes mais de saisir les orientations que les députées canadiennes donnent à leur rôle de représentation de la population féminine, les arguments de rejet présentés par neuf députées n'en demeurent pas moins intéressants en regard de ce qui a été dit à propos de la théorie de la représentation. 1 Particulièrement chez les députées réformistes — et conséquemment aux convictions de ce parti —, certaines ont associé la représentation des femmes à une représentation de groupes d'intérêt. 2 Reprenant une critique formulée à l'égard de la représentation politique des femmes par des femmes, certaines députées ont soutenu ne pas être en mesure de représenter les femmes non seulement parce que la population féminine est trop diversifiée, mais parce qu'elles-mêmes ne cumulent pas l'éventail des expériences féminines (cet argument sera aussi discuté par des députées qui acceptent de représenter les femmes). 3 Certaines refusent la ghettoïsation dont leur semble porteur le projet de représentation politique des femmes, s'inscrivant ainsi dans une conception

universaliste de la gouverne politique. 4 Enfin, certaines considèrent que des hommes peuvent tout aussi bien représenter les femmes, de nombreuses études montrant que des hommes politiques parlent et agissent en faveur des femmes (voir dans le contexte canadien Bashevkin 1985; Tremblay 1993, 1995). Toutefois, les hommes ne pourront jamais se substituer à la présence des femmes en politique, et ce, en vue de satisfaire l'objectif d'institutions politiques plus inclusives.

10. Aucune députée réformatrice n'a utilisé le langage du type-idéal des « traditionnelles ». Si, au premier abord, il peut surprendre que les députées de cette formation se retrouvent dans les types-idéaux des « humanistes » et des « égalitaires », par ailleurs ces types sont porteurs d'idées qui rejoignent la philosophie de leur formation politique : 1) penser la société comme un tout plutôt qu'en fonction de « groupes d'intérêt »; 2) interpréter l'égalité en termes de traitement identique.

Bibliographie

- ARNOTT, Jennifer (1997), « Re-emerging Indigenous Structures and the Reassertion of the Integral Role of Women » dans Jane ARSCOTT et Linda TRIMBLE (sous la direction), *In the Presence of Women. Representation in Canadian Governments*, Toronto, Harcourt Brace : 64-81.
- BACCHI, Carol (1990), *Same Difference: Feminism and Sexual Difference*, Sydney, Allen & Unwin.
- BACHRACH, Peter (1967), *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique*, Boston, Little, Brown.
- BASHEVKIN, Sylvia (1996), « Losing Common Ground: Feminists, Conservatives and Public Policy in Canada during the Mulroney Years », *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 29, 2 : 211-242.
- BASHEVKIN, Sylvia B. (1985), « Political Participation, Ambition and Feminism: Women in the Ontario Party Elites », *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 15, 4 : 405-419.
- BIRCH, A. H. (1964), *Representative and Responsible Government*, Londres, Unwin University Books.
- BOLES, Janet K. (1991), « Advancing the Women's Agenda Within Local Legislatures: The Role of Female Elected Officials » dans Debra L. DODSON (sous la direction), *Gender and Policymaking. Studies of Women in Office*, New Brunswick (N. J.), Rutgers — The State University of New Jersey, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Center for the American Woman and Politics : 39-48.
- BURRELL, Barbara C. (1994), *A Woman's Place is in the House. Campaigning for Congress in the Feminist Era*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press.
- BURT, Sandra (1988), « Legislators, Women, and Public Policy » dans Sandra BURT, Lorraine CODE and Lindsay DORNEY (sous la direction), *Changing Patterns. Women in Canada*, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart : 129-156.
- CARROLL, Susan J. (1992), « Women State Legislators, Women's Organizations, and the Representation of Women's Culture in the United States » dans Jill M. BYSTYDZIENSKI (sous la direction), *Women Transforming Politics. Worldwide Strategies for Empowerment*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press : 24-40.
- DARCY, R., Susan WELCH et Janet CLARK (1994), *Women, Elections, & Representation*, 2nd edition, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press.
- DIAMOND, Irene et Nancy HARTSOCK (1981), « Beyond Interests in Politics: A Comment on Virginia Sapiro's "When Are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women" », *American Political Science Review*, 75, 3 : 717-721.
- di STEFANO, Christine (1990), « Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity and Postmodernism » dans Linda NICHOLSON (sous la direction), *Feminism/Postmodernism*, Londres, Routledge : 63-82.
- DODSON, Debra L. et Susan J. CARROLL (1991), *Reshaping the Agenda: Women in State Legislatures*, New Brunswick (N. J.), Rutgers — The State University of New Jersey, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Center for the American Woman and Politics.
- DUFRESNE, Danielle (1997), « Entre l'égalité et la différence : le rapport des femmes à l'État-providence au Québec et au Canada » dans Manon TREMBLAY et Caroline ANDREW (sous la direction), *Femmes et représentation politique au Québec et au Canada*, Montréal, Remue-ménage : 149-178.
- EISENSTEIN, Zillah (1989), *The Female Body and the Law*, Berkeley, University of California Press.

*Femmes et représentation à la Chambre des communes du Canada : un
modèle des orientations du rôle de représentation des femmes*

- EVANS, Judith (1995), *Feminist Theory Today: An Introduction to Second-Wave Feminism*, Londres, Sage.
- FOX, Richard Logan (1997), *Gender Dynamics in Congressional Elections*, Thousand Oaks, Sage.
- GERTZOG, Irwin N. (1995), *Congressional Women. Their Recruitment, Integration, and Behavior*, 2nd edition, Westport, Praeger.
- GUINIER, Lani (1994), *The Tyranny of the Majority. Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy*, New York, The Free Press.
- HEDLUND, Gun (1988), « Women's Interests in Local Politics » dans Kathleen B. JONES et Anna G. JÓNASDÓTTIR (sous la direction), *The Political Interests of Gender. Developing Theory and Research with a Feminist Face*, Newbury Park, Sage : 79-105.
- HUDDY, Leonie et Nayda TERKILDSEN (1993), « Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates », *American Journal of Political Science*, 37, 1 : 119-147.
- JÓNASDÓTTIR, Anna G. (1988), « On the Concept of Interest, Women's Interests, and the Limitations of Interest Theory » dans Kathleen B. JONES et Anna G. JÓNASDÓTTIR (sous la direction), *The Political Interests of Gender. Developing Theory and Research with a Feminist Face*, Londres, Sage : 33-65.
- KELLY, Rita Mae, Michelle A. SAINT-GERMAIN et Jody D. HORN (1991), « Female Public Officials: A Different Voice? », *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 515 : 77-87.
- KLEIN, Ethel (1984), *Gender Politics. From Consciousness to Mass Politics*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- LIJPHART, Arend (1984), *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- MEZEY, Susan Gluck (1980), « Perceptions of Women's Roles on Local Councils in Connecticut » dans Debra W. STEWART (sous la direction), *Women in Local Politics*, Metuchen (N. J.), Scarecrow Press : 177-197.
- MOUFFE, Chantal (1992), « Feminism, Citizenship and Radical Democratic Politics » dans Judith BUTLER et Joan W. SCOTT (sous la direction), *Feminists Theorize the Political*, Londres, Routledge, Chapman & Hall : 369-384.
- PATEMAN, Carole (1989), *The Disorder of Women*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
- PHILLIPS, Anne (1995), *The Politics of Presence*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- PHILLIPS, Anne (1992), « Democracy and Difference: Some Problems for Feminist Theory », *Political Quarterly*, 63, 1 : 79-90.
- PHILLIPS, Anne (1991), *Engendering Democracy*, University Park (Pennsylvania), Pennsylvania State University Press.
- PHILLIPS, Melanie (1980), *The Divided House. Women at Westminster*, Londres, Sidgwick & Jackson.
- PITKIN, Hannah Fenichel (1967), *The Concept of Representation*, Berkeley, University of California Press.
- REINGOLD, Beth (1992), « Concepts of Representation Among Female and Male State Legislators », *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 17, 4 : 509-537.
- SAPIRO, Virginia (1981), « When Are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women », *American Political Science Review*, 75, 3 : 701-721.
- SAWER, Marian (1986), « From Motherhood to Sisterhood: Attitudes of Australian Women MPs to their Roles », *Women's Studies International Forum*, 9, 5 : 531-541.
- SAWER, Marian et Marian SIMMS (1984), *A Woman's Place. Women and Politics in Australia*, Sydney, George Allen & Unwin.
- SCOTT, Joan (1988), « Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Post-structuralist Theory for Feminism », *Feminist Studies*, 14, 1 : 33-50.
- SIGEL, Roberta S. (1996), *Ambition & Accommodation. How Women View Gender Relations*, Chicago et Londres, The Chicago University Press.
- THOMAS, Sue (1997), « Why Gender Matters: The Perceptions of Women Officeholders », *Women & Politics*, 17, 1 : 27-53.
- THOMAS, Sue (1994), *How Women Legislate*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- THOMPSON, Joan Hulse (1980), « Role Perceptions of Women in the Ninety-fourth Congress, 1975-6 », *Political Science Quarterly*, 95, 1 : 71-81.
- TREMBLAY, Manon (1998), « Do Canadian Female MPs Substantively Represent Women? A Case Study of the Legislative Behaviour of Females and Males in the 35th Parliament », *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 23, 3.
- TREMBLAY, Manon (1995), « Gender and Support for Feminism: A Case Study of the 1989 Quebec General Election » dans François-Pierre GINGRAS (sous la direction), *Gender and Politics in Contemporary Canada*, Toronto, Oxford University Press : 31-55.
- TREMBLAY, Manon (1993), « Political Party, Political Philosophy and Feminism: A Case Study of the Female and Male Candidates in the 1989 Quebec General Election », *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 26, 3 : 507-522.

- TREMBLAY, Manon et Réjean PELLETIER (1995), *Que font-elles en politique?*, Sainte-Foy, Presses de l'Université Laval.
- VALLANCE, Elizabeth (1979), *Women in the House: A Study of Women Members of Parliament*, Londres, Athlone Press.
- VICKERS, Jill (1997a), *Reinventing Political Science. A Feminist Approach*, Halifax, Fernwood Publishing.
- VICKERS, Jill (1997b), « Toward a Feminist Understanding of Representation » dans Jane ARSCOTT et Linda TRIMBLE (sous la direction), *In the Presence of Women. Representation in Canadian Governments*, Toronto, Harcourt Brace : 20-46.
- WAHLKE, John C., Heinz EULAU, William BUCHANAN et LeRoy C. FERGUSON (1962), *The Legislative System*, New York, Wiley.
- WHIP, Rosemary (1991), « Representing Women: Australian Female Parliamentarians on the Horns of a Dilemma », *Women & Politics*, 11, 3 : 1-22.
- YOUNG, Iris Marion (1994), « Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective », *Signs*, 19, 3 : 713-738.
- YOUNG, Iris Marion (1990), *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- YOUNG, Iris Marion (1989), « Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship », *Ethics*, 99, 2 : 250-274.

Brenda O'Neill*

The Relevance of Leader Gender to Voting in the 1993 Canadian National Election

Abstract

This paper evaluates the importance of leader gender to voting in the 1993 Canadian general election. The existing gender gap for the Conservatives was somewhat reversed under Campbell's leadership but remained unchanged for McLaughlin's New Democrats. The key finding is a larger share of women voters recruited by each party, particularly the Conservatives. This differential recruitment pattern appears due to differences in leader evaluations, and less to differences in beliefs regarding the need to improve the status of women and in support of feminism. No significant gender differences were recorded in defection rates from either party, and votes against the two parties do not appear to have been driven by gender-related concerns.

Résumé

Cet article évalue l'importance du sexe du chef de parti lors des élections générales au niveau fédéral en 1993. La situation d'écart des sexes qui caractérise les Conservateurs à l'heure actuelle était renversée à l'époque du leadership de M^{me} Campbell, mais demeure inchangée dans le cas des Néo-démocrates de M^{me} McLaughlin. La conclusion clé de l'article a trait au plus fort contingent de recrutement parmi les électrices de chaque parti, en particulier dans le cas des Conservateurs. Ces types différentiels de recrutement semblent attribuables aux différences observées sur le plan de l'évaluation des chefs de parti, beaucoup plus qu'aux différences au niveau de la conviction qu'il existe un besoin d'améliorer la condition féminine ou encore de l'appui au féminisme. On n'observe pas de différences significatives entre les sexes sur le plan des taux de défections des deux partis, et les votes enregistrés contre les deux partis ne semblent pas imputables à des préoccupations liées au sexe.

The 1993 Canadian general election proved an important milestone in the political representation of women: for the first time in federal electoral history, women ran as leaders of major political parties. The two leaders, Audrey McLaughlin for the New Democrats and Kim Campbell for the Conservatives, were chosen by their respective parties due in part to their gender. Conventional wisdom suggested that perhaps Canadians would be more willing to support women-led parties given the increased cynicism toward politicians generally, and Brian Mulroney's previous government more specifically. Both new leaders attempted to portray their political

styles as somehow “different” from traditional ones, in the anticipation that the electorate would respond to such innovation.

This paper evaluates whether leader gender was of any consequence to voting in the 1993 election and, more specifically, whether women and men responded differently to these leaders at the ballot box. The evidence suggests that although neither leader was able to improve the party's standing in the 1988 election (indeed, in terms of overall vote share both parties failed miserably on this count), the Conservatives and the New Democrats were nevertheless partially rewarded for their choice of leader. This reward came in the form of a gender gap in recruitment. Both parties fared better by recording substantially higher rates of recruitment among women voters than among men, stemming in part from gender differences in leader evaluations.

Investigations of the importance of leader characteristics are worthwhile given that voters in Canada often list party leader as one of the prime considerations driving their vote decisions. Pammett reveals that in 1993, 22 percent of voters reported that the most important factor in their vote decision was party leader, and 62 percent of these voters claimed that the issues these leaders stood for were particularly important in their calculations (1994, 584). Moreover, Wearing notes the importance of leader assessments among voters who switch their votes (1988, 83). Other research suggests that leaders are very much the focus of electoral contests and play both an indirect and direct part in influencing voting behaviour (Johnston et al., 1992).

Conventional wisdom within political parties suggests that changing leaders can translate into an electoral boost, although evidence reveals that such actions do not always have the anticipated results (Stewart and Carty, 1993). That both the Conservatives and NDP endorsed women as party leaders heading into the 1993 election in part *because of their gender* provides evidence of changing attitudes regarding women and positions of leadership in political parties and suggests that each might have anticipated gaining some electoral mileage with its leadership choices. Woolstencroft reports that widespread support in the Conservative camp for electing a leader who would be Canada's first female prime minister prompted Hugh Segal not to run as a leadership candidate (1994, 11). And according to Whitehorn, some individuals within the federal New Democratic Party “felt that with the electorate increasingly cynical with the old, male-dominated style of politics, a female leader with a new and less confrontational style might be an advantage, if the message could be conveyed” (1994, 48). Thus, both parties had gender considerations in mind when they selected their leaders.

The parties also selected the two women as leaders knowing that each intended to speak as an advocate for women, although in different ways. Both Audrey McLaughlin and Kim Campbell openly declared themselves

feminists, and endorsed measures intended to bring about the possibility of “doing politics differently.” In her book, *A Woman’s Place*, McLaughlin noted that she proudly calls herself a feminist in an attempt to incorporate the feminist goals of equality and choice with broader notions of social justice (1992, 213-217). Indeed, in the 1993 election the party put considerable energy into achieving gender parity among candidates and targeting women voters directly (Whitehorn, 1994, 49).

While Campbell also openly declares herself a feminist, and during her stint as Minister of Justice attempted to put in place the concept of “inclusive justice” which was later broadened to the “politics of inclusion,” her brand of feminism fits less comfortably with that endorsed by the feminist movement than McLaughlin’s (Campbell, 1996, 162-163). Her support and promotion of Bill C-43, abortion legislation introduced in 1989 by Minister of Justice Doug Lewis, left many feminists, particularly those of the left, questioning her commitment to feminism (Fife, 1993, 104-106 and 115-117). Nevertheless, the fact remains that, to lead them into the 1993 election, the Conservatives selected a woman who had openly declared herself to be a feminist and who supported a conception of politics that called for increasing the direct participation of Canadians in the political process. While the selection of women leaders may have represented a move toward the symbolic legitimization of women rather than an intention to produce substantive policy change, their selection may nevertheless have had the anticipated impact on voting behaviour.¹

The voting behaviour of women and men at the time of the 1993 election is the focus of this examination. More specifically, the paper analyzes the degree to which women and men responded differently to the first opportunity for supporting a woman-led party at the federal level in Canada. The data for the examination come from the 1993 Canadian Election Study (CES).² The sample under investigation is drawn from the study’s campaign and post-election waves and is weighted to be representative of the national adult population.³ This selection resulted in an overall sample of 3,343 respondents, of whom 46.7 percent are women. The poor showing of both the NDP and Conservatives in the 1993 election translates into very small sample sizes for some of the analyses. This provides a weakened ability to confidently argue that these results hold for all voters for both parties, and means that few of the findings are statistically significant. Both of these factors should be borne in mind in the subsequent analyses.

Previous Research

While the election has produced a growing body of research, the relevance of leader gender to the Canadian electorate has received relatively little systematic study or attention. Two exceptions can be noted, and their assessments of the impact of leader gender on voting are contradictory. On the one hand, Forbes (1996) highlights both the poor showing of the NDP

and the Conservatives in 1993 among women voters and the relative closing of gender gaps in reported votes for parties compared to previous federal elections, and concludes that gender may have been of little relevance to the election. He further speculates that partisan appeals to feminist interests, indirectly made by selecting women as leaders, alienated voters by highlighting the brokerage nature of traditional party politics. Pammett, on the other hand, while dismissing the overall relevance of socio-demographic characteristics to vote decision in 1993, nevertheless suggests that the closing of the gender gap in voting for the Conservatives was “perhaps because of the selection of Kim Campbell as leader” (1994, 158). He notes that women may have been drawn to the party in 1993 more so than in the past because Kim Campbell was chosen to lead it into the contest. Neither, however, bases their conclusions on examinations of voter behaviour directly.

A number of studies have assessed the degree to which women and men candidates are differentially treated by voters, that is, the degree to which women candidates “lose votes” (Hunter and Denton, 1984; Studlar and Matland, 1996). The evidence from the level of the local candidate suggests that women receive as much electoral support as men at the ballot box. Their lower share among legislators, relative to their share of electoral candidates, is due instead to structural factors including the higher likelihood of women running for less competitive parties and the greater likelihood of running against incumbents who have a greater rate of re-election. The sacrificial lamb hypothesis, which argues that women are less successful at the ballot box because parties nominate them to run in lost cause ridings, appears to be losing ground. Studlar and Matland (1996) reveal that the importance of this factor at the provincial level in Canada has diminished and by the mid-1980s had all but disappeared. Voters, it seems, are as likely to support female candidates as they are male, other things being equal.

Despite an equal willingness to support female and male candidates, voting decisions nevertheless vary with gender: women and men hold differing opinions on a number of political issues, assign the same issues varying levels of importance, rank leaders differently and as a result, identify with parties in varying numbers (Gidengil, 1995; Pultzer and Zipp, 1996; Hayes and McAllister, 1997). While women candidates may not lose votes, the voting calculus differs between women and men and the result is a noticeable gender gap in voting. In Canada, these gaps have given a particular benefit to the Liberal party: since 1979 women have been more likely to support the party than men (Brodie, 1991).

The gender gap in opinions is of particular consequence to voting choices: women’s greater support of liberal positions on certain issues, most notably the economy, defence and the welfare state, go some distance toward explaining their greater willingness to endorse parties that are believed to be more ideologically in tune with these attitudes (Kopinak,

1987; Gidengil, 1995; O'Neill, 1995). Women and men not only differ in their fundamental concerns, but also in the relative influence of these concerns on attitudes and vote choice. The 1988 election campaign was telling in the ability of an issue to galvanize opinion on a gender basis: the free trade debate, a particularly salient issue during the campaign, was at its core an issue that divided support by gender. "Social woman" and "economic man" brought different values to bear in their support of free trade, and as the political parties were clear in their positions regarding the deal, the gender gap in attitudes translated into a clear gap in voting (Gidengil, 1995). Although women traditionally give less support to parties on the right, the Conservatives are likely to have lost even greater support among women in 1988 given their endorsement of free trade. The 1993 election had no such dominant issue, particularly one as likely to cue gender differences in opinion, and as a result, gender differences in voting were not as large as those recorded in 1988. But neither did the party present a policy platform that deviated substantially from that put forward in 1988. Instead, the unique aspect of the 1993 election was the initiation of a woman as party leader at the federal level.

There exist a number of reasons for assuming that party leader gender may have had an impact on voting behaviour in 1993. As previously discussed, the selection of a woman as party leader was partly motivated by a belief that such a move would likely increase electoral support for each party. But women and men may respond differently to such efforts in the voting booth. Women may be drawn to such parties, while men may turn away.

Gender gaps in voter movement to and from women-led parties will appear if women and men render differing evaluations of these leaders. According to Johnston et al. (1992), leader evaluations rest on several interrelated criteria. Voters are likely to rate leaders according to assessments of both their competence and their character, each potentially influenced by the dynamics of the campaign, but grounded solidly in each voter's cumulative experience with the leader. They are also likely to rate leaders according to the degree to which each best represents a voter's interests or embodies a voter's demographic characteristics. Both play a potential role in producing gendered voting patterns for women-led parties. Women and men have been found to rank leaders differently (Pultzer and Zipp, 1996; Hayes and McAllister, 1997). The increased ability to identify with a female leader would also seem particularly important for women's voting decisions. It is reasonable to expect that voters may select leaders that "embody their own basic demographic characteristics" since resemblance is likely to translate into an increased expectation that they will "reflexively... understand and act in one's own interest" (Johnston et al. 1992, 169). Resemblance criteria in Canadian voting decisions have traditionally been regional and ethno-religious characteristics. But the

selection of women party leaders at the federal level in 1993 provided the first instance in which gender could be employed in this manner.

Apart from gendered leader evaluations, women may move toward women-led parties in an effort to increase the representation of women in the political arena. In support of this argument, Gidengil (1996) shows that women in Canada are more likely than men to consider women's lack of electoral access a problem, to believe that improved access for women would make for better government, and to endorse affirmative action to achieve it. While neither a majority of women nor men endorsed candidate quotas, the weaker opposition of women in the general population for increasing the number of women candidates may directly translate into greater electoral support for women candidates during elections. In addition, it may translate into increased female support for parties led by women with the understanding that party leaders hold the potential for wielding tremendous power in the political system. The potential for exacting substantial change for women that comes with being leader of the party with the most votes in the legislature might provide sufficient incentive for moving towards women-led parties, and in particular, those parties with some chance of forming the next government. By supporting women candidates, women in the electorate may be making a conscious decision to put in place legislative representatives whom they believe will work to bring about substantive policy change for women in Canada. Thus voting for women-led parties may be part of a broader attempt to promote women and their interests in society. If this is the case, then women leaders who make explicit appeals to women voters are more likely to win their support than are those who avoid such strategies. Both Campbell and McLaughlin attempted in varying degrees to promote themselves as feminists, supportive of women and women's issues. Such appeals may have enticed women to move to each party to a greater degree than men.

Support for feminism also stands as a potential incentive leading women towards women led-parties in that it provides women with the particular lenses for recognizing the possibility for effecting substantive change that would come with having a woman at the head of government. Moreover, connections with feminist groups may provide women voters with the information necessary to allow them to make such an informed choice. For instance the National Action Committee published a voter's guide at the time of the 1993 election designed to aid women voters and such information may increase the likelihood of women voting for women (Bashevkin, 1996, 491). Feminism has also been linked to the gender gap in attitudes, and thus seems likely to be of some consequence to voting decisions for female party leaders (Brodie, 1991; Rinehart, 1992).

If feminism is of any consequence to vote decisions among women, then one would anticipate that this connection would be greater for parties on the left of the ideological spectrum, whose platforms fall more closely in line with the feminist movement. Indeed, by advancing policies that reflected

the demands of the organized women's movement, the NDP was able to increase its electoral appeal among women and reduce the gap in voting for the party in 1984 and 1988 (Brodie, 1992). But parties on the ideological right could potentially attract more women voters to the party by selecting a woman as leader who, like Campbell, willingly declared herself a feminist yet promoted policies that are decidedly conservative. There was little substantive policy change in the Conservative Party's 1993 platform from that in the 1988 election: the party continued to support free trade and the G.S.T., and endorsed the North American Free Trade Agreement. The party selected a leader who willingly adopted the party's policy platform, subject to the prescription for "doing politics differently,"⁴ but who also provided the potential for attracting new women voters to the party by promoting herself as a feminist.

If women are more likely to support women-led parties in order to increase their representation in positions of political power or as a result of their greater support for feminism, it seems possible that men may be driven away from such parties because of their perspectives on such questions. Men's weaker support of feminism might lessen their willingness to endorse parties led by women who openly declare their feminist beliefs, as did both McLaughlin and Campbell. And men's stronger opposition to specific efforts at increasing women's political representation might lead them to reject parties that make such appeals, whether explicitly in policy platforms or implicitly as reflected in decisions made by the party.

Thus several possible explanations for a gendered voting response to women-led parties seem feasible. First, women and men might evaluate women leaders differently, both in overall assessments and in ability to identify with them. Second, it seems reasonable to suggest that women may be differentially drawn to women-led parties in response to a belief in the need for increasing women's electoral representation, political power and status. Third, support for feminism might be the mechanism inducing greater support for women-led leaders among women: feminism may be the lens through which gender becomes a determining factor in vote decisions as it provides women with the information necessary to bring leader gender to bear on their electoral calculus. And finally, men's weaker feminism and greater opposition to specific efforts at increasing women's political representation and power might lead them to reject women-led parties.

Investigation and Results

The key element of the investigation is the suggestion that women and men might be differentially drawn toward, and differentially turn away from, parties led by women. The first step is to assess the gender gap in voting for this election. Table 1 provides reported votes in the 1993 election by gender. In the first order, gender appears to have had some relevance to vote decisions. The data reveals a statistically significant association between gender and party vote, with the largest difference in men's higher reported

support for the Reform party. Voting gaps reflect the ideological positioning of each party: women reveal more liberal attitudes on many policy positions and, as such, are more likely to support parties of the left than are men. The size of the gap in Reform voting is thus not surprising given the party's platform and the accumulated evidence on gender gaps in support of the neo-conservative agenda (Youngman and Gibbins, 1996). Our interest lies more specifically in the reported voting for the two parties led by women. Although the New Democrats and Conservatives appear to have drawn more support from women, by 1.2 and 2.7 percentage points respectively, these differences are not dramatic. Neither do they reveal the extent to which women and men might have been drawn to the party, or alternatively repelled away, because of its decision to select a woman leader. That is, although gender gaps have previously existed in support for the NDP and the Conservatives, the degree to which the 1993 gaps deviate from earlier patterns is not yet known.

Table 1

Party Votes by Gender, 1993 CES

Party Vote*	Women (%)	Men (%)	
Liberal		44.7	40.5
Conservative		15.5	12.8
NDP		7.2	6.0
Reform		15.2	22.8
Bloc Québécois		13.6	14.5
Other		3.9	3.4
N		1,254	1,486


* Chi-square significant at the .01 level. Column percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

To address this, trends in gender voting gaps by political party are examined to determine if the selection of women leaders resulted in any change. Figures 1 and 2 present trends in gender gaps in support of the Conservatives and the NDP from 1974 to 1993.⁵ These figures clearly show the extent of the electoral losses suffered by both parties in the election. More importantly, the evidence suggests that despite the absence of large gender gaps in voting for the two parties in 1993, the election marked a turning point of sorts for the Conservatives. From 1974 to 1988, the party consistently fared better among men than among women: indeed, in 1988 the reported vote gap between women and men was over 8 percentage points, reflecting the lower support among women for the Free Trade Agreement. Even in the absence of such a salient and gendered issue as free

trade, fewer women reported supporting the Conservatives in previous elections than men. This reflects gender gaps in attitudes: the more conservative platform endorsed by the party translates into fewer votes among women than among men. But as shown in Figure 1, this trend ended in 1993: the gap between women and men in electoral support for the Conservatives narrowed and for the first time in six national elections, more women supported the party than men, albeit by a very small margin. And while the party platform and policy did not undergo any radical transformation during this period, leader gender did.

Figure 1

Support for the Progressive Conservatives in Canadian National Elections from 1974-1993 by Gender




Source: 1974-79-80, 1984 and 1988 CNES and 1993 CES.

Note: Votes shares calculated from a base figure which excludes respondents who selected none, don't know or refused to the vote choice probe in order to remove gender differences in vote choice due to differences in the likelihood of selecting one of these responses. Sample sizes for women and men respectively: 1974 (548, 474), 1979 (1159, 1075), 1980 (730, 704), 1984 (1442, 1183), 1988 (1132, 1152) and 1993 (1254, 1486).

The trend in support of the NDP among women and men is less dramatic, as revealed in Figure 2. Since 1980, women have supported the party at rates similar to men, but in 1988 the traditional gender gap in support was reversed. In that year, women lent more support to the NDP by a margin of 2 percentage points. This gender difference in voting continued with the 1993 election although the gap was smaller. Women appear to have responded at the ballot box to the party's feminist appeals during the earlier campaign, and the choice of a woman as leader does not initially appear to have reversed the gender gap in voting that first appeared in the previous election.

Figure 2




Source: 1974-79-80, 1984, and 1988 CNES and 1993 CES.

Note: Votes shares calculated from a base figure which excludes respondents who selected none, don't know or refused to the vote choice probe in order to remove gender differences in vote choice due to gender differences in the likelihood of selecting one of these responses. Sample sizes for women and men respectively: 1974 (548, 474), 1979 (1159, 1075), 1980 (730, 704), 1984 (1442, 1183), 1988 (1132, 1152) and 1993 (1254, 1486).

In order to ascertain voter movement to and from parties between the 1988 and 1993 elections, the number of renegades and recruits for each of the major parties was computed. Renegades are defined as voters who supported a party in 1988 but defected from that party in the 1993 election by either supporting another party or by choosing not to vote. Recruits, on the other hand, are voters that supported a particular party 1993 but who chose another party, abstained from voting, or were ineligible to vote in the 1988 election.⁶ These figures inform us whether women were more likely to be drawn to parties led by women and whether men were more likely to turn away from such parties. If this is the case, we would expect to find more male than female renegades among 1988 voters, and more female than male recruits among 1993 voters for the two parties. Figures 3 and 4 allow for a comparison of the share of renegades and recruits among men and women voters for each major party.⁷

Figure 3




Sample sizes: Liberal: female voters (N=375), male voters (N=375); PC: female voters (N=415), male voters (N=659); NDP: female voters (N=186), male voters (N=230).

The pattern in Figure 3 suggests that in the 1993 election women were less likely than men to defect from parties they had supported in 1988. This pattern holds for each of the three parties investigated: Conservative, New Democratic and Liberal. Yet differences across these parties are nevertheless apparent. Voters were significantly less loyal to the Conservatives and the NDP in 1993 than they were to the Liberals: roughly 70 percent of 1988 voters deserted the two former parties compared with only 30 percent of 1988 Liberal voters. And the gender gap in defection is much larger in the Liberal party than in the other two: women were less likely by 10 percentage points to desert the party in 1993 while the gaps among Conservative and New Democrat voters range from 2.9 percentage points to 4.2 percentage points respectively. Women and men were almost equally likely to turn away from the two parties led by women. It is not yet clear to what extent the high defection rates among former NDP and Conservative voters, women and men alike, are due to leader gender.

The pattern in Figure 4 indicates the voting impact of the parties' decision to select women as leaders. No clear pattern in recruitment emerges for the two parties led by men: the Liberal party drew a significantly greater share of recruits among men than among women, by a margin of 14 percentage points, but no gender differences appear in recruitment to the Reform party. This is in direct contrast to the gender gap in recruitment rates among the Conservatives and the New Democrats. Although the two parties did not match the Liberals and Reform in their ability to attract new voters in 1993, the share of female voters recruited by the two parties with women at the helm is much higher than among their male voters. For the Conservatives, the gender gap in recruits was an impressive 23.3 percentage points. Taking into account the relatively equal number of men and women that voted for the Conservatives, the ratio of female to male party recruits party is 2.3 to 1. For the New Democrats, the gap was a smaller but nevertheless impressive 5.7 percentage points between female and male recruits that translates into a 1.2 to 1 ratio of female to male recruits. The evidence clearly reveals that women were drawn to the two parties led by women more than men, particularly for the Conservatives.

Figure 4

Gap in Share of Recruits among 1993 Male and Female Voters by Party



Sample sizes: Liberal: female voters (N=502), male voters (N=581); PC: female voters (N=183), male voters (N=185); NDP: female voters (N=84), male voters (N=88); Reform: female voters (N=167), male voters (N=312).

It is instructive to examine the sources from which recruits to these parties were drawn. A comparison of female and male recruits to the Conservatives reveals that while 94 percent of male recruits came almost equally from two primary sources, previous Liberal Party voters and non-voters, female recruits came from a more differentiated set of sources. Like their male counterparts, the Liberal Party and non-voters were equally important sources (37 and 36 percent respectively) of female recruits to the Conservatives, but a significant portion (19 percent) came from the NDP. Given the ideological distance between the NDP and the Conservatives, it seems reasonable to suggest that such a shift might have been influenced by the potential for voting a women-led party into power. Among NDP recruits, differences are also to be found. Like male recruits to the Conservative Party, male recruits to the NDP were also drawn from two significant sources: non-voters and former Conservative voters. These two sources alone account for just over 80 percent of male recruits. For female recruits, similar to the pattern found among Conservative female recruits, women were drawn from a more diverse set of sources: with former Conservative voters former Liberal voters, and former non-voters

accounting for 35, 27 and 27 percent of women recruits to the party respectively. It is less easy to speculate on potential factors behind women's recruitment to this party, although for both parties women were recruited from a greater number of sources, suggesting that other than simply ideological forces were at play.

An evaluation of defection patterns among 1988 female and male renegades reveals less in the way of differentiation. Both the Liberal and Reform parties benefitted equally from Conservative vote defections in a pattern that is mirrored among both women and men. On average a third of male and female renegades shifted their support to these two parties in 1993. Greater gender differentiation appears among NDP renegades. While the Liberal party was the overwhelming choice among these voters, 45 per cent of male renegades compared with only 37 percent of female renegades changed their vote choice in this manner. The other notable gender difference among these voters is to be found among those who moved from voting for the NDP in 1988 to the Conservatives in 1993: while 10 percent of women renegades made this move, only 3 percent of men acted similarly. This also suggests that some women may have bridged the ideological gap between the two parties in an effort to vote a woman-led party into power.


The goal is to ascertain the factors that lie behind women's and men's differential recruitment to the Conservative and New Democratic parties. Three theoretical arguments were provided for explaining gendered voting for women-led parties: leader evaluations, group interest calculations and feminism. The analyses below address each of these possibilities in turn.

A suggested cause of women's greater recruitment rate to the two women-led parties was a difference in the rankings women and men gave to each leader and to their respective traits. Figure 5 presents evidence of gender differences in leader ratings among recruits to both parties while Table 2 presents gender differences in ascribing various traits to each leader. Assigning women leaders differing scores on these variables may account for gender differences in willingness to vote for these parties.

Gender differences in deviations from average leader thermometer ratings are found among recruits to both parties. In both instances, female recruits give the leader a ranking that differs substantially and positively from the average ranking given to all leaders. Although male recruits also rank each leader more positively than the average ranking across all leaders, the differences are substantially weaker than in the case of female recruits. Among NDP recruits the difference is 4.4 percentage points; among Conservative recruits the gap jumps to 6.6 percentage points and becomes statistically significant. On this evidence it seems clear that leader evaluations account in part for the greater recruitment among women to both parties, particularly for the Conservatives.

Figure 5

Deviations from Average Leader Thermometer Ratings of Female and Male Recruits by Party



See Appendix for question wording and variable construction.

* indicates differences significant at $p < .05$.

Sample sizes: PC: female recruits (N=66), male recruits (N=32); NDP: female recruits (N=26), male recruits (N=22).

Leader evaluations hinge on evaluations of individual leader traits, particularly perceptions of their competence (Johnston et al., 1992). The 1993 CES asked respondents a set of questions regarding how well a set of traits described each leader. Examining the beliefs of recruits to the Conservative Party presents solid evidence that differential recruitment rates partly relates to differences in how women and men evaluated Kim Campbell. As shown in Table 2, female recruits were significantly less willing to describe Campbell as arrogant than male recruits, and more willing to describe her as trustworthy and compassionate, two traits linked to evaluations of the leader's character. Significant differences also appear between female and male recruits in assessments of Campbell's competence. When asked how well the term "intelligent" described Campbell, female recruits were more likely say that the term described her very well than were male recruits. The gap in ascribing "intelligent" to Campbell is considerable, with a full 0.7 points separating female and male recruits on this question, a difference that achieves statistical significance.

Thus it appears that differences in evaluations of Campbell as leader were important factors behind gender differences in recruitment to the party in 1993: female recruits judged Campbell more highly in terms of both character and ability.

Table 2

Mean Evaluations of Kim Campbell and Audrey McLaughlin among Female and Male Recruits

	Kim Campbell		Audrey McLaughlin	
	Female Recruits	Male Recruits	Female Recruits	Male Recruits
Arrogant	4.44** (63)	3.01 (31)	4.98 (25)	5.18 (22)
Trustworthy	2.90 ^a (65)	3.41 (32)	2.69 (25)	2.45 (22)
Aggressive	2.96 (64)	2.86 (31)	3.76 (25)	3.99 (22)
Compassionate	3.05* (63)	3.70 (33)	2.93 (21)	2.65 (18)
Strong Leadership	3.55 (64)	3.55 (32)	3.73 (25)	3.65 (22)
Intelligent	1.98** (68)	2.68 (33)	3.03 (22)	2.94 (19)
Speaks for Women	2.44** (65)	3.46 (33)	3.04 (23)	2.68 (19)

Measures are scales ranging from 1 to 7; responses were coded such that a 1 indicates that respondents believed the trait described the leader “very well,” 3 “fairly well,” 5 “not very well,” and 7 that they believed it described her “not at all.” See Appendix for question wording.

Note: ** denotes differences significant at $p < .01$; * denotes differences significant at $p < .05$; ^a denotes differences were significant at $p < .055$; Ns appear in parentheses.

It was also suggested that the choice of women leaders provided women with the first opportunity to employ gender as a characteristic with which to identify with the leader. The 1993 CES asks respondents how well they believed “can really speak for women” described each leader. This variable is employed here to assess the recruits’ ability to see each leader as a spokesperson for women’s interests and as a representative of women more broadly. Significant differences are recorded between female and male recruits to the party: female recruits were significantly more likely to see Campbell as a leader who spoke for women, by a substantial and statistically significant margin. Thus, not only did female recruits think

more highly of Campbell's character and ability, they were also much more likely to believe that she could speak for them as well.

The degree to which trait evaluations for Audrey McLaughlin led to differential recruitment rates among women and men is less clear. Recalling Figure 5, female recruits did rate McLaughlin somewhat more positively than other leaders, but this difference failed to achieve statistical significance. Breaking these evaluations down into individual leader traits also fails to reveal any significant or substantial differences in leader evaluations. Bearing this in mind, some of the results are noteworthy. For example, male recruits were more willing to describe McLaughlin as trustworthy and compassionate, and less willing to describe her as arrogant and aggressive. Similarly, female recruits appear less willing to describe her as intelligent and to agree that she provides strong leadership for the party. Too much should not be made of these differences, however; they are small in size and fail to achieve statistical significance. It is also clear that women were not more drawn to the party because they believed the leader might provide them with a political voice; indeed, although both female and male recruits agreed with the description "she speaks for women," male recruits were slightly more willing to accept this description than female recruits. But this difference is small and not statistically significant. Thus, although female recruits' overall ranking of Audrey McLaughlin was somewhat more positive than that of male recruits, an evaluation of leader traits does not clearly show what is driving this positive gender gap in leader evaluation.

A second possible factor for gender differences in movement toward women-led parties was the suggestion that women might be more supportive of efforts directed at increasing women's electoral representation, political power and status. Female voters might be persuaded that women as a group could be helped promoting a woman to the position of prime minister and attracted to parties that allowed for such a possibility. Table 3 provides a breakdown of attitudes among female and male recruits to the two parties regarding the necessity of "doing more for women." A comparison of recruits to the two parties reveals a remarkable degree of similarity in thinking on this issue despite the ideological divide between the two parties. But the absence of significant gender differences in thinking on this question for both parties downplays the relevance of a desire for increasing women's political power in bringing about the gender gap in recruitment to each party. The weakness of the variable employed in this analysis to capture opinion on increasing women's political power may be masking the existence of a stronger relationship.

Table 3

Selected Orientations of Male and Female Recruits and Renegades by Party

	PC		NDP	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Recruits				
Do more for women	2.2 (70)	2.3 (31)	2.0 (25)	2.0 (18)
Feminists	53.2 (74)	49.4 (33)	60.7 (26)	58.2 (22)
Renegades				
Do more for women	2.1** (283)	2.4 (454)	2.0 (120)	2.1 (148)
Feminists	50.4 (300)	51.7 (496)	59.5* (124)	53.7 (162)

From campaign period survey: "How much do you think should be done for women": much more (scored as 1), somewhat more (scored as 2), about the same as now (scored as 3), somewhat less (scored as 4), much less (scored as 5), or haven't you thought much about it (coded as missing)?

From post-election survey: "How do you feel about feminists?" scored 0 (very negative) to 100 (very positive).


Note: * indicates differences significant at $p < .05$; ** indicates differences significant at $p < .01$; Ns appear in parentheses.

Table 3 also compares feelings about feminists between female and male recruits for the two parties. It was suggested that support for feminism might enhance the importance of having a woman prime minister, and hence feminists would be more likely to support a party with a woman at the helm. Although it would not provide definitive proof, stronger feelings toward feminists among female recruits would provide initial evidence of the link between feminist belief and differential recruitment patterns among men and women to the two women-led parties. Although the evidence is not overwhelming, several conclusions can be drawn from the data in Table 3. First, the NDP drew support from recruits that felt more positively toward feminists than did the Conservatives (reflecting the ideological positions of the two parties): roughly 10 percentage points in support for feminism distinguishes recruits to both parties. One might have anticipated a larger difference in light of the number of decisions by the Conservatives while in office that were antithetical to the feminist agenda. Second, female recruits in both parties felt somewhat more positively toward feminists than did male recruits although the differences fail to achieve statistical significance. And in keeping with the trends found on other factors, the gender gap among Conservative recruits is larger than the gaps among NDP recruits. Although the evidence does not rule out the

possibility that the differential pull to these parties among women and men was due to feminist belief, neither does it overwhelmingly point to this factor's importance in accounting for the gap.

Figure 6

Deviations from Average Leader Thermometer Ratings of Female and Male Renegades by Party



See Appendix for question wording and variable construction.
Sample sizes: PC: female renegades (N=288), male renegades (N=485); NDP: female renegades (N=115), male renegades (N=158).

The extent to which defection from the two women-led parties owed to leader evaluations and to gender-related concerns must also be examined. Although there were no apparent gender differences in defection rates from the two parties, it is nevertheless instructive to examine whether leader evaluations or gender-related concerns played some part in similarly driving women and men away from each party. However, as shown in Figure 6, an examination of deviations from average leader thermometer ratings among renegade voters reveals that renegades from the NDP did not rate McLaughlin substantially lower than their average rating for all other leaders. Less than 2 percentage points separated McLaughlin's rating from the average rating accorded all leaders. This result is noticeable in that it stands in stark contrast to the results for renegades from the Conservative party: Campbell's rating falls between 6 and 8 percentage points lower than the average for all leaders among both male and female Conservative

renegades. This suggests that the party leaders were not equally rejected by virtue of their gender alone. In one instance, some voters left the party despite rating McLaughlin as positively as other leaders. For Conservative renegades, however, Campbell appears to have played a larger role in inducing the defections among both women and men.

Table 4

Mean Evaluations of Kim Campbell and Audrey McLaughlin among Female and Male Renegades

	Kim Campbell		Audrey McLaughlin	
	Female Renegades	Male Renegades	Female Renegades	Male Renegades
Arrogant	3.52 (285)	3.48 (479)	5.01 (109)	5.41 (157)
Trustworthy	4.08 (281)	4.09 (478)	3.04 (106)	2.99 (157)
Aggressive	3.24* (287)	3.55 (481)	3.98 (107)	4.26 (155)
Compassionate	3.67 (266)	3.59 (436)	2.71 (97)	2.45 (142)
Strong Leadership	4.44** (285)	4.81 (476)	4.06 (105)	4.21 (154)
Intelligent	2.52 (287)	2.70 (475)	2.56* (102)	2.90 (145)
Speaks for Women	3.16** (273)	2.74 (449)	2.75* (100)	2.40 (144)

Measures are four point scales ranging from 1 to 7; responses were coded such that a 1 indicates that respondents believed the trait described the leader "very well," 3 "fairly well", 5 "not very well" and 7 that they believed it described her "not at all." See Appendix for question wording.

Note: ** denotes differences significant at $p < .01$; * denotes differences significant at $p < .05$; Ns appear in parentheses.

An evaluation of leader traits among male and female renegades is also informative. In keeping with her more positive evaluation among renegades than Campbell, Table 4 reveals that McLaughlin also received higher scores on evaluations of a number of character traits and ability. And despite the absence of significant gender differences in the share of renegades among 1988 voters for each party, gender differences are apparent in trait evaluations for each leader. Female renegades from the Conservative party were significantly less likely to criticize Campbell for

not providing the party with strong leadership and were significantly more likely to describe her as aggressive. For McLaughlin, the only significant gender difference appears in the greater willingness of female renegades to describe her as intelligent. These results confirm that Conservative renegades were more likely led away from the party because of Campbell than were NDP renegades because of McLaughlin. Further it reveals that gender differences in leader evaluations can appear among those voting against the party, with women voters not always rating women leaders more positively on the traits in which such differences appear.

An examination of beliefs regarding each leader's ability to "speak for women" is more suggestive of differing motives for male and female renegades' actions. Table 4 reveals that female renegades were more reserved than male renegades in describing both Campbell and McLaughlin as having the ability to "really speak for women." A further comparison of the scores given by renegades and recruits on this measure reveals that only women that moved away from and toward the Conservatives held beliefs that one might have anticipated: this comparison alone shows recruits that are more likely than renegades to believe that the leader could speak for them as a group. For Campbell, then, this leadership trait appears to have played some part in drawing some women toward the party while turning others away.

A return to Table 3 suggests that beliefs on the need for "doing more for women" were not significant in motivating a vote against either party. Indeed, the attitudes of recruits and renegades for both the Conservatives and NDP are remarkably similar on this score. The only group which appears to have been somewhat less than accepting of this need were male Conservative renegades, who differ significantly in their thinking from female renegades. Yet in spite of this difference, male Conservative renegades were nevertheless generally supportive of doing more for women and their thinking on this measure differs little from recruits.

Renegades may also have been driven away from the two parties if their attitudes toward feminists were particularly negative, in light of both Campbell's and McLaughlin's declared feminism. The results from Table 3 suggest that such attitudes were of little consequence in driving voters away from the party. Both male and female renegades reveal positive scores in their feelings towards feminists, scores which are less positive but not significantly different from recruits to each party. The only group for which such feelings may have played some part in the decision to vote against the party were male NDP renegades since their scores differ significantly from both female renegades and male recruits to the party. But even these lower scores remain generally positive toward feminists, and as such, their influence is likely to have been moderate at best.

Summary and Discussion

This analysis has attempted to shed light on the relevance of party leader gender to individual vote decisions taken in 1993. The evidence presented suggests that party leader gender was a factor in determining the vote, particularly when comparing women and men recruited to the two parties that chose women as their leaders for the first time in a Canadian national election.

The selection of these women as leaders did not keep these parties from suffering electoral losses at the polls. Indeed, both parties failed to keep the defection rate among their 1988 voters below 60 percent in 1993. Neither was the choice of leader able to attract sufficient numbers of voters to each party to allow them some possibility of forming the next government. Both parties failed to attract more than 15 percent support among Canadians. Instead, the selection of women leaders provided a lure that attracted more women than men to each party. And this lure was of sufficient strength to slightly reverse the traditional gender gap in voting for the Conservatives.

Bashevkin notes that the 1993 election was not fought on issues that the National Action Committee had identified as key questions and concerns of women. Moreover, she argues that campaign workers for both leaders may have directed each of them to avoid making explicit connections to "women's issues" in an effort to disassociate themselves from the feminist agenda (1996, 492). The evidence provided here suggests that in spite of the lack of a gendered campaign, or a particularly salient and gendered issue such as free trade, gender was nevertheless a factor in the election.

That gender mattered in the election is due to the differential rate of recruitment among women to the Conservative and New Democratic parties. The causes of these differential rates appear to be the more positive evaluations that women gave to the two leaders. For the Conservatives in particular, significant differences in the willingness of female and male recruits to ascribe certain traits to Campbell appear to have played some part in the greater willingness of women to endorse her, and hence, explains in part the higher recruitment rate to the party among women. Both parties appear to have been correct in anticipating some electoral mileage gain among Canadian voters, particularly among women.

The more substantive differences found among Conservative voters indicate that the decision to select Campbell as leader had greater ramifications than the decision to select McLaughlin. The NDP had much earlier adopted a specific program for increasing its electoral attractiveness among female voters; as such, there was less electoral mileage to be tapped by selecting a woman as leader. For the Conservatives, however, Campbell might have provided an outlet for women voters who previously had none: the pool of women who held an ideologically conservative set of opinions but who nevertheless saw in Campbell someone who could speak for them as a group and who perhaps, over any ideological considerations, placed a

significant premium on having a woman lead the government. The decision to select Campbell also appears to have been made at some cost in votes among former women partisans: some women may have left the party specifically because they were less able to see Campbell as someone who could speak for them.

Although no significant gender gaps were recorded in renegade activity for the two parties, the results suggest that Campbell played a more significant role in turning people away from the party than did McLaughlin. These defections appear to extend beyond a mere unwillingness to accept a woman as party leader, considering that renegades for the NDP left despite relatively positive evaluations of the leader. We should not be surprised to find that voters are more discriminating in their electoral calculations than to rely solely on leader gender. Neither do these defections appear to have been driven by negative feelings towards feminists or an unwillingness to do more for women. Renegades in both parties held beliefs on these measures that differed little from recruits. Campaigns employing more explicit appeals to feminist concerns and/or women's issues might have led to different results than those recorded here.

The conventional wisdom of party members appears to have been upheld: men were no more likely than women to desert a party headed by a woman, but women were more drawn to them in part because of the choice of leader. It remains to be seen whether a party will employ this strategy successfully in the future to provide Canadians with their first elected female prime minister.

Appendix

Respondents were asked how well a set of words and phrases described a party leader and to rate each leader on a thermometer scale. Only respondents who considered themselves more than not at all informed about each leader were included (based on their response to the following question: Do you feel very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all informed about Kim Campbell (Audrey McLaughlin)?).

For leader traits (Tables 2 and 4), variables were selected from both the campaign and post-election waves of the survey:

Campaign Wave:

Does “intelligent” describe Kim Campbell (Audrey McLaughlin) very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all?

Does “can really speak for women” describe Kim Campbell (Audrey McLaughlin) very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all?

Does “compassionate” describe Kim Campbell (Audrey McLaughlin) very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all?

Post-election Wave:

Does “arrogant” describe Kim Campbell (Audrey McLaughlin) very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all?

Does “trustworthy” describe Kim Campbell (Audrey McLaughlin) very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all?

Does “aggressive” describe Kim Campbell (Audrey McLaughlin) very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all?

Does “provides strong leadership” describe Kim Campbell (Audrey McLaughlin) very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all?

For deviations from average leader thermometer ratings (Figures 5 and 6), the five leader thermometer ratings from the post-election survey were averaged and subtracted from the individual ratings for Campbell and McLaughlin. This controls for variation across respondents in interpretations of the thermometer scale. Thus the sign of the deviation indicates whether the leader was rated more highly (+) or more poorly (-) than the average for all leaders, and the size of the deviations corresponds to the percentage point difference between the average and each leader's thermometer rating.

Post-election question: How would you rate Kim Campbell (substitute each leader's name)? Scale runs from 0 to 100 where 0 means very unfavourably and 100 means very favourably.

Notes

- * This is a substantially revised version of a paper presented at the 1997 meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in St. John's. The author would like to thank David Stewart, Sandra Burt and in particular an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on the paper, and Mebs Kanji for his help with the CES data. In spite of their help, I alone remain responsible for any errors contained herein.
1. Gotell and Brodie (1996) argue that despite an increased number of women running as candidates and as party leaders in electoral races, parties have endorsed women for reasons of symbolic legitimization rather than in an effort to bring about any real change in party platforms or public policies.
 2. The 1993 Study was directed by Richard Johnston, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Neil Nevitte and Henry Brady. The Institute for Social Research at York University carried out the fieldwork and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada funded the project. The original conductors of the data and the institutions involved bear no responsibility for the analysis and interpretations presented here.
 3. The variable included in the 1993 CES employed to weight the data in this analysis is CPSNWGT1 which adjusts for regional and household discrepancies in sampling.
 4. Woolstencroft notes that the promise of "doing politics differently" was not upheld throughout the course of the election campaign and became instead an attempt to "stay the course" (1994, 15).
 5. The Wearing and Wearing (1991) figures for the gender gap in voting are not employed here because the restricted use of respondents that completed all three waves of the 1974-79-80 CNES distorts the size of gender gaps in voting, particularly for the Conservatives.
 6. The campaign-period survey variable employed to capture vote in 1988 (CPSM6) is likely to contain some error given that respondents are asked to recall their vote choice from five years earlier. But as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer for this journal, recall error is unlikely to vary with gender and thus poses no serious threat to this investigation.
 7. The share of renegades for the Reform party is not included given their extremely small numbers (for women, N=10 and for men, N=18). The Bloc Québécois did not contest the 1988 election and so voting patterns for the party do not appear here.

References

- Bashevkin, Sylvia (1993). *Toeing the Lines: Women and Party Politics in English Canada*, 2nd edition. (Toronto: Oxford University Press).
- _____. (1996). "Political Parties and the Representation of Women" in *Canadian Parties in Transition*, 2nd edition, edited by A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon. (Toronto: Nelson Canada).
- Brodie, Janine with the assistance of Celia Chandler (1991). "Women and the Electoral Process in Canada" in *Women in Canadian Politics: Towards Equity in Representation*, edited by Kathy Megyery, volume 6 of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. (Toronto: Dundurn Press).
- Campbell, Kim (1996). *Time and Chance*. (Toronto: Doubleday Canada).
- Fife, Robert (1993). *Kim Campbell: The Making of a Politician*. (Toronto: Harper Collins).
- Forbes, H. D. (1996). "Interpreting the 1993 Election" in *Party Politics in Canada*, 7th edition, edited by Hugh G. Thorburn. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada).

- Gidengil, Elisabeth (1995). "Economic Man-Social Woman? The Case of the Gender Gap in Support for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement," *Comparative Political Studies*, 28, 384-408.
- _____. (1996). "Gender and Attitudes Towards Quotas for Women Candidates in Canada," *Women & Politics*, 16, 21-44.
- Gotell, Lise and Janine Brodie (1996). "Women and Parties in the 1990s: Less Than Ever an Issue of Numbers" in *Party Politics in Canada*, 7th edition, edited by Hugh Thorburn. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada).
- Hayes, Bernadette and Ian McAllister (1997). "Gender, Party Leaders, and Election Outcomes in Australia, Britain and the United States," *Comparative Political Studies*, 30, 3-26.
- Hunter, Alfred A. and Margaret Denton (1984). "Do Female Candidates 'Lose Votes'? The Experience of Female Candidates in the 1979 and 1980 Canadian General Elections," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 21, 395-406.
- Johnston, Richard, André Blais, Henry E. Brady, and Jean Crête (1992). *Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press).
- Kopinak, Kathryn (1987). "Gender Differences in Political Ideology in Canada," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 24, 23-38.
- McLaughlin, Audrey (1992). *A Woman's Place: My Life and Politics*. (Toronto: McFarlane, Walter & Ross).
- O'Neill, Brenda (1995). "The Gender Gap: Re-evaluating Theory and Method" in *Changing Methods: Feminists Transforming Practice*, edited by Sandra Burt and Lorraine Code. (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press).
- Pammatt, Jon H. (1994). "Tracking the Votes" in *The Canadian General Election of 1993*, edited by Alan Frizzell, Jon H. Pammatt and Anthony Westell. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press).
- Pultzer, Eric and John F. Zipp (1996). "Identity Politics, Partisanship and Voting for Women Candidates," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 60, 30-57.
- Rinehart, Sue Tolleson (1992). *Gender Consciousness and Politics*. (New York: Routledge).
- Stewart, David K. and R.K. Carty (1993). "Does Changing the Party Leader Provide an Electoral Boost? A Study of Provincial Parties: 1960-1992," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 26, 313-330.
- Studlar, Donley T. and Richard E. Matland (1996). "The Dynamics of Women's Representation in the Canadian Provinces: 1975-1994," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 29, 269-293.
- Wearing, Joseph (1988). *Strained Relations: Canadian Parties and Voters*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart).
- Wearing, Peter and Joseph Wearing (1991). "Does Gender Make a Difference in Voting Behaviour?" in *The Ballot and Its Message: Voting in Canada*, edited by Joseph Wearing. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman).
- Whitehorn, Alan (1994). "The NDP's Quest for Survival" in *The Canadian General Election of 1993*, edited by Alan Frizzell, Jon Pammatt and Anthony Westell. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press).
- Woolstencroft, Peter (1994). "Doing Politics Differently: The Conservative Party and the Campaign of 1993" in *The Canadian General Election of 1993*, edited by Alan Frizzell, Jon Pammatt and Anthony Westell. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press).
- Youngman, Lolleen and Roger Gibbins (1996). "Gender and Neoconservatism: Public Policy Implications of the Alberta Experience," unpublished paper, June 1996.

Linda Trimble¹

“Good Enough Citizens”: Canadian Women and Representation in Constitutional Deliberations²

Abstract

In their quest for representation in the processes and outcomes of constitutional deliberations since 1980, individual women and women's groups have pursued broad and varied constitutional agendas and have addressed all aspects of the constitutional order. This paper argues that Canadian women have acted as “good citizens” when pursuing their diverse constitutional aspirations. Yet much of the literature describing Canadian constitutional discourses and dramas during this time period inscribes women as “Charter Canadians” whose present and future constitutional interests are (wrongly) assumed to be shaped entirely by a singular desire to protect and enhance their Charter rights and whose constitutional interventions are, therefore, self-interested, particularistic and even disruptive. This paper argues that the conventional assumptions about women's constitutional participation (especially their representational claims) are based on patriarchal conceptions of citizenship which construct women as inherently partial, private and dependent and, therefore, as unable to measure up to the supposedly universal, but actually masculinist, norms of political engagement.

Résumé

Dans leur quête d'une représentation au niveau des processus et résultats des discussions constitutionnelles qui se sont tenues depuis 1980, les femmes et groupes de femmes ont poursuivi des programmes constitutionnels vastes et divers, et se sont attaquées à tous les aspects de l'ordre constitutionnel. Cet article soutient que les femmes canadiennes ont agi à titre de « bonnes citoyennes » en tentant de réaliser leurs diverses aspirations constitutionnelles. Cependant, une bonne partie de la documentation, qui décrit les discours et drames constitutionnels de cette période, caractérise les femmes qui y ont pris part comme des « Canadiennes de la Charte ». Ainsi, on suppose (à tort) que leurs intérêts constitutionnels actuels et futurs sont entièrement modelés par un désir singulier de protéger et de renforcer les droits que leur garantit la Charte et que leurs interventions constitutionnelles sont, par conséquent, intéressées, particularistes et même perturbatrices. Cet article soutient que les présupposés conventionnels au sujet de la participation des femmes aux débats constitutionnels (en particulier leurs prétentions à un caractère représentatif) sont fondés sur des notions patriarcales de la citoyenneté qui représentent les femmes comme fondamentalement partielles, privées et dépendantes et, par conséquent, incapables de se mesurer aux normes soi-disant universelles, mais en fait masculinistes, de l'engagement politique.

This paper argues that Canadian women and women's groups have, through three rounds of constitutional deliberation and negotiation, fulfilled their obligations as good citizens by actively voicing their authentic constitutional goals and by considering the constitutional aspirations of other citizens and groups. During and since the patriation discussions in 1980, individual women and women's groups have pursued broad and varied constitutional agendas which covered all aspects of the constitutional order, including the division of powers, institutional structures, the relationship between citizens and the state, and processes of constitutional amendment. Women's diverse constitutional agendas, taken as a whole, have been comprehensive and sensitive to societal diversity. So why do many observers of the Canadian constitutional scene characterize women's constitutional participation and aspirations as narrow, particularistic and self-interested?

Scholars and pundits cast women as "Charter Canadians" whose constitutional interests are said to be shaped almost entirely by a desire to protect and enhance their Charter rights. As a result, women (and women's groups) are portrayed solely as *an* interest group, the perspectives and goals of which are partial, self-regarding and disruptive of the broader constitutional project. Therefore, when women and women's groups make further constitutional claims, their demands, especially their desire to be recognized as valid participants in constitutional decision-making processes, are regarded as defensive and narrow. This characterization is incorrect because it misrepresents women and their demands, most notably by assuming the existence of a "universal woman." Women are falsely homogenized by portrayals which suppose that they act in constitutional lock-step. As well, labelling women "Charter Canadians" assumes the Charter is the sole focus of women's constitutional claims. In fact, women's constitutional recommendations have never been limited to equality rights, and many individuals and groups were ambivalent about, or opposed to, the entrenchment of individual rights in the Constitution. The idea that women are not good enough citizens to be entitled to exercise their equality substantively, in constitutional deliberations, really has no empirical legs to stand on. I argue that this misleading characterization of women's constitutional interventions is premised on patriarchal conceptions of citizenship which hold women up to masculinist norms of public reasonableness and judge women accordingly as particularistic, private and incapable of acting as "good enough" citizens in the formal political realm.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first section outlines the conceptual framework for the analysis by defining and discussing three key concepts; women, citizenship and the constitutional order. It argues that the constitutional order is gendered and that the commonly accepted virtues of constitutional participation are masculinist norms parading as universal citizenship standards. The second part delineates inclusive norms of constitutional citizenship and gives an overview of women's activism

during the patriation, Meech Lake and Charlottetown rounds of constitutional deliberations. It shows that women’s activism, taken as a whole, represents good citizenship. The mischaracterizations of women’s constitutional ideas and activities are revealed, and contested, in the third section.

Women, Citizenship and the Gendered Constitutional Order

When using the term, *women*, we are mindful of the fact that women are by no means a homogeneous group which speaks with one voice and articulates collective goals. Iris Marion Young’s concept of gender as seriality is particularly helpful as it avoids essentialism (assuming the “existence of some kind of essence corresponding to women *as women*”³) while allowing the term “women” to refer to social and political collectivities.⁴ Young distinguishes between a group and a series. Whereas members of a *group* recognize themselves as part of a unified collectivity pursuing a common project, a *series* is a collection of people whose personal attributes, actions and goals differ, though they are all affected by particular social practices or material realities. For women, then, being part of a series does not require identification of essential/bodily attributes which women share; it simply means that women are linked by structures like “enforced heterosexuality and the sexual division of labour.”⁵

Young notes that while the “gendered being of women’s groups arises from the serial being of women,” women’s organizations generally reflect a range of overlapping serialities based on race, class, location, language, mental and physical dis/ability, sexual orientation and so on⁶. Students of Canadian politics who have tended to see identities as mutually exclusive and oppositional — woman *or* Aboriginal, Québécois *or* Canadian, for example — are usefully reminded that identities typically intersect. As Young points out, since various forms of seriality do not define the identity of individuals, a woman’s political engagement does not inevitably require hard choices between identities. Her political action may, for instance, be based on her lived experience as woman *and* Aboriginal.

The distinction between a group and a series should not be read as mutually exclusive possibilities. Young argues that a series has the *latent* potential to organize around a common purpose in reaction to the structural constraints which its members experience. Once underway, such organization is neither latent nor passive. Individuals embodying one, or multiple, serial memberships can, and do, organize into *groups* with self-consciously political agendas, purposive strategies and concrete political goals. Moreover, overlapping serialities are represented not only within groups, but also between groups, via coalition-building and other strategies of support.

Citizenship, in the Canadian context, is a network of interlocking understandings about who belongs to the Canadian nation and what

belonging involves. These understandings, which evolve over time, include ideas about the duties and virtues of citizens and the concomitant obligations of the state.⁷ Feminist scholars have unearthed the patriarchal nature of citizenship theory and have challenged the liberal norm of universal citizenship.⁸ The ideal of universal citizenship is not universal at all; when one looks closely enough, the “good enough” citizen is revealed to be normatively male. The norms and values of citizenship are gendered not the least of all because supposedly universal citizenship rights, duties and virtues are actually premised on the well-established distinction between public and private realms whereby the masculine, public sphere is the “universal world of individualism, rights, contract, reason, freedom, equality, impartial law and citizenship” while the feminine, private sphere is the “world of particularity, natural subjection, inequality, emotion, love, [and] partiality.”⁹

The duty to participate in public affairs is stressed by classic and contemporary citizenship theorists alike on the assumption that citizens can only learn good civic behaviour through participation in the political realm.¹⁰ This is fine in theory, but in practice all women were once explicitly excluded from formal political institutions on the basis of their sex. And even having claimed basic democratic citizenship rights, including the right to vote, run for political office and serve as appointed representatives in institutions like the Senate, women remain significantly under-represented in the processes and structures which allow citizens a part in the administration of their common affairs. Moreover, as Susan James observes, “in so far as public political life is seen as male, and is defined in opposition to the private, domestic sphere of women, women lack full membership in the political world and are not full citizens.”¹¹ The (false) dichotomization of public and private characteristics, duties and standards is alive and well in the liberal norms of citizenly political participation. Two citizenship virtues are of particular relevance to an understanding of women’s constitutional ideas and interventions — independence and public reasonableness.

For liberal theorists, freedom is essential to citizen participation in public affairs, for the citizen should be able to engage in unfettered political activity. Therefore, economic, physical and emotional independence are regarded as prerequisites of good citizenship.¹² However, liberty for women has not been a central feature of the citizenship package elaborated by theorists or translated into rights and entitlements by legislators. The traditional female role within the hetero-patriarchal family is one of economic dependency on the male spouse and wage earner. The sexual division of labour, unequal pay, workplace discrimination and the gendered effects of government restructuring translate into economic insecurity for many women.¹³ Physical independence remains equally elusive, for it is only very recently that security of the person has been interpreted to include the right of women to freedom from stalking, harassment and sexual

violence. Still, the threat of bodily harm, whether in the public sphere or in the home, limits women’s liberty and capacity for formal and informal political participation.¹⁴ The third pillar of citizenly independence, emotional independence, is defined as a state of mind which reflects a certain detachment from the realities of everyday life, and which requires both the ability to “speak from a more distant standpoint, as one person among others,” and to put aside personal feelings which “put the self too prominently at the centre of the picture.”¹⁵ In other words, emotional independence equals impartiality; good citizens transcend their particularisms when acting in the public sphere, especially in the political realm. But if women are seen to speak from their particular (private) standpoint when they engage in political discourse, they will be judged as lacking emotional independence. And when women and women’s groups make claims as women, or on the basis of other, or overlapping, serial locations, they run the risk of being regarded as insufficiently impartial to participate in discussions about the public good. Similarly, the norm of public reasonableness is defined as the ability of citizens to “stand well back from their private identities and purposes”¹⁶ and to put the general or public interest above their personal or private concerns.¹⁷ This ethic of active political citizenship clearly delineates the public from the private, as it requires people to leave their private selves behind when they enter into political discourse.

Iris Marion Young argues that it is impossible for anyone to deliberate about political issues without being influenced by their own context and standpoint.¹⁸ Citizens do not enter public discussions with experiential *tabula rasa*, and even if they did they would have little of value to contribute to the discussion. As well, in “a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as citizens, persons should leave their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view, serves only to reinforce that privilege, for the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups.”¹⁹ Finally, Young wonders why the articulation of group-based needs and interests are seen as necessarily incompatible with the public good. Citizens can speak from the standpoint of their specificities and/or group-specific needs in ways that are public spirited, as Young defines public spiritedness as a willingness to listen to and be concerned with the claims of others.

When discussing the Canadian *Constitution*, it is important to distinguish between the written Constitution and the constitutional order. The *written Constitution*, the Constitution Act, comprises the original constitutional documents, including the British North America Act, 1867, the various amendments and additions to the BNA Act, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, as Alan Cairns points out in “The Living Canadian Constitution,”²⁰ the written document is by no means the whole story. It is one part of a larger story, a story which evolves over time as the

attitudes and practices of governments and citizens change. The Canadian *constitutional order* comprises the set of understandings about the state, governance and civil society which are constantly being contested and transformed by citizen and state actions. Cairns points out three elements of the Canadian constitutional order: understandings about the basic institutions of government and the relationships between them; understandings about the division of powers between governments in the federal system; and understandings about relationships between citizens and their governments. A fourth element — understandings about how to change the Constitution and thereby alter the relationships defined by it — should be added to the list.

As Cairns notes, we need to recognize that “the formal text of written constitutional documents is filtered through an informal constitutional culture of meanings and assumptions ...”²¹ One of the key aspects of the constitutional order is its gendered nature. Our constitutional understandings have originated from, and have been developed within, a patriarchal society, an important feature of which is the sex-based dichotomization of the public sphere of business and government and the private sphere of home and family. At the time of Confederation, laws and policies were designed to keep women in their place, which was under the social and political control of men, and for many women this meant economic and psychological dependency on the male head of the household.²² Women, regardless of ethnicity or relation to paid work, were regarded as biologically inferior, as naturally subject to men, and as singularly incapable of participating in the public sphere.²³ At the inception of the constitutional order, then, all women and some men were denied many of the individual rights of citizens *because* they were women (and/or Aboriginal, and/or of Asian or East Indian origin). Decades of constitutional evolution occurred without the presence of women in institutions which play key roles in changing our political understandings, and these institutions and processes of government have continued to develop in the context of women’s relative exclusion from formal politics. Women’s citizenship statuses, therefore, are shaped by the constitutional order and its informal cultural understandings, which evolve when they are contested within (male-dominated) institutions of formal political power, such as legislatures and courts. It is not surprising, then, that the demand for equitable representation in these institutions is a common theme in the constitutional claims made by Canadian women’s groups.²⁴

Women’s Constitutional Participation: Good Enough Citizens

The putatively neutral norms of “universal” citizenship are functionally exclusive, particularly the virtues of emotional independence and public reasonableness. It is unreasonable (and unfair) to expect marginalized and oppressed groups to leave their private selves, their experiences of discrimination and their specific claims behind when they enter into

political discourse. So by what criteria can we assess women’s constitutional participation? What duties and virtues define the “good enough” constitutional citizen? Clearly, the duty of taking an active interest in constitutional matters is important. Most constitutional interventions are recognized as fulfilling the obligation to take an interest in political matters, even using a masculinist definition of political activity. A feminist revisioning of the political realm would include constitutional actions and ideas which stretch the boundaries of mainstream constitutional discourses and disrupt the public/private dichotomy.²⁵

Should constitutional participants be required to address all aspects of the constitutional order, including the division of powers, the institutions of government, Charter rights and freedoms, and the process of making constitutional decisions? Arguably this standard should not be applied to individual persons and groups because it imposes an extraordinarily high bench mark for assessing the activities and demands of non-governmental actors, especially those with insufficient funding or expertise to cover the entire constitutional agenda. However, it is not unreasonable to expect the constitutional interventions of Canadian women and women’s groups, taken in their entirety, to address most if not all of this traditional constitutional territory.

An inclusive approach to defining the virtues necessary for constitutional participation would propose that how citizens participate is as important as what they say. James Tully makes a case for a constitutional dialogue of mutual recognition, featuring intercultural discussions between participants who are “equally recognized and accommodated.”²⁶ According to Tully, the standard of participation in this dialogue is having the civic ability to tell one’s own story, to hear the different stories others tell, and to “see their common and interwoven histories together from a multiplicity of paths.”²⁷ If we blend Iris Marion Young’s definition of public spiritedness with Tully’s norms of constitutional discourse, then the good citizen can be expected to make political claims in an authentic voice, and to share the responsibility of listening to, and respecting the claims of, other members of the political community. The criteria for “good enough” constitutional participation by Canadian women and women’s groups, then, are: active participation in constitutional discussions, be it through informal channels or formal consultation mechanisms; articulation of women’s diverse constitutional aspirations in dialogue with the official constitutional agenda but not limited to it; and willingness to consider the constitutional goals of other groups and actors.

The Patriation Round

The “patriation round” of constitutional deliberations formally began after the 1980 Quebec referendum but, as with previous attempts at constitutional negotiation, discussions between federal and provincial governments quickly became deadlocked. In response to the lack of

progress at the bargaining table, the federal government announced, in the spring of 1980, that it would unilaterally patriate the Constitution and add a human rights document. Provincial governments challenged the authority of the federal government to proceed on its own and asked the Supreme Court of Canada to rule on the matter. Meanwhile, in the fall of 1980, the Justice Minister introduced the federal government's proposed constitutional package, including a draft Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in the House of Commons.

The umbrella group of the English-Canadian women's movement, the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), had been doing educational work on federalism and jurisdictional issues for some time.²⁸ These discussions revealed a significant difference of opinion between Anglophone feminists and Francophone Quebec feminists about the division of powers, with Quebec groups favouring devolution of family law and divorce to the provinces and English-Canadian groups failing to understand this position.²⁹ The disagreement reinforced the divide between Francophone feminists from Quebec, including the *Fédération des Femmes du Québec* (FFQ,) and English-Canadian feminist groups. Yet NAC tried to achieve a pro-active position reflecting the diverse political aspirations and constitutional positions of its various member groups.³⁰ NAC began working on the constitutional file as soon as it was foregrounded by the federal government, creating a constitutional subcommittee which included a representative of the FFQ, and identifying fifteen constitutional issues of concern to women, including family law, the economic union, the status of Aboriginal women, representation of women in appointed and elected political institutions, and matters like immigration policy which are affected by alterations in the division of powers.³¹

Charter equality guarantees were not the sole or even the primary goal of many Canadian women in the late 1970s and early 1980s because almost two decades of litigation based on the federal Bill of Rights had proven unhelpful to women, especially to Aboriginal women who had lost status due to sexist provisions of the Indian Act.³² Women recognized that formal rights guarantees do not ensure that rights will be respected in practice.³³ As a result, equality rights were but one part of a comprehensive constitutional agenda articulated by the English-Canadian women's movement.³⁴ The federal government's Charter was not on the agenda of Francophone feminists in Quebec; in keeping with their overall strategy of transforming the provincial state, they sought a constitutional framework which would recognize and reflect Quebec's specificity. Also, as Micheline De Sève writes, "[f]eminists from Quebec had just obtained recognition of affirmative action programs in this provincial charter. It was not clear at the time if the Canadian equality proposal would be as strong as our own charter on this matter."³⁵ Aboriginal women sought recognition of their rights within the context of constitutional acknowledgement of the inherent self-government rights of Aboriginal peoples.³⁶ The patriation discussions

revealed that mainstream Anglophone feminists neither fully comprehended nor championed the self-determination goals and collective rights demands of Quebec nationalists and First Nations.³⁷

“Elements of the Canadian women’s movement have differed fundamentally on the relative importance of individual and collective rights ... and about the value of a strategy of legal and constitutional protection.”³⁸ Many English-Canadian feminists questioned the utility of constitutional rights protections as a strategy of advancing the economic, social and political status of women. There was outright opposition to entrenched rights among Progressive Conservative women, women and women’s groups in Western Canada, as well as among “those with more traditionalist views [who] tended to believe that it was not in keeping with Canada’s political history and political culture to have an entrenched Charter of Rights ...”³⁹ Some activists on the left were ambivalent about the proposed Charter, but for different reasons. For instance, the NDP government in Saskatchewan felt entrenched equality rights might prohibit governments from initiating affirmative action programs, and some women activists supported this position.⁴⁰

A NAC mid-year meeting held in October 1980, devoted considerable attention to the Charter proposal and a variety of issues not addressed by the federal government’s proposal, including the division of powers and the economic union. As well, a variety of groups mobilized to present briefs to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, which was mandated to hear public submissions on the federal government’s constitutional package. Women’s groups and individuals raised issues as disparate as: women’s representation in governmental institutions such as the Supreme Court and the Senate; the need for a “Canada clause” or a statement of recognition of Canada’s cultural diversity; jurisdictional issues, especially divorce; the necessity for specific recognition of equality rights for Aboriginal women; official languages and minority language education rights; equalization and regional disparities; the amending formula; the status of the monarchy; and the process of constitutional renewal.⁴¹ Many of the recommendations forwarded by individual women and groups were not framed as “women’s issues”; and some groups urged constitutional recognition of Canada’s linguistic, geographic, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. For instance, the National Council of Women of Canada proposed a preamble to the Constitution which would begin with the following statement: “Recognizing the vastness of our land and the diversity of its inhabitants, we realize that a federation is only possible through the triumph of our will for a common citizenship, *overarching yet respecting the differences of region, race, language and religion of our peoples*” (emphasis mine).⁴²

Representational claims traversed women’s diverse opinions on constitutional renewal. Several groups recommended that the constitution guarantee a representative number of women on the Supreme Court of

Canada.⁴³ Others demanded, and were refused, the right to appear before the Special Joint Committee.⁴⁴ The National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL) decried the limited opportunities for citizen participation in the patriation round, saying “the only legitimate way in which a new Constitution can be developed for all Canadians is through their own participation in a Constituent Assembly.”⁴⁵ NAWL recommended that such an Assembly be designed to represent diverse voices, including women, ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities and persons with different religious affiliations.

Some “legally knowledgeable members of Canada’s established women’s organizations” felt the proposed Charter’s equality rights guarantees would actually worsen women’s legal positions.⁴⁶ These women felt compelled to articulate the problems with the document and to suggest ways of rewording various clauses. When the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women’s (CACSW’s) constitutional conference was cancelled, an ad-hoc committee of women, including the legal activists, very efficiently mobilized to organize an alternative, non-partisan conference. Participants reached agreement on a number of constitutional goals, though some delegates continued to argue against the entrenchment of a Charter of Rights in the constitution.⁴⁷ The recommendations stemming from the Ad-Hoc Conference on Women and the Constitution included: recognition of the principle of “equitable representation of women throughout the political system”; revision of the legal rights section of the Charter to include the right to reproductive freedom and equality of economic opportunity; the inclusion in Section 15 of sexual orientation, marital status and political belief as prohibited grounds of discrimination; consistent use of the word “person” throughout the Charter; and a guarantee that gender equality rights would be recognized without limitation.⁴⁸ None of these goals was achieved.

After the conference ended, several pro-Charter activists stayed in Ottawa to lobby on Parliament Hill. After some initial resistance, the federal Department of Justice began to work with members of the Ad-Hoc Committee to draft a sex equality clause. On April 23, 1981, Parliament unanimously agreed to add Section 28⁴⁹ to the draft Charter. In the eventual agreement, which was reached by the federal government and nine provinces and presented as a *fait accompli* to the Premier of Quebec, Section 33 was added as a concession to premiers opposed to the Charter. This so-called “notwithstanding clause” allows governments to make laws which override certain Charter protections, including Section 15 equality rights. When asked in the House of Commons whether the notwithstanding clause applied to Section 28, the Prime Minister said he didn’t know; apparently the first ministers had not considered the matter!⁵⁰ Members of the Ad-Hoc Committee then mobilized individual women, women’s groups and advisory councils on the status of women from across the country to put pressure on provincial governments, and these strategies of

public pressure and private lobbying ultimately proved successful. As one activist put it, “[Section] twenty-eight was a helluva lot to lose ... But it was not a helluva lot to win.”⁵¹ For many Quebec women, it was not a win at all, as the Charter could not be separated from the patriation deal, which was widely interpreted as a grave insult to Quebec and a betrayal of democratic principles.⁵²

The Meech Lake Accord

The Meech Lake Accord, a set of constitutional amendments concocted at an all-night bargaining session among federal and provincial first ministers in 1987, was designed to bring Quebec back into the constitutional fold. It featured explicit recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, constitutional recognition of the arrangement whereby provinces can “opt out” of shared-cost programs with financial compensation from Ottawa, a provincial role in the appointment of Supreme Court Justices and a requirement of unanimity for constitutional amendments regarding the Crown, the Senate, the Supreme Court and the creation of new provinces. A ratification period of three years was allocated, during which time federal and provincial governments were to seek approval for the Accord in their legislatures; this ultimately proved fatal to the agreement. Women’s groups had different responses to the Accord, though, like many citizens and groups, they decried the secretive, undemocratic and unrepresentative process which created it, and protested the Prime Minister’s characterization of the agreement as an inviolable “seamless web” which could not be amended. Citizens were told to stay out of the deliberations by Mr. Mulroney, who denounced critics of the Accord as “enemies of Quebec” and called Anglophone feminists, who questioned the relationship between the distinct society clause and Charter rights, “racists.”⁵³

Francophone women from Quebec were in favour of the Accord, on the whole, because it addressed Quebec’s constitutional isolation. Anglo-Canadian women’s groups such as NAC agreed with the overall intent of the agreement, which was to include Quebec in the Constitution and recognize the province as a distinct society.⁵⁴ But groups like NAC and NAWL had a number of concerns about the Accord, particularly the opting out provisions (NAC felt this clause would prevent the creation of a national day care system) and the issue of whether the distinct society clause could trump Charter rights guarantees. Francophone feminists in Quebec disputed this interpretation and argued that constitutional recognition of Quebec’s distinct society was crucial.⁵⁵ Indeed, Francophone feminists were insulted by the suggestion that Quebec would use the distinct society clause to trample on women’s rights; in fact the FFQ argued that, given the Quebec government’s solid record with respect to women’s rights, gender equality could be seen as an integral part of the distinct society which the clause was designed to protect.⁵⁶ Francophone and Anglophone groups eventually met and developed a *rapprochement* of sorts on the issue. While

they did not solve the disagreement about the potential impact of the distinct society clause on Charter rights, they agreed that a gender equality provision should be added to the Accord to prevent its misinterpretation by courts or governments.⁵⁷

As NAC and the FFQ struggled to reach this compromise, some “minority and marginalized women” objected to their exclusion from this process of elite accommodation within the mainstream elements of the Canadian women’s movement.⁵⁸ Women with disabilities and other multiply-oppressed women tended to share NAC’s concern about the erosion of federal responsibility for the welfare state and the primacy of Charter rights, but many of these groups “voiced anger at the fact that a compromise between the old established groups (French and English) should interfere with their right to express their own concerns to government.”⁵⁹ First Nations women were also peripheral to the official women’s movement discussions. Aboriginal organizations, including Aboriginal women’s groups, opposed the Accord because they were excluded from both the process and content of the agreement.

Although their positioning was, of necessity, reactive, women’s groups took the opportunity to present hastily prepared briefs to yet another Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons. Their papers illustrated a desire to broaden the scope of the constitutional agenda beyond the amendments contained in the Meech Lake Accord. Again, a variety of groups stressed the need for a more inclusive and consultative process. The National Association of Women and the Law said the constitutional bargaining table should be expanded to include territorial representatives and Aboriginal groups.⁶⁰ In addition to addressing the impact of various clauses of the Accord on Charter rights, women’s groups discussed the federal spending power, the amending formula, jurisdiction over immigration and representation in national institutions such as the Supreme Court and the Senate.⁶¹ Many of the English-Canadian women’s groups which presented briefs to the Special Joint Committee on the 1987 Constitutional Accord began with a statement welcoming the inclusion of Quebec in the Constitution and recognizing Quebec’s distinct society.⁶² Still, most of these groups defied the NAC/FFQ compromise position and argued against the Accord.⁶³

The “Canada Round” and the Charlottetown Accord

Governments tried to show they had learned the lessons from Meech Lake by offering an inclusive “Canada round.” The Charlottetown Accord process, which stretched from fall of 1990 to fall of 1992, featured a flurry of task forces, hearings, conferences, citizens forums and other types of consultations, followed by multilateral negotiations among federal, provincial and territorial governments and the four main Aboriginal groups, and topped off by a nation-wide referendum on the eventual “everything but the kitchen sink” agreement. Detailing the involvement of

individual women and women’s groups is an important project, but beyond the scope of this paper. Women represented themselves in the hearings and task forces held by governments and the discussion groups elicited by Citizen’s Forum on Canada’s Future (Spicer Commission). Women appeared as experts, representatives of women’s groups and “ordinary Canadians” at the five Renewal of Canada conferences designed to elicit responses to the federal government’s constitutional proposals.⁶⁴ As well, women took part in referendum discussions and rallies. As with the patriation and Meech Lake deliberations, women’s interventions reflected their serial locations as women and their intersecting serialities.

NAC’s overall position going into the Charlottetown round was developed at a 1990 Annual General meeting where representatives of the member groups decided to focus on the constitutional status of Quebec and First Nations.⁶⁵ This strategy illustrated a willingness on the part of the NAC executive and member groups to see the Constitution from the perspective of the peoples most profoundly alienated by it. As a result, NAC argued for a three-nations view of Canada with constitutional recognition of self-determination goals. NAC recommended entrenchment of the inherent right to self-government for Aboriginal peoples and amendments promoting asymmetrical federalism (the idea that the powers should be devolved to the government of Quebec but not to other provinces).⁶⁶ In its position paper NAC also addressed Senate reform, the social contract, the economic union, the division of powers, and the process of constitutional amendment.⁶⁷

The Charlottetown Accord itself was developed in the spring and summer of 1992 by the traditional constitutional players, joined by leaders of the territories and representatives of the four main Aboriginal organizations.⁶⁸ The document was detailed and wide-ranging, as it dealt with Senate reform, the division of powers, Aboriginal governance and Quebec’s status in the federation. It also offered a Canada clause to address issues of identity, recognition and solidarity. NAC and the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) held a joint women’s constitutional conference in Ottawa in August 1992, at which fifty major women’s groups, including the FFQ, the Fédération nationale des femmes canadiennes-françaises, the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women, and the Business and Professional Women’s Clubs participated. Significant opposition to the Accord was voiced at this meeting.⁶⁹ NAC, which at this time had strong representation from immigrant and visible minority women, women with disabilities and lesbians,⁷⁰ criticized the Accord on a number of grounds, and urged Canadians to vote “no” in the referendum. NAC said the agreement failed to provide for gender and minority representation in the Senate; moreover, NAC maintained that the Canada clause created a hierarchy of rights and the federalism and economic union provisions threatened to erode the welfare state. NAC also stressed that the agreement did not meet the

fundamental demands of the province of Quebec.⁷¹ And NAC stood in solidarity with NWAC, supporting the group's claim that it had been denied its legitimate role in the negotiation process, and that Aboriginal women's rights were not sufficiently protected by the self-government provisions of the Accord. Jill Vickers argues that "NAC's decision to oppose the Accord reflected the concerns of its most vulnerable members, minority, marginalized and non-status Aboriginal women in particular."⁷²

NAC did not represent all of the diverse positions of Canadian women, and as in the previous rounds of constitutional discussion, women's organizations and individual women had different goals and different responses to the Accord. Most women politicians from the three long-standing national parties (Liberal, NDP, PC) supported the Accord, and some female media elites urged a yes vote as well.⁷³ The *Fédération des Femmes du Québec* urged women to vote no, though women were mobilized on both the yes and no sides in Quebec.⁷⁴ Aboriginal women had conflicting views about the applicability of the Charter to First Nations governments.⁷⁵ The Inuit Women's Association (Pauktuutit) was part of the Inuit "yes" committee during the referendum, as they felt the representatives of the Inuit Tapirisat, Rosemarie Kuptana and Mary Simon, had successfully represented Inuit women's concerns. The Métis National Council of Women also spoke out in favour of the Accord and said the NWAC did not speak for Métis women.⁷⁷ Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, a key advisor to AFN leader Ovide Mercredi during the Charlottetown Accord negotiations, questioned NWAC's quest for constitutionally entrenched equality rights: "... to look only to an objective of equality with men is clearly insufficient for First Nations women's struggles and continued identities because it cannot encompass our aspirations to continue as distinct, albeit dynamic cultures. I cannot separate my gender from my culture."⁷⁸

In contrast with the Meech Lake round, citizens and groups had time to organize, respond to government proposals, and form coalitions before the formal negotiations began. But many of women's representational claims were ignored or ridiculed. NAC and NWAC requested, and were denied, participant status in the multilateral negotiations between governments and Aboriginal organizations.⁷⁹ Quebec women's groups were not invited to choose a representative to take part in the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, which formulated the Quebec government's position; as well, no women were on the original list of invited experts, and the final report only contained one paragraph addressing women's equality claims.⁸⁰ At the Renewal of Canada conference on institutional reform, held in Calgary, NAC representatives and other equity-seeking groups suggested that the representation of women and other marginalized groups be considered in the discussion of institutional reform, especially Senate reform. They were accused of "hijacking the agenda" by media commentators.⁸¹ NAC continued to recommend mechanisms for achieving gender parity in the

Senate, even after the Accord, which allowed provinces to determine the methods for electing/selecting Senators, was finalized. When three premiers agreed to proposals for gender parity, politicians and pundits called the move unfair, insulting, undemocratic, repugnant and absurd.⁸²

Summary: “Good Enough” Citizens

The patriation round illustrated the extent to which women were regarded as constitutional outsiders. As it became clear that fewer and fewer of their concerns and issues would be addressed by governments, some women’s groups chose to focus on improving the proposed Charter of Rights. Still, the ideas offered by women and women’s groups were wide-ranging, covering all aspects of the constitutional order and stressing the need for more equitable representation of women in the processes of constitutional deliberation and the institutions of government. As well, their briefs to the Special Joint Committee illustrated sensitivity to constitutional claims based on regionalism, multiculturalism, economic diversity and language.

There was little time or opportunity to listen to the constitutional aspirations and stories of other groups during the Meech Lake round. Anglophone and Francophone Quebec women’s groups tried to understand each other’s positions, without a great deal of success, and women’s groups reflecting intersecting serialities were virtually invisible during the period of reaction to the Accord. A more consultative process in the lead-up to the Charlottetown Accord negotiations allowed cross-movement strategizing and coalition-building, and NAC attempted to foreground the constitutional positions of its diverse member groups, as well as those of First Nations and Quebec nationalists. Again, women and women’s groups showed their desire to be actively involved in constitutional discussions. They also illustrated attentiveness to the entire constitutional order and to a variety of diversity-based claims.

**Women as “Charter Canadians”: Exposing Falsely Universal
Citizenship Norms**

A central premise of Alan Cairns’ analysis of the constitutional order since 1982 is that the Charter officially recognized groups and identities which, under the old constitutional discourses of governments, institutions and federalism, were excluded from constitutional deliberations. The centrality of the Charter to women’s *formal* constitutional recognition leads Cairns to characterize women, along with Aboriginal peoples, official-language minority populations and “ethnic groups” variably as “Charter Canadians,” “Charter citizens,” the “Charter constituency” and “Charter clientele groups.”⁸³ These labels, especially “Charter Canadians,” are now widely used.⁸⁴ While Cairns clearly did not intend the label to be applied so narrowly,⁸⁵ an unfortunate consequence of his conceptualization of women as “Charter Canadians” is that women’s role in the constitutional order, and

in constitutional discourse, is understood solely in relation to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Chaviva Hosek notes that “women are generally perceived as having emerged among the winners in the process of patriating the constitution and entrenching a new Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”⁸⁶ In much of the Anglophone literature on the Constitution, the Charter is celebrated as an unproblematic victory for Canadian women, and as a triumph of the women’s movement.⁸⁷ As a result, the story of women and the Constitution presented in much of the literature maintains that women staked out a constitutional “niche” during the patriation round and have fiercely defended it against all challengers in subsequent rounds of constitutional discussion.⁸⁸ As a result, women’s continued attempts to have their voices recognized and their demands processed within Canada’s post-patriation constitutional dialogues are often disregarded and criticized because of the assumption that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was what women wanted and represents an adequate response to women’s constitutional claims.

As this paper has shown, the Charter was not something all women wanted and even the individuals and groups which sought individual rights protections did not have most of their Charter demands met. Also, women have not acted as *an* interest group whose constitutional interventions are solely directed at protecting the Charter. Francophone feminists from Quebec do not claim the Charter as a triumphant victory, and some Aboriginal women resist the imposition of the colonizer’s rights document on First Nations governments. Further, women’s diverse constitutional claims cover the entire constitutional order, so obviously most women and women’s organizations do not believe the Charter answers their constitutional demands. Why, then, are women’s non-Charter claims unheard or ignored? And why are women’s requests for representation in constitutional deliberations (and in the political institutions which shape the constitutional order) rejected out of hand?

Jennifer Smith argues that, in reaction to the Meech Lake Accord, women acted as an interest group promoting partial interests on particular issues.⁸⁹ Smith describes governments as good enough (legitimate) constitutional actors because they are duly elected and held responsible for their public policy choices, but she says women’s groups are neither elected nor accountable.⁹⁰

The leaders of women’s groups who presented briefs on the proposed [Meech Lake] Accord before legislative committees, or gave media interviews, do not represent “women” in any procedural, electoral way. They represent themselves, and the members of the particular organization with which they are associated — altogether the smallest fraction of Canadian women. Therefore the only general claim of representation that leaders of these organizations can make is a mirror claim, which amounts to

the idea that they can speak *for* women (on what? women’s issues? other issues?) because they *are* women — an idea unacceptable to any independent-minded citizen.⁹¹

Participation by women’s groups, according to Smith, undermines key liberal democratic principles, particularly majority rule, responsible government and traditional concepts of representation.

Jennifer Smith says first ministers “cannot be accused of being unrepresentative of a given group [e.g. women] on the ground that they do not share the characteristics of members of the group.”⁹² Her argument about the illegitimacy of women’s constitutional participation considers only governments to be legitimate articulators of citizens’ interests during constitutional discussions. That few Canadians would accept this proposition has been illustrated by persistent and widespread citizen demands for input into constitutional deal-making. What clearly underlies the view of scholars such as Smith is the belief that men can and should represent the interests of women, not just politically but constitutionally.⁹³ However, as Alan Cairns recognizes, men have *not* represented the interests of women politically or constitutionally, so women and other politically marginalized groups distrust elites with good reason.⁹⁴ Cairns supports the creation of more inclusive dialogue which would recognize more diversity than before, and include women’s voices.⁹⁵ He acknowledges that a key element of the old constitutional order was the exclusion “of significant segments of Canadian society from full active political membership in the community.”⁹⁶ Moreover, Cairns says majority rule has promoted inferior citizenship status for minority groups and women, institutions of supposedly representative government have failed to represent marginalized peoples, and governments themselves have acted in a self-interested fashion at the constitutional bargaining table.⁹⁷ But while Cairns says we must welcome women, Aboriginals, people with disabilities and other new claimants as they “emerge from the background, drop their masks, and seek to be more authentically themselves,”⁹⁸ his revisionism stops short of replacing the traditional practice of constitutional amendment by governments with a system embodying so-called mirror representation.⁹⁹ Also, Cairns’ descriptions of women’s constitutional participation imply that gender-based claims are inherently particularistic and self-regarding.

Cairns characterizes women as particularistic when he classifies them among the “Charter constituencies” whose leaders have adopted proprietary attitudes towards “their” Charter clauses.¹⁰⁰ He describes the basic constitutional world view of “Charter groups” as “constitutional minoritarianism”; these groups “see their fate as affected by the evolving meaning attached to particular constitutional clauses” and therefore act as “self-conscious demanding minorities.”¹⁰¹ As “constitutional somebodies” with explicit constitutional identities and niches, these Charter groups

adopt the language of minorities and the discourse of marginality.¹⁰² All of this, says Cairns, generates:

a rather *shrill, aggressive discourse*, a product of their sense that their presence in the constitution/Charter is precarious. Consequently, their attention is directed unremittingly to *their own precise constitutional concerns, not to the larger claims of the community or to the overall health of the constitutional order*. Such concerns are left to others.¹⁰³ (emphasis mine).

More specifically, Cairns maintains that the social groups now linked to the Constitution via Charter rights do not speak the language of federalism, and are indifferent to federalism.¹⁰⁴ Cairns points to the Meech Lake debate as an illustration that “the strident and multifaceted emergence of minoritarianism makes a negative contribution to our capacity to respond to the older, more traditional concerns of dualism and regionalism.”¹⁰⁵ So, for Cairns, while we ignore the new constitutional discourses at our peril,¹⁰⁶ they present fundamental challenges to the old constitutional discourses as defined by governments.

Finally, Cairns says the multitude of new, non-governmental actors with constitutional concerns, including women, have separate and particularistic constitutional histories, based on a passionate attachment to specific constitutional clauses. He asserts that these “histories do not unite. ... These histories are weapons, and they occupy a different discursive terrain than the self-interested histories of governments.”¹⁰⁷ As well, the representational claims of “Charter Canadians” are disruptive because the “distrust of governing political elites is led by the formerly excluded, who tend to adhere to a mirror theory of representation and who challenge the legitimacy of executive federalism as the central deliberating arena for fashioning constitutional change.”¹⁰⁸ This distrust, says Cairns, “poisons the atmosphere of contemporary constitutional politics.”¹⁰⁹ Women must be included in some fashion, then, but their inability or unwillingness to leave their particularities behind when entering constitutional discussions disrupts the official constitutional agenda.

This portrayal of women’s constitutional citizenship can be challenged on a number of grounds. First, it is based on the idea of women as a coherent interest group, acting collectively to achieve common goals. We have seen that women are more aptly characterized as a series, for Canadian women do not speak with one voice on constitutional issues.¹¹⁰ Women have varied citizenship statuses and different relationships with the constitutional order which lead them to pursue divergent constitutional strategies and agendas.¹¹¹ So when women are portrayed as acting out of self-interest, whose self-interest is being referred to? For some women, the Charter is symbolically (or perhaps even personally) meaningful. For others, it is a symbol of oppression or colonialism. Some women champion the decentralization of powers; others shudder at the thought. Women’s constitutional interests are as diverse as the women who voice them.

The characterization of women’s constitutional actions and goals as partial can be contested on empirical grounds. The assertion that women are “Charter Canadians” has already been disputed, as was the idea that women are narrowly interested in “their” sections of the Constitution. In short, in all three constitutional rounds, womens’ groups discussed federalism, representative institutions, rights and the process of reforming the Constitution in a way that illustrated concern for the larger constitutional order, the health of the federation and many of the aspirations of other citizens and groups. So why are women constructed as narrow in their concerns and self-interested in their mobilization? Because women speak from their serialized contexts and from their identities as members of marginalized groups, their views on all aspects of the constitutional order tend to be regarded as inherently particularistic. Women are inscribed as unwilling to “transcend their particular self-interested lives and the pursuit of private interests to adopt a general point of view from which they agree on the common good.”¹¹² Women are cast as failures at public reasonableness — the ability to speak from a disinterested or neutral standpoint. As a result, proposals for gender-based representation at the constitutional bargaining table, or gender parity in the political institutions which help shape the constitutional order, are often treated with derision.

The idea that representing women *qua* women is undemocratic rests on the assumption that women will speak politically from their inherently partial and private location as women. This assumption reveals a commitment to essentialism and the myth of the “universal woman.” It also betrays a patriarchal double standard, one that lies at the heart of liberal individualism’s commitment to undifferentiated (falsely) universal citizenship. When women speak, they are heard as women, and therefore as persons with partial views limited to their gendered experiences. When men speak, they are heard as impartial, ungendered citizens who legitimately express the public good. Women’s public speech is seen as rooted in their private lives while men’s public speech is regarded as a natural outcome of their public roles and identities. Here is but one example which seems illustrative of this point. In its coverage of amendments to the Canadian human rights legislation to prohibit discrimination against gays and lesbians, CBC’s evening news program, *The National*, interviewed Reform MP Ian McLellan, who discussed the fact that he felt conflict over the bill because, while his party was clearly opposed to the legislation, his gay son, whose opinion and perspective he respected very much, was in favour of the legislative changes. The discussion during the interview focused on Mr. McLellan’s personal life, his relationship with his son and how his discussions with his son had shaped his perspective on this important matter of public policy.¹¹³ That his position should be affected by his private experiences and relationships was regarded as entirely natural and even important to his consideration of the public good. Yet women’s private sphere experiences and relationships are consistently considered

beyond the scope of the political and outside the boundaries of discussions about the common good.

Conclusion

Representation of women in all their diversity within political institutions is central to the process of claiming full citizenship. Representation in the deliberations which generate constitutional change is particularly important because of the gendered nature of the constitutional order and women's historical exclusion from its political re-shaping. Constitutional interventions by women and women's groups illustrate acute awareness of this fact, as representation has been a central and enduring constitutional issue for women's groups expressing otherwise divergent constitutional positions.¹¹⁴ The demand for equitable representation has two parts; first, a call for institutional reform with the goal of achieving more representative outcomes, and secondly, a desire for including women in the process of constitutional deliberation. Neither claim has been taken seriously by constitutional gatekeepers. Demands for gender-based representation (in a reformed Senate, for instance) have been denounced as undemocratic and unfair. Women are perceived as speaking politically on the basis of their private standpoint and this standpoint is regarded as inherently particularistic. On the other hand, men and male representatives are seen to embody the impartial, neutral standpoint of the good universal citizen. The qualifications for participation in constitutional deliberation reflect falsely universal (patriarchal) conceptions of citizenship. Women's claims for representation should be viewed within the context of a new, inclusive, norm of constitutional participation, one which embraces Tully's ideal of a constitutional dialogue of mutual recognition.¹¹⁵ The good citizen, according to this new norm, has the right to tell her story in an authentic voice, but she also has the responsibility to listen to the diverse stories of other members of the community. In this way, no one's story is regarded as partial, private or harmful to the public good; rather, it is simply a necessary part of the legitimate constitutional discussion.

Notes

1. I wish to thank Jane Arscott, Alan Cairns and Judy Garber for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also appreciate the helpful advice offered by two anonymous reviewers for this journal.
2. The concept of the "good enough" citizen is developed by Susan James, "The Good-Enough Citizen: Female Citizenship and Independence," in Gisela Bock and Susan James, eds., *Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity* (London: Routledge, 1992), 48-65.
3. Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political* (London and New York: Verso), 81.
4. Iris Marion Young, "Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective," *Signs* 19:3 (1994), 713-738.
5. *Ibid*, 730.
6. *Ibid*, 736.

7. See Jane Jenson, “Citizenship and Equity: Variations Across Time and in Space,” in Janet Hiebert, ed., *Political Ethics: A Canadian Perspective* (Dundurn Press, 1991), 195-228.
8. See, for instance: Bock and James, *Beyond Equality and Difference*; Mary Dietz, “Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship,” *Deadalus* 116:4 (1987), 3-34; Patrice DiQuinzio, “Feminist Theory and the Question of Citizenship,” *Women & Politics* 15:3 (1995), 23-42; Susan Kell Easting, “The Dilemma of Women’s Citizenship,” *Women’s Studies Journal* (1991), 14-21; Kathleen Jones, “Citizenship in a Woman-Friendly Policy,” *Signs* 15:4 (1990), 781-812; Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*; Susan Moller Okin, “Women, Equality and Citizenship,” *Queen’s Quarterly* 99:1 (1992), 56-71; Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford University Press, 1988); Anna Yeatman, *Postmodern Revisionings of the Political* (New York and London: Routledge, 1994); and Iris Marion Young, *Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 114-137.
9. Carole Pateman, “Introduction: The Theoretical Subversiveness of Feminism,” in Carole Pateman and Elizabeth Gross, eds., *Feminist Challenges* (Allen & Unwin, 1987), 6.
10. See Will Kymlicka, *Recent Work in Citizenship Theory* (Ottawa: Report prepared for Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, 1992), 5-14, 19-24; and Richard Norman, “Citizenship, Politics and Autonomy,” in David Milligan and Williams Watts Miller, eds., *Liberalism, Citizenship and Autonomy* (Avebury, 1992), 40.
11. James, “The Good Enough Citizen,” 48.
12. *Ibid.*, 48-65.
13. Janine Brodie, *Politics on the Margins* (Halifax: Fernwood, 1996); Gurston Dacks, Joyce Green and Linda Trimble, “Road Kill: Women in Alberta’s Drive Toward Deficit Elimination,” in Trevor Harrison and Gordon Laxer, eds., *The Trojan Horse: Alberta and the Future of Canada* (Montreal: Black Rose, 1995), 270-285; and The National Council of Welfare, *Women and Poverty Revisited* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1990).
14. Statistics Canada, “The Violence Against Women Survey,” *The Daily* (Ottawa: 18 November, 1993).
15. James, “The Good Enough Citizen,” 50-51.
16. Kymlicka, *Recent Works in Citizenship Theory*, 20-21.
17. Janine Brodie, “Meso-Discourses, State Forms and the Gendering of Liberal-Democratic Citizenship,” *Citizenship Studies* 1:2 (1997), 223-242.
18. See Young, *Throwing Like a Girl*, 115-134.
19. *Ibid.*, 120.
20. Alan Cairns, “The Living Canadian Constitution,” in R.S. Blair and J.T. McLeod, eds., *The Canadian Political Tradition: Basic Readings* (Scarborough: Nelson, 1989), 3-16.
21. Alan Cairns, *Reconfigurations: Canadian Citizenship and Constitutional Change* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995), 20.
22. Sandra Burt, “The Changing Patterns of Public Policy,” in Sandra Burt, Lorraine Code and Lindsay Dorney, eds., *Changing Patterns*, 2nd edition (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993), 213-214.
23. Linda Trimble, “Becoming Full Citizens: Women and Politics in Canada,” in Robert M. Krause and R.H. Wagenberg, eds., *Introductory Readings in Canadian Government and Politics*, 2nd edition (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1995), 264.

24. Jill Vickers, "The Canadian Women's Movement and a Changing Constitutional Order," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 7-8 (Spring-Fall 1993), 272-3.
25. Re: contesting the boundaries of democratic political activity, see Yeatman, *Postmodern Revisionings of the Political*, 114, and Jones, "Citizenship in a Woman-Friendly Polity," 788.
26. James Tully, *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 25-26.
27. Ibid.
28. Jill Vickers, Pauline Rankin and Christine Appelle, *Politics As If Women Mattered: A Political Analysis of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 104.
29. Ibid, 110.
30. Mary Eberts, "Women and Constitutional Renewal," in Audrey Doerr and Micheline Carrier, eds., *Women and the Constitution in Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1981) 6-15; and Micheline Carrier, "Women's Rights and 'National Interests,'" in Doerr and Carrier, eds., *Women and the Constitution in Canada*, 181-207.
31. Eberts, "Women and Constitutional Renewal," 6.
32. Beverley Baines, "Law, Gender, Equality," in Burt et al., *Changing Patterns*, 171-174.
33. Carrier, "Women's Rights and 'National Interests,'" 181.
34. Eberts, "Women and Constitutional Renewal," 6-7; also see Chaviva Hosek, "Women and the Constitutional Process," in Keith Banting and Richard Simeon, eds., *And No One Cheered* (Toronto: Methuen, 1982), 282-3.
35. Quoted in Micheline Dumont, "Women of Quebec and the Contemporary Constitutional Issue," in François-Pierre Gingras, ed., *Gender Politics in Contemporary Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995), 161.
36. "Statement by the Native Women's Association of Canada on Native Women's Rights," in Doerr and Carrier, eds., *Women and the Constitution in Canada*, 64-73.
37. Vickers, Rankin and Appelle, *Politics as if Women Mattered*, 9.
38. Vickers, "The Canadian Women's Movement," 263.
39. Hosek, "Women and the Constitutional Process," 283. Also see Vickers, "The Canadian Women's Movement," 274, and briefs by the Federated Women's Institutes of Canada and the Saskatchewan Advisory Council on the Status of Women to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution, 1980, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session (RG 14 ACCE 1990-91/119), [hereafter referred to as Briefs].
40. Brief by the Saskatchewan Advisory Council on the Status of Women.
41. See Briefs by the following individuals and groups: Doris Anderson, 2; Canadian Federation of University Women, 2; Catholic Women's League of Canada, 6-7, 16; Federated Women's Institutes of Canada, 2; Indian Rights for Indian Women; National Council of Women of Canada, 3; National Action Committee on the Status of Women, 1-7; National Association of Women and the Law, 2-18; National Council of Jewish Women of Canada, 1-2; Progressive Conservative Women's Association of Cornwall and Area; University Women's Club of White Rock, 2; Women's Research Centre/Vancouver Status of Women, 6.
42. Similar sentiments were expressed in the briefs by the Federated Women's Institutes of Canada, Indian Rights for Indian Women, and the National Council of Jewish Women of Canada; also in a letter to the Committee from a woman in

- Nanaimo, BC, and a letter from the Progressive Conservative Women’s Association of Cornwall and Area.
43. See the briefs by the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, the Federated Women’s Institutes of Canada, the Ontario Committee on the Status of Women, the National Action Committee on the Status of Women, 7, and the National Association of Women and the Law, 4.
 44. Letter to the Special Joint Committee from the Alberta Women for Constitutional Change, 19 November 1980; and letter from Jan Barnsely, Co-ordinator, Women’s Research Centre, Vancouver Status of Women, 24 November 1980. The Native Women’s Association of Canada was forced to lobby several MPs to secure a hearing before the committee.
 45. Brief by the National Association of Women and the Law, 18.
 46. Lise Gotell, *The Canadian Women’s Movement, Equality Rights and the Charter* (Ottawa: Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women, 1990), 10.
 47. Penney Kome, *The Taking of Twenty-Eight: Women Challenge the Constitution* (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1982) 59-60. The 1,300 women who participated in the Ad-Hoc Constitutional Conference in Toronto on February 14, 1981, represented three national parties (Liberal, New Democratic and Progressive Conservative) and a fairly broad range of backgrounds and geographic regions. However, women from Quebec, women of colour and women with disabilities were not well represented at the conference. See Laura Bonnett, “The 1980-81 Constitutional Arena: Developing Women-Centred Ideas of Representation and Citizenship,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, 2 June 1998.
 48. Hosek, “Women and the Constitutional Process,” 298-299.
 49. “Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.”
 50. Kome, *The Taking of Twenty-Eight*, 84.
 51. *Ibid*, 95.
 52. Dumont, “Women of Quebec,” 161; Gérard Bergeron, “Quebec in Isolation,” and Daniel Latouche, “The Constitutional Misfire of 1982,” both in Banting and Simeon, *And No One Cheered*, 96-118.
 53. Lynn Smith, “Equality Rights for Women,” in K.E. Swinton and C.J. Rogerson, *Competing Constitutional Visions: the Meech Lake Accord* (Toronto: Carswell, 1988), 39, f.n. 14; Vickers, “The Canadian Women’s Movement,” 277.
 54. Barbara Roberts, *Smooth Sailing or Storm Warning? Canadian and Quebec Women’s Groups and the Meech Lake Accord*. (Ottawa: Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women, 1989), 32-45.
 55. Ginette Busque, “Why Women Should Care About Constitutional Reform,” and Diane Lamoureux, “Une majorité encore oubliée” in Schneiderman, ed., *Conversations Among Friends/Entre Amis*, 13-17 and 58-60; also, Roberts, *Smooth Sailing or Storm Warning?*
 56. Smith, “Equality Rights for Women,” 46; Dumont, “Women of Quebec,” 162.
 57. See Busque, “Why Women Should Care About Constitutional Reform”; Lamoureux, “Une majorité encore oubliée”; and Roberts, *Smooth Sailing or Storm Warning?*
 58. Vickers, “The Canadian Women’s Movement,” 278.
 59. Vickers, Rankin and Appelle, *Politics As If Women Mattered*, 276.
 60. Roberts, *Smooth Sailing or Storm Warning?*, 33.
 61. *Ibid*, 32-45.
 62. *Ibid*, 32-45.

63. Vickers, Rankin and Appelle, *Politics As If Women Mattered*, 276.
64. However, women were under-represented at these conferences, particularly the one on the economic union.
65. NAC, "NAC Response to the Federal Constitutional Proposals," (NAC National Office, Toronto, October 25, 1991).
66. NAC, "NAC's Response to the Report of the Special Joint Committee on 'A Renewed Canada' (Beaudoin-Dobbie)," (NAC National Office, Toronto, 1992).
67. Ibid.
68. The Assembly of First Nations, AFN; the Native Council of Canada, NCC; the Métis National Council, MNC; and the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, ITC.
69. NAC, "NAC Response to the Federal Constitutional Proposals."
70. Vickers, Rankin and Appelle, *Politics As If Women Mattered*, 277.
71. NAC, "Constitutional Accord Unacceptable to Women, NAC Says," (NAC, Toronto, July 15, 1992 Press Release). F.L. Morton's statement (p. 66 of "The Living Constitution," in Krause and Wagenberg, *Introductory Readings in Canadian Government and Politics*, 2nd edition (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1995) that NAC "condemned the [Charlottetown] accord for subordinating women's rights to those of Quebec and Aboriginals" is simply untrue.
72. Vickers, "The Canadian Women's Movement," 279.
73. Ibid, 278-9. Also see Sylvia Bashevkin, *Women on the Defensive: Living Through Conservative Times* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 195.
74. Dumont, "Women in Quebec," 166.
75. Joyce Green, "Constitutionalizing the Patriarchy: Aboriginal Women and Aboriginal Government," *Constitutional Forum* 4:4 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Centre for Constitutional Studies, 1993), 110-120; also see Lilianne E. Kroenbrink-Gelissen, "The Canadian Constitution, the Charter and Aboriginal Women's Rights," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 7-8 (Spring/Fall 1993), 207-259.
76. Vickers, "The Canadian Women's Movement," 278-9.
77. Sheila Genaille, "Métis Women Endorse Agreement," *Globe and Mail*, Wednesday, 20 September 1992, A23 (letter to the editor).
78. Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, "Patriarchy and Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian State for First Nations Women," in Caroline Andrew and Sandra Rodgers, *Women and the Canadian State* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 72.
79. Green, "Constitutionalizing the Patriarchy," 116. Also see Jo-Anne Fiske, "The Womb is to the Nation as the Heart is to the Body: Ethnopolitical Discourses of the Canadian Indigenous Women's Movement," *Studies in Political Economy* 51 (Fall 1996), 65-95.
80. Dumont, "Women of Quebec," 163; at the last minute, a few women experts were added to the list.
81. Shelagh Day, "Speaking for Ourselves," in McRoberts and Monahan, *The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 50.
82. *Financial Post*, 21 September, 1992, 5; *Globe and Mail*, 12 September 1992, A5; *British Columbia Report*, 14 September 1992, 6.
83. Alan Cairns, *Charter versus Federalism: The Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 68, 74 and 81.
84. See, for instance: Keith Archer, et. al., *Parameters of Power: Canada's Political Institutions* (Scarborough: Nelson, 1995), 139; Rainer Knopff and F.L. Morton, *Charter Politics* (Scarborough: Nelson, 1992), 81; Errol Mendes, "Sinking Again

- into the Quagmire of Conflicting Visions ...” in Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan, eds., *The Charlottetown Accord*, 164; Morton, “The Living Constitution,” 66; and Jennifer Smith, “Representation and Constitutional Reform in Canada,” in David E. Smith et al., eds., *After Meech Lake: Lessons for the Future* (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1991), 74, 76. Smith includes women among “Charter minority groups.”
85. Cairns believes all Canadians are Charter Canadians because the Charter identifies everyone as a bearer of rights; see Alan Cairns, *Disruptions: Constitutional Struggles from the Charter to Meech Lake* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991), 109.
 86. Hosek, “Women and the Constitutional Process,” 280.
 87. For instance, Pal and Morton stated, regarding the patriation deal, “No lobby fared better than the feminists.” See Leslie Pal and F.L. Morton, “Bliss v. Attorney General of Canada: From Legal Defeat to Political Victory,” *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 24: 156. Michael Mandel is ambivalent about this point; he says on the one hand that the women’s lobby was “far from completely successful,” and on the other hand, and in the same paragraph, he asserts that the women’s lobby was, “all in all, pretty successful.” See *The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics* (Toronto: Thompson, 1994), 378. Interestingly, Quebec commentators see women as among the “constitutional losers” in 1982; see, for instance, Bergeron, “Quebec in Isolation”, 60.
 88. Cairns, *Reconfigurations*, 120; and Cairns, *Charter versus Federalism*, 73; also see Archer et al., *Parameters of Power*, 138; Janet Ajzenstat, “Constitution Making and the Myth of the People,” in Curtis Cook, ed., *Constitutional Predicament: Canada After the Referendum of 1992* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press), 117-118; and Smith, “Representation and Constitutional Reform in Canada,” 75.
 89. Smith, “Representation and Constitutional Reform,” 77. Given the differences in the positions of Anglophone and Francophone Quebec women’s groups, one wonders which “interest group” Smith is referring to.
 90. This is not the case. The executive committees of women’s organizations such as NAC are elected by, and held accountable to, members (or member groups) at annual general meetings.
 91. Smith, “Representation and Constitutional Reform,” 76.
 92. *Ibid*, 75.
 93. Beverley Baines, “After Meech Lake: the Ms/Representation of Gender in Scholarly Spaces” in Smith et al., *After Meech Lake*, 208.
 94. Cairns, *Reconfigurations*, 107-8; 132.
 95. *Ibid*, 97-115.
 96. *Ibid*, 105.
 97. *Ibid*, 22-26; 105-109; and Cairns, *Charter versus Federalism*, 96-98.
 98. Cairns, *Reconfigurations*, 138.
 99. *Ibid*, 132.
 100. Cairns, *Charter versus Federalism*, 73.
 101. Cairns, *Reconfigurations*, 120, 123.
 102. *Ibid*, 129-130.
 103. *Ibid*, 131.
 104. Cairns, *Charter versus Federalism*, 3, 84.
 105. Cairns, *Reconfigurations*, 138.

106. As Cairns puts it in *Reconfigurations*, 138, “an ostrich approach that denies or ignores these changes is no recipe for success in managing our constitutional affairs.”
107. Cairns, *Reconfigurations*, 117.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. See Carrier, “Women’s Rights and ‘National Interests,’” 182; Vickers, “The Canadian Women’s Movement,” 261-284; Dumont, “Women of Quebec,” 153-174; and Schneiderman, ed., *Conversations Among Friends/Entre Amies*.
111. Vickers, “The Canadian Women’s Movement,”; and Jill Vickers, “Why Should Women Care About Federalism?” in Douglas Brown and Janet Hiebert, eds., *Canada: The State of the Federation 1994* (Kingston: Queen’s Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1994), 261-284.
112. Young, *Throwing Like a Girl*, 116.
113. Mr. McLellan decided to vote with his party, against the bill.
114. Vickers, “The Canadian Women’s Movement,” 272-3.
115. Tully, *Strange Multiplicity*, 25.

Micheline de Sève

Féminisme et nationalisme au Québec, une alliance inattendue

Résumé

Le mouvement nationaliste québécois, se voulant modernisateur, a dû, dès le départ, composer avec la présence d'un mouvement autonome de femmes. Mais le mouvement des femmes, à son tour, interpellé par d'autres valences identitaires que celle du genre, s'est vu confronté avec sa propre pluralité interne. L'étude des représentations véhiculées par les grandes revues féministes, entre la naissance du Front de libération des femmes en 1969 et la fermeture de La Vie en rose en 1987 permet de suivre l'évolution de ce processus de différenciation, et de comprendre comment le féminisme québécois est passé de positions dogmatiques axées sur une mobilisation collective unitaire à l'expression individualisée des visions multiples de sujets-femmes indépendants.

Abstract

From the outset, striving to be a force for modernization, the Quebec nationalist movement had to deal with the reality of an autonomous women's movement. However, in turn challenged by identity-creating factors other than gender, the women's movement came face to face with its own internal plurality. An examination of representations conveyed in feminist journals from the time the Front de libération des femmes came into existence in 1969 to the termination of La Vie en rose in 1987 traces the development of this process of differentiation and offers insight into how feminism in Quebec shifted its focus from dogmatic positions geared to united, group mobilization to an individualized expression of multiple visions of the independent woman-subject.

L'un des effets majeurs de la Révolution tranquille sur les francophones — femmes et hommes — du Québec a été l'apparition de leur représentation en tant que communauté nationale globale, distincte des fractions minoritaires de la communauté canadienne-française dispersée à travers le Canada. Le lien d'appartenance commune des *Québécois* à l'une des nations fondatrices du pays s'est circonscrit en fonction d'un territoire résiduel. Le Québec s'est imposé comme lieu où pouvait s'inscrire leur action de transformation d'une communauté désireuse d'entrer dans la modernité de plain-pied, avec la latitude propre à une population majoritaire.

Dès le début, l'intrusion d'un mouvement autonome de femmes dans un mouvement nationaliste, qui se voulait modernisateur, pose le Québec en cas d'espèce, celui de rapports tendus certes, mais non antagoniques¹, entre féminisme et nationalisme. En effet, l'exigence de participation égalitaire des femmes dans la construction du nouvel État a confronté d'emblée l'imaginaire souverainiste² à la dimension du genre. L'inclusion ou l'exclusion des femmes est devenue l'un des critères utilisés pour jauger les prétentions du mouvement national de se situer dans une mouvance émancipatrice, en rupture avec la vision ethnocentriste et patriarcale d'une nation de plus, gérée elle aussi par des hommes, fut-elle composée, cette fois, d'indépendantistes francophones.

Mais qu'un mouvement féministe organisé émerge sur le terrain du nationalisme n'a pas été sans exercer un impact majeur sur le mode d'articulation du genre avec les autres composantes de l'identité des femmes québécoises. La spécificité du projet de « libération » des femmes, se conjuguant avec la lutte pour l'émancipation nationale et contre l'exploitation sociale, sur le terrain de l'imaginaire politique féministe, l'unité des femmes, y compris celles qui se réclamaient de l'existence d'une « sororité » reliant toutes les femmes entre elles, est devenue problématique. La méfiance des relents du colonialisme britannique, en particulier, a envenimé les rapports entre les féministes anglophones et francophones; les rapports de classe, l'adhésion à divers groupuscules marxistes-léninistes et l'orientation sexuelle ont multiplié les frictions entre féministes. L'étude des revues féministes qui ont exprimé les positions des féministes francophones organisées entre la naissance du Front de libération des femmes en 1969 et la fermeture de *La vie en rose* en 1987 nous permettra de suivre ce processus de différenciation et de fragmentation d'un mouvement autonome de femmes qui a expérimenté très tôt, non seulement la difficulté de recomposer les rapports femmes-hommes dans une perspective égalitaire, mais celle de briser certains *patterns* d'exclusion ou de discrimination qui opposaient les femmes entre elles.

Un enracinement particulier

La mort de Maurice Le Noblet Duplessis en 1959 accélère le processus de modernisation, amorcé en douce sous son règne. La société québécoise prend acte de son urbanisation et de la nécessité d'adapter ses institutions en conséquence. Et surtout, la hiérarchie catholique ultra-conservatrice perd en quelques années le contrôle de ses brebis. Le changement de la garde au niveau des élites est brutal : la gestion des hôpitaux et des écoles passe des communautés religieuses aux ministères sectoriels; la fonction publique échappe au patronage; la nationalisation de l'électricité et la croissance des effectifs des syndicats marquent une toute nouvelle conception du rôle de l'État québécois comme maître-d'œuvre d'un énorme chantier à l'échelle de la province.

Mais le nouveau slogan libéral, le « Maîtres chez nous » de Jean Lesage, n'avait pas qu'une résonance collective, il manifestait l'aboutissement d'un processus d'individuation amorcé de longue date. Si les verrous purent sauter si vite, c'est que le mouvement de modernisation trouvait le terrain préparé. Depuis la fin des années cinquante, en particulier, la télévision avait brisé l'isolement culturel de la population, ébranlé les cadres traditionnels de pensée, rapproché la campagne de la ville et élargi le bassin des représentations du soi et de l'Autre, sapant la permanence d'un *statu quo* que l'équipe du tonnerre de Jean Lesage achèverait de renverser.

Le caractère soudain de ce mouvement de sécularisation et de rattrapage atteignait la société en profondeur. Les femmes, assise traditionnelle du pouvoir de l'Église, illustrèrent massivement par leur comportement qu'elles entendaient dorénavant s'affirmer elles aussi, maîtres de soi: en moins de dix ans, de 1961 à 1971, l'indice synthétique de fécondité des Québécoises tombait de 3,77 à 1,99; le nombre de naissances hors mariage passait de 3,7 p. 100 à 8,2 p. 100; les femmes mariées, qui constituaient déjà 31,8 p. 100 de la main-d'œuvre féminine au début de la période, en formaient 48,8 p. 100 dix ans plus tard; et en 1964, étaient adoptés la Loi prohibant la discrimination sexuelle sur le marché du travail et le Bill 16 reconnaissant enfin la capacité juridique des femmes mariées³.

Les bouleversements sociaux en cours impliquaient non seulement les élites mais l'ensemble de la société; la mise en question des us et coutumes établis se posait sur le plan individuel comme sur le plan collectif, les individus, les femmes comme les hommes, cherchant à se doter d'un environnement immédiat, favorable à la poursuite de leurs aspirations. La dissociation de fait, dans les représentations aussi bien que dans la pratique, entre le Québec et le reste de la communauté canadienne, allait s'accomplir dans le mouvement même de consolidation d'un État québécois moderne.

Québécoises Deboutte!

Le premier regroupement collectif de femmes, à s'afficher révolutionnaire, est né dans une période particulièrement agitée⁴, dans la foulée du défi lancé par un Front commun de Québécoises au règlement anti-manifestation⁵ de la Ville de Montréal, le 29 novembre 1969. L'urgence de lutter contre l'oppression spécifique des femmes, vécue dans la double exploitation du travail ménager et de l'infériorisation des femmes dans la division du travail, justifiait la mise sur pied d'une organisation autonome des femmes sur la base de la non-mixité avec les hommes, y compris les membres du Front de libération du Québec⁶. Ce noyau de Québécoises féministes « anti-capitaliste et anti-impérialiste » voulait « apprendre à être autre chose que des reproductrices, des balayuses et des objets sexuels » et se proposait de fournir aux femmes « un moyen d'*apprendre à travailler ensemble* » pour entrer de plain-pied dans « la lutte de libération du peuple québécois⁷ ».

Le Front de libération des femmes du Québec (FLFQ), créé un mois après cette première manifestation exclusive de femmes, et le Centre des femmes, qui lui succédera de 1971 à 1975, chercheront comment lier libération nationale et libération des femmes : « pas de libération des femmes sans libération du Québec; pas de libération du Québec sans libération des femmes »⁸ portait la page-titre du premier numéro régulier de leur journal, *Québécoises Deboutte!*, en novembre 1972.

Il importe de souligner que l'initiative de cette formation d'une organisation autonome de femmes revenait — ô surprise! — à quelques étudiantes anglophones de McGill, adeptes du *Women's Lib* et converties à la légitimité de la lutte de libération sociale et nationale du Québec⁹. Ce sont elles qui convaincront des employées de soutien de la CSN (Centrale des syndicats nationaux), quelques comédiennes de théâtre engagées, des artistes et des écrivaines, des ménagères à temps plein doublées de travailleuses à temps partiel, et quelques étudiantes francophones, dont une seule était aux études avancées, de la nécessité de former un groupe autonome de libération des femmes au Québec¹⁰. « Surtout qu'à ce moment-là, on [ne] lisait pas tellement en anglais!¹¹ », diront ces pionnières; les premières féministes radicales québécoises doivent à leurs alliées anglophones la chance d'avoir pu se familiariser très vite avec les grands textes des Kate Millett, Juliet Mitchell et Germaine Greer¹².

Rompant avec la stratégie classique des groupes de pression féministes qui revendiquaient l'intégration aux structures existantes sur la base de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes¹³, ces radicales nationalistes ne réclamaient rien moins que le renversement du patriarcat et de l'impérialisme anglo-américain:

La libération des femmes n'est pas un principe abstrait. C'est une réalité qui se situe dans un pays, une histoire, avec des êtres humains. Le Québec étant un pays colonisé, la Québécoise est donc doublement exploitée. Aussi le F.L.F. prend-il une optique bien particulière du fait qu'il se situe au Québec. L'exploitation économique de la femme en dehors du foyer est directement influencée par l'impérialisme américain (importance du secteur tertiaire, économie sous-développée), par le colonialisme anglo-saxon et par le capitalisme. (Les Québécois constituent une réserve de main-d'œuvre à bon marché.)¹⁴

Le phénomène peut surprendre : une alliance idéologique entre un mouvement nationaliste, qui prône des formes de mobilisation collective unitaire, et un courant féministe d'extrême-gauche axé sur la libération nationale et sociale, mais qui privilégie néanmoins le droit des femmes de contrôler leur corps et qui n'hésite pas à assimiler le mariage à la prostitution légale ni à réclamer le droit à la non-maternité. Il est difficile de reconnaître ici l'habituelle fonction de service allouée aux femmes en période pré-révolutionnaire¹⁵. S'agirait-il d'une exception à la règle qui veut que: « Le nationalisme nourrisse et se nourrisse de la subordination des

femmes, qu'il renvoie à des fondamentalismes raciaux, religieux, ethniques ou politiques »¹⁶? Le néo-nationalisme québécois, né avec la Révolution tranquille, a peut-être échappé plus facilement que d'autres à la tentation fondamentaliste, non seulement parce qu'il émergeait dans le contexte d'une démocratie, même imparfaite, mais justement parce qu'il a été tiraillé dès le début entre des orientations contradictoires.

Classe, nation et sexe s'opposaient comme autant de pôles identitaires prétendant chacun dominer la scène. Les cellules terroristes du Front de libération du Québec, les groupuscules marxistes-léninistes et les groupes autonomes de femmes pourront prétendre former, successivement ou conjointement, l'avant-garde d'un mouvement de masse, les scissions resteront plus fréquentes que les regroupements, faute de pouvoir intégrer des composantes qui, toutes, se voulaient « principales » (pour reprendre le vocabulaire maoïste du temps). Mais le facteur clé, à mon avis a été la prévalence de la liberté d'expression, qui a empêché l'établissement à un discours monopoliste, aussi bien du côté des forces d'opposition que du côté du pouvoir.

Il convient de souligner la rareté des mouvements nationalistes de libération qui se sont ainsi constitués dans le cadre d'un État de droit. Quelles qu'aient été les convictions exprimées par Pierre Vallières dans *Nègres blancs d'Amérique*¹⁷ ou par les militantes qui prônaient la libération des femmes comme corollaire d'un mouvement de décolonisation, le Québec de l'époque ne pouvait se comparer aux nations tenues en dictature, en Afrique ou en Amérique latine, ou engluées, comme l'Algérie, dans un cadre proprement colonial. L'on pouvait bien se représenter la situation d'oppression nationale sur le mode des mouvements révolutionnaires du Tiers-Monde, les conditions de développement du nationalisme et du féminisme au Québec étaient celles d'un régime parlementaire de type britannique, et le contexte était celui d'une société urbaine industrialisée.

Les frustrations n'en étaient pas moins réelles. Droit d'association et liberté d'expression étaient reconnus en droit mais pas toujours en fait. Ainsi, il fallut que sept membres de la cellule X du F.L.F. envahissent le box des jurés en plein procès, le 1^{er} mars 1971, aux cris de : « Discrimination » et « La justice, c'est d'la marde! », ce qui leur valut des peines d'un à deux mois de prison¹⁸, pour que soit corrigée — à quelques mois de distance — une anomalie juridique patente. Une femme, soi-disant citoyenne de plein droit, était passible d'emprisonnement pour refus de témoigner alors que les Québécoises n'étaient pas habilitées à être membres de jury. Le procès, en l'occurrence, était celui de Lise Balcer, accusée d'outrage au tribunal pour refus de témoigner contre le féliciste Paul Rose, quelques mois après l'enlèvement et l'assassinat du ministre Pierre Laporte pendant la Crise d'octobre.

Qu'à côté d'organisations terroristes comme le Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), le Front de libération des femmes (FLF) et le Centre des

femmes, aussi bien que le Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance nationale (RIN) suivi du Parti québécois, aient pu évoluer dans un cadre légal, non sans connaître les écoutes téléphoniques, les perquisitions abusives ou le harcèlement policier, introduisait néanmoins une différence de taille dans la capacité de groupes radicaux d'accéder aux media et de participer à la vie publique. Ce cas de figure de groupes nationalistes, féministes radicaux ou socialistes anti-impérialistes, se disputant les faveurs des « masses » dans le contexte d'un État de droit est effectivement exceptionnel.

Women Unite?

La modernisation de la société québécoise aurait pu déboucher sur une forme de dynamisme régional sans susciter l'émergence d'un mouvement nationaliste. De même, le processus d'individuation de femmes désireuses de s'accomplir professionnellement comme d'affirmer leur autonomie personnelle aurait pu se poursuivre en sourdine, sans impliquer la mobilisation collective d'un mouvement de femmes. Pour comprendre l'articulation spécifique de ces mouvements au Québec, il convient de se reporter au début des années soixante et de se rappeler les statistiques contenues dans le Rapport de la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme : les Franco-Québécois, majoritaires en termes démographiques, occupaient le 12^e rang sur 14 dans l'échelle des revenus selon l'origine ethnique. Alors que le salaire des hommes francophones québécois se situait 8 p. 100 sous la moyenne, celui de leurs compatriotes d'origine britannique atteignait 42 p. 100 au-dessus de la moyenne. Le retard culturel n'expliquant pas tout, la discrimination devenait flagrante et pointait vers les inégalités de pouvoir à la source de la position défavorable qu'occupaient les francophones du Québec, une situation d'autant plus choquante dans le cadre d'un régime démocratique qu'ils formaient la majorité de la population.

De là à conclure à l'existence d'un lien entre l'inégalité sociale manifeste et le statut politique subordonné d'un Québec « colonisé », le pas fut vite franchi, et ce, non seulement par une frange marginale de la « nation québécoise » en voie de cristallisation. Témoin, la lecture rétrospective de son cheminement que nous offre Lise Bissonnette, l'ex-directrice du quotidien *Le Devoir*, organe de l'intelligentsia francophone :

Il y avait ici une réelle structure coloniale, et la lutte de libération avait un certain sens. J'ai lu *Nègres blancs d'Amérique* de Pierre Vallières, et dans les mêmes circonstances je serais encore d'accord aujourd'hui avec ce qu'il écrivait. La littérature de libération a été juste, parce qu'il y avait une oppression économique réelle des Canadiens français. En 1965, une enquête sur les revenus moyens répertoriait quatorze groupes ethniques classait les francophones en douzième position, soit juste avant les Italiens et les autochtones. *C'est ce qui a déclenché mon nationalisme*¹⁹.

Femmes ou hommes, les Québécois appartenant à cette génération, ont construit la représentation de leur identité collective sur l'expérience de partage d'une oppression nationale et économique commune, indépendamment de leurs caractéristiques de classe ou de genre. Cela explique que la belle solidarité entre « révolutionnaires » francophones et anglophones, à l'origine du FLF, comme de maints groupuscules socialistes, n'ait pu survivre. Moins d'un an après sa formation, les francophones du F.L.F. se « séparaient » des femmes anglophones du groupe. L'écart entre le petit groupe d'étudiantes universitaires, américaines pour plusieurs²⁰, qui commandaient l'accès à la littérature du *Women's Lib*, qu'elles traduisaient et interprétaient pour leurs consœurs québécoises, moins instruites, créait un malaise croissant à l'intérieur du groupe. L'indépendance de pensée des Québécoises, qui, malgré leur orientation socialiste et nationaliste globale, avaient érigé la non-mixité en principe d'organisation pour s'affranchir de la tutelle masculine, s'accommodait mal d'une approche pédagogique qu'elles ressentaient comme « un contrôle idéologique sur le FLF, imprimant ainsi au groupe une tendance américaine, sans égard à la réalité québécoise²¹ ».

Il faut voir dans l'expulsion des Anglo-américaines, si douloureuse qu'ait été une telle rupture sur le plan personnel, moins une manifestation de « nationalisme intransigeant²² » que le désir de s'affranchir de toute influence « coloniale ». L'écart restait très large entre les « intellectuelles » anglophones, nourries de l'enseignement d'une Marlene Dixon, féministe américaine alors en poste à l'Université McGill, l'égérie du Montreal *Women's Liberation Movement* (MWLM), et les « ouvrières » de l'organisation-fille du FLF. Les anglophones, au nom du féminisme, prônaient la sororité avec les femmes du Canada, alors que les francophones, moins bien outillées intellectuellement pour soutenir un débat contradictoire, sentaient que l'alliance entre le pan-canadianisme et le féminisme les plaçait, comme sujets-femmes, dans une position de subordination politique, incompatible avec l'affirmation de leur autonomie personnelle. Prôner la sororité était une chose, mais si cela signifiait subordonner leurs intérêts collectifs à ceux des Canadiennes, c'était faire abstraction de leur identité spécifique, un jeu qu'elles ne voulaient plus jouer, pas plus avec des femmes qu'avec des hommes.

Dès le début, et même si francophones et anglophones se rejoignaient dans la lutte pour le droit à l'avortement et la défense du Dr Morgentaler et de ses aides, il sera malaisé de faire front commun. Les francophones tiendront, par exemple, leur propre manifestation au Parc Lafontaine, en marge de la « caravane sur l'avortement » dont le point d'arrivée était la colline parlementaire à Ottawa, le jour de la Fête des mères, en mai 1970. Les membres du FLF disaient partager les aspirations des femmes canadiennes, mais nous refusons, disaient-elles, « d'aller manifester devant un parlement dont nous ne reconnaissons pas les pouvoirs qu'il s'arroge sur le Québec »²³. La même « ligne » prévaudra quand le Centre des femmes,

une « avant-garde » féministe marxiste, prendra la succession des cellules du FLF, en 1972, pour produire *Québécoises Deboutte!*²⁴, monter un service d'information et de référence sur l'avortement, (par où passeront des milliers de femmes décidées à obtenir clandestinement une interruption volontaire de grossesse que leur refusaient les rares comités thérapeutiques des hôpitaux catholiques²⁵), et mener la lutte pour l'accès à l'avortement et à la contraception libres et gratuits²⁶. Militantes anglophones et francophones mèneront leurs luttes en parallèle, sans vraiment se concerter, faute pour les secondes, de se sentir les égales des premières. Et faute, bien sûr, de partager la même analyse des rapports entre féminisme, marxisme et nationalisme. La dépendance idéologique des féministes francophones n'en persistait pas moins. C'est sur la traduction d'une brochure rédigée par une étudiante en médecine de McGill, Donna Cherniak, et un étudiant, Allan Feingold, le *Birth Control Handbook*²⁷, publiée aux Presses de la Santé en 1970, sous le titre *Pour un contrôle des naissances*, que les féministes francophones pourront articuler massivement leur position sur l'avortement et la contraception. Le succès de librairie remporté par ce véritable petit manuel, diffusé à plus de 50,000 exemplaires à son premier tirage en français, est d'autant plus extraordinaire que l'information sur la contraception était assimilée à la pornographie, et interdite de publication. Que cette brochure ait atteint un record de publication, avec deux millions de copies vendues au Canada, à sa troisième édition, en 1970-71, souligne clairement l'écart entre la norme publique et les besoins réels des femmes en la matière.

Le paradoxe du fossé entre Franco- et Anglo-Québécoises s'explique ainsi : en 1976, lorsque le Parti québécois prit le pouvoir sur la scène provinciale, sur 7249 avortements thérapeutiques pratiqués au Québec, plus de 90 p. 100 l'étaient dans des hôpitaux anglophones de Montréal. Un seul avortement avait été pratiqué cette année-là dans la ville de Québec, la capitale francophone²⁸. « Colonisation » et « oppression spécifique des femmes » n'impliquaient pas toujours les mêmes agents, l'Église et les médecins catholiques, en particulier, qui offraient une résistance acharnée à la reconnaissance du droit des femmes de contrôler leur propre corps.

Mais ni la gauche ni le Parti québécois ne réussirent à convaincre les féministes québécoises de fusionner dans le grand tout du parti de la nation ou de celui du prolétariat, ni d'ailleurs les féministes anglophones qui susciteront peu d'enthousiasme avec leur projet de rassemblement dans une association unique, la *Montreal Feminist Association*, dont le congrès de fondation, le 20 janvier 1973, sera boudé nerveusement :

Ce n'est pas dire que nous sommes contre la création d'un mouvement autonome de femmes. ... Mais le désaccord que nous avons avec le « Montreal Feminist Association » repose plutôt sur l'opportunité de la création du mouvement à l'heure actuelle par un petit groupe de femmes coupées de la situation de la majorité des Québécoises²⁹.

L'initiative, jugée prématurée, ne connaîtrait pas de suite.

Têtes de pioche

Le rêve d'un mouvement autonome de femmes, construit comme un bloc homogène unique, s'achève avec la fermeture du Centre des femmes en mars 1975. Bon nombre de militantes tenteront encore de trouver « la ligne juste », cette fois, en rejoignant l'une ou l'autre formation politique marxiste-léniniste, mais plusieurs commenceront à contester toute forme d'encadrement rigide et absolu pour explorer des avenues alternatives. Ainsi, quand le Centre des femmes ferme, la moitié de ses militantes adhèrent à l'une ou l'autre des organisations marxistes-léninistes pendant que l'autre moitié essaime pour former le Théâtre des cuisines, le Comité de lutte pour l'avortement et la contraception libres et gratuits, le Centre de documentation féministe, les Éditions du remue-ménage et le Centre de santé des femmes du Plateau Mont-Royal.

L'influence du féminisme radical, même si les féministes dérangent, est plus sensible que jamais. En milieu scolaire et dans les syndicats, les comités de condition féminine se multiplient; en province, des maisons de femmes ouvrent; et partout, des collectifs de femmes s'organisent. L'effervescence est telle que même une revue féminine de masse, comme *Châtelaine*³⁰, n'hésite pas à prendre position en faveur de l'avortement libre et gratuit, et à publier, en octobre 1975, un numéro spécial sur la femme et son corps, qui sera « enlevé » en quelques jours³¹. La rédactrice en chef de la revue, Francine Montpetit, pouvait craindre « l'image radicale d'une équipe de viragos qui aurait troqué le balai pour le fusil³² » et exiger certaine prudence de style, cela ne l'empêchait pas d'affirmer publiquement :

La philosophie féministe est aujourd'hui si bien assimilée par l'ensemble de [l']équipe qu'elle s'exprime le plus naturellement du monde, sans agressivité³³.

Ce n'est donc pas seulement à la marge que le féminisme gagnait du terrain, mais dans l'ensemble d'une société tout entière attachée à rattraper le retard pris à se positionner dans le monde moderne. Et si les féministes radicales intimidaient avec leurs bottes de travailleurs et leur fièvre révolutionnaire, elles étaient manifestement lues et admirées à distance par leurs consœurs réformistes qui n'hésitaient pas à les engager comme recherchistes ou pigistes.

Des luttes et des rires de femmes

À la fin des années 70, ce n'est plus une, mais deux nouvelles revues qui manifestent la vitalité du courant féministe radical. Pendant que *Les têtes de pioche* sort 23 numéros entre mars 1976 et juin 1979, *Pluri-elles*, dont le nom devint vite *Des luttes et des rires de femmes*, publie 21 numéros entre l'été 1977 et l'été 1981. L'autonomie des groupes de femmes, qui se multiplient en province comme dans la métropole, devient le maître mot.

L'évolution est notable entre le FLF et le Centre des femmes, soucieux l'un et l'autre d'ancrer à gauche le mouvement autonome des femmes, et « Les têtes de pioche³⁴ » qui adopteront sans complexe une position féministe intransigeante, expulsant au besoin les militantes de gauche, soupçonnées de visées hégémoniques³⁵.

Le référent masculin, fut-il celui de l'*homme nouveau*, s'estompe derrière l'émergence d'un référent central *femme*, lui-même porteur de conflits. Les femmes découvrent que le monde politique au féminin, l'espace de femme à femme, ouvre aussi un monde de débats, d'échanges et de conflits. La transgression de la norme hétérosexuelle, en particulier, offre un formidable exutoire à la création et à l'affirmation de l'individualité des femmes. Les lesbiennes osent se passer d'intermédiaire pour nommer le monde. Leur visibilité n'est pas pour peu dans cette transition où « la victimisation fait place à la création »³⁶. Avec *Les têtes de pioche*, les femmes, encore largement prises dans les rêts de leur oppression sexuelle, commençaient tout juste à se construire en référence les unes aux autres, en sujets libres :

Nous voulons de l'espace, de la place pour vivre, pour rire, pour aimer. De l'espace pour bouger, danser, découvrir, créer, inventer un nouveau mode de vie qui ne soit plus, qui ne se conjugue plus seulement au masculin³⁷.

Mais c'est avec *Pluri-elles*, vite renommée *Des luttes et des rires de femmes*, que le dogmatisme et l'approche féministe normative le cèdent à une approche radicale, certes, mais foncièrement pluraliste et pragmatique. « Tribune de liaison et d'échange », la revue se veut un « outil » au service des groupes autonomes de femmes et, plus timidement, des individus :

L'autonomie du mouvement est loin d'être un acquis et on ne peut se-nous déclarer autonome du jour au lendemain. À ce sujet, nous n'avons qu'à observer nos cheminements personnels où lentement nous apprenons à vivre pour nous-mêmes sans faire de concessions, avec des compromis qui ne nous retirent aucun droit... Il nous semble important de référer à nos expériences personnelles pour mieux comprendre l'autonomie du mouvement et elles ne peuvent en être détachées à cause même de l'origine du mouvement.³⁸

Non seulement le féminisme autonome prend-il le pas sur le féminisme socialiste, mais l'approche collectiviste des groupes de libération le cède, progressivement, à une approche phénoménologique axée sur la diversité d'expériences des groupes et des femmes elles-mêmes. L'objectif reste d'articuler un projet politique collectif, mais, cette fois, sur la base de représentations ouvertes à « l'expression des pluralités du mouvement des femmes »³⁹.

La vie en rose

Le plus frappant dans l'évolution de la pensée féministe radicale au Québec est le fait qu'il ait fallu seulement une dizaine d'années pour que le mouvement des femmes échappe à la séduction de l'embrigadement collectif. Écartelées entre le *Women's lib*, la lutte de libération nationale et la marche victorieuse du prolétariat vers la Révolution, les militantes des groupes autonomes de femmes ont été confrontées à des points de vue aussi inconciliables que viscéralement prenants. Rien de tel pour ébranler les certitudes et, une fois évacuée la tentation monogame d'épouser une idéologie — ne serait-ce que par épuisement⁴⁰ — pour mûrir l'habitude du questionnement critique. Témoin, le projet de féminisme en mouvement qui animera l'équipe de *La vie en rose*, le premier magazine féministe d'actualité, pour qui le principe d'autonomie demeure central, mais dont les journalistes, lesbiennes et non-lesbiennes, nationalistes ou a-politiques, entreprennent joyeusement de déboulonner « ce vieux mythe que nous sommes toutes, les femmes et les féministes, coulées dans le même moule (!); que nous pensons toutes de la même manière et que nous cherchons toutes la même chose »⁴¹.

D'abord insérée en encart dans *Le temps fou*, une revue alternative alliée, en mars 1980, le nouveau magazine féministe québécois prendra son envol en mars suivant. L'aventure durera jusqu'en juin 1987 et le tirage du mensuel atteindra trente mille exemplaires⁴². La revue se situait clairement dans le champ du féminisme radical mais l'esprit frondeur et le parti pris en faveur de la liberté d'expression, y compris à l'égard des groupes autonomes de femmes, était présent dès le départ :

Au début, une position radicale était indispensable pour être prise au sérieux par le mouvement féministe pur et dur. Il a fallu une dizaine de numéros pour que nous avouions que le radicalisme du féminisme ne nous intéressait pas mais plutôt le féminisme en mouvement. Nous croyions possible de bâtir un projet commun avec des féministes d'orientations différentes... Nous voulions produire un magazine pour le plus grand nombre de femmes possible⁴³.

Le magazine couvre l'ensemble de l'actualité d'un point de vue féministe. Ses sympathies pour la gauche sont manifestes et l'orientation québécoise, très marquée. Pluraliste de pensée plus encore que de contenu, la revue, qui rejette le Parti libéral du Québec, « assis sur l'électorat de droite », accorde un appui clairement tactique au Parti québécois, plus vulnérable aux pressions de sa base « (quand elle appuie majoritairement une résolution en faveur de l'avortement libre et gratuit, par exemple)⁴⁴ ». À trois mois de l'échec du référendum de mai 1980, l'éditorial d'un des tout premiers numéros soupèse les chances du Parti québécois et du Parti libéral dans les élections qui s'annoncent :

Et puis, le choix est si mince qu'il est bien tentant de s'en laver les mains : **Qu'y s'arrangent avec leurs troubles**. Le hic, c'est que

les troubles en questions [sic], comme les pluies acides, ont plutôt tendance à nous retomber dessus...

Nous voterons donc contre le Parti libéral et pour le Parti québécois, bien que nous ne soyons pas péquistes. Nous voterons pour ceux qui risquent le moins de nous faire du tort parce que l'histoire quotidienne et collective des femmes nous a appris que l'argument masochiste de la politique du pire ne sert qu'à nous enfoncer davantage dans notre exploitation. Nous avons encore la joue sensible de la claque du 20 mai. Et très peu envie de tendre l'autre, n'en déplaise au très catholique Ryan.⁴⁵

Insensiblement, la distance s'est creusée entre femmes du Québec et femmes du Canada. Spécificités locales et différences linguistiques dictent aux premières le choix de « mettre de l'énergie sur des actions plus décentralisées⁴⁶ », les secondes s'efforçant vainement de les rallier à des actions « nationales », (lire canadiennes)⁴⁷. Dressant le bilan de ce processus de construction identitaire des féministes québécoises comme sujets politiques, Rachel Bélisle, membre du collectif de la revue *Des luttes et des rires de femmes* et fondatrice des Éditions du remue-ménage, écrivait à l'été 1982 :

L'existence de luttes nationales au Québec et notre isolement culturel influencent les choix des groupes féministes québécois, consciemment ou pas. Individuellement, les féministes québécoises ont plus souvent vécu leurs premières prises de conscience politiques comme francophones que comme enfant-femme⁴⁸.

L'ouverture internationale sur l'Amérique et le monde, quitte à sauter, sans même le noter, par dessus le Canada, le rejet de l'« albanisation », et l'attention aux « réalités québécoises » commanderont la critique, de plus en plus vive, à l'endroit des formations socialistes comme du « vieux rêve » nationaliste, « un peu suranné », dans un monde « en train de se restructurer » :

En principe, féminisme, socialisme et même indépendance devraient faire bon ménage. Mais comme il y a loin du rêve à la réalité, les ruptures se sont, dans les faits, succédé. Pourquoi?

D'abord, *le nationalisme, le mouvement le plus enraciné au Québec*, n'est pas automatiquement progressiste, inutile d'évoquer Duplessis pour le savoir...

Un Québec socialiste aurait pu, par contre, nous être utile à un moment pareil. Mais comment le savoir vraiment? Le socialisme qu'on a vu et lu ici se limitait généralement à *de grands principes M-L (marxistes-léninistes) inadaptés aux réalités québécoises*. Ce n'est pas par hasard que *la lutte des femmes, comme mouvement politique multiple et enraciné*, a survécu à la « lutte des classes » : celle-là répond toujours à un véritable besoin d'affranchissement social, politique, économique; celle-ci semblait trop souvent se résumer à l'idéalisation du travail en usine!⁴⁹

À la fin de la période, le thème de la langue, qui ne se confond plus avec le rêve de l'indépendance, fonde le projet politique de l'équipe de la revue de vivre dans une société qui nous « ressemble » : « On nage dans sa langue comme une truite dans une eau limpide », écrit Françoise Guénette, qui a pourtant l'impression « de mariner entre deux eaux vinaigrées, coincée dans un bocal »⁵⁰. Que faire quand on vit en Amérique du Nord et que les législations sur la protection de la langue, édulcorées par Robert Bourassa, « un chef d'État oublieux de l'histoire », sont insuffisantes à contrer « l'assimilation collective toute proche⁵¹ »?

La question linguistique, « talon d'Achille du gouvernement⁵² » est aussi un enjeu brûlant du point de vue de la formation d'un mouvement de femmes unifié. Elle gêne non seulement les rapports entre francophones québécoises et Canadiennes anglaises⁵³, mais elle dresse une barrière entre l'image, très surfaite, d'un Québec pluriculturel et l'isolement réel des immigrantes. Au sortir d'un atelier sur les problèmes des réfugiées organisé par le YWCA (*Young Women Christian Association*), Hélène Sarrasin se dit « profondément touchée » mais aussi « agacée » de constater que si les professionnelles intervenantes parlent français, les immigrantes allophones, elles, parlent anglais. Elle conclut à l'urgence de mettre sur pied « des structures d'accueil qui permettent à toutes et à tous d'apprendre la langue de la majorité de façon à préserver la paix sociale⁵⁴ ». Nonobstant, le magazine devient, petit à petit, moins ethnocentrique. On y lit des reportages sur les femmes amérindiennes⁵⁵ ou sur les femmes en provenance d'Afrique, du Moyen-Orient ou de l'Amérique latine. La couverture de l'actualité internationale gagne du terrain, les collaboratrices du magazine découvrent que l'oppression des femmes est très variée et que certaines sont plus opprimées que d'autres.

Sans que le point de passage soit très net, le discours de la décolonisation fait place à la perception du statut relativement privilégié d'un « nous » Québécoises par rapport au « elles » des immigrantes ou des femmes de tous les pays. Mais la distance se maintient entre les pays et les autres et si quelques néo-Québécoises élargissent le bassin des rédactrices de la revue, aucune ne se retrouve au conseil d'administration. Le rapport avec ces autres, que constituent, au niveau de la représentation, les Québécoises nées à l'étranger, n'est pas un terrain familier pour l'équipe de *La vie en rose*, bien aise de saluer l'apparition d'une revue qui « leur » offre enfin un lieu pour s'exprimer, *La Parole mètèque*⁵⁶, le 8 mars 1987, et à laquelle elles souhaitent longue vie.

À l'été 1987, le collectif de *La vie en rose* se dissout⁵⁷, marquant l'échec commercial d'une entreprise qui, sans l'appui financier de plusieurs milliers d'abonnées⁵⁸ ne pouvait contrer la difficulté de trouver des publicitaires pour assurer sa rentabilité dans un milieu hautement compétitif. Cette disparition n'empêchera pas les têtes de file de la revue de poursuivre de brillantes carrières solo dans le monde de l'information. Mentionnons à titre d'exemple : Francine Pelletier, Françoise Guénette,

Ariane Émond, Hélène Pedneault, pour ne mentionner que les plus connues. Il est réjouissant de constater que les lieux où s'élabore une pensée féministe libre se soient démultipliés, manifestant la vitalité et l'indépendance d'esprit d'autant de sujets-femmes engagées dans toutes les sphères de la société. De femmes qui entendent penser et agir par elles-mêmes.

Les orientations fondamentalistes, d'où qu'elles viennent, risquent fort de se buter à l'expérience de ces quelques milliers d'ex-militantes féministes, socialistes ou nationalistes, devenues réfractaires à toute vision politique réduite à une interprétation unique. Mais l'envers de la médaille, c'est l'atomisation d'un mouvement qui arrive encore à former des coalitions larges dans les moments de crise⁵⁹ mais parvient difficilement à articuler autre chose qu'une présence sporadique sur la scène publique, alors que la participation des femmes à l'élaboration des politiques d'ensemble est encore loin de s'effectuer sur une base paritaire⁶⁰.

Conclusion

« Autonomie des femmes » et « fin de toute oppression » apparaissent liés en termes d'objectifs. L'individu, femme ou homme, ne saurait se développer pleinement, sans l'appui idoine du monde qui le porte. Mais la volonté de chacune de se démarquer mène au casse-tête stratégique d'une action concertée entre autant de sujets indépendants dont il importe de respecter les caractéristiques individuelles aussi bien que celles qui disent leur communauté d'appartenance avec d'autres. L'identité ne se décompose pas en tranches nettes; le « je » féministe et le « je » ethnique s'expriment d'une seule voix, partagent un corps unique dont l'apparence traduit le rangement selon les règles d'une grammaire sociale. Le féminisme peut bien correspondre à une option politique privilégiée, il n'empêche que les femmes ne se caractérisent pas uniquement par leur différence sexuelle mais aussi par la couleur de leur peau, leur accent, leur formation, leur aisance de manières et de langage, leur degré de familiarité avec tel ou tel code culturel, bref, leur position dans un système complexe de places hiérarchisées en termes d'orientation sexuelle, de classe et d'ethnie.

Pas plus que les femmes de couleur, les féministes francophones, confrontées à la mouvance de leur identité nationale et de leur identité socio-sexuelle à l'aube des années soixante, ne pouvaient sortir la femme de la Québécoise. Comme l'exprime une théoricienne eurasiate, la stigmatisation sociale ne permet pas de choisir entre l'ethnicité et l'appartenance de sexe :

You never have/are one without the other. The idea of two illusory separated identities, one ethnic, the other woman (or more precisely female), again, partakes in the Euro-American system of dualistic reasoning and its age-old divide-and-conquer tactics⁶¹.

Les féministes du Québec, confrontées à leur double, triple ou quadruple marginalisation sur la base du genre, de l'identité nationale, de la classe ou de l'orientation sexuelle, sont loin d'avoir résolu l'énigme de la construction d'une stratégie politique adaptée à la fragmentation de l'identité du sujet politique post-moderne. Mais au moins ont-elles appris qu'il est inutile de vouloir simplifier l'équation, de quelque côté qu'on l'aborde. Si les tensions qui promettent d'accompagner la tenue d'un troisième référendum sur la souveraineté du Québec sont à craindre, c'est moins parce que le nationalisme recouvre le féminisme québécois de son ombre que parce que les féministes, monopolisées par des dossiers sectoriels sans nombre, délaissent la scène politique centrale, laissant une fois de plus les citoyens décider seuls du genre de la nation, sans les citoyennes. C'est aussi, hélas, parce que ne se sont pas reconstitués de carrefours permanents de discussion autonomes comme ces grandes revues féministes indépendantes qui ont alimenté l'imaginaire féministe des Québécoises pendant plus de quinze ans.

Notes

1. Pour une présentation classique de l'opposition entre féminisme et nationalisme, voir Nira Yuval-Davis et Flora Anthias (dir.), *Woman/Nation/State*, Berkeley, St-Martin's Press, 1989. La théorie féministe n'a commencé que très récemment à étudier avec empathie les alliances possibles entre féminisme et nationalisme, voir Lois A. West (dir.), *Feminist Nationalism*, New York/Londres, Routledge, 1997.
2. Sur le thème de la construction imaginaire d'une communauté nationale, voir Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Londres/New York, Verso, 1983.
3. Voir Louise Paquette, *La situation socio-économique des femmes. Faits et chiffres*, Québec, Les Publications du Québec, 1989, p. 1 à 8.
4. L'esprit du Mai 68 français, les protestations contre la guerre au Vietnam, de nombreuses grèves et un mouvement de mobilisation sans précédent contre le *bill* 63 qui, libérant le choix de la langue d'enseignement, risquait d'accélérer l'anglicisation des enfants des immigrants et des francophones en général, avaient créé un climat explosif, qui justifiait, aux yeux de l'administration Drapeau-Saulnier, l'adoption de mesures exceptionnelles d'interdiction des rassemblements publics.
5. Il fallait du courage aux deux cents manifestantes qui s'enchaînèrent les unes aux autres pour défier le règlement; 165 furent arrêtées et trois ans plus tard, deux militantes, Suzanne Plamondon et Lise Landry, firent une semaine de prison pour refus de payer le 25 dollars d'amende qui avait été imposé à chacune des contrevenantes. Voir Véronique O'Leary et Louise Toupin, *Québécoises Deboutte! Une anthologie de textes du Front de libération des femmes (1969-1971) et du Centre des femmes (1972-1975)*, Montréal, Les éditions du remue-ménage, 1982, tome 1, p. 62 et tome 2, p. 331.
6. Voir les deux premiers bulletins de liaison de juillet et août 1971 reproduits dans Véronique O'Leary et Louise Toupin, *op. cit.*, tome 1, p. 101-121.
7. « F.L.F.Q. historique : "Nous nous définissons comme les esclaves des esclaves..." », reproduit *ibid.*, p. 65-67.
8. La volonté de rompre avec l'élitisme et la hiérarchisation touchait jusqu'à l'orthographe. Sur l'histoire du FLFQ et du Centre des femmes, voir l'excellent

- dossier présenté par Véronique O'Leary et Louise Toupin, *Québécoises Deboutte!*, Tomes 1 et 2, Montréal, Les éditions du remue-ménage, 1982.
9. L'histoire ne devrait pas oublier la présence au tout début du mouvement d'un noyau de femmes réunies autour de Naomi Brickman et de Suzanne Dubrowsky, deux étudiantes anglophones séparatistes qui se chargèrent d'effectuer les premiers contacts avec Nicole Thérien, Véronique O'Leary et Marjolaine Péloquin. Voir « Table-ronde : Front de libération des femmes du Québec le 16 novembre 1982 », V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, *op. cit.*, p. 328 et 341.
 10. Voir l'avant-propos de V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, *op. cit.*, p. 22 et 27. Nous nous appuyons également sur la présentation de Louise Toupin, Ph.D., à l'occasion d'une table ronde du 49^e Congrès de l'Association d'histoire de l'Amérique française, à Orford, le 5 octobre 1997.
 11. « Table-ronde : Front de libération des femmes du Québec le 16 novembre 1982 » dans V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, *op. cit.*, tome 2, p. 328.
 12. V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, « Nous sommes le produit d'un contexte », *op. cit.*, tome 1, p. 40.
 13. Le combat de plus de vingt ans d'une Thérèse Casgrain pour l'obtention du suffrage universel inspirera les femmes rassemblées pour célébrer le vingt-cinquième anniversaire de cette victoire, en 1965, à fonder l'année suivante la Fédération des femmes du Québec, un lobby féministe qui sera à l'origine de la création du Conseil du Statut de la femme en 1966, suivra avec enthousiasme les travaux de la Commission royale sur le statut de la femme et qui, depuis ce temps, n'a cessé de proposer des mémoires sur l'ensemble des politiques fédérales et provinciales concernant les femmes.
 14. *Bulletin de liaison FLFQ*, n° 2, août 1971, reproduit dans V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, *op. cit.*, Tome 1, Montréal, Les éditions du remue-ménage, p. 117.
 15. Sur la manipulation des aspirations à l'émancipation des femmes au service des intérêts supérieurs de la nation ou des forces de la Révolution, voir Sheila Rowbotham, *Féminisme et révolution*, Paris, Payot, 1973.
 16. Philomena Essed, « Gender, Migration and Cross-Ethnic Coalition Building » dans Helma Lutz, Ann Phoenix et Nira Yuval-Davis (dirs.), *Crossfires. Nationalisms, Racism and Gender in Europe*, Londres, Pluto Press, 1995, p. 54.
 17. Pierre Vallières, *Nègres blancs d'Amérique. Autobiographie précoce d'un terroriste québécois*, Montréal, Parti pris, 1968.
 18. Voir V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, *op. cit.*, tome 1 p. 80-91.
 19. Entretien avec Lise Bissonnette, dans Marcos Ancelovici et Francis Dupuis-Déri, *L'archipel identitaire*, Montréal, Boréal 1997, p. 127. Les italiques sont de nous.
 20. Les universités canadiennes-anglaises, dont l'Université McGill, étaient remplies de jeunes déserteurs américains, souvent accompagnés de leurs compagnes.
 21. V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, *op. cit.*, Tome 1, p. 76.
 22. C'est l'interprétation que retient Martine Lanctôt dans un mémoire de maîtrise consacré à *La genèse et l'évolution du Mouvement de libération des femmes à Montréal, 1969-1979*, Montréal, UQAM, déc. 1980, p. 194. Pour l'histoire des démêlés entre francophones et anglophones aussi bien au sein du FLF que dans Le Centre des femmes qui lui succédera, voir *ibid.*, p. 51-64.
 23. V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, *op. cit.*, tome 1, cité p. 71.
 24. Neuf numéros, outre le numéro un sorti à l'automne 1971, seront publiés entre novembre 1972 et mars 1974, et le journal comptera jusqu'à 2000 abonnées. Voir M. Lanctôt, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
 25. En vertu de la loi fédérale sur l'avortement, amendée en 1969, seuls les avortements soumis à l'approbation de comités thérapeutiques étaient légaux

- mais les hôpitaux accrédités à former de tels comités n'étaient nullement obligés de le faire. Tous les autres cas relevaient du droit criminel, d'où les accusations portées en 1971 et en 1973 contre le Dr Morgentaler qui avait osé défier la loi dès 1969, en ouvrant sa propre clinique d'avortement privée. Sur l'affaire Morgentaler, voir Eleanor W. Pelrine, *Morgentaler, assassin ou héros?*, Montréal, Quinze, 1975.
26. Sur le Centre des femmes, voir le mémoire de Martine Lanctôt, *op. cit.*, p. 87-141. Voir également V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, *op. cit.*, tome 2.
 27. Sur l'histoire de cette publication, commandée par la McGill Student Society, voir Donna Cherniak et Allan Feingold, « Birth Control Handbook », dans *Women Unite!*, Toronto, Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1972, p. 109-113. Voir également, Martine Lanctôt, *op. cit.*, p. 54-55.
 28. Données citées dans *Pour les Québécoises: égalité et indépendance*, Québec, Conseil du Statut de la femme, 1978, p. 89.
 29. « Pour un mouvement des femmes, mais lequel? », in *Québécoises Deboutte!*, 1, 4, mars 1973, p. 3, reproduit dans V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, *op. cit.*, tome 2, p. 95.
 30. En 1975, *Châtelaine* vendait par abonnement près de 260 000 exemplaires par mois, auxquels s'ajoutaient plus de 15,000 exemplaires vendus en kiosque pour un tirage payé total de 274 627 exemplaires par mois, A.B.C. Publishers Statement, dans *Canadian Advertising Rates and Data. The Media Authority, CARD*, novembre 1960-novembre 1987, cité dans Marie-José des Rivières, *Châtelaine et la littérature (1960-1975)*, Montréal, L'hexagone, 1992, p. 50.
 31. Marie-José des Rivières, *ibid.*, p. 49.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
 33. Francine Montpetit, « Billet », avril 1974, p. 4, cité *ibid.*, p. 123. L'orientation politique de la revue était réformiste, et son courrier du cœur, carrément rétrograde, mais les positions présentées sur un ton « modéré », en éditorial, se rapprochaient de celles du nouveau féminisme, comme le démontre l'analyse de Marie-José des Rivières. Voir en particulier le chapitre 2 de son ouvrage, « Les idéologies exprimées par *Châtelaine* : contrastes et paradoxe », *ibid.*, p. 95-149.
 34. Les, « pour notre solidarité », têtes, « parce que dans cette affaire le cœur n'y suffit pas », pioche, « pour notre entêtement », *Les Têtes de pioche*, 1, mars 1976, p. 2.
 35. Cf. *Les Têtes de pioche*, 3, 2, 1978, p. 2.
 36. Diane Lamoureux, *Fragments et collages. Essai sur le féminisme québécois des années 70*, Montréal, Les éditions du remue-ménage, 1986, p. 140. L'auteure dégage l'apport du lesbianisme politique à la capacité des femmes de se poser comme individuelles en les habilitant « à dépasser la conception des femmes telle que développée par la société patriarcale, qui en fait les appendices des hommes », *ibid.*, p. 143.
 37. « Éditorial », *Les têtes de pioche*, mars 1977, p. 1.
 38. *Des luttes et des rires de femmes*, 4, 2, p. 16, reproduit *ibid.*, p. 124.
 39. cf. *Sans fleurs ni couronnes, Bilan des luttes et des rires de femmes*, Montréal, DLR, 1982, p. 141-142.
 40. L'épuisement pouvait mener à la « capitulation » comme l'expliquera une ex-militante du Centre des femmes, convertie à En lutte, une organisation marxiste-léniniste pure et dure : « Pour moi, ce que ça veut dire d'avoir milité avec *En lutte!*, c'est la mort, le massacre d'un paquet d'aspirations personnelles, de ma créativité, de mes convictions personnelles. Je voulais l'unité mais pas la mort... Je me rappelle que dans les premiers temps, je lisais les articles de *En lutte!* sur les mouvements féministes et j'étais scandalisée mais je n'ai rien dit parce que c'était plus facile ». Danièle, in « Table ronde : Centre des femmes, le 18 novembre

- 1982 », dans V. O'Leary et L. Toupin, *op. cit.*, tome 2, p. 365. Sur l'anti-féminisme des organisations marxiste-léniniste, voir *En Lutte*, « Hommes et femmes du prolétariat : un seul ennemi, un seul combat », Montréal, *En lutte*, 1978 et LCCML, *Contre le féminisme, lions la lutte pour nos droits à la lutte pour le socialisme*, Montréal, Brochure éditée par la Ligue communiste (marxiste-léniniste) du Canada, 1977.
41. Extraits du formulaire de réabonnement du printemps 1986.
 42. Sur le féminisme pluraliste et lesbien de *La vie en rose*, voir le mémoire de Manon Thibert, *Le courant radical du féminisme au Québec de 1969 à 1984*, Montréal, UQAM, août 1986, chap. 4, p. 83-120.
 43. Françoise Guénette dans Ghila Benesty Sroka (Entrevue réalisée par), « La vie en rose », *La Parole métèque*, 8, hiver 1989, p. 18.
 44. « Éditorial : contre la politique du pire », *La vie en rose*, numéro 3, septembre, octobre, novembre 1980, p. 5.
 45. *Loc. cit.*
 46. Voir la réponse à une lettre d'invitation concernant une rencontre nationale des publications féministes au printemps 1980, reproduite dans *Sans fleurs ni couronnes*, Montréal, DLR, 1982, p. 163-164.
 47. À noter qu'au Québec, le terme national ne renvoie pas d'emblée à l'espace canadien, mais désigne généralement des actions entreprises dans le cadre strictement québécois.
 48. Rachel Bélisle, « Conscience et visibilité de nos pratiques » dans *Sans fleurs ni couronnes*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
 49. Francine Pelletier, « Quinze ans plus tard : la mort de l'indépendance », éditorial, *La vie en rose*, 23, février 1985, p. 5 et p. 19. Les italiques sont de nous.
 50. Françoise Guénette, « Édito : Langue marinée », *La vie en rose*, décembre 1986, p. 5.
 51. *Ibid.*
 52. Hélène Sarrasin, « Controversé : Les immigrantes au pays des autruches », *La vie en rose*, avril 1987, p. 13.
 53. Il est remarquablement peu question de l'actualité féministe canadienne dans les pages de *La vie en rose*. S'il y aura un *Spécial USA : Les Américaines et le pouvoir*, le numéro d'octobre 1984, on chercherait vainement l'équivalent en ce qui concerne le féminisme canadien.
 54. *Loc. cit.* Une « paix sociale » qui explosera au visage des féministes québécoises en avril 1990 quand les femmes immigrantes boycotteront *Femmes en tête*, un sommet convoqué à l'occasion du 50^e anniversaire de l'obtention du droit de vote au Québec, pour protester contre le fait que la rencontre soit présidée par Lise Payette, ex-ministre du gouvernement péquiste et l'une des féministes québécoises les plus respectées. Lise Payette, journaliste et écrivaine, venait de présenter à Radio-Canada un documentaire intitulé *Disparaître* que les femmes immigrantes jugeaient injurieux à l'endroit des minorités ethniques du Québec. Sur ce sujet, voir Le collectif Cléo, *L'histoire des femmes au Québec depuis quatre siècles*, Montréal, Le jour, 1992, (édition remaniée), p. 485.
 55. Voir les numéros de février 1985 et de février 1986 pour des articles concernant le statut des Amérindiennes selon la loi fédérale sur les Indiens.
 56. La revue, dirigée par Ghila Benesty Sroka, également responsable de *La Tribune juive*, offre toujours aux « métèques » comme aux autres féministes québécoises « un lieu pour s'exprimer », mais elle est rarement mentionnée dans la liste des périodiques féministes, pas plus que la *Revue du Réseau d'action et d'information*

pour les femmes, (RAIF), la revue de Marcelle Dolment, faute de relever d'un collectif de production.

57. D'autres revues féministes existent mais aucune ne relève plus d'un collectif autonome de femmes. Mentionnons, à titre d'exemple, une revue scientifique subventionnée comme *Recherches féministes*, produite par la Chaire en études féministes de l'Université Laval ou *la Gazette des femmes*, organe du Conseil du Statut de la femme, un organisme para-gouvernemental.
58. Il convient de mentionner que la liberté de ton du magazine n'était pas sans lui créer des ennemies au sein même du mouvement autonome féministe. La Fédération du Québec pour le planning des naissances ne pardonna pas à *La vie en rose* le numéro de l'été 1985. Ce numéro était composé de nouvelles érotiques dont certaines mettaient en scène des rapports sexuels sado-masochistes et brisaient le tabou anti-pornographie. L'ouverture à des collaborateurs masculins, invités à se prononcer, entre autre, sur la garde conjointe des enfants, dans un numéro sur les hommes en novembre 1985 acheva d'antagoniser maints groupes de femmes. Une campagne de désabonnement s'ensuivit dont la revue se remit difficilement.
59. Pensons à la mobilisation massive au moment de l'affaire Daigle, à l'été 1989. Suite à la décision de Chantal Daigle de quitter un conjoint violent et de se faire avorter, celui-ci avait obtenu une injonction de la cour lui interdisant de se faire avorter avant l'audition de son plaidoyer en faveur de son droit à la paternité. Voir Micheline de Sève, « Tremblay contre Daigle : retour à l'abc du féminisme », *Recherches féministes*, 3,1, 1990, p. 111-118.
60. Sur ce point voir Micheline de Sève, « Femmes, action politique et identité », *Cahiers de recherche sociologique*, hiver 1995, p. 25-39.
61. Trinh T. Minh-ha, *Woman, Native, Other*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1989, p. 104 : « L'une n'est/ne va jamais sans l'autre. L'idée de séparer vainement les deux identités, l'une ethnique, l'autre femme (ou plus précisément femelle), relève, une fois de plus, du système de pensée dualiste euro-américain et de ses tactiques éprouvées de diviser pour régner » (notre traduction).

Deborah Parnis

Representation, Regulation and Commercial Radio Broadcasting in Canada

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between commercial radio broadcasting and the ideology of “Canadian nationalism” as constructed through cultural regulation. In illustrating how the representation of narrow material interests at the level of civil society have intersected with and been articulated to the symbolic representation of national identity(ies) at the state level, it argues that Canadian commercial radio has historically been drawn into the dominant discourse(s) characteristic of the processes of hegemony in this country. This has largely occurred through the practices and mechanisms of cultural regulation.

Résumé

Cet article se penche sur les relations entre la radiodiffusion commerciale et l'idéologie du «nationalisme canadien», telle qu'elle se constitue à travers la réglementation de la culture. En montrant comment la défense d'étroits intérêts matériels sur le plan de la société civile a recoupé la représentation symbolique d'une identité ou d'identités nationales et s'est articulée sur elle au niveau de l'État, l'auteure soutient que la radio commerciale canadienne a toujours été attirée dans l'orbite du ou des discours dominants qui caractérisent les processus d'hégémonie en cours au Canada. Ce résultat est largement attribuable aux pratiques et mécanismes de réglementation de la culture.

Studies of culture and nationalism in Canada usually concentrate on the visual and literary media, particularly their perceived potential for representing the nation to itself. Radio, on the other hand, has been the “invisible” medium, seemingly without influence in the cultural landscape. In the rare cases where radio is addressed, the focus tends to centre on the CBC (Canada’s public broadcaster), especially within the academic environment.¹ However, since Canadians spend an average of 22 hours per week tuned in to the radio (Sutton; 1993), and since roughly only 10% of radio audiences listen to the CBC (Task Force; 1986, p. 120), to neglect the commercial side of this country’s radio broadcasting system is unwarranted. As this paper will argue, not only has commercial radio played an influential role in the social practices of Canadian listening audiences, but it has long been a site where the larger patterns of power characteristic of this country have played out. As a heavily regulated

industry, commercial radio has historically been woven into the changing fabric of this country, with deep connections to the perennial issues of Canadian nationalism and unity. Thus, although commercial radio broadcasting is structured on radio “formats,” target audiences, advertising revenue and profit-making, the industry has longstanding, intimate links to the dominant ideology of “Canadian nationalism.”

In exploring the link between commercial radio and the larger cultural and political character of Canadian society, the objective here is twofold. First, by conceptualizing regulation as the tie that binds the medium to larger structures and processes, the development of commercial radio and the interests of commercial broadcasters are shown to be linked to the “national interest” and issues of Canadian nationalism through the specific mechanisms of representation inherent in the regulatory process established in 1968. In this regard, the ideology of Canadian nationalism embedded within cultural regulation is one of the forces that distinguishes Canada’s radio industry from commercial radio broadcasting in other countries.

Next, it is argued that the nature of cultural regulation and the representation of the nation within the broadcasting sphere have undergone a subtle, yet significant shift. This transformation combines with changes in the broadcasting industry and in the larger political economy, particularly as the 1980s shift to the right emerged within state structures. As a result, the nature of regulation has been altered, as the prevailing cultural nationalism which dominated in the 1960s and 70s receded, partly overshadowed by a form of economic nationalism in the 1980s and 90s. This shift heralded new forms of representation both in terms of the material interests of private broadcasters and the creation of symbolic, national identities articulated within the state through regulatory policies and practices.

The State and Industry Regulation

State regulation is a primary means by which commercial radio has been historically connected to the larger balance of power within Canadian society. The interpretation of state regulation used in this paper derives largely from a neo-Gramscian approach. In this model, although the state apparatus itself may harbour a degree of institutional autonomy based on the self-preservation interests of those working within it (Brym; 1985), state power is fundamentally perceived as the mediation of relational power struggles within the social formation as a whole (Magder; 1985, p. 85). This mediation occurs through an uneven institutional ensemble within which the historical balance of power usually favours the dominant class and social forces. Activities undertaken by the state which appear to foster that balance of power must be understood then as the result of real struggles between classes and groups, and of the contradictions within the social formation concretized by the state organization (Wolfe; 1989). In turn, the ensuing state structure mediates and institutionalizes future conflicts and

contradictions. Thus, the “authority” of the state, which tends to represent the hegemony of the leading fraction of the power bloc (Mahon; 1979, p. 165), reflects the continuous incorporation of such interests into that structure which, with respect to the unequal capacities of various social forces to effect changes, is “biased” (Jessop; 1990, p. 93, 147-148). Within this formation then, “state interventions (are) a set of compromises, reflecting the unequal representation of social forces within the state itself” (Albo & Jenson; 1989, p. 198).

In this scheme, hegemony is achieved through particular long-term hegemonic projects. As a variety of political economists have determined,² the principal long-term project of the hegemonic alliance in Canada over the course of much of this century has centred around national unity in the pursuit of capitalist economic development.³ This project has been strategically favoured within the state apparatus. As an element of the hegemonic paradigm (Jenson; 1989), this project has been termed the “national interest” and commonly translated as the “general interest” at the level of civil society. Through the processes of hegemony, subordinate and more marginal interests have generally been articulated in various ways over time to this general national interest by their incorporation into state structures through particular hegemonic accumulation strategies and state projects. These projects and ideologies, especially compatible with the federalist structure of governance, have often been couched in Canadian nationalist ideologies. Accordingly, efforts to represent the material interests of specific groups or collective identities have appealed to the processes involved in building a national identity.

Regulatory agencies are conceptualized within this framework. According to Rianne Mahon, an extension of the “authority” of the state is necessary at particular moments in the development of capitalism in order to regulate conflict which cannot be adequately resolved through the normal authoritative structures. In these cases, an independent body is established. The formal authority of these bodies, or regulatory agencies, relies on their ability to make what are perceived to be “politically neutral” technical judgements (1979, p. 174-175). However, just as the larger state apparatus is biased, so too are the activities of regulatory agencies subject to structural limitations. These limitations arise through a variety of means such as procedural rules, the mandate of the regulatory body and the position of the agency within the state hierarchy (Ibid., p. 176). These structural mechanisms of regulation coordinate the actions of the regulatory agency with the general state bias, where they tend to correspond to the fundamental interests of hegemony.⁴

Therefore, unlike traditional analyses which treat regulatory agencies as neutral and independent bodies, Mahon argues that a comprehensive and more accurate understanding of such regulation not only deals with the differential representation of competing interests, but also with the subordination inherent in the larger hegemonic process embedded within

the state. Here, representation performs the dual function of representing specific interests in the negotiation process, and “persuading” or coercing those interests to accept compromises, in partial subordination to more powerful interests also represented in the “biased” state structure (Ibid., p. 183). Thus, the task of the regulatory body is to regulate the industry of concern in a way that represents the interests of a specific fraction of capital (i.e., commercial broadcasting) and simultaneously subordinates them to the larger interests of the hegemonic fraction.

With this model, we can look at cultural regulation and the nature of representation within the broadcasting sector by focusing on the central regulatory agency, the CRTC, and the 1968 Broadcasting Act which provided it with its strongest mandate and terms of reference for the regulation of broadcasting throughout the contemporary format era. By examining this policy, we can make sense of how commercial radio has been regulated, and how regulation has historically bound the industry’s interests to the larger political and economic interests of hegemony.

Representation and Subordination in Regulation: The Case of Commercial Radio

Although it was Canada’s fourth addressing the broadcasting system, the 1968 Broadcasting Act was the most detailed, comprehensive and definitive piece of legislation introduced since broadcasting had begun in this country. It governed and, to a great extent, shaped commercial radio broadcasting throughout the contemporary period. It was also the first piece of legislation to formally recognize and secure the place of commercial radio within the Canadian broadcasting system. Embodied in its text is the discursive tradition of Canadian broadcasting policy dating back to the 1930s, as well as the state’s political compromise following decades of mediation between competing pro-nationalist, public forces and private broadcasting interests in the struggle to gain rights to control the airwaves. By narrowing our focus from the broad mandate of regulation to some of the more concrete aspects of this legislation and the activities of the CRTC, we can explore some of the ways in which commercial radio industry representation appeared in the regulatory mechanisms established in 1968.

After years of conflict between private broadcasters and a strong, public-sector lobby over the articulation of particular policy preferences, the 1968 Broadcasting Act granted private broadcasting its first formal recognition within the Canadian broadcasting system. Following nearly five decades of “temporary status,” commercial radio had become one-half of the “single system” of broadcasting. This entrenchment resulted partly from the increased popularity of commercial radio in the 1950s and 60s. This popularity owed to a number of factors including the development of the transistor radio and the car and clock radio, as well as the rise of the “rock and roll” music culture and the concomitant establishment of the first radio format — “Top 40.” Beyond this, the increased cross-ownership of radio

and television outlets which started in the 1950s meant that private broadcasters were fast becoming economically concentrated and politically powerful. In addition to these industry-specific developments, the relative success of commercial broadcasters was enhanced during this period by the larger post-war environment where heightened wealth, urban growth and continentalization provided a climate within which commercial broadcasters could flourish economically, socially and politically. This was accomplished primarily through the activities of the industry's chief organization, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB).

In this context, commercial radio interests were formally represented in cultural policy for the first time. In more concrete terms, the specific policy mechanisms which expressed this representation were the licensing regulations established by the CRTC (within the boundaries of the 1968 Broadcasting Act). Through these mechanisms, the licensing practices surrounding private commercial stations ultimately created conditions of economic protectionism within and across radio markets by restricting format competition, imposing entry and exit barriers and fostering corporate concentration and monopoly conditions as the state granted "public" airwaves to private interests for profitable gain. These conditions have largely guaranteed the profitable success of many broadcasting operations throughout the contemporary era (particularly the larger corporate operations). As Gathercole (1986) states in her analysis of *The Caplan-Savageau Task Force on Broadcasting Policy*, "(t)he report suggests the extent to which the private broadcast and cable companies have the Government of Canada to thank for their existence and profitability" (p. 10).

As discussed above, regulation involves representing the interests of the regulated, as well as somewhat subordinating those interests through the political processes of hegemony. Licensing practices (and their attendant economic protection) did reflect a relatively successful articulation of the material interests of commercial radio broadcasters within the larger balance of power. However, as a marginal sector within the power bloc,⁵ the industry remained partially subordinated to the larger agenda of hegemony. In order to illustrate how this subordination was manifest through regulation, we must first characterize the socio-political context within which the structures of regulation were instituted. This helps to make further sense of the complexities of representation as it intersects the civil and state levels of a social formation.

While the prosperity of the post-war years provided commercial broadcasters with a more favourable climate for advancing their interests, this period of economic growth and relative social stability ended in crisis by the late 1960s as the economy began a downward spiral, and as Quebec nationalism sparked large-scale political unrest and concerns over cultural sovereignty. The struggle to define an image of "Canadian nationalism"

intensified as changes in the social structure threatened to shake the foundations of the country.

What set apart the nationalism of this era, played out in the politico-cultural arena, was its emphasis on symbolism. According to Brodie and Jenson, because the powerful, post-war, pro-continentalist forces and their economic strategy had made any substantive threat to their hegemonic path of economic development untenable at that time, the struggle over nationalism was largely fought in cultural and symbolic, rather than economic terms. Conflicts arose over issues such as the official use of the term "Dominion," a new flag or whether mailboxes should be designated "Royal Mail" (1980, p. 245). The broadcasting realm became a focal point for a variety of social forces and for the state as this national-level turbulence surfaced in debates about the direction of the country's broadcasting system and its potential role in creating and maintaining a cohesive national identity. The media, propelled by the popularity of television (with its proliferation of American programming) had become central to concerns over cultural sovereignty. As a result, the federal Liberal government at the time instigated a strategy for confronting the national crisis wherein cultural policy would become an instrument for preserving and fostering national unity (Raboy; 1990, p. 138). Statements made by the 1969 Senate Committee (Davey Commission) on the ownership and control of the media in Canada reflected the depth of this concern. "Cultural survival," the Committee argued "is perhaps the most critical problem our generation of Canadians will have to face..." (*Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Vol. I*; 1970, p. 195).

So, while private broadcasters had indeed grown much more powerful throughout the 1950s and 1960s, their growth was checked by the larger social order in which Quebec unrest (along with the rise of more general social unrest) threatened to destabilize English-Canadian dominance, bringing a renewed need for national unity and a single Canadian "public" to the fore of state involvement. In this atmosphere of continentalist, and Canadian and Quebec nationalist tensions, the state's compromise solution to the long-lived conflict between public and private broadcasting was institutionalized in 1968. Thus, the increasing power and institutional representation of private broadcasting interests as manifest within the Broadcasting Act were tempered by both the national(ist) tradition of broadcasting and the social conditions of the country during the 1960s.

At this time, the nature of commercial radio regulation changed substantially as it shifted towards greater regulation of content in an attempt to accommodate the larger agenda of cultural nationalism. While the CBC continued to champion cultural "enlightenment" and broad geographic coverage, one of the most profound policy outcomes of this shift resulted when the CRTC instituted the first strictly enforced Canadian content regulations for commercial radio broadcasting. Intended to foster "Canadianism" through music, Canadian content regulations (or "Cancon")

as they are commonly called) stipulated that 30% of the music played by commercial broadcasters was to be Canadian in origin.⁶ This content obligation became a condition of license which outraged many private broadcasters, especially given the dearth of Canadian recorded music in existence at the time.⁷ Nonetheless, the commercial sector was being assigned a cultural role wherein this primarily local medium would become a part of the hegemonic agenda of Canadian nationalist discourse and ideological representation. Here, the “national interest” was articulated to the more narrow economic interests of commercial broadcasters via the state. And, whereas the licensing regulations reflected the material interests of private broadcasters, these Canadian content regulations could be understood as a means by which commercial radio was simultaneously subordinated to more powerful interests.

Shifting Meanings: Cultural and Economic Nationalisms

Throughout the contemporary period of commercial broadcasting, Canadian nationalism remained a central regulatory concept. The meaning of this ideological construct, however, shifted as the predominant cultural nationalism of the 1960s and 70s was partly displaced by a new form of economic nationalism in the 1980s and 90s. Having outlined the complex mechanisms by which representation of the commercial radio industry was structurally established in 1968, we will now briefly examine how changes at the societal and industry levels have impinged upon and reshaped those policy mechanisms, with the gradual evolution of industry representation and symbolic interpretations of the nation since the 1980s.

As discussed, much of the Canadian nationalism behind the 1968 Broadcasting Act was symbolic. It aimed to generate a sense of national identity both through wide geographic coverage and a degree of Canadian programming by the public sector, and through broadcasting content that was partially Canadian in origin and flavour, for which the commercial sector was also responsible. In this policy context, radio audiences were constituted and represented as a mass of “Canadians,” among whom the promotion of Canadian nationalism was deemed to be in the general “public interest.” This could be understood as an articulation of the “national interest” in the broadcasting sphere. The ideology underpinning this assumption (and long-term hegemonic vision) was that economic prosperity would eventually follow the creation of a national consciousness and unity. Over time, however, policy alterations had seemingly inverted this assumption, such that any benefits of national ideals and identity were increasingly expected to result from the trickle-down effect of economic growth. This trend was reflective of that within the larger national political economy.

And so, even though national identity and nation-building continued to be rhetorically recounted in government statements and documents (including the 1991 Broadcasting Act), appeals to the tradition of Canadian

nationalism became largely a cultural remnant in a structure undergoing transformation. Although symbolic representation of the nation still figured in regulation, its meaning had somewhat diminished. Shorter-term economic considerations began to surpass long-term cultural objectives and concerns as the historic tradition of the Canadian broadcasting system was being recast. What had caused this shift in policy and ideology, and how did it impact on the regulation of commercial radio, especially in terms of the mechanisms of representation and subordination established in 1968?

While the 1970s had witnessed the early effects of the breakdown of the post-war order, accelerated by the challenges of Quebec, heightened provincialism, decentralization, internationalization and deregulation, the country took a sharp turn to the right in the 1980s. The communication industries (telecommunications, satellite, cable) became highly profitable and particularly attractive as the Canadian resource and manufacturing sectors declined (Atkinson & Coleman; 1989). Because private broadcasting interests were often linked to these new communications industries through corporate and technological cross-ownership, corporate radio became increasingly powerful by integrating with this rising nationalist fraction of the power bloc. One political outcome of this power in a more neo-conservative business environment was that the commercial broadcasting sector was able to enhance representation of its material interests. It did so chiefly by pressuring the CRTC to alter the regulatory guidelines established in 1968.

For example, private broadcasters (through the CAB) began to push the agency toward allowing them to use satellites and syndicated programming in order to obtain the economies of scale resulting from corporate ownership of many stations across different markets in this country (i.e., to either re-use programming or simultaneously broadcast programming across several stations owned by the same company). Prior to this time, the state had determined that commercial radio was to be a local medium barred from broadcasting beyond particular markets. At this point, however, the CRTC changed the rules, allowing satellite simulcasting and redistribution of programming. Similarly, a strong lobby working to eliminate many of the anti-network radio regulations (especially for the AM stations) reflected greater representation of the material interests of corporate commercial broadcasters.⁸

The key to this policy success for commercial broadcasters concerned not only their increased power base in a changing economic climate, but also their ability to play on ambiguities in the 1968 Broadcasting Act. In particular, while most CRTC activity throughout the 1970s had focused on Subsection 3(g) in the Act centred on the mandate of national unity and consciousness, by the 1980s, private broadcasters capitalized on a more marginal section of the Act dealing with the state's role in remaining "flexible" in order to accommodate technological change. In particular,

along with Section 3(c) with its emphasis on freedom of expression, Subsection 3(j) addressing technological change and the need to establish flexibility and adaptability became a focal point.

In a formal submission to the CRTC, private broadcasters made a number of references to that more obscure section of the Act, repeatedly engaging the term “flexibility” (CAB; 1981). For example, the Association boldly stated that “(b)y its very nature, intensive regulation can have a negative impact on flexibility in private industry” (Ibid., p. 6). “Flexibility” in this usage implied de-regulation, and it was to play a meaningful role in shifting commercial radio away from a mandate of cultural and national objectives to one centred on the more immediate and market-oriented nature of format radio programming and increasingly fragmented consumer behaviour patterns. “New forms and styles of information and entertainment are changing listening patterns. Private radio needs all the flexibility it can muster to meet these changes, to identify and carve out its new niche in the Canadian cultural mosaic. The regulatory structure under which the industry operates must be revised to accommodate this crucial element of flexibility” (Ibid., p. 7).

After initiating this discursive shift, state agencies soon intoned this new language as well, and the term “flexibility” began to appear frequently throughout government strategy papers, addresses and annual reports, generally allowing that the state must be “flexible” with regard to new technologies such as satellites and cable. In its 1983-84 *Annual Report*, the CRTC wrote: “the Commission believes that a greater emphasis on supervision rather than strict regulation together with a consultative approach to major issues is the appropriate orientation. This approach permits greater flexibility while ensuring that the regulatory framework which governs the broadcasting sector remains strong and is consistently applied. It also allows increased scope for the industry to devote more time to the creative and marketing aspects of broadcasting...” (p. 21). As Fortner (1988-89) states, it is “(b)y means of both the process of socially constructing reality through the control of language and symbolization and the process of making a particular signification stick that the legitimacy of ideas or perspectives is created and maintained...” (p. 83).

Thus, where the section of the Broadcasting Act on “a balanced and enlightening broadcasting system, intended to contribute to the development of national unity and the expression of Canadian identity,” was the dominant discursive expression within the regulatory environment throughout the 1970s, the focus had changed by the 1980s. This was largely the accomplishment of private broadcasters, marking a shift towards a re-regulation which complied with both the political economy of the 1980s and a different conceptualization and prioritization of Canadian nationalism in cultural regulation.

This shift coincided with the larger societal move away from “Canadian” identity toward an era of individual and minority group rights, especially following the Constitution and Charter of 1982. Ivan Emke (1993) has suggested that the concept of a single, general “public” in this context was changing to the notion of “publics,” as a national identity receded to a variety of regional, ethnic, linguistic and gender-based identities. This could be seen as an outgrowth of the bi- and multi-culturalism of the 1970s. The abstractive “public interest” closely connected to earlier policies gradually began to collapse under the real shared interests of these “publics” and with it, the symbolic representation of national identity seemed to lose much of its meaning.⁹

With the proliferation of varied identities came new forms of representation of the “Canadian identity,” particularly through the state’s introduction and widespread use of the term “consumers” to define and represent the population (Raboy; 1990, p. 216-217). This terminology, closely associated with the rising importance of new technologies and the increasingly explicit role of market forces within cultural regulation, soon appeared at the policy level. For example, in a 1983 Department of Communications strategy paper, the initiatives proposed for a new national broadcasting policy were based on enabling “Canadian consumers, broadcasters and other entrepreneurs to take advantage of new technologies.” Likewise, the 1986 *Annual Report* of the CRTC focused on the need to manage the unfolding of new technologies as they had begun competing for the “communications consumer.” And a 1987 document *Vital Links* cited the proliferation of new services within the broadcasting environment as “good news for consumers.” These statements indicate not only the growing precedence of the market in cultural policy, but the new ideological role of technology in the discursive shift from a largely symbolic representation of nationalism to one expressing marketplace and corporate terminology, where a collective mass of “Canadians” was becoming a collectivity of “consumers.”

Unlike cultural policy formulated prior to the 1970s, this new thrust centred on a shorter-term vision of capital accumulation. Private broadcasters could move away from using “nation-building” goals to justify their monopoly control of public airwaves and begin focusing instead on their ability to respond to marketplace and audience needs. Where they had formerly gained some representation by articulating their interests to larger issues of national unity, they could now re-articulate their interests to the new cultural identities emerging within the shifting social order.¹⁰ And, as the private sector attempted to detach itself from its traditionally assigned cultural role, the government appeared to re-assign part of what was originally the responsibility of commercial broadcasters to the public broadcaster (where taxpayers would shoulder the cost of unity). Funding cuts to the public broadcasting sector soon followed, further indicating the shifting significance of these symbolic objectives.

With this increased ability to influence policy and the nature of regulation, against a backdrop of larger political and economic continentalism and deregulation, we might ask: did commercial radio broadcasting remain subordinated to the mandated representation of nationalism through regulatory policy? The answer is “yes.” The diminished cultural nationalism evident in the development of commercial radio reflects a general trend surrounding conceptions of the “national interest” and representations of the nation in Canada over the last decade. The regulation of commercial radio offers a clear exposition of this trend, as well as an interesting irony in terms of its continued subordination through Canadian content rules although the cultural nationalism imperative which spawned them has weakened.

Canadian content regulations remained a condition of license despite changing temper of the 1980s and 1990s¹¹. However, this form of subordination was no longer based solely on the original hegemonic project of creating a national identity, but increasingly connected to the more narrow sectoral interests of another industry with its own form of representing the new conceptualization of the “national interest.”

When Canadian content regulations were introduced in the 1970s, the Canadian recording industry was virtually nonexistent. However, these regulations prompted a rapid increase in production, as shown by the 519% increase in payments made to Canadian recording artists between 1968 and 1977 (Ministry of Secretary of State; 1980, p. 8). In the 1980s, the sound-recording industry had become this country’s most widely traded cultural product, with exports worth approximately \$500 million annually (Department of Communications, *Annual Report*; 1986-87, p. 16). By the 1990s, the burgeoning industry was not only domestically viable, but its enormous export potential made it highly valued particularly in a political economy expanding outside of national boundaries.

In light of this potential, the industry received substantial state resources to further facilitate the consumption of these recorded products at home and abroad, particularly through initiatives such as a \$25 million funding program for which the Department of Communications was responsible for the “international marketing, business development and specialized music distribution components” (Department of Communications, *Annual Report*; 1986-87, p. 16). Similarly, in 1989-90, the government took action to sponsor the export of national cultural products by supporting participation by Canadian artists at major international events and distributing their recordings to international recording executives and distributors (Communications Canada, *Annual Report*; 1989-90, p. 45).

Thus, the viability of the Canadian recording business, along with a very strong lobby organization, helped to sustain “Canadian nationalism” as a priority in cultural regulation by obliging radio broadcasters to continue playing a certain percentage of Canadian recorded music. The lost meaning

of symbolic nationalism was partly compensated by the increased influence of a form of economic nationalism. "Cancon" endured, not so much for its significant contribution to Canadian cultural unity and identity formation, but for its increasing role in helping to generate domestic and export revenue. The ideology of nationalism took on a somewhat different cast which reflected the larger hegemonic project emerging at this time. In this incarnation, an economic nationalism was based not only on the discursive tradition of Canadian nationalism, but also the stimulation of indigenous industry in the aim of capital expansion through multi-nationalization. Nationalism as a long-term interest persisted, but in a more unstable environment where new forces were struggling for representation. Although not explicitly referring to the recording industry, a statement by the CRTC Chair seemed to sum up the government's changing attitude towards the interrelation of cultural objectives, nationalist interests and commercial broadcasting:

I cannot help but think that broadcasters, as businessmen, should be looking at Canadian content as *the* way of differentiating themselves in an increasingly competitive environment...(w)hile Canadian content had its birth as a cultural policy, it will increasingly become a straight-forward business decision by Canadian broadcasters (CRTC, *Annual Report*; 1985-86, p. xiv).

Conclusion

Canadian radio broadcasting has long been an outlet for the cultural expression of Canadian nationalism. While the dynamics of commercial format radio, with its highly targeted audiences, suggest fragmented demographics and local audiences, the nationalist hegemonic agenda has historically assigned the commercial sector a particular role in constructing a Canadian national identity and unity. In this sense an analysis of Canadian commercial radio reveals the intersection between the representation of narrow material interests and the constructed representation of nationalist ideologies and identities.

As this paper argues, throughout the contemporary period, commercial radio broadcasting interests have been partly subordinated to issues of Canadian nationalism evident in both symbolic and economic terms. In making this argument, it was shown that regulatory and government bodies are not neutral entities. Instead, they are extensions of the "authority" of the biased state structure which embodies the concretized outcomes of hegemony. More particularly, these biases become embedded in the activities of regulatory agencies, such as the CRTC, where they appear in processes of representation. The nature of representation was illustrated with respect to the specific licensing practices of the state which protected the industry and created monopoly conditions for private broadcasters. At the same time, the Canadian content regulations, which served both a historic concern for the larger symbolic representation of national unity and

identity through broadcasting and its economic potential, have subordinated commercial radio to the “national” or “general” interest. The fundamental material interests of commercial broadcasters were largely represented in a way that combined them with those of the power bloc. As those larger interests shifted over time, we also witnessed a shift in the nature of cultural regulation within the commercial radio sector, which exemplifies how the patterns of power within Canadian society have played out in the broadcasting system.

Notes

1. In the rare cases when commercial radio is discussed, it tends to concern the so-called “Golden Years” before the advent of television. For example, see Gifford, Dennis, *The Golden Age of Radio*, London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1988; Terrace, Vincent, *Radio's Golden Years. The Encyclopedia of Radio Programs 1930-1960*, California: A.S. Barnes and Co., 1981; Snagge, John & Michael Barley, *Those Vintage Years of Radio*, London: Pitman Publishing, 1972; Buxton, Frank & Bill Owen, *The Big Broadcast 1920-1950*, New York: The Viking Press, 1972; Lazer, David, *What's on the Wireless*, Gloucestershire: Evergreen, 1989; Halhed, Dick and Dodi Halhed, *Radio – The Remote Years*, Scarborough: D. Halhed, 1981; McDonald, J. Fred, *Don't Touch That Dial: Radio Programming in American Life 1920-1960*, Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1979; Bannerman, R. Leroy, *Norman Corwin and Radio: The Golden Years*, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1981; Settel, Irving, *A Pictorial History of Radio*, New York: The Citadel Press, 1960; Nobbs, George & Wensum Boaks, *The Wireless Stars*, Norwich: Norwich Ltd., 1972. However, in light of the enormous changes within the industry over the last two and a half decades, particularly within the development of format-based programming (Berland; 1994), this lacuna is significant.
2. Mahon (1979, p. 180; 1984, Ch. 1), Clement (1977: 1983), Atkinson & Coleman (1989), Brodie & Jenson (1980, p. 219-221).
3. A shifting alliance revolving around Canadian-owned finance capital has held a leading position throughout most of this country's history. More specifically, during the first half of the century, especially the inter-war period, the hegemonic alliance concentrated around the commercial-financial capitalists, for whom the National Policy was developed in pursuit of industrialization and the export trade (Atkinson & Coleman; 1989, Ch. 2). Following the Second World War, a shift in this alliance incorporated American investment capital in the key resource and manufacturing sectors, leaving indigenous monopoly capital to control the various service sectors in an unequal, yet interdependent, continentalist alliance (Jenson; 1989, p. 79). Since the late 1970s, the possibility of a third shift has emerged in the strong challenge posed by an indigenous fraction of capital in the “high-tech” sectors to the prevailing continentalist hegemonic alliance (Wolfe; 1989; Mahon; 1985; Atkinson & Coleman; 1989).
4. As her more recent work (Mahon; 1991) makes very clear, the strategic and structural “selectivity” of the state is, in a sense, an “ideal type.” That is, the interests of dominant forces in state activity and strategies are not guaranteed to prevail.
5. Although the configuration of broadcasting has altered in recent years with extensive mergers and acquisitions (creating even larger corporate structures

within the industry), as part of the indigenous corporate environment, commercial broadcasting has aligned primarily with the nationalist fraction of the power bloc under the leadership and authority of finance and resource capital. In some instances, the interests of the peripheral and dominant fraction have converged, and in some they have diverged.

6. The "Canadianess" of a recording was determined through a quantitative measurement system established by the CRTC wherein at least 30% of music played would have to meet two of the following conditions: the playing or singing must be principally by a Canadian, the music written by a Canadian, the lyrics written by a Canadian or the performance recorded in Canada (Bird; 1988, p. 451). While the BBG, which governed the industry prior to the CRTC, had also established regulations concerning Canadian content, they primarily centred on television programs rather than recorded music. Also, see Raboy (1990) for an interesting discussion of the motivations behind the BBG's content initiatives which he argues aimed not so much to serve a "perceived public interest as they were designed to show that public broadcasting was not the only solution to the national interest" (p. 145).
7. As a response to these measures, the primary trade journal of private broadcasters and the mouthpiece of the CAB changed its name from *Canadian Broadcaster* to *Broadcaster* as an act of scorn for the new regulations (Bird; 1988, p. 454).
8. The CRTC also introduced new regulations based on extending licenses to companies which could ensure "economic viability" rather than promises of enlightening or alternative programming, a change which favoured existing large corporate owners (see 1986-87 CRTC *Annual Report*).
9. The 1991 Broadcasting Act, while continuing to rhetorically emphasize Canadian nationalism, reflected these changes at the political level in terms of "publics" and the representation of multiple identities. For example, Subsection 3(1)(d)(iii) states... "serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian men, women, and children, including equal rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that society" (Broadcasting Act, February 1, 1991).
10. However, commercial broadcasters have retained the rhetoric of national unity in one dimension of their discursive activities. In order to be protected from both American signals/programming and provincial control, the CAB has fought vigorously to maintain federal regulatory control. To this end, the CAB will sometimes come out with surprisingly bold statements and initiatives regarding its role in preserving the national character of Canadian broadcasting.
11. In balancing the recording industry lobby, the state agenda and broadcaster resistance, the CRTC changed the content requirements for Canadian music on radio in 1993 in order to make it easier for recordings and live musical broadcasts to qualify as Canadian if they involved collaboration between Canadian and non-Canadian artists (CRTC *Public Notice 1993-5*).

Bibliography

- Albo, Greg & Jane Jenson 1989. "The Relative Autonomy of the State" in *The New Canadian Political Economy*, (eds.) Wallace Clement & Glen Williams. Kingston, Montreal, London: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Atkinson, Michael & William Coleman 1989. *The State, Business and Industrial Change in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Berland, Jody 1994. "Radio Space and Industrial Time: The Case of Music Formats" in *Canadian Music: Issues of Hegemony and Identity*. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc.

*Representation, Regulation and Commercial Radio Broadcasting in
Canada*

- Bird, Roger (ed.) 1988. *Documents of Canadian Broadcasting*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.
- Brodie, Janine & Jane Jenson 1980. *Crisis, Challenge and Change: Party and Class in Canada*. Toronto: Methuen Publications.
- Brym, Robert 1985. "The Canadian Capitalist Class, 1965-1985" in *The Structure of the Canadian Capitalist Class*, (ed.) R.J. Brym, Toronto: Garamond.
- Clement, Wallace 1977. "The Corporate Elite, the Capitalist Class and the Canadian State" in *The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power*, (ed.) Leo Panitch. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Clement, Wallace 1983. *Class, Power and Property: Essays on Canadian Society*. Toronto: Methuen.
- Canada, Ministry of Secretary of State 1980. *Canadian Broadcasting and Telecommunications: Past Experiences, Future Options*, a report prepared for the CRTC.
- Canada, Department of Communications 1983. *Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Canada, 1986. *Report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy*. Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services.
- Canada, Department of Communications April 1987. *Vital Links: Canadian Cultural Industries*. Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services.
- Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB) August 1981. *Review of Radio Submission to the CRTC - Part 1 (Radio in General)*.
- Communications Canada 1989-90. *Annual Report*.
- CRTC 1983-84. *Annual Report*.
- CRTC 1985-86. *Annual Report*.
- Emke, Ivan 1993. "Public Consultation Under the Charter: Constructing a New Audience" presented at "Publics, Markets and the State: Seminar on Canadian Communications Policy" at Carleton University, January 22.
- Fortner, Robert 1988-89. "Signification and Legitimacy in Public Policy Debate: The Canadian Public and the Politics of Language in Canadian Broadcasting Development" in *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter).
- Gathercole, Sandra 1986, November. "The Best Damn Report From Bennett to Mulroney: An Analysis of the Caplan-Savageau Report" in *Cinema Canada*.
- Jenson, Jane 1993. "Naming Nations: Making Nationalist Claims in Canadian Public Discourse" in *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 30:3, August.
- Jessop, Bob 1990. *State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in Their Place*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Magder, Ted 1985. "A Featureless Film Policy: Culture and The Canadian State" in *Studies in Political Economy*, No. 16.
- Mahon, Rianne 1979. "Regulatory Agencies: Captive Agents or Hegemonic Apparatuses" in *Studies in Political Economy*, No. 1, Spring.
- Mahon, Rianne 1991. "From 'Bringing' to 'Putting': The State in Late Twentieth-Century Social Theory" in *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring.
- Raboy, Marc 1990. *Missed Opportunities: The Story of Canada's Broadcasting Policy*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Sutton, Ian 1993 (April). "Point-and-Shoot Radio" in *Broadcaster*.
- Wolfe, David 1989. "The Canadian State in Comparative Perspective" in *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 26:1, February.

Lynda Jessup

Prospectors, Bushwhackers, Painters: Antimodernism and the Group of Seven

Abstract

For almost seventy-five years, the National Gallery of Canada has advanced a story of the Group of Seven that posits the artists as populist advocates of cultural democracy, and as painters expressing an essential Canadianism. In contrast, this paper argues that the Group's rhetoric and activities should be seen in the light of the broad international reaction to the modern world that swept Europe and North America in the decades around the turn of the century. That reaction, which cultural historian Jackson Lears has termed antimodernist, effectively represented an exclusive, regional British Canadianism as the basis of an inclusive, national and, ultimately, progressive culture that subordinated and di-temporalized contemporary Aboriginal and French-Canadian cultures in the process.

Résumé

Pendant près de soixante-quinze ans, le Musée des beaux-arts du Canada a propagé une version de l'histoire du Groupe des Sept qui présente ces artistes comme des populistes, des défenseurs de la démocratie culturelle et des peintres qui se seraient donné pour tâche d'exprimer l'essence de l'âme canadienne. Cet article s'inscrit en faux contre cette façon de voir pour soutenir que l'on doit percevoir la rhétorique et les activités du Groupe dans le contexte plus large d'une réaction internationale contre le monde moderne qui s'est emparée de l'Europe et de l'Amérique du Nord au cours des décennies du tournant du siècle. Cette réaction, que l'historien de la culture Jackson Lears a qualifiée d'antimoderniste, représentait, en fait, un « canadianisme » exclusif, régional et britannique conçu comme le fondement d'une culture inclusive, nationale et, ultimement, progressiste, au terme d'un processus qui subordonnait et détemporalisait les cultures autochtones et canadiennes-françaises.

As far as Canadian Art concerns me, it can go to ---. There never will be a school of Canadian art. The natural centre for Eastern Canadian artists will be New York, and it will be better for themselves and their art when they realize it.

A.Y. Jackson, 1 October 1910.¹

Decorum likely dictated Jackson's use of three dashes instead of the obvious epithet, but his words are probably nonetheless shocking to Canadians steeped in the mythology of the Group of Seven and their fight

for “a distinctively Canadian art.” Coming from one of the foremost members of the Group and, for a large part of the twentieth century, Canada’s poster boy for cultural nationalism, they rank with his now famous 1910 comment that the Georgian Bay landscape the Group would later celebrate was “not quite paintable.”² Both suggest a counter narrative to the accepted story of the Group of Seven, the story most recently advanced by the National Gallery of Canada in its exhibition, “The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation.” The latter posits the idea that the Group of Seven was, and is, populist; that they were advocates of cultural democracy, and that their’s was an art expressive of an essential Canadianism. It has simply been reformulated in the current show as underpinning to the idea that the Group of Seven was a beleaguered avant-garde, fighting the academy and, in doing so, struggling to bring art to the Canadian people. Thus the artists’ subsequent victory, we are told, was, and continues to be, that of all Canadians.³

Feel-good history of the inclusive sort, it also asserts the importance of the National Gallery, which has consistently identified itself with the Group’s populist position. This is perhaps nowhere more apparent in the recent show than in the description of the 1924 controversy surrounding the Gallery’s selection of works for the Canadian Section of the British Empire Exhibition at Wembley, England. There, while asserting in a manner consistent with his thesis that “the real battle was between the ancients and the moderns,” exhibition curator Charles Hill represents the recorded conflict arising from the Royal Canadian Academy’s association of the National Gallery both with the Group members’ interests and with efforts to diminish the Academy’s previously unchallenged authority to choose representative Canadian works for international exhibitions. “At issue,” he explains of what amounted to a public struggle for power, “was whether artists (the Academy) or lay people (the board and director of the National Gallery) should establish standards for Canadian art.”⁴

His choice of words, it seems, is important, for it could just as easily, and at this juncture perhaps more appropriately, be argued that what this transfer of authority to the National Gallery exemplified was not the democratization of aesthetic opinion, but rather the professionalization of the cultural field and the shift evidenced elsewhere during this period to bureaucratically-oriented, hierarchical cultural institutions modeled on the modern business corporation.⁵ Such an approach would set the Group of Seven’s activities, which were more often than not intimately connected with such institutions, in the context of a broader, international experience in the early twentieth-century Western world. That experience is clearly associated with the process of rationalization characteristic of the transformation of nineteenth-century entrepreneurial capitalism into the modern corporate capitalism of the twentieth century. In a word, we call that experience “modernity,” what Ian McKay has succinctly described as

“the lived experience of [an] unremitting process of rapid change and its social consequences.”⁶

Reluctance to see the Group of Seven in relation to such broader trends in the history of culture in the West — to see them instead only in the context of a Canadian scene isolated from larger international currents — perpetuates the self-fulfilling claim witnessed in the literature to date that the artists were, and thus remain today, “distinctively Canadian.”⁷ Apart from the fact that it smacks of parochialism, the problem with this limited perspective is that it distorts the Group of Seven’s role in the history of Canadian art. Simply put, the Group was not, as we have been told, populist in its stance. Nor was its work expressive of an essential Canadianism. On the contrary, affected by the managerial restructuring of Western society in a manner similar to that of their counterparts on both sides of the Atlantic during these years, its members actually helped reformulate the cultural authority of the nation’s Anglo-Canadian elite.

Of course, one reason it is difficult to see the Group of Seven in the light of early-twentieth-century modernity is that the artists positioned themselves so stridently against it. Consider the Group’s polemic, which was largely fashioned in a flurry of publications by future members A.Y. Jackson, Arthur Lismer and J.E.H. MacDonald prior to its collective, and often cryptic, presentation in the Group’s exhibition catalogues of the 1920s.⁸ Based on a conflation of avant-gardism and arts and crafts aestheticism, it was nothing less than an all-embracing critique of modern production, both artistic and industrial. “We [Canadians] are the poor victims of standardization,” Lismer argued in 1919, “the acceptors of the impositions of so-called experts, and at the mercy of whatever kinds of goods the manufacturers and distributors wish to impose,” goods, he went on to assert “that reflect neither taste nor utility.”⁹ The only difference between industrial products and fine art in Canada was the cost, a point Jackson whimsically brought to the fore at about the same time in his story of the Buckeye Picture Company, a pot-boiler factory on Toronto’s Yonge Street where the then current taste for quasi-nineteenth-century-European art was met by paintings replicated in quantity, and priced accordingly at about 20 bucks each. As the pragmatic manager of the shop was made to explain, “most painters work with one eye continually on the prospective buyer. Their product is commercial but not commercial enough. ... By systematizing their output and not wasting time mooning around for an individual subject they can while selling their product at an honest price treble their income. An uninspired product,” he was made to state, “is merely a manufactured product. The Buckeye Coy sell [sic] them as such.”¹⁰

In fact, the Group members’ self-definition as authentic, original artists and, thus, as authentically uncommercial artists, rested on this critique of imagined art production in Canada, which set them in opposition to market-driven art. In keeping with many arts and crafts ideologues in the

north-eastern United States earlier in the century, they also tied their aestheticism to social conditions, seeing the ugliness fostered by commercialism as leading to the deterioration of society. To combat the decline in taste that caused the public to abandon older models of beauty and utility, or as Jackson would have it, the rural Canadian to favour ugly housing inappropriate to his needs while “[looking] back condescendingly to the simple home-like old log cabin his grandfather built,”¹¹ they called for the reintroduction of aesthetic concerns to society. Like the object of arts and crafts reform elsewhere, art was “common meeting ground for all the classes,”¹² its usefulness in suppressing social unrest and building community compounded in 1920s Canada by the Group’s association of the latter with the growth of nationality. Elevating standards of taste, the artists argued, would ultimately foster nationality by creating a market for articles of beauty and utility, including goods such as theirs, which like the product of the Ruskinian craftsman, promised renewal in the midst of degenerative modernity.¹³

In other words, they were antimodernists, their suspicion of so-called “progress” one of a number of responses that tied them to a more general fear in Western society from the end of the nineteenth century that the unprecedented social changes wrought by industrial capitalism — among them the shift to routinized work and bureaucratic rationality — were removing the possibility of “authentic” experience.¹⁴ Their other responses are definitional of antimodernism as well, which can be described according to Jackson Lears as “the recoil from an ‘overcivilized’ modern existence to more intense forms of physical or spiritual experience.”¹⁵ Key among them, as Canadians schooled in the story of the Group of Seven can guess, was the fiction of the authentic Canadian painter as a pre-modern man seeking, in the imagined pre-modern environment of the “Canadian wilderness,” the physical and emotional intensity identified with “authentic” experience.

Derived from the artists’ sketching trips, which actually began in 1914 with their first joint excursion north of Toronto to Algonquin Provincial Park (figure 1), the figure of the Canadian artist was invariably described as that of a prospector, bushwhacker, woodsman or child. To journalist Peter Donovan, writing in Toronto-based *Saturday Night* in 1916, “the coming Canadian artist” was “a husky beggar” who “puts on a pair of Strathcona boots, rolls up his blanket and beans enough to last three months, takes a rifle and paddle, and hikes for the northern woods”; to Toronto journalist Fred Housser, writing his “biography” of the Group ten years later, he was a “new type of artist,” who “divests himself of the velvet coat and flowing tie of his caste, puts on the outfit of the bushwhacker and prospector; closes with his environment; paddles, portages and makes camp; sleeps in the out-of-doors under the stars; climbs mountains with his sketch box on his back;” while to Arthur Lismer, speaking of the “natural and spontaneous impudence of the Canadian type” in his 1926 address to the Canadian Club

Figure 1

Insert Figure 1 here
Crop white area
Align with text margins
Use actual size

in Toronto, he was an artist who loved “to stick his tongue out at tradition and go gaily on his own livelier road through his own native bush instead of following the shady, flower strewn ways of older countries. ...”¹⁶ In every case, he stood outside the constraints of civilization, whether socially (in the guise of the prospector, bushwhacker or woodsman) or developmentally (in the figure of Lismer’s impudent child), the landscape surrounding him conceptualized in developmental terms as well, both in youthful opposition to so-called “older,” cultivated lands and, as Lismer would have it in almost the same breath, as a landscape with a past itself—a “boundless background of lake and stream, forest and prairie, mountain and coast, each with precious memories of pioneer, explorer and prospector.”¹⁷

He can also be associated with what Patricia Jasen has recently identified as the wild man of Toronto’s recreational hinterland, the product of the urban, middle-class, wilderness holiday that grew in popularity from the end of the nineteenth century in Ontario along with the province’s cities and “fears of about of effects of overwork and ‘overcivilization’ on personal and racial health.”¹⁸ To begin with, the painters identified with “the Canadian artist” began the sketching program that would eventually take them across Canada and to the Arctic with a number of short trips by rail to camp in this tourist area, which comprised Georgian Bay, Muskoka and Algonquin Park (figure 2). In doing so, they participated in a journey much touted by contemporary advocates and advertisers of the area. Jasen has

Figure 2

Insert Figure 2 here
Crop white area
Reduce by 8%
Align with text margins

mapped it in a survey of contemporary tourist literature and travel accounts as “a journey inwards to discover the primitive self, and back to a time when ‘the race’ as a whole was more vigorous, more self-reliant, more alive to its place in nature.”¹⁹ Once there, urbanites searching for the wild man within found him in the “natural,” “authentic,” “real” experience offered in the intimate wilderness encounter promoted in tourist literature of the period as

“typically Canadian.”²⁰ Not surprisingly, of the possibilities that existed for such an encounter, the artists were identified with the most rigorous, the camping and canoeing trip associated at the time with the male domain, in contrast to the cottage or resort vacation normally identified with the family (figure 3).²¹

What distinguished them from the urban middle-class tourist was the product of this encounter — small, 8 x 10 inch oil sketches (see, for example, figure 4). Jackson described them as “hard won impressions of places where the going was tough,” casting them in terms familiar to vitalist antimodernists who equated strenuous physical activity with authentic emotional response.²² Of course, his comments were also in keeping with the avant-garde theory inherited by the artists along with the tepid Post-impressionism that characterized their landscape paintings by 1920. According to this thinking, originality was the defining quality of the work of art. It made itself felt in distinctive pictorial effects which were seen as the product of the creative impulses of the original, or authentic, artist. In this case, it was also understood that the formal qualities that seemingly registered these creative impulses simultaneously embodied the artists’ emotional response to the landscape. What has not been so clearly understood, however, is that in doing so, these formal qualities also invested the landscape in the sketches with characteristics associated at the time with “wilderness.”

To put it another way, it seems to me that what has not been stressed in discussion of the artists’ landscape paintings to date is the fact that landscape does not inherently possess character, it is invested with character. We cannot simply assert, as has been most recently, that “the rough wildness of the landscape, its raw, dramatic austerity, coupled with breathtaking colour and light spoke far more directly of Canada for these artists than anything to be found in the cities or settled areas.”²³ As Roderich Nash points out, although “wilderness has a deceptive concreteness at first glance ... [t]here is no specific material object that is wilderness.”²⁴ It is a concept or, in keeping with his discussion, part of a larger concept, in which civilization and over-civilization are mutually constitutive parts. As a term, Nash observes, it “designates a quality ... that produces a certain mood or feeling in a given individual and, as a consequence, may be assigned by that person to a specific place.”²⁵ Thus, the wilderness in the artists’ paintings, through its inextricable relationship to the formal, pictorial effects of post-impressionism, not only embodied the artists’ response to the landscape, but was also the object of emotion itself, and thus was capable of stimulating a response from the viewer that, although triggered by pictorial effects, was seen to be an emotional reaction to the landscape depicted. At a time when middle-class Ontarians identified wilderness with an essential Canadianism, then, the artists located the national feeling it stimulated firmly in the formal qualities of their work. In fact, as early as 1911, in his review of an Arts and Letters Club exhibition in Toronto of oil sketches by future Group

Figure 3

Insert Figure 3 here
Crop white area
Reduce by 8%
Align with text margins

member J.E.H. MacDonald, fellow artist C.W. Jefferys argued that “so deep and compelling has been the native inspiration that it has, to a very great extent, found through him, a method of expression in paint as native and original as itself.” MacDonald’s art was “native,” Jefferys insisted, “as native as the rocks or the snow, or pine trees, or the lumber drives that are so largely his themes.”²⁶

Figure 4

Insert Figure 4 here
Crop white area
Align with text margins
Use actual size

At the same time, Dennis Reid has pointed out that the definitional framework Jefferys presented for a national style of painting was probably a response to a review of an exhibition of Canadian art held the year before at the Walker Art Gallery in Liverpool (figure 5).²⁷ The writer in Liverpool, a reviewer for the *Morning Post*, had felt that although “observation of physical fact” in the Canadian works was strong, “the more immutable essence of each scene is crushed out by foreign-begotten technique.”²⁸ If Jefferys was responding to this review, as he clearly seems to have been, then reviews of this 1910 show were used in relation to the Group’s work first by Jefferys, almost a decade before the actual formation of the Group in 1920, and then by Jackson and by Housser, the latter in 1926 in his influential book, *A Canadian Art Movement: The Story of the Group of Seven*.²⁹ Hill points out, as a way of following suit in his recent catalogue, that Housser actually “begins the story” of the Group of Seven with the 1910 Liverpool exhibition, which consisted of works selected by the Royal

Figure 5

Insert Figure 5 here
Crop white area
Reduce by 5.5%
Align with text margins

Canadian Academy we are told, as though to set the stage for Hill's tale of the Group as an anti-academic avant-garde.³⁰ However, Hill prefaces the *Morning Post* review Housser used with a quotation from a review in the *Art Chronicle* that, like many of the almost 40 reviews of the show, situates the art firmly within a colony-to-nation narrative. "Canadian painting has not yet grown beyond the assimilative stage of youth," it reads, "its painters still look to Europe for initiative, its students go to London and Paris for the training and the inspiring associations that the artist-life of the Old World alone can provide. The sapling, however, is a vigorous one," the text continues, "and all that is now being grafted on it will in due season bear rich fruit."³¹

It is appropriate commentary, particularly given what Hill does not tell us, that the works in the 1910 exhibition were originally selected under the auspices of the Royal Canadian Academy only because they were intended as part of a Canadian display in an international exhibition, in this case significantly, an imperial exhibition called the "Festival of Empire," which would have been held in London had not the death of King Edward caused its postponement for a year.³² Setting aside the ensuing 1911 exhibition, which celebrated imperial solidarity along with the coronation of King George V, the next and, as it turned out, last of the large imperial exhibitions was the 1924-25 "British Empire Exhibition" at Wembley, the show that marked "the almost unanimous" praise of the British press for the work of the Group of Seven, and with it, what the National Gallery saw as approval of both its unstinting support of the artists for the decade or so prior to the

show and, connected with this support, its battle to control the selection process for international exhibitions of Canadian art (figure 6).³³ In other words, what these shows make abundantly clear is the fact that progress in art in Canada at the time was tied in a concrete way to its evaluation in an imperial context. In this sense, it is not surprising that the Group responded to a definitional framework for Canadian art suggested in reviews of the 1910 show. Jackson saw the relationship between the two as pivotal; his reference to reviews of the 1910 exhibition, which he made in a 1925 talk to the Empire Club in Toronto, included a corresponding reference to a favourable review of the Wembley show as evidence of the Group's triumphant emergence as a "national" school of art.³⁴

Simply put, the colony-to-nation narrative championed by the Group and its supporters reveals their essentially British Canadianism, a British Canadianism that in its appearance of inclusiveness — in its claim to speak for the country as a whole — is characteristic of what can be more precisely defined as Ontario regionalism.³⁵ This is significant because this regional ideology was institutionalized in the second and third decades of the century through the Group's close association with authoritative cultural institutions ranging from the Art Gallery of Toronto to the National Gallery, and National Museum of Canada, which, like other cultural institutions with "national" mandates, were instrumental in legitimating the cultural authority of this regional identity on a national scale.³⁶ Of course, part of the institutionalization of Ontario's British Canadianism involved the definition and subordination of what became in the process other, mutually constitutive identities, a project undertaken to some degree by the Group in conjunction with these institutions in the mid 1920s. This was done in a gallery context for the first time in an exhibition of what was called "Art in French Canada," a display of paintings, woodcarvings and rural Quebec homespuns, which was held alongside the 1926 "Group of Seven Exhibition" at the Art Gallery of Toronto (figure 7), and in the 1927 "Exhibition of Canadian West Coast Art, Native and Modern," which toured from the National Gallery in Ottawa to Toronto and Montreal as a show combining North American Aboriginal work with paintings and sculptures by Euro-Canadian artists, prominent among them, of course, members of the Group of Seven (figures 8 and 9).³⁷

Although celebrated in the recent Group of Seven exhibition as evidence of an expanding definition of national culture in the 1920s, one that provided "a new lineage" for the Group of Seven,³⁸ the exhibitions can be seen more critically as a way of reformulating and naturalizing this regional ideology as a cultural hierarchy with clear ethnic, gender and class divisions, and with the Group of Seven firmly at the top. We have only to recognize the way in which such exhibitions worked to exclude certain groups from consideration as equal participants in "modern" life by representing them as peoples "of the past" — as people existing outside the historical present in that indeterminate time we call "the traditional." We

Figure 6

Insert Figure 6 here
Crop white area
Reduce by 5.5%
Align with text margins

have only to realize that the people represented through the work in the exhibitions were not, as was suggested at the time, Primitives and Folk vanishing in the face of Western civilization and “the march of progress.” They were members of the contemporary Native cultures of the Pacific Northwest and the lower-class, rural populations of the lower St. Lawrence valley — the French-speaking *habitant* of Isle d’Orléans and the north shore of the St. Lawrence river — that were being cast as the pre-modern ancestors of so-called “modern” Canadian culture.³⁹ Classified by elite aesthetic opinion as producers of Folk art, Native art, fine art or craft, they were effectively institutionalized, the social relations defined in the exhibitions played out in turn in the modern museum complex. This was, after all, the moment in which the Art Gallery of Toronto, the National Gallery and the National Museum were taking shape as modern corporate structures, the moment in which, as Kathleen McCarthy points out, such “urban repositories replaced the informality of market mechanisms with a more coordinated approach, gathering cultural capital from all corners of the community, sifting it, systematizing it, categorizing it, and making it available to the public in new ways.”⁴⁰

As well, such cultural hierarchies have more immediate social, political and economic implications for those within them. This becomes clear, of course, the moment we introduce a discussion of what Johannes Fabian calls the “chronopolitics” of colonial expansion, the ways in which concepts of time have been harnessed by some to situate Others outside an

Figure 7

Insert Figure 7 here
Crop white area
Use actual size
Centre with text margins

advancing world order and, in so doing, to justify their subordination to colonial rule.⁴¹ It illuminates the nature of the relationship between museums, as part of the intellectual apparatus of the modern state, and government policies and legislation dealing with the social, economic and political life of what was, in this case, an emergent nation. In the light of his observations, for instance, it is possible to argue that such exhibitions as

Figure 8

Insert Figure 8 here
Crop white area
Use actual size
Centre with text margins

those discussed, which apparently operated only within the politically neutral realm of aesthetics, actually served on another level to reinforce and to naturalize social relations that in turn facilitated government legislation designed to maintain them. This is evident in examination of the seemingly benevolent state paternalism behind federal government policies in the 1920s to create a tourist market for the “French-Canadian homespun

Figure 9

Insert Figure 9 here
Crop white area
Reduce by 28.5%
Align with text margins

industry” (figure 10).⁴² It is nowhere more apparent, however, than in the policies and programs of coercive tutelage designed by the federal government in the early twentieth century to “save” the Aboriginal population of Canada by ridding it of its Aboriginality. They were part of the process of aggressive assimilation implemented by the Department of Indian Affairs and by Euro-Canadian institutions in the areas of Aboriginal culture, education, religion and land use. In fact, in 1927, as the Department of Indian Affairs faced increasingly organized efforts on the part of Aboriginal groups in Canada to secure rights, lands and resources, the National Gallery of Canada not only held “The Exhibition of Canadian West Coast Art, Native and Modern,” but the federal government also passed an amendment to the Indian Act effectively prohibiting claim-related activity among the Aboriginal population of Canada.⁴³

All this, of course, would seem to run counter to the all-embracing aestheticism that characterized so much of the Group’s polemic — a polemic that advocated the reintroduction of aesthetic appreciation to modern life as the key to social harmony. But, in fact, it does not; the democratization of aesthetic expression advocated in the Group’s stance couched a clearly defined set of social relations that legitimated, even facilitated, their easy existence elsewhere. And what the Group promoted in this regard was the status quo; for in seeing renewed joy in aesthetic expression as a way of quenching social unrest, the artists moved away from any real critique of the social conditions of modern production to a position of ambivalence. Like so many antimodernists both in Europe and on this

Figure 10

Insert Figure 10 here
Crop white area
Use actual size
Centre with text margins

side of the Atlantic, the artists were essentially accommodationist, preserving what has been described as “an eloquent edge of protest”⁴⁴ in what was otherwise a deep-seated belief in “progress.” Theirs was a modernizing antimodernism that sought both social and industrial progress in a return to the imagined state of aesthetic consciousness that had been lost with over-civilization.⁴⁵ Theirs was a desire to elevate public taste, and thus create a market for the work of the “authentic” Canadian artist. In the end, as a result, theirs was a polemic that sought to rally the aesthetic appreciation of society as a whole in the cause of elite aesthetic expression. Theirs was not a populist position. On the contrary, by working with museums in 1920s to institutionalize this exclusive aesthetic opinion, they helped reformulate the cultural authority of the Anglo-Canadian elite.

Notes

1. Family letter in possession of Dr. Naomi Jackson Groves, Ottawa. I am grateful to David McTavish both for bringing the existence of this letter to my attention and for sharing his research notes on it.
2. Quoted in Dennis Reid, *Le Groupe des Sept/The Group of Seven* (National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa, 1970), p. 34, from notes prepared by Dr. Naomi Jackson Groves from family letters in her possession. Jackson made the comment during his first visit to the region, which he spent vacationing with relatives.

3. Celebrating the seventy-fifth anniversary of the first Group of Seven exhibition in 1920, "The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation" opened in October 1995 at the National Gallery of Canada in Ottawa and subsequently toured to the Art Gallery of Ontario in Toronto, the Vancouver Art Gallery and the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts, where it closed in December 1996. A 375-page catalogue of the same title was prepared by curator of Canadian art, Charles Hill, and published by the Gallery in collaboration with McClelland & Stewart Inc.
4. "The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation," "Academicians" wall text. See also Hill, *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*, pp. 134-51. For further discussion of how the exhibition as a whole is designed to identify the National Gallery of Canada with the Group of Seven, see Lynda Jessup, "Art for a Nation?" *Fuse*, vol. 19, Summer 1996, pp. 11-14. The National Gallery of Canada also held a major exhibition in 1970 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Group's first show, the catalogue — Reid's *Le Groupe des Sept/The Group of Seven* — constituting another of what are now three scholarly histories of the Group of Seven. Aside from the 1995 exhibition, the most recent attempt both to associate the National Gallery with the Group and to valorize that stance is Charles Hill, "The National Gallery, A National Art, Critical Judgement and the State," in Michael Toobey (ed.), *The True North: Canadian Landscape Painting, 1896-1939* (Lund Humphries with the Barbican Art Gallery, 1992), pp. 65-83.
5. Established in 1880 with the formation of the Royal Canadian Academy, the National Gallery of Canada was effectively incorporated under its own Board of Directors by an act of Parliament in 1913. This followed the appointment of a full-time curator in 1910, and the establishment in 1907 of both an Advisory Arts Council and regular government appropriations to purchase works of art. The Art Museum of Toronto (now Art Gallery of Ontario) and Toronto's Royal Ontario Museum were organized in similar fashion during the first two decades of the century. See Jean Sutherland Boggs, *The National Gallery of Canada* (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1971), pp. 6-17; Lovat Dickson, *The Museum Makers: The Story of the Royal Ontario Museum* (Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto, 1986), and Karen McKenzie and Larry Pfaff, "The Art Gallery of Ontario: Sixty Years of Exhibitions, 1906-1966," *RACAR*, vol. 7, 1980, pp. 62-5. For discussion of the professionalization and corporatization of the American museum world during this period see Kathleen McCarthy, *Woman's Culture: American Philanthropy and Art, 1830-1930* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991), pp. 111-16.
6. "Introduction: All That is Solid Melts into Air," in Ian McKay (ed.), *The Challenge of Modernity: A Reader on Post-Confederation Canada* (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 1992), p. x. In fact, processes of industrial development that occurred over longer periods in Britain and the United States were telescoped in Canada from the 1890s through the early decades of the twentieth century (see Reg Whitaker, "Images of the State in Canada," in Leo Panitch (ed.), *The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power* (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1977), p. 53.
7. Perhaps the best indication of the nationalistic imperative underpinning studies of the artists' work are the titles of the most recent exhibitions and catalogues to deal with, or to prominently feature, paintings by Group of Seven members. In addition to *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*, which calls up a nationalistic frame of reference, are "Oh! Canada" (the 1996 Art Gallery of Ontario exhibition held in conjunction with the Toronto run of "Art for a Nation"), Michael Toobey, ed., *Our Home and Native Land: Canada's Sheffield Artists* (Mappin Art Gallery, Sheffield, 1991), a group of career studies including discussion of Arthur Lismer's

and Frederick Varley's early training in Sheffield, and *The True North: Canadian Landscape Painting 1896-1939*, all of which depend for their impact on the fact that they are drawn from the Canadian national anthem.

To construct a brief genealogy of the use of the phrase "distinctively Canadian" in connection to the work of the Group of Seven, see Arthur Lismer, *A Short History of Painting with a Note on Canadian Art* ([Andrew Bros.] Toronto, 1926), p. 31, who relates the Group's ideals to "the development of a distinctive type of painting in Canada"; Frederick Housser, *A Canadian Art Movement: The Story of the Group of Seven* (MacMillan Company, Toronto, 1926), p. 24, who states that the "Canadian movement is distinctly a Canadian phenomenon"; Eric Brown, "Canada's National Painters," *The Studio*, vol. 103, June 1932, p. 311, who, as director of the National Gallery, posits the Group of Seven as the source of "a robust school of painting in a style that is distinctively national"; Reid, *Le Groupe des Sept/The Group of Seven*, p. 10, who credits Lismer with the phrase, "distinctively Canadian"; Charles Hill, "The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation," introductory panel, and *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*, p. 30, where he credits the artists with fostering "a distinctive Canadian expression in painting, design, and manufacturing." See also *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*, passim, where Hill refers essentialistically throughout to the development of "Canadian art" as something different from art in Canada.

8. Although William Colgate, *Canadian Art: Its Origin & Development* (Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1967), p. 82, states that Lawren Harris wrote the foreword to the catalogue of the first Group show, the ideas expressed in it are those of the other main proselytizers of the "gospel" of the Group of Seven: J.E.H. MacDonald, Arthur Lismer and A.Y. Jackson (see *Group of 7 Exhibition of Paintings* [Art Museum of Toronto, Toronto, 1920]). In fact, the foreword, which acted as the first collective statement of the Group's position, is more an amalgamation of ideas expressed in print by these men — often using their words, their phrases and the structures of their arguments — than it is the product of one author. Of the artists' early writings see, in particular, J.E.H. MacDonald, "Art and Our Friend in Flanders," *The Rebel*, vol. 2, February 1918, pp. 182-6; "Art Crushed to the Earth," *The Rebel*, vol. 2, January 1918, pp. 150-3; "A Whack at Dutch Art," *The Rebel*, vol. 2, March 1918, pp. 256-60; Arthur Lismer, "Art and the Average Canadian," *Canadian Courier*, vol. 24, 1 February 1919, p. 13; "Art Education and Art Appreciation," *The Rebel*, vol. 4, February 1920, pp. 208-11; and A.Y. Jackson, "The Vital Necessity of the Fine Arts," *Canadian Courier*, vol. 24, 30 August 1919, p. 7; "A Policy for Art Galleries," *Canadian Forum*, vol. 2, June 1922, pp. 660-2; [Ajax] "Dutch Art in Canada: The Last Chapter," *The Rebel*, vol. 4, November 1919, pp. 65-6; [Smoke Lake] "Figure Versus Landscape," *The Rebel*, vol. 3, January 1919, pp. 158-9. See also Lawren Harris, "The Federal Art Commission," *Toronto Globe*, 4 June 1914, p. 6. For a full discussion of the relationship between the artists' early writings and the polemic developed in the Group's exhibition catalogues, see Lynda Jessup, "Canadian Artists, Railways, the State and 'the Business of Becoming a Nation'" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1992), pp. 15-98.
9. "Art and the Average Canadian," *Canadian Courier*, vol. 24, 1 February 1919, p. 13.
10. National Archives of Canada (hereafter NAC), J.E.H. MacDonald Papers, MG30 DIII, vol. 1, file: A.Y. Jackson – Miscellaneous 1900 – [1919], "Buckeyes," typescript of unpublished essay [c. 1919]. The original capitalization has been

retained. See also Jessup, "Canadian Artists, Railways, the State and 'the Business of Becoming a Nation,'" pp. 14-22.

11. Jackson, "The Vital Necessity of the Fine Arts."
12. Jackson, "The Vital Necessity of the Fine Arts."
13. Jessup, "Canadian Artists, Railways, the State and 'the Business of Becoming a Nation,'" pp. 14-22. For a discussion of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century arts and crafts ideology in the north-eastern United States, see T.J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983), pp. 59-96.
14. See Lears, pp. xi-xx; Ian McKay, *The Quest for the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-century Nova Scotia* (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal & Kingston, 1994), pp. 30-1.
15. Lears, p. xv.
16. Peter Donovan, "Arting Among the Artists," *Saturday Night*, vol. 29, 8 April 1916, p. 5, quoted in Hill, *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*, p. 52; Housser, p. 15; NAC, Arthur Lismer Papers, MG30 D184, vol. 1, file: "Canadian Art," "Lecture in Toronto to the Canadian Club, Dec. 13 1926."
17. NAC, Arthur Lismer Papers, vol. 1, file: "Canadian Art," "Lecture in Toronto to the Canadian Club, Dec. 13 1926."
18. Patricia Jasen, *Wild Things: Nature, Culture, and Tourism in Ontario, 1790-1914* (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1995), p. 105.
19. Jason, p. 132. See also Carl Berger, "The True North Strong and Free," in J.M. Bumstead (ed.), *Interpreting Canada's Past*, vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1986), pp. 157-74.
20. Grand Trunk Railway, *Temagami: A Peerless Region for Sportsman, Canoeist, and Camper*, 1905; Jasen, pp. 105-32; Lynda Jessup, "Wilderness Imagery in Canadian Advertising and Its Impact on Canadian Painters, 1890-1914" (Phil.M. final paper, University of Toronto, 1983). See also Douglas Cole, "Artists, Patrons and Public: An Enquiry into the Success of the Group of Seven," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, vol. 13, Summer 1978, pp. 69-78; Robert Stacey, "The Myth — and Truth — of the True North," in Michael Toobey (ed.), *The True North*, pp. 37-63.
21. For discussion of these vacation types see Jasen, p. 111. Jasen also points out that the idea of a child-like return to nature was an important part of this wilderness experience as well. For discussion of the Group of Seven in the context of the "post-colonial wilderness," see Jonathan Bordo, "Jack Pine — Wilderness Sublime or the Erasure of Aboriginal Presence from the Landscape," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Winter 1992-93, 98-128; "The Terra Nullius of Wilderness — Colonialist Landscape Art (Canada & Australia) and the So-called Claim to American Exception," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 15, Spring 1997, 13-36, and Matthew Teitelbaum, "Sighting the Single Tree, Sighting the New Found Land," in *Eye of Nature* (Banff: Walter Phillips Gallery, 1991), pp. 71-88.
22. Art Gallery of Ontario Library, "The Tom Thomson Film, December 1943," typescript of address by Jackson on the occasion of the first showing in Toronto of the Tom Thomson film, *West Wind*, p. 3, quoted in Reid, p. 11; Lears, xii, 142-9.
23. Hill, *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*, p. 23.
24. *Wilderness and the American Mind*, 3rd ed. (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982), p. 1.
25. Nash, p. 1.

26. "MacDonald Sketches," *The Lamps*, vol. 1, June 1912, p. 12.
27. Reid, p. 29, n. 11.
28. NAC, Papers of the Royal Canadian Academy of Arts, MG28 I 126, vol. 14, file: "Scrapbook, Newspaper Clippings (1880-1915)," "Royal Canadian Academy Exhibition at Liverpool," 4 July 1910.
29. Housser, p. 11.
30. Hill, *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*, p. 19.
31. 30 July 1910, quoted in Hill, *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*, p. 19. For newspaper accounts of the show, including the *Art Chronicle* review, "Canadian Art at Liverpool," see NAC, Papers of the Royal Canadian Academy of Arts, vol. 14, file: "Scrapbook, Newspaper Clippings (1880-1915)."
32. NAC, Papers of the Royal Canadian Academy of Arts, vol. 14, file: "Scrapbook, Newspaper Clippings (1880-1915)"; John E. Findling (ed.), *Historical Dictionary of World's Fairs and Expositions, 1851-1988* (Greenwood Press, New York, 1990), pp. 215-16.
33. Discussion of the British imperial exhibitions is provided in Findling; the characterization of the British press response by Hill, "The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation," "1922" wall text. The degree to which the National Gallery of Canada identified itself with the Group of Seven and sought public vindication of its position in relation to the artists is reflected, for example, in the fact that the Gallery actually published two books containing reprints of favourable reviews of the show, the 1924 *Press Comments on the Canadian Section of Fine Arts, British Empire Exhibition*, and the 1925 *Press Comments on the Canadian Section of Fine Arts, British Empire Exhibition 1924-25*. This valorization of the Gallery's actions has been sustained by the publication of the Gallery's two celebratory histories of the Group of Seven: Reid, *Le Groupe des Sept/The Group of Seven*, and Hill, *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*, who also takes up the Gallery's case in the text. The extensive press coverage in Canada of the controversy surrounding the selection process for Wembley is documented in NAC, Papers of the Royal Canadian Academy, "Scrapbook, Newspaper Clippings (1880-1915)."
34. The talk was reported widely in the Toronto press. Among the accounts, two described Jackson's references to the exhibitions specifically, "If Cow Can Stay in Parlor Then Why Can't Bull Moose?," *Toronto Star*, 26 February 1925, p. 29, and "Advice to Group of Seven: Paint the Paintless Barn," *Toronto Telegram*, 27 February 1925. See also "Two Views of Canadian Art: Addresses by Mr. Wyly Greer, R.C.A., O.C.A. and A.Y. Jackson, R.C.A., O.C.A.," in *Empire Club of Canada: Addresses Delivered to the Members during the Year 1925* (Macomb Press, Toronto, 1926), pp. 105-13; "Blazing Trails in Art: The Modern Canadian Artists' Point of View," *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 March 1926.
35. McKay, "Introduction: All that Is Solid Melts into Air," xviii-xxi. See also L.D. McCann, "Heartland and Hinterland: A Framework for Regional Analysis" and Iain Wallace, "The Canadian Shield: The Development of a Resource Frontier," in L.D. McCann (ed.), *Heartland and Hinterland: A Geography of Canada*, 2nd ed. (Prentice-Hall Canada, Scarborough, 1987), pp. 22-33, 443-44, respectively.
36. The artists', and the Group's, various relationships with these authoritative cultural institutions are well documented, intimate, and too numerous to mention here. The nature of the relationship between them is suggested, however, by the National Gallery's strident support of the artists, and by the fact that the Group held all six of its flagship exhibitions in the 1920s at the Art Gallery of Toronto (now the Art Gallery of Ontario). These exhibitions (held in 1920, 1921, 1922, 1925, 1926, 1928) have been recreated in part as the basis of the recent exhibition,

- “The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation.” The artists’ many connections with these institutions, and others, are documented in Hill, *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*.
37. A catalogue was published in each case. See *Exhibitions of the Group of 7 & Art in French Canada* (Art Gallery of Toronto, Toronto, 1926), which comprises the catalogues of both the “Exhibition of the Group of Seven,” pp. 2-6, and the “Exhibition of Paintings, Sculpture and Wood Carvings of French Canada,” pp. 7-12; and *Exhibition of Canadian West Coast Art, Native and Modern* (National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa, 1927). For discussion of the exhibitions and the artists’ involvement see Jessup, “Canadian Artists, Railways, the State and ‘the Business of Becoming a Nation,’” pp. 35-98.
 38. “The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation,” “1926 and 1928” wall text. See also Hill, *The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation*, pp. 32, 176-93.
 39. Jessup, “Canadian Artists, Railways, the State and ‘the Business of Becoming a Nation,’” pp. 35-98. For discussion of the ways in which the Other is set outside historical time see James Clifford, “On Ethnographic Allegory,” in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1986), pp. 98-121; James Clifford, Virginia Dominguez, Trinh T. Mihn-Ha, Discussion Group, “Of Other Peoples: Beyond the Salvage Paradigm,” in *Discussions in Contemporary Culture*, no. 1, ed. Hal Foster, Dia Art Foundation (Bay Press, Seattle, 1987), pp. 121-50; James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature and Art* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1988), pp. 189-214, 215-251.
 40. McCarthy, p. 113.
 41. Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1983).
 42. See, for example, Henri Turcot, *The French-Canadian Homespun Industry* (Department of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa, 1928).
 43. For discussion of public policy in Canada as it has affected Native peoples, see Noel Dyck and James B. Waldram, “Anthropology, Public Policy and Native Peoples: An Introduction to the Issues,” in Noel Dyck and James B. Waldram (eds.), *Anthropology, Public Policy, and Native Peoples in Canada* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal & Kingston, 1993), pp. 3-38; E. Brian Titley, *A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada* (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1986); Paul Tennant, *Aboriginal People and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989* (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1990); Chief Joe Mathais and Gary R. Yabsley, “Conspiracy of Legislation: The Suppression of Indian Rights in Canada,” and Shirley Joseph, “Assimilation Tools: Then and Now,” in Doreen Jensen and Cheryl Brooks (eds.), *In Celebration of Our Survival: The First Nations of British Columbia* (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1991), pp. 34-45, 65-79, respectively.
 44. Lears, p. xii.
 45. For discussion of what he describes as the “ambivalence” evidenced in much American antimodernism during this period, see Lears. For reconceptualization of this notion of ambivalence as a “modernizing antimodernism” with clear political, social and economic implications, see McKay, *Quest for the Folk*.

Illustrations

Figure 1.

Algonquin Park, October 1914. From left, Tom Thomson, Frederick Varley, A.Y. Jackson, Arthur Lismer, Marjorie Lismer and Esther Lismer. (Photo: National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa.)

Figure 2.

Detail of map published in *The Province of Ontario*, Province of Ontario, Department of Agriculture, 1913, showing railroad lines from Toronto to Georgian Bay, the Muskoka District and Algonquin Park. (Photo: author.)

Figure 3.

Canadian Pacific Railway, *Muskoka Lakes and Georgian Bay*, 1909. (Photo: author.)

Figure 4.

J.E.H. MacDonald, *Batchewana Wood, Algoma*, n.d., oil on board, 21.6 x 26.7 cm, Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto. (Photo: Art Gallery of Ontario, Toronto.)

Figure 5.

Installation photograph, Canadian art exhibition, Walker Art Gallery, Liverpool, 1910. (Photo: National Archives of Canada, Ottawa.)

Figure 6.

Installation photograph, Canadian Section of Fine Arts, British Empire Exhibition, Wembley Park, London, 1924. (Photo: National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa.)

Figure 7.

Catalogue cover, *Exhibitions of the Group of 7 & Art in French Canada*, Art Gallery of Toronto, 1926. Designer: Thoreau MacDonald. (Photo: Toronto Reference Library, Toronto.)

Figure 8.

Catalogue cover, *Exhibition of Canadian West Coast Art, Native and Modern*, National Gallery of Canada, 1927. Designer: Emily Carr. (Photo: National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa.)

Figure 9.

Installation photograph, Exhibition of Canadian West Coast Art, Native and Modern, National Gallery of Canada, 1927. (Photo: National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa.)

Figure 10.

“Workroom, Old French-Canadian Home, as shown at Exhibition, Quebec, 1924,” reproduced in Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, *The French-Canadian Homespun Industry*, 1928, p. 18. (Photo: author.)

Opent Topic Article
Article hors-thème

John Harles

Multiculturalism, National Identity, and National Integration: The Canadian Case

Abstract

As a strategy of ethnic inclusion and a focus for national identity, in Canada multiculturalism is built on the premise that national integration is possible, even preferable, without assimilation. The present paper considers whether multiculturalism can bear the weight of this integrative task. The argument will be that multiculturalism is an insufficient, though in the Canadian context an understandable, substitute for a strong sense of Canadian nationhood. If Canada is to find a consolidating identity, one that would fix the boundaries of a distinctly Canadian community by specifying the values of its members, norms which Canadians would be expected to assimilate, a civic variety of nationalism may be the most promising alternative. Yet now as ever, the disposition of Quebec hangs over any discussion of Canadian integration.

Résumé

À titre de stratégie d'inclusion ethnique et de point de concentration de l'identité nationale canadienne, le multiculturalisme se fonde sur la prémisse que l'intégration nationale est possible, et même préférable, sans l'assimilation. L'auteur de cet article soutient que le multiculturalisme est un substitut insuffisant, quoique compréhensible dans le contexte canadien, d'un sens profond de la nationalité canadienne. Si le Canada doit trouver une identité consolidatrice, une identité qui solidifierait les frontières d'une communauté canadienne distincte en précisant les valeurs que partagent ses membres, la solution de rechange la plus prometteuse pourrait être l'instauration de normes dont on s'attendrait à ce que les Canadiens les assimilent, une variante civique du nationalisme en quelque sorte. Cependant, maintenant comme jamais, la question de l'avenir du Québec continue à peser sur toute discussion de l'intégration canadienne.

Integration is not synonymous with assimilation. Assimilation implies almost total absorption into another linguistic and cultural group. An assimilated individual gives up his cultural identity, and may even go so far as to change his name. Both integration and assimilation occur in Canada, and the individual must be free to choose whichever process suits him, but it seems to us that those of other than French or British origin clearly prefer integration.

Canadian society, open and modern, should be able to integrate heterogeneous elements into a harmonious system, to achieve "unity in diversity."¹

When the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB) included the foregoing observations in the fourth volume (1969) of its report on the nature of the Canadian polity, it voiced a perspective that had been influential in Ottawa for more than a generation — national integration was possible, even preferable, without assimilation.²

Two years later, on the inauguration of multiculturalism as an official policy of government, that assumption became part of the Canadian public ethos. As an integrative strategy, multiculturalism emerged out of a concern to coalesce, socially and politically, the ethnically diverse population introduced into Canada as consequence of twentieth-century — especially post-World War II — immigration. At its most basic level, the policy intended to make those immigrant-stock individuals of other than Anglo-Irish or French lineage feel that they, too, were an indispensable part of the Canadian political community. When Pierre Trudeau, building on the recommendations of the RCBB, introduced the official policy of multiculturalism to the Commons, his remarks reflected this unity in diversity theme:

We believe that cultural pluralism is the very essence of Canadian identity. Every ethnic group has the right to preserve and develop its own cultures and values within the Canadian context. ... A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians. ... National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes, and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence. It can form the base of a society which is based on fair play for all.³

A principled desire to reconstitute Canadian national identity was not first among the reasons why multiculturalism was advanced by the Trudeau government. Most immediately, the policy aimed at shoring up Liberal electoral support in Western Canada and urban Ontario. In that respect, official multiculturalism was driven by an elite accommodation mode of Canadian politics, a means of mollifying the leadership of certain ethnic groups — representatives of the Ukrainian community were particularly vocal — who rejected the “two nations” view of Canada, French and English, endorsed in the RCBB report. Subsequent grants to minority ethnic organizations, and the development of a bureaucratic structure designed to give ethnic groups a formal, consultative role in government policy-making, served to institutionalize cultural differences and solidify the electoral support of ethnic elites for the party in power. More controversially, Trudeau's endorsement of multiculturalism may also be interpreted as an attempt to reduce Quebec's appeal as a pole of political attraction rivalling Ottawa. On this reading, Trudeau intended the policy to counter the RCBB's emphasis on Canada as a bicultural state, thereby

relegating French-Canadians to the status of simply one ethnic group in Canada among many others. Beyond such calculations, however, Trudeau's enthusiasm for multiculturalism appears tepid.⁴

No matter. Over the last twenty-seven years, multiculturalism has become an explicit strategy of national consolidation in Canada. During that period, Canada's commitment to accommodate, celebrate and promote ethnic diversity has been constitutionally entrenched in section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) and reiterated and amplified in the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988. More than this, multiculturalism has been affirmed by the federal government and all provincial governments save one as a fundamental characteristic — perhaps *the* fundamental characteristic — of Canadian identity and an essential prop of the political order. The dominant view of multicultural policy has remained that it “should assist and encourage the integration (but not assimilation) of all immigrants.”⁵ As the federal Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and the Status of Women has warned:

We have too many examples of what can happen when we don't promote that Canadian mosaic which fundamentally says the world is here, we are all Canadians, and that the plurality, the multicultural, the cultural communities, the mix, is fundamental to Canada, and without an understanding of the complexities that that brings, this country will not be a united country. ... One can choose how one wants to live in this country and *there is no need to be assimilated. It is a matter of integration ...* (emphasis added).⁶

The present paper considers whether multiculturalism can bear the weight of this integrative task. The argument will be that multiculturalism is an insufficient, though in the Canadian context an understandable, substitute for a strong Canadian identity. If Canada is to find an integrative national identity, one that would fix the boundaries of a distinctly Canadian political community by specifying the common beliefs and values of its members, norms which Canadians would be expected to assimilate, a civic variety of nationalism may be the most promising alternative. On this approach, national identity is forged out of citizen participation in and commitment to the deliberative processes of democratic government. Yet even here there is reason for only the most guarded optimism. Now as ever, the disposition of Quebec hangs over any discussion of Canadian integration.

I

National integration is a fundamental task of any political system. The reason is clear: periodically the state requires its members to make sacrifices for the good of the whole. Absent a sense of collective destiny, individuals will find it difficult to subordinate private interest to public welfare. Military service is the most dramatic and the most elementary example of this general point. The decision to risk death in defense of the

community turns, in part, on whether an individual believes that community sufficiently expresses his or her own identity and interests and is worthy of protection. But the issue of sacrifice applies to more mundane matters as well — taxation, for instance. Not even the most doctrinaire capitalist will readily argue that the market can provide all desired public goods and services; the state must undertake some of the required functions that the market cannot or will not do. At the very least, provision must be made for domestic security, though in the modern era, the public catalog of services will be far more extensive. And all of these services must be funded in large measure by tax revenues collected from individuals whose remittances may be quite disproportional to the personal benefits they bring. Still, if the state is to fulfil its agenda, it must have the compliance of those who do not immediately profit from its assistance. Belief in a common national identity, and consequently an acceptance of mutual civic obligations, is one reason to forego current satisfactions for diffuse benefits. Indeed, from the viewpoint of individual citizens, membership in such an “imagined community” may offer emotional satisfaction, meeting a perceived need for social solidarity in modern, impersonal, market-driven societies.⁷ It is this sense of a shared political fate — Durkheim called it the “collective conscience” of a people⁸ — that from the perspective of the citizenry may be termed polity, and from the perspective of the state, national integration.

It is a common place among students of the Canadian political system that Canada is not a well-integrated and unified polity. Titles in the bibliography of Canadian political studies are indicative. Over the last few years they have included: *The Roots of Disunity*;⁹ *Mosaic Madness*;¹⁰ *Deconfederation*;¹¹ *The Unmaking of Canada*;¹² *Canada at Risk*;¹³ *Reimagining Canada*;¹⁴ and most directly, *The Collapse of Canada*?¹⁵

Scholarly assessments are equally forthright. Thus, Anthony Birch asserts that “the level of national integration in Canada ... may be lower than any other advanced democratic state.”¹⁶ Carolyn Tuohy observes that “Canadian ambivalence extends to the very legitimacy of the state itself and to the identification of the political community.”¹⁷ R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward remark that “this continuing ambivalence has perpetrated a set of conflicts about the essence of Canadianness that lies at the heart of the political system. Canadians divide between Anglophone and Francophone, old and new, immigrant and Aboriginal, partly because there is no common meeting ground, no agreement on what constitutes a Canadian.”¹⁸ And Charles Taylor maintains that, “[a] basic fact about Canada which we often have trouble accepting is that we are still far from achieving a universally agreed definition of our country as a political community. ...”¹⁹ Even the British news weekly, *The Economist*, weighs in with an appraisal: “It seems unlikely that Canada’s future is going to be a country with a strong national purpose. The glue that holds the place together is no more adhesive than

maple syrup, and there is little prospect of replacing it with something stickier.²⁰

It is often observed that a root cause of such difficulties is that Canada does not possess a unifying political nationalism, or, more precisely, that it is without the common beliefs and values, the collective political commitments, that would drive such a nationalism.²¹ Canada's problem in achieving a country-wide consensus on constitutional reform, despite five formal attempts to do so since 1960, may be symptomatic. In the judgment of James Tully, a "crisis of identification" is responsible, discrete cultural and regional constituencies being unable or unwilling to agree on a constitutional document that might bridge their particularisms.²² Consequently, the question of a consolidating political identity in Canada is regularly framed in terms of the need for a "pan-Canadian" nationalism, suggesting that to the extent national sentiment exists in Canada it does not predominantly accrue to the Canadian state.²³

If one searches in vain for comparable treatments of pan-French, pan-British, or pan-American nationalisms — indeed, in the United States, "pan-American" has continental connotations — the reason may be that these countries possess what Canada does not and perhaps cannot possess: national identities conceived largely in ethnic or ideological terms. With regard to matters of integration, the difference between these two ideal-types of nationhood is critical. On both accounts the bearers of a national identity will share geographic attachments and a common cache of historical memories. But in the instance of ideologically grounded identities, commitment to a particular system of political belief further delimits the political community. In such cases, common political values are not merely a necessary condition of a well-integrated polity but a sufficient one, membership in the political community being determined by them. Because this sort of identity is creedal, it is also essentially voluntaristic. Its acquisition is primarily a matter of individual civic commitment, though its content will extend beyond the mere assumption of citizenship. And this may be contrasted to those polities whose national identities are understood in terms of broader ethnic or cultural affinities — those based on belief in a common lineage, history, language, religious orientation or way of life. Here, the valuational and behavioral boundaries of the political community might include, but will not be limited to, shared ideological convictions. To the degree that national identity is expressed by way of ethnic and cultural homogeneity, membership in the political community will be a function of ascription as much as choice. At least, the acceptance of ethnic minorities as members of the polity in good-standing will require significant cultural transformation on their part.

The United States and Great Britain illustrate the distinction. American identity is ideologically centred. In the United States a Lockean liberal political creed, granting republican and populist overtones, is widely regarded as definitive of the national community.²⁴ Historically,

acceptance of that creed, with a few shameful exceptions, has enabled immigrant-stock individuals of varying cultural backgrounds to be fully received into the polity, in effect to become American in more than strictly a legal sense. In Britain, on the other hand, ideological conviction would not seem sufficient reason to bar one from the political community — when questioned about the legitimacy of the British Communist party, Churchill is reported to have replied that it was comprised of fellow Englishmen, people from whom there was nothing to fear — but lack of appropriate ethnic credentials might well do so. At least until late, it has been difficult to imagine that one could become British in more than a legal sense absent the relevant Anglo-Saxon or Celtic cultural characteristics (and possibly lineage).

Doubtless such distinctions are idealized. National self-conceptions are negotiated over time, and the difference between an ideological and ethnically-based identity is a matter of degree. In the early years of the republic, American identity was strongly ethnic in nature — Anglo-Saxon and Protestant, or at least northern European, in character. Only under the pressure of large numbers of immigrants who did not fit that mold, as well as the centripetal force of two world wars, did the American identity turn decisively in an ideological direction.²⁵ Similarly, it has been pointed out that traditionally British nationhood included a commitment to the principle of constitutionalism, and that a more precise and updated statement of the distinctive political values of the British polity might help to resolve the current crisis of British identity.²⁶ Still, the disparate emphases of the American and British political communities is suggested by the use of the ethnic hyphen. It is common to refer to German-Americans, Mexican-Americans, Chinese-Americans and so on because, in the United States, political identity can be divorced from cultural identity. One suspects that the hyphen is conspicuous by its absence in Britain because there cultural and political identity are more of a piece.

In the case of countries with relatively well-established national identities, students of politics commonly regard assimilation as the primary vehicle of congealing an ethnically diverse citizenry into a stable political whole. Among democratic theorists, John Stuart Mill provides the prototypical discussion. In *Considerations on Representative Government*, Mill maintains that individual nationalities — groups sharing a common lineage, language, religion or history — are inclined to demand self-government, a condition to which, on democratic principle, they are entitled. If for reasons of geography the creation of distinct national governments is not possible, Mill maintains, “[e]xperience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another. ... Whatever really tends to the admixture of nationalities, and the blending of their attributes and peculiarities in a common union is a benefit to the human race.”²⁷ Moreover, as “it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of free governments should coincide in the

main with those of nationalities,²⁸ Mill warns that the alternative to assimilation (a term he does not use) is susceptibility to despotism — a government of divide and rule in which antagonistic cultural groups are played off against one another and the power of the central authorities is thereby enhanced.

Contemporary scholars, often more solicitous of the rights of cultural minorities, do not so much advise assimilation as they observe and endorse its politically coalescent effect.²⁹ In the settler societies of the “New World,” where ethnic diversity is largely the result of voluntary migration rather than conquest or dynastic alliance, assimilation is considered an especially appropriate strategy of nation-building.³⁰ And as the United States is in aggregate the greatest of all immigrant receiving societies, it is not surprising that the integrative advantages of assimilation receive particular attention from students of American politics.³¹

The conventional manner of employing the term assimilation is simply to indicate conformity to the preexisting norms, political norms included, of a dominant social group. Accordingly, assimilation nears its endpoint when others come to identify most closely with the imperatives of that group, and when this contingent is willing to accept individuals who were not originally members as equal participants in group life.³² Yet the form that assimilation takes, and its implications for ethnic out-groups, will vary depending upon which understanding of nationhood — ethnic or ideological — prevails in a given polity. In countries whose national identities are culturally centred, provided that the principal ethnic group is amenable — and it may not be if it defines itself primarily in terms of race or lineage — assimilation will demand considerable sacrifice from ethnic minorities; not simply political ideas but more extensive cultural commitments are at issue. But in countries whose national identities are ideologically centred, assimilation as a political process may not require the loss of minority cultural distinctives, save for potentially dissonant ethnic political values.

That said, should a country lack a clear understanding of its national identity, be it culturally or ideologically grounded, it would seem to want for the ability to incorporate ethnic minorities, to furnish them with the shared commitments and common public culture which characterize a cohesive political community. On that reading, in a sense Canada may pursue integration without recourse to assimilation because it cannot do otherwise. In light of what is commonly considered the indeterminate nature of Canadian nationhood, assimilation in Canada is an implausible integrative strategy; conceptually there is little to assimilate to and no certain focus of political incorporation. To be sure, the policy of multiculturalism — and of integration without assimilation — was not adopted *because* of the long-standing debate over Canadian national identity. Yet its subsequent prominence in defining what it means to be Canadian must be seen in the context of that debate. Integrative national

identities are constructed across history, but in Canada history has worked against a single unifying and assimilative identity and ultimately in favour of multiculturalism.

II

The prospect of Canada building a national identity on culturally exclusive grounds is ruled out in the first instance by the nature of the relationship between its two founding European traditions. Originally, Canada was a culturally dualist country — one culture being Anglophone, Protestant and of British origin, the other, Francophone, Catholic and of French provenance. Notwithstanding the British government's pre-Confederation flirtations with the idea of assimilating the French, the cultural resilience of French Canada — cause and effect of early legal recognition from London, most famously via the Quebec Act of 1774 — as well as its geographic concentration in the province of Quebec has meant that, at a minimum, Canada has remained a bilingual polity — a status somewhat weakly acknowledged in the initial constitutional provisions of the British North America Act (1867), though presently entrenched through the Official Languages Act (1969) and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Nevertheless, as a focus for a comprehensive integrative national identity, something to which ethnic minorities might become assimilated, the dualist reading of confederation appears to be a non-starter. Dualism suggests that from its creation Canada was not to be an integrated national whole but at best an “equal partnership between the two founding races” — an approach, of course, that leaves indeterminate the status of Canada's Aboriginal peoples and immigrant “others.” Granted, as Ken McRoberts has argued, for the first hundred years of confederation, dualism may have been a viable formula for achieving a measure of political civility between the English and French Canadian solitudes. Even so, a history of conflict — e.g., the Riel/Northwest rebellions, the Manitoba and Ontario Schools controversies, the conscription crises during the two World Wars — suggests that the national partnership was marked as much by rivalry as harmony. Over the last generation, English-Canadian support for the idea of Canada as a contract between communities — *provincial* as opposed to *cultural* communities, in the Anglophone perspective — has been eroded by a more individualistic, rights-based and Ottawa-centred idea of the nation, in McRoberts' analysis, a legacy of the Trudeau government's national unity strategy.³³ And whereas the language of cultural compact continues to resonate with many French-Canadians who support a united Canada,³⁴ among Quebec Francophones, a pan-Canadian dualist approach to the political community has progressively lost ground to the view that the French-Canadian culture is to be nurtured and protected within the administrative structures of Quebec.³⁵ Related measures to make Quebec officially unilingual, as well as efforts by *indépendantistes* and federalists alike to secure special concessions for the province, are typically resented

elsewhere in Canada, as the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords may have indicated, where they are interpreted as evidence of divided political loyalty.³⁶

This points to a further difficulty with a dualist understanding of Canada: the two cultural communities have not been equally yoked. Things may not always have been this way. In the era when the dualist interpretation of Canada was unrivalled, in Anglophone Canada, immigrants and their progeny were encouraged to assimilate to what were regarded as Anglo-Saxon cultural and political standards.³⁷ So R.B. Bennett argued that Canada must “maintain our civilization at that high standard which has made the British civilization the test by which all other civilized nations in modern times are measured. ... We desire to assimilate those whom we bring to this country to that civilization ... rather than assimilate our civilization to theirs.”³⁸ Legally, too, Anglo-conformity was an implied Canadian norm. Until 1947, Canadian citizenship was defined essentially in terms of being a subject of the United Kingdom. And immigration policy, at least until the late 1940s, was designed in many respects to give precedence to immigrants with British credentials, the assumption being that individuals of other lineages were less assimilable.³⁹ Shortly after the end of the Second World War, Canada’s director of immigration, A.L. Joliffe, presented a confidential memorandum to the Cabinet which well-stated the prevailing orthodoxy:

The claim is sometimes made that Canada’s immigration laws reflect class and race discrimination: they do, and necessarily so. Some form of discrimination cannot be avoided if immigration is to be effectively controlled in order to prevent the creation in Canada of expanding non-assimilable racial groups, the prohibiting of entry to immigrants of non-assimilable races is necessary.⁴⁰

Given a perceived post-war need for immigrant labour as well as for population growth in the interest of an expanded consumer market — an outlook advanced by leading public officials and members of the business community alike — legal considerations of immigrant ethnicity gradually relaxed.⁴¹ Yet even of late, when asked their ethnicity, Canadians of British origin are more likely than respondents of any other ancestry to identify themselves simply as Canadian.⁴²

Despite a residue of affection for things British, Canada’s diminishing political and demographic connection to the United Kingdom means that English-Canada — more precisely, English-speaking Canada — can no longer be classified primarily in terms of a single cultural identity.⁴³ In the strictest sense, Francophone Canada is not ethnically homogeneous either. But by comparison, the French-speaking community bounded by Quebec appears far more culturally cohesive and politically confident than its Anglophone counterpart in the rest of Canada.

Nowhere is the contrast greater than with respect to the significance of language in the two communities.⁴⁴ In Canada outside Quebec, English has become a mode of communication rather than a distinct cultural symbol, a circumstance brought on in some part by immigration itself. When at the turn of the century the Canadian government began to recruit immigrants from countries other than primarily the British Isles in an effort to populate the prairies, the result was that English was increasingly employed as the most practical means of discourse between individuals of various ethnic backgrounds. That English is the *lingua franca* of the majority of Canadians does have important political implications: it makes Canada outside Quebec vulnerable to American cultural penetration and threatens to undermine any distinctive English-Canadian identity. Consequently, numerous government initiatives in the cultural industries — the Canadian Broadcasting Company, the National Film Board, the Canada Council, Canadian content laws for radio and television broadcasting, tax disincentives for split-run editions of American magazines — have been taken with a view toward nurturing and protecting English-Canadian sensibilities.

In Quebec, on the other hand, the cultivation of the French language has been seen as a matter of preserving the identity of a French-Canadian nation — especially given the waning of the nation's other historic distinctives, its Catholic and agrarian character. As Quebec has opened its doors to immigration, which it was reluctant to do until a decline in post-war French-Canadian birth rates made labour recruitment a necessity, the linguistic disposition of the foreign-born has been a major concern.⁴⁵ The province's accessibility to Lebanese, Haitian and Indochinese immigrants, individuals with a greater likelihood of knowing French in their countries of origin, is an indication of this.⁴⁶ For economic reasons both outside and inside Quebec, the great majority of immigrants have been attracted to Anglophone Canada. On balance, non-French speaking immigrants have most often been perceived as a threat to French-Canadian identity. The Quebec language legislation of the 1970s, which among other things required immigrant children to be schooled largely in French — an assimilationist emphasis of sorts — had as its primary aim ensuring the demographic stability of the French cultural community in Canada. Similarly, while the Quebec government rejects official federal multiculturalism, it affirms many of the same policies through provincial "interculturalism," albeit with the understanding that the French culture and language is normative for ethnic minorities in Quebec. On that basis, provided that "*pure laine*" Quebecers accept these individuals, one is tempted to argue that ethnic minorities may be integrated in Quebec in a way that they cannot be integrated in the rest of Canada — assimilated to a relatively well-defined, linguistically-centred political identity.

Were Canada to possess a unifying political ideology that articulated the values, purposes and aspirations of the Canadian political community and

established the terms by which ethnic minorities might come to affirm a distinctly Canadian identity, its historic cultural dualism might be of lesser political consequence. But it is partly because of the relationship between French and English Canada that a consolidating ideology has been difficult to construct.⁴⁷

Although Canadians subscribe to the essential propositions of liberal-democratic political practice — political authority based on the consent of the governed as effectuated through elected representatives, equal political rights, including the equal ability to influence political decision-making, toleration of dissent, freedom of expression, conscience and association — this is considerably less than an overarching and unifying national vision. Such procedural commitments alone cannot distinguish a distinctly Canadian identity from that of other advanced industrial democratic states, nor do they provide sufficient reason for identifying with a Canadian as opposed to, say, an American national community. Even then, it has been suggested that the gloss placed on liberal-democratic ideals in Quebec and the rest of Canada is different: a substantive and collective rights based orientation in the former instance, a procedural and individual rights based orientation in the latter.⁴⁸ By entrenching these disparate readings of what Canadian democracy requires, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms itself has become a source of considerable political conflict across Canada.⁴⁹ Contrary to the nation-building aspirations of its framers, the Charter is not widely regarded as defining shared Canadian values: a 1991 Angus Reid poll indicated that only 45 percent of Canadians were willing to describe the document in this way.⁵⁰

It is not just that Canada is marked by diverse ideological traditions — conservatism, liberalism, socialism and populism have all made their electoral presence known — but that the leading candidates for a unifying political creed are compromised by Canadian political history. Thus, the integrative potential of toryism, often cited as a major influence on the Canadian political perspective and one distinguishing it from the United States,⁵¹ has been hindered by its connection with loyalism. Conservatism, then, has had a fundamentally different colouring in French Canada than in English Canada. In Anglophone Canada, conservatism can be traced to the immigration of loyalists from the United States. If, in the view of some scholars, these individuals were disgruntled and anti-revolutionary American liberals as much as dyed-in-the-wool tories,⁵² what seems clear is that their political allegiances and identity were directed toward the British Crown.⁵³ By contrast, the conservatism of pre-Quiet Revolution French Canada had both a different source — arguably the legacy of a mildly feudal and authoritarian seventeenth century French fragment of settlement — and a different point of reference. After the Conquest, a French Catholic priestly elite pursued a conservatism that may have partially cohered with that of English Canada, but which was exercised in the interest of insulating

French-Canadians from what were perceived as anti-clerical and liberal English-Canadian ideas, and in which the British connection was tolerated at best and anathema at worst.⁵⁴

Within English Canada, too, loyalism would appear to have frustrated the emergence of an ideologically based political community. Allegiance to the British Crown, which long provided the focal point of English-Canadian national identity, may have impeded the development of an indigenous Anglophone identity. As David Bell has put it, loyalist myths “encouraged (Canadians) to honour colonial symbols instead of adopting (their) own, and to substitute for nationalism a peculiar variety of coattails imperialism.”⁵⁵ Early Canadian nationalists — members of the Canada First Movement and the Imperial Federation League — championed greater independence for the Dominion, but they rarely did so outside the context of a markedly British empire.⁵⁶ Granted, some of these individuals envisioned that Canada might actually supplant Great Britain as the dominant player in a federated empire, but few called for outright independence or even, as with Goldwin Smith, a Canadian-American union. Comparatively high levels of foreign investment and ownership — predominantly British until the mid-1920s, American thereafter⁵⁷ — most likely compounded the difficulty of constructing an autonomous national vision.⁵⁸ In the measure that English-Canadian political identity was vicariously expressed, the demise of British power worldwide and the post-war attenuation of the British political connection left Anglophone Canada in the lurch. What remained was the obverse of the loyalist heritage but a staple of Canadian identity since before Confederation — the desire not to be American.⁵⁹ Indeed, Sylvia Bashevkin *defines* Canadian nationalism as “the organized pursuit of a more independent and distinctive Canadian in-group on the North American continent, primarily through the introduction by the federal government of specific cultural, trade and investment policies that are designed to limit US out-group influences.”⁶⁰

Although the sentiment is understandable, that English-Canadian nationalism should be equated with fear of Americanization may have cost the cause of Canadian integration in at least two ways. First, considering the possibility that the dominant political tradition among English Canadians is in fact liberal (if with conservative nuances), since the United States is the quintessentially liberal nation, liberalism cannot function as Canada’s integrative ideology — it is guilty by association.⁶¹ More than this, the very idea of a Canadian equivalent to Americanization — that is to say of an assimilative and consolidating ideology constructed on any basis whatsoever — is diminished by the most vigilant defenders of Canada’s national integrity precisely for reason of being American.⁶² In the view of critics such as Andrew Stark, the result is a Canadian nationalism that is “diffident, hesitant, and reticent,”⁶³ a nationalism which advances the “peculiar conception of the ‘identity-less citizen’,”⁶⁴ in brief, a nationalism inauspicious for the cause of Canadian integration.

III

Against this background, committed multiculturalists propose to reconfigure Canada's national character. Under the rubric of integration without assimilation, multiculturalism seeks to make a virtue of the very diversity that otherwise frustrates the search for a unifying Canadian national identity. Cultural pluralism is no longer feared for its political consequences, rather it is acclaimed — perhaps indulged — as the substance of a flexible Canadianism.

Foreshadowing the logic of integration without assimilation, a generation ago W.L. Morton observed that “there is no process in becoming Canadian akin to conversion, there is no pressure for uniformity, there is no Canadian way of life.”⁶⁵ On Morton's reading, “the society of allegiance [Canada] admits of a diversity the society of compact [the United States] does not, and one of the blessings of Canadian life is that there is no Canadian way of life, much less two, but a unity under the crown admitting of a thousand diversities.”⁶⁶

Following Morton, contemporary multiculturalists judge the lack of a precise national sense as no bad thing. Single, integrative national identities are rejected as too confining and static, inappropriate to post-modern political realities.⁶⁷ What is required, instead, is constitutional provision for deep cultural diversity, official recognition that citizens can and do maintain multiple political commitments within the boundaries of a single state. Cultural communities merit a measure of autonomy on this perspective, even at the risk of asymmetry in the distribution of political power. In fact, advocates of multiculturalism sometimes argue that it may actually be easier to integrate ethnic minorities into a Canadian political community that is not already well-formed, that such individuals may more readily commit to a polity if they believe they can make some contribution to its character.⁶⁸

Hence the integrative vision of the architects of Canadian multiculturalism: an ethnically responsive and equitable procedure of political decision-making, the public approval of which is transferred to those institutions within which the procedure takes place. Through the establishment of bureaucratic agencies and public funds earmarked for the purpose, federal and provincial governments have expended considerable effort to promote the idea that ethnic minorities are of equal dignity and merit equal treatment. And by removing discriminatory barriers to, as well as expanding opportunities for, the social, economic and political inclusion of ethnic minorities in Canadian life — most prominently via employment equity programs that sanction preferential treatment for disadvantaged visible minorities — multiculturalism seeks to create the necessary conditions for national integration. At the limit, multiculturalism itself becomes an integrative ideology — *the* Canadian ideology:

Multiculturalism is not only commensurate with Canadian social norms. More to the point, multiculturalism *is* the quintessential Canadian value. It constitutes a distinctive feature of our celebration (however understated) as a people, and distinguishes us from the melting pot of the United States. As the cornerstone of Canada's nation-building process, multiculturalism shapes our identity, unites us in a distinct society with a national vision, and invigorates us as a people with a destiny.⁶⁹

If multiculturalism is destined to become the integrative strategy of choice among states increasingly confronted by global population flows and the ethnically diverse citizenries they create, it is an approach to national consolidation that would seem especially well-suited to the Canadian experience. And that is because multiculturalism addresses each of the major socio-political obstacles to Canadian nation-building. In Canada outside Quebec, given the diminishing strength of the imperial connection, increasing numbers of immigrants of non-British heritage, and the demise of Anglo-conformity as an integrative model, multiculturalism proffers a new national identity: immigrant and native-born Canadians are to be united by the values of multiculturalism — committed, at a minimum, to cultural pluralism and equal opportunity for ethnic, especially visible, minorities. By legitimating the devolution of disproportionate amounts of political power to distinct cultural constituencies, in theory multiculturalism can accommodate Quebec's claim to be a province "*pas comme les autres*" (as well as the territorial imperatives of Aboriginal groups), although not exclusively so. And since America can be offered as a foil — the mosaic presuming to distinguish Canada, said to revel in its cultural tolerance and ethnic diversity, from the United States, which allegedly under the assimilationist logic of the melting pot does not — multiculturalism aspires to a triply useful statement of the Canadian political character.

Yet as a vehicle of national integration, multiculturalism is compromised, both theoretically and empirically. On the former account, there is a wooliness about the way that the concept is deployed. The RCBB's observations, though antedating by two years the introduction of official multiculturalism, suggest the ambiguity of integration without assimilation. In the Commission's view, integration was largely a matter of removing barriers to the full economic and social participation of immigrants within Canada's two founding linguistic and cultural communities. Unity within diversity was thereby to be accomplished. Newcomers were expected to acculturate — that is to adapt their behavior to the lifestyle of the community of which they had become a part — but not to assimilate, which according to the RCBB suggested a more thoroughgoing cultural transformation. And yet if integration without assimilation merely indicates the functional adaptation of ethnic minorities to an open economic marketplace — that they must learn the dominant language, social conventions and commercial culture simply in order to

feed their families, albeit without being required to give up the majority of their ethnic heritage — then as a matter of necessity everyone will be integrated to greater or lesser degree and integration as a political concept will have little meaning.⁷⁰

At the most basic and uncontentious level, multiculturalism may describe the fact of an ethnically diverse Canadian society. Or more normatively, and as the RCBB presaged, multiculturalism may point to a public policy that tolerates, even encourages, expressions of cultural diversity and prohibits discrimination against ethnic minorities. In this respect, it is important to distinguish between Canada's official understanding of multiculturalism, which is limited in scope — the “thin” position on multiculturalism, one might call it — and the more expansive connotations that multiculturalism may carry in public and scholarly discourse. When official multiculturalism was inaugurated in 1971, it had four stated objectives: the removal of cultural (and by the 1980s, racial) barriers to full participation in Canadian society; cultural exchange and appreciation; official-language training for immigrants; and state funding for cultural maintenance activities (e.g., support for ethnic minority associations, for ethnic expression in the visual and performing arts, ethnic heritage festivals, and to a much smaller extent, for training in “heritage languages” — those other than English or French). If this is the sum total of multiculturalism, then among Canadians its provisions are widely endorsed.⁷¹ Only in the instance of employment equity and, to a lesser degree, cultural maintenance programs have such propositions been at all contentious. But if multiculturalism is simply a matter of “the right of individuals to be different yet the same, from within a context of commonly shared core values,”⁷² it begs the question of what these commonly shared core values are, that is to say the essence of Canadian identity and the grounds on which national integration might be achieved. At best, such norms might supplement a consolidating sense of nationhood, but they cannot replace it.

That multiculturalism often aspires to more than this is suggested by the heightened profile that the concept seems to have in Canada, in particular the way in which multiculturalism has become for its proponents “a key element in symbolic expressions of national identity.”⁷³ One of Canada's foremost students of ethnicity, Robert Harney, delineates this “thick” version of multiculturalism as “an innovative and altruistic civic philosophy of democratic pluralism to replace loyalty to the British empire as a legitimizing principle for the Canadian state.”⁷⁴ Indeed, the most aggressive formulations of multiculturalism make cultural identity the *sine qua non* of political involvement and representation. On this approach, in an ethnically pluralist state integration is achieved by organizing the political process so as to validate and empower group differences.⁷⁵ Ironically, perhaps, national cohesion becomes a function of maximizing the social and institutional autonomy of ethnic groups.

Thick multiculturalism's appraisal of the principle of nationality and assimilation is double-sided and mutually reinforcing. Given that this form of multiculturalism maintains that a primary purpose of politics is to affirm group differences, not to elide them, national identities are considered artificial and culturally exclusivist, and the process of assimilation whereby those identities are taught is discredited. Conversely, because assimilation is rejected as a means whereby the most powerful social contingents within a state seek to absorb or at least to marginalize cultural minorities so, too, the national identities which are inculcated via assimilation. In the interest of legitimizing and promoting social diversity, the most ardent advocates of the "politics of identity" condemn assimilation as a strategy of group oppression.

The argument fails to persuade on at least three counts. First, the group identities that multiculturalism champions are not any more genuine than national identities.⁷⁶ The social and political construction of ethnic and racial identity is a fundamental of modern sociological thought. It is disingenuous to suggest that in the political arena ethnic interests should be prior to and transcendent of national ones because assimilation to a national identity is coercive in a way that the assumption of an ethnic identity is not. Ethnic and racial identities equally may be the result of compulsion, both from without — e.g., via government imposition of ethnic and racial caste distinctions — and from within — most vividly, perhaps, in the way that certain religiously-based cultural communities shun members who wish to leave, but more broadly in the stigma which may be imposed by minority groups on co-ethnics who refuse to embrace fully their cultural heritage, especially in a climate of enhanced ethnic consciousness.

Second, from a political perspective, the multicultural critique misreads what assimilation requires. In fact, Robert E. Park, who helped introduce assimilation into the social science lexicon, maintained that it was more properly a political than a cultural concept. In Park's opinion, assimilation did not insist that ethnic minorities sacrifice their cultural traditions in order to be accepted as fully members of the national political community, but rather that they demonstrate a commitment to "those ideas, practices and aspirations which are national ... the generally accepted social customs and political ideas and loyalties of a community or country."⁷⁷ In terms of the distinction drawn earlier in this essay, Park appeals to an ideological as opposed to a cultural understanding of national identity and assimilation. To reiterate, ethnicity and membership in a national community are not necessarily one and the same. If constructed primarily on ideological and not cultural grounds, a national identity will leave considerable room for the expression of ethnic differences. Thus, the principle of nationhood does not invariably demand that ethnic groups betray their cultural legacy, only that they subscribe to the norms and values of a common public culture communicated through the process of assimilation. The American case, often the object of multiculturalist disapprobation, including those

Canadians who contrast an ethos of integration without assimilation to an alleged American melting pot, is instructive. Under the canopy of an integrative and assimilative public creed, in the United States cultural pluralism yet flourishes in the private domain — the Amish and Hasidim are regarded as no less American for all their cultural idiosyncracies.

Third, thick multiculturalism risks reducing the polity to little more than a dispassionate forum for cultural interaction and economic exchange. As the idea of a strong and consolidating sense of nationhood is depreciated so, too, is a substantive community interest informed by the public values that comprise that national identity and which might be shared over and above discrete group interests. The diverse cultural contingents that comprise the polity may come together to discuss the issues of the day and to decide on matters of public policy — indeed they will require a settled constitutional framework to do so — but they will always do so with an eye to maintaining their individual autonomy and integrity.

In this respect, multiculturalism is politically naive. Assuming that minority groups will participate in the democratic political process so as to remedy their collective grievances by making claims on public resources, they will need to forge political coalitions.⁷⁸ Otherwise, there is no assurance that their demands will be met. In fact, in the measure that democracy relies on the vote counting device of majority rule as a procedural expedient, such groups may find themselves consistently outvoted on issues about which they most deeply care. Democratic participation may actually deepen the frustrations and mutual suspicions of opposed and self-contained minorities. To what shared values will such groups appeal so that they may attract sympathetic allies and forward their political aims? The ideals expressed in a common national identity may be one answer, but it is an answer not open to the most committed of multiculturalists.

Perhaps more important than multiculturalism's theoretical brittleness, however, is that as a cornerstone of Canadian identity and a basis for national cohesion it has modest support among the Canadian public.⁷⁹ The contemporary debate over integration without assimilation suggests that historic questions concerning the nature of Canadian identity — questions which multiculturalism seeks to address — are far from resolved.

Consider the desire for a Canadian identity separate from that of the American republic. In the judgement of many social scientists, multiculturalism does not distinguish Canada from the United States.⁸⁰ The nuances of multicultural policy in the two countries may be different — in the US multiculturalism is most strongly rooted in the race issue whereas in Canada it initially played off of the French/English divide — but its substance is effectively the same. Descriptively, the United States is as ethnically pluralist a society as Canada. Institutional indicators of the robustness of ethnicity in the US are plentiful: the diversity of the countries

of origin from which sizable numbers of immigrants continue to arrive, the residential concentration of ethnic groups, ethnic clustering in certain occupations, political mobilization on an ethnic basis, the vitality of the foreign-language media, the variety and number of ethnic festivals, and so on.

But lack of official status in the United States notwithstanding, multiculturalism has a prescriptive hold on Americans as well. Precisely because ethnicity counts in the United States, myriad public and private agencies, including the Bureau of the Census, routinely classify Americans according to an “ethno-racial pentagon” — Euro-American, Asian-American, African-American, Native-American, and Hispanic.⁸¹ Affirmative action is the way in which such distinctions have mattered dramatically for public policy, but funding for bilingual education, accommodating linguistic minorities in the publication and dissemination of election materials, and legislative redistricting in the interest of empowering ethnic and racial minorities are additional examples. Relatedly, American courts have been forced to accommodate the issues that a multicultural society raises — of preferential hiring strategies, of public funding for parochial schools, of culture used as a legal defense. Educational institutions, too, have conceded the special claims of race and ethnicity, whether through admissions offices concerned to recruit a representative student body or a curriculum that aims at sensitizing Americans to the dynamics of a multicultural society. No wonder that according to certain comparative surveys, Americans are even more likely to support the retention of ethnic cultures than are Canadians.⁸² And if in the US, as in Canada, there is presently a backlash against special public benefits accruing to ethnic minorities, it is a function of the imagined seriousness of the multicultural threat. Indeed, in relating the liabilities of multiculturalism, American apologists for assimilation often cite Canada as an example to avoid.⁸³ If Canadian and American identities are to be distinguished, multiculturalism will not suffice.

Neither does multiculturalism resolve the different national conceptions of Anglophone and Francophone Canadians. Predictably, in Quebec multiculturalism is disparaged as an attempt to undermine the province’s status as a distinct society by making French Canadians appear as merely one of any number of equal contributors to a Canadian ethnic mosaic.⁸⁴ In the opinion of many Quebecois, multiculturalism’s origins are in the Trudeau government’s explicit rejection of Canada as a culturally dualist state, a partnership of Anglophones and Francophones dear to the hearts of Quebecois of various political stripe. To illustrate, the Quebec public is far more likely to endorse a dualist reading of confederation than are other Canadian citizens; a 1995 Maclean’s/CBC poll reported that 45% of Quebec respondents viewed Canada as a pact between two founding groups, French and English, as opposed to 22% of Canadians living elsewhere.⁸⁵ Moreover, to the degree that multiculturalism undermines

official bilingualism in Canada by negating any necessary relationship between linguistic and cultural privilege, it may further alienate Francophones. It is not surprising, then, that “les différents gouvernements du Québec n’ont jamais accepté la notion fédérale d’une ‘mosaïque’ multiculturelle ... (Conseil des communautés culturelles et de l’immigration du Québec, 8 February 1988).”⁸⁶

Immigrants, too, can be decidedly wary of multiculturalism. An irony of Canadian multiculturalism is that it is often discredited by the very immigrant constituencies it is designed to embrace. Many newcomers fear that on the official account they will be ghettoized as “everlasting immigrants,” understood as members of the discrete groups constituting the Canadian polity, not respected as individuals who might be coalesced into some greater political totality. Most famously, Neil Bissoondath, he of East Indian origin by way of Trinidad, in his Canadian best-seller, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada* (1994), makes the case that multiculturalism fails immigrants and the native-born alike. “In eradicating the centre,” writes Bissoondath, “in evoking uncertainty as to what and who is a Canadian, (multiculturalism) has diminished all sense of Canadian values, of what is a Canadian.”⁸⁷ A case study of Lao immigrants in Canada reveals much the same disenchantment.⁸⁸ In qualitative interviews, Lao respondents indicate that whereas they appreciate multiculturalism’s intent to combat discrimination against visible minorities, they doubt the wisdom of retaining a separate cultural identity at the risk of social isolation and political disunity. As one interviewee relates, “(Cultural groups) all have their different beliefs and different opinions and there are too many to try and become one. It would be better if the people who all came here would just become Canadians — they would become one united country and there would not be too many groups separate from each other.”⁸⁹ What newcomers may most desire from the Canadian host society is a clear statement of an integrative national identity, one establishing the criteria of social and political acceptance for discrete immigrant communities, something to which they can be assimilated. If immigrants to Canada do achieve integration without assimilation, their national loyalties may be forged more by the dynamics of migration itself, animated by the imagined deficiencies of the homeland and the promise of a new life in Canada, than by multiculturalism per se.⁹⁰

IV

Canadians often seem to desire a more secure and precise national identity than multiculturalism allows, a set of definitive public commitments which for newcomers to Canada might afford integration *with* assimilation.⁹¹ For example, Canadians regularly indicate concern for the disruptive potential of immigrant beliefs and attitudes. In a 1994 Decima survey, 43 percent of the individuals polled indicated that relations between immigrant and non-immigrant communities had worsened; the primary cause of this

deterioration — the choice of 25 percent of the respondents — was attributed to the different values of immigrant and non-immigrant groups.⁹² A recent policy statement of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, recommending a revised Citizenship Act as a means of promoting common Canadian values, builds on a similar reading of public opinion: “Newcomers need to participate in the larger community and to respect the core values and principles upon which Canadian society and its institutions are based. ... If newcomers are to integrate successfully into Canadian society, they need a better sense of what it means to be Canadian. They need to understand the values and principles that this society is based on.”⁹³ Yet when it comes to specifying these national norms, Canadians often seem at a loss. In a further 1994 Decima poll, when asked what “most ties us together as a nation,” the leading response was “our system of government” — the choice of only 7 percent of the sample. When prompted with specific answers to the same question, the top two replies, with 75 percent and 70 percent of the poll in Canada outside Quebec respectively, were health care and hockey.⁹⁴

Here one confronts the conceptual conundrum of the debate over multiculturalism: if not multiculturalism, then in what does Canadian identity consist? Are there alternative grounds of nationhood on which Canada can hope to be an integrated polity? In response, several students of Canadian politics have explored the unifying potential of an active Canadian citizenship — a non-national, political identity, largely independent of fixed ideological or cultural content. Such individuals draw on a consistent strain of thought about Canadian nationality, one stretching back at least to Confederation and the desire of the Canada East/Quebec Conservative leader, Sir George-Étienne Cartier, that Canada develop a political as opposed to a cultural standard of nationhood. From this perspective, given the reality of a culturally and, one might add, an ideologically pluralist society, Canada must find its character primarily in its structures of government, its source of national unity in allegiance to and involvement in consolidating political institutions.⁹⁵

According to some of its advocates, this civic brand of nationalism turns on what the sociologist Edward Shils has called “allocative integration,”⁹⁶ gratitude for the social benefits and economic well-being that the Canadian government provides.⁹⁷ But participatory citizenship is recommended for its emotional affect as well, promising a sense of national inclusion to those who exercise its rights and responsibilities.⁹⁸ The glue of the pluralist polity, this analysis holds, is a function of the citizenry’s willingness to participate in an ongoing national “conversation” concerning the central issues of political life. That conversation will be constrained by a modicum of shared values, particularly with respect to the procedural norms of political engagement, but in terms of substantive policy ends, any national consensus achieved will be moving and provisional. Ultimately it is to the conversation itself and to the national forum in which it occurs that citizens

will express their allegiance.⁹⁹ If an integrative and assimilative Canadian identity is at all to be found, on this view it will be found in process, a function of citizen involvement in shaping the future direction of the polity, its common mores and values.¹⁰⁰

It is not the intention of the present paper to evaluate systematically the integrative potential of this civic variety of nationalism. There may be reason for optimism. In the sequence of nation-building, statehood has often preceded and informed the construction of nationhood.¹⁰¹ Clearly, there is a connection between the public policies emerging out of the process of deliberative democracy and national identity itself. Such policies help to express the values constitutive of nationhood by indicating the priorities and commitments of the public culture. In that respect, one should not dismiss the inclination of many Canadians to cite public health care as a major component of Canadianism — a commitment, moreover, that does distinguish Canada from the United States. It is not inconceivable that a discrete national identity might emerge from the open political process which advocates of civic nationalism anticipate. In the Constitution Act (1982), and especially in its Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada has already taken a considerable step toward articulating the institutional framework and guiding principles of the civic conversation. Further, if the democratic process of which civic nationalists conceive requires “an open dialogue in which all points of view are represented,”¹⁰² then to the degree that Canada is constitutionally committed to at least a thin theory of multiculturalism and to a politics of ethnic inclusion, the prospects for shaping an integrative identity are brighter.

Still, outstanding questions need to be addressed. A national identity that comes as a *quid pro quo* for perceived economic benefits appears less than secure, especially in light of global economic pressures that governments hold responsible for the need to reduce their social welfare commitments.¹⁰³ Likewise, one may doubt how emotionally satisfying a civic nationalism can be absent a clear statement of the ideals and purposes of the national community. To paraphrase Burke, to love our country, must not our country first be lovely? Moreover, given that a discrete legal definition of Canadian citizenship emerged relatively late in Canada’s national history (and even then, the Citizenship Act of 1947 simultaneously preserved British subject status for Canadian citizens, a provision that was removed only in 1977), and that it entitles the bearer to few privileges that permanent residence does not — mainly the right to vote and run for office in federal and some provincial elections, priority in hiring for certain jobs, and the right to leave and reenter the country on a Canadian passport — Canadian citizenship may not be sufficiently robust to claim an individual’s political allegiance.¹⁰⁴ In Canada, the provisional nature of civic national identity may be especially problematic, since the constitutional framework that is to guide the search for that identity was not submitted to popular ratification in 1982 when Canada’s original constitution — the British North America Act

(1867) — was patriated and amended, and thus, arguably, lacks a popular mandate. One also may wonder whether proponents of civic nationalism exaggerate the inclination of ordinary Canadian citizens to participate in the political process and thereby set the bar of national identity too high. And if the events surrounding Charlottetown are any indication, Canada's efforts at a "national conversation" may aggravate underlying political differences as much as resolve them.

Most significant of all, Quebec is not firmly part of Canada's constitutional family. In 1982, the Canada Act was passed over Quebec's strident objections and successive provincial governments have never agreed to the original terms of patriation. It is not too much to say that subsequent attempts to oblige Quebec and to gain greater democratic legitimacy for the Constitution, via the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, have unraveled precisely because Canada is such a culturally and regionally diverse society.

In this, advocates of civic nationalism might do well to remember the prejudice of those classical political theorists — Aristotle, Machiavelli, Rousseau, among others — to whose republican conceptions of citizenship they are indebted: the communal spirit necessary to a polity is advantaged by cultural homogeneity. Civic nationalism may be hard pressed to bridge the identity divide between Quebec and the rest of Canada, a Quebec that most often affirms a decidedly cultural conception of nationhood, one which, for reasons already cited, is largely inappropriate to the rest of Canada.¹⁰⁵ As David Miller has cautioned, in culturally pluralist societies, a common sense of national allegiance may in fact be a prerequisite of an integrative citizenship, not its consequence.¹⁰⁶ Separatist movements are not readily subject to this discipline.

There is a hard but simple truth here: as long as Canada includes Quebec, pan-Canadian questions of identity and integration may be incapable of resolution. With one exception, in Canada outside Quebec, questions of political belonging appear resolved in favour of Canada. Survey evidence indicates that only in Newfoundland — perhaps a function of it being the last province to enter confederation (in 1949, and then by a slim margin in a popular referendum), geographic isolation, and the gravity of its economic difficulties — do provincial or regional identifications rival identification as Canadian.¹⁰⁷ By contrast, Quebec Francophones, who comprise over eighty percent of the province's population, are persistent outliers. If there is hope in civic nationalism, Canada may yet achieve national integration, but — dare one say it — as long as Quebec remains part of the confederation, the odds do not seem favourable.

V

As this essay has argued, largely because of the tension between its two founding European communities, Canada possesses neither the ethnic and

cultural homogeneity nor the ideological consensus that typically serve as foci of integration in other democratic political systems. Absent a clear sense of Canadian national identity, political assimilation, in the sense of being socialized to the defining beliefs and values of a cohesive polity, is a difficult prospect. Consequently, as a means of incorporating ethnic minorities into a unified Canadian political community, multiculturalism and the ethos of integration without assimilation with which it is twinned are understandable alternatives to a strong consolidative notion of Canadian identity.

Yet in the measure that advocates of multiculturalism wish it to function as a substitute Canadian identity, it must be found wanting. Should national identities be important to political unity, giving citizens strong reasons to undertake collective efforts in the interest of the common good, even when those efforts will not always be individually rewarded, then multiculturalism can hardly constitute an adequate basis for identity and integration. Multiculturalism may be part of a reconfigured Canadian identity (thin multiculturalism), but it cannot be the major part of it (thick multiculturalism). Multiculturalism does not in fact provide a satisfying answer to outstanding issues surrounding Canadian identity — the attempt to distinguish Canada from the United States, the desire of immigrants to affirm a common Canadianness, the need to address Quebec's claim to be a distinct society. Nor is multiculturalism able to articulate a distinctive core of beliefs that might hold the Canadian polity together, a common public culture that would unite Canadians of diverse cultural backgrounds in relationships of mutual support and obligation. In the interest of championing the politics of difference, multiculturalism actually denudes the public sphere that makes that common life possible. What Gertrude Stein once observed of Oakland seems equally apropos of multiculturalism as a mechanism for Canadian consolidation — in the final analysis, there is no there, there.

Notes

1. *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, Volume IV (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1969), p. 5, p. 7.
2. Leslie A. Pal, *Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), pp. 74-90.
3. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, *Debate* (Hansard), October 8, 1971, p. 545.
4. Raymond Breton, "Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation-Building," in *The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity, and Language in Canada*, eds. Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp. 27-66; Kenneth McRoberts, *English Canada and Quebec: Avoiding the Issue* (North York: Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, 1991), pp. 27-30.
5. Standing Committee on Multiculturalism, *Multiculturalism: Building the Canadian Mosaic* (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1987), p. 47.

6. "I Don't Enjoy Neil Bissoondath," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto) February 7, 1995: A21.
7. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 129ff.; Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 18-20; David Miller, "In Defence of Nationality," *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 10, no. 1 (1993), pp. 3-16.
8. Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893; rpt. New York: The Free Press, 1984), pp. 60-61.
9. David V.J. Bell, *The Roots of Disunity: A Study of Canadian Political Culture*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992).
10. Reginald W. Bibby, *Mosaic Madness: The Poverty and Potential of Life in Canada* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1990).
11. David Jay Bercuson and Barry Cooper, *Deconfederation: Canada Without Quebec* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1991).
12. Robert Chodos, Rae Murray, and Eric Hamovitch, *The Unmaking of Canada: The Hidden Theme in Canadian History Since 1945* (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1991).
13. G. Bruce Doern and Byrne B. Purchase, eds., *Canada at Risk: Canadian Public Policy in the 1990s* (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1991).
14. Jeremy Webber, *Reimagining Canada: Language, Community and the Canadian Constitution* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1994).
15. R. Kent Weaver, ed. *The Collapse of Canada?* (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1992).
16. Anthony Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 178.
17. Carolyn Tuohy, *Policy and Politics in Canada: Institutionalized Ambivalence* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), p. 5.
18. R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward, "The Making of a Canadian Political Citizenship," in *National Politics and Community in Canada*, eds. R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986), pp. 76-77.
19. Charles Taylor, "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth Century Canada," in *Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada*, eds. Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 221.
20. "For Want of Glue: A Survey of Canada," *Economist*, June 29, 1991, p. 19.
21. Reg Whitaker, "Images of the State in Canada," in *The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power*, ed. Leo Panitch (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 49; also see Bell.
22. James Tully, "The Crisis of Identification: The Case of Canada," *Political Studies*, XLII (1994), pp. 75-76.
23. See, for instance, Sylvia Bashevkin, *True Patriot Love: The Politics of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 1-28.
24. See, for instance, Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, 1955); Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Stephen Dworetz, *The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988); Thomas L. Pangle, *The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Seymour Martin Lipset,

- Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (London: Routledge, 1990).
25. Philip Gleason, "Americans All: World War II and the Shaping of American Identity," *The Review of Politics*, vol. 43, no. 4 (1981), pp. 483-518; also Michael Lind, *The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution* (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
 26. David Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 165-180.
 27. John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (1867; rpt. London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1972), pp. 363-64.
 28. Mill, p. 362.
 29. Louis Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964), esp. p. 14; Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 358, (1965), 55-57; Nathan Glazer, "Individual Rights Against Group Rights," in *Ethnic Dilemmas: 1964-1982*, ed. Nathan Glazer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 254-73; Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 151ff.
 30. Michael Walzer, "Pluralism in Political Perspective," in *Dimensions of Ethnicity*, ed. Stephen Thernstrom (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1982), pp. 1-28.
 31. Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition*; Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 318; Huntington, *American Politics*, pp. 230-31; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992).
 32. Raymond H.C. Teske and Bardin H. Nelson, "Acculturation and Assimilation: A Clarification," *American Ethnologist*, vol. I (1974), pp. 351-67.
 33. Kenneth McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 184-88.
 34. McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada*, chs. 1, 2, 10.
 35. Douglas V. Verney, *Three Civilizations, Two Cultures, One State: Canada's Political Traditions* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), p. 226ff; also McRoberts, *Misconceiving*.
 36. For example, Philip Resnick, *Letters to a Quebecois Friend* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990).
 37. Howard Palmer, "Mosaic versus Melting Pot?: Immigration and Ethnicity in Canada and the United States," *International Journal*, summer 1976, pp. 493-502.
 38. House of Commons, *Debates*, June 7, 1928, 3925-7.
 39. Freda Hawkins, *Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared*, 2nd ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), pp. 3-28.
 40. Quoted in Irving Abella and Harold Troper, *None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948* (Toronto: Lester, 1983), p. 199.
 41. Abella and Troper, p. 239ff. As the authors point out, however, at least with respect to the admission of Jewish refugees, immediate post-war Canadian policy was grudging; in this case, the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 removed some of the pressure for Canadian immigration authorities to be more generous.
 42. Leo Driedger, *The Ethnic Factor: Identity in Diversity* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1989), p. 41.
 43. The percentage of Canadians who state they belong to ethnic groups of other than Anglo-Irish or French descent are: 1881 — 11%; 1901 — 12.3%; 1921 — 16.4%;

- 1941 — 20%; 1961 — 25.8%; 1981 — 33.1%; 1991 — 42% (Census of Canada, various dates).
44. See, for example, Charles Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1993).
 45. See, for instance, the discussion in Jerome A. Black and David Hagen, "Quebec Immigration Politics and Policy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives," in *Quebec: State and Society*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1993), pp. 280-303. A 1990 policy statement of the Quebec ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l'Immigration proposed that by 1995 at least 40 percent of individuals arriving in Quebec should be French-speaking. In 1989, only 28.3 percent of immigrants admitted to Quebec either spoke or had knowledge of French; by 1992, 36 percent of newcomers could claim that distinction. Employment and Immigration Canada, *Immigration Statistics 1992* (Hull: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992), p. 36.
 46. Every year from 1973 through 1988, Lebanon, Haiti and/or Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam were among the top five countries sending immigrants to Quebec. In the case of Indochinese immigrants, however, only a minority are actually proficient in French. Simon Langlois et al., *Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), p. 544.
 47. Allan Smith, "National Images and National Maintenance: The Ascendancy of the Ethnic Idea in North America," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 14, no. 2 (1981), pp. 227-57.
 48. Taylor, *Reconciling*, pp. 172-79. There is, on the other hand, a good deal of survey evidence suggesting that the matter of language rights aside, residents of Quebec are among the most individualistic citizens in Canada. See, for example, Webber, p. 50.
 49. See the discussion in F.L. Morton, "The Charter and Canada Outside Quebec," in *Beyond Quebec: Taking Stock of Canada*, ed. Kenneth McRoberts (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), pp. 93-114; also see Peter H. Russell, *Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).
 50. Angus Reid Group, *Multiculturalism and Canadians: Attitude Study 1991 — National Survey Report* (Ottawa: Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, 1991), p. 13.
 51. See, for instance, S.F. Wise, *God's Peculiar Peoples: Essays on Political Culture in Nineteenth Century Canada* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), ch. 9; Lipset, esp. ch. 1; Kenneth McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History," in Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies*, pp. 234-44; Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXXII, no. 2 (1966), pp. 141-71; Philip Resnick, *The Masks of Proteus: Canadian Reflections on the State* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1990), ch. 2.
 52. Bell, pp. 38-40.
 53. See W.L. Morton, *The Canadian Identity*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 85, 100, 104; also see McRae; Verney; Lipset; Bell.
 54. See McRae; Verney; Bell.
 55. Bell, p. 67.
 56. See Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).
 57. W.T. Easterbrook and Hugh G.J. Aitken, *Canadian Economic History* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 401-02, pp. 572-74.

58. See, for instance, Resnick, *The Masks of Proteus*, ch.8.
59. Reg Whitaker, *A Sovereign Idea: Essays on Canada as a Democratic Community* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1992), p. 288.
60. Bashevkin, pp. viii-ix.
61. Bell, p. 86.
62. See, for example, Ramsay Cook, *The Maple Leaf Forever: Essays on Nationalism and Politics in Canada* (1971; rpt. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977), p. 187; H.G. Thorburn, "Canadian Pluralist Democracy in Crisis," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. XI, no. 4 (1978), p. 734; also W.L. Morton.
63. Andrew Stark, "English-Canadian Opposition to Quebec Nationalism," in *The Collapse of Canada?*, ed. R. Kent Weaver (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 134.
64. Stark, p. 136.
65. W.L. Morton, p. 85.
66. W.L. Morton, p. 111.
67. See, for example, Crawford Young, "The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality," in *The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay?*, ed. Crawford Young (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), pp. 3-35; Iris Marion Young, "Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group Political Conflict," in *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 155-76; Janet McLellan and Anthony H. Richmond, "Multiculturalism in Crisis: A Postmodern Perspective on Canada," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 17, no. 4 (1994), pp. 662-83; Ian Angus, *A Border Within: National Identity, Cultural Plurality, and Wilderness* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press); Webber.
68. William Kaplan, "Who Belongs?: Changing Concepts of Citizenship and Nationality," in *Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship*, ed. William Kaplan (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), pp. 255-56.
69. Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliot, *Multiculturalism in Canada: The Challenge of Diversity* (Scarborough: NelsonCanada, 1992), p. 125. Also see the analysis in Kogila Moodley, "Canadian Multiculturalism as Ideology," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 16, no. 3 (1983), pp. 320-331.
70. For this insight the author is indebted to Byron Shafer.
71. Rudolf Kalin and J.W. Berry, "Ethnic and Multicultural Attitudes," in *Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape*, eds. J.W. Berry and J.A. Laponce (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 293-321; Fleras and Elliot, ch. 5; Richard Gwyn, *Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996), Ch. 11.
72. Fleras and Elliot, p. 141.
73. Yasmeen Abu-Laban, "The Politics of Race and Ethnicity: Multiculturalism as a Contested Arena," in *Canadian Politics*, 2nd ed., eds. James P. Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1994), p. 246.
74. Quoted in Gilles Paquet, "The Political Philosophy of Multiculturalism," in *Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape*, eds. J.W. Berry and J.A. Laponce (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 67.
75. See, for example, I. Young.
76. Miller, *On Nationality*, pp. 133-35.
77. Quoted in Philip Gleason, *Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth Century America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 55.

78. See, for instance, the discussion in Miller, *On Nationality*, pp. 139-40.
79. See, for instance, the study for Canadian Heritage as reported in the *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), "Ottawa fails to sell multiculturalism," 18 October 1996, A8.
80. For instance Palmer; John Porter, "Melting Pot or Mosaic: Revolution or Reversion?," in *Perspectives on Evolution and Revolution*, ed. Richard A. Preston (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979), pp. 152-79; Howard Brotz, "Multiculturalism in Canada: A Muddle," *Canadian Public Policy*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 41-46; Garth Stevenson, "Multiculturalism: As Canadian as Apple Pie," *Inroads*, vol. 1, no. 4 (1995), pp. 72-87.
81. See, for example, David A. Hollinger, *Postethnic America* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), ch. 2.
82. Jeffrey G. Reitz and Raymond Breton, *The Illusion of Difference: Realities of Ethnicity in Canada and the United States* (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1994), ch. 2.
83. Schlessinger, p. 13; Nathan Glazer, "Reflections on Citizenship and Diversity," in *Diversity and Citizenship: Reconsidering American Nationhood*, eds. Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn and Susan Dunn (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), pp. 86-87; Peter D. Salins, *Assimilation American Style* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 11.
84. McRoberts, *English Canada*, pp. 27-30.
85. "Taking the Pulse," *Macleans*, January 1, 1996, pp. 32-33.
86. Quoted in Elliot L. Tepper, *Changing Canada: The Institutional Response to Polyethnicity* (Ottawa: Carleton University Mimeo, 1988), p. 46.
87. Neil Bissoondath, *The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada* (Toronto: Penguin, 1994), p. 71.
88. John C. Harles, "Integration Before Assimilation: Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Canadian Polity," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, XXX: 4 (1997), pp. 711-36.
89. Harles, p. 26.
90. Herbert Guindon, *Quebec Society: Tradition, Modernity, and Nationhood* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p. 139; Hawkins, p. 217; Harles.
91. See, for instance, Stevenson; also Philip Resnick, *Thinking English Canada* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1994).
92. "The Poll," *Macleans*, January 2, 1995, pp. 30-31.
93. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Into the 21st Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1994), pp. 16-17.
94. "In Search of Unity," *Macleans*, July 1, 1994, p. 17.
95. See, for example, W.L. Morton; Cook.
96. Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 66.
97. See, for example, Keith Banting, *The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1982), p. 119; Raymond Breton, "From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: English Canada and Quebec," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1978), pp. 85-100; Bibby, p. 158ff.
98. F.L. Morton, pp. 93-114; Bissoondath, pp. 215-224.
99. Tully; Paquet; Webber, p. 188ff.
100. Thomas J. Courchene, "Staatsnation v. Kulturation: The Future of the ROC," in *Beyond Quebec: Taking Stock of Canada*, ed. Kenneth McRoberts (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1995), pp. 388-99.

101. See the discussion in Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*.
102. Miller, *On Nationality*, p. 150.
103. See, for example, Jane Jenson's discussion of the disintegrative effects of neo-liberal political economy on Canadian national solidarity, "Fated to Live in Interesting Times: Canada's Changing Citizenship Regimes," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, XXX: 4 (1997), pp. 627-44.
104. See the discussion in Kaplan.
105. Pursuing this distinction, Marcel Masse (1994), former Minister of Communications in the Mulroney Government and himself from Quebec, contends that because Canadians in the rest of Canada lack a strong sense of cultural identity — indeed, in Masse's experience English-Canada depreciates the political value of culture — they tend to understand what unites them in narrow public policy terms. According to Masse, "(Canada) must be the first example in history of 'J'ai un système de sécurité sociale, donc je suis (I have a social security system, therefore I am)'." Marcel Masse, "A World Beyond Borders," *Canadian Forum*, vol. 73, no. 835 (1994), p. 12.
106. David Miller, "Citizenship and Pluralism," *Political Studies*, vol. 43, no. 3 (1995), pp. 432-50.
107. See, for instance, Ross Laver, "How We Differ," *Macleans*, January 3, 1994, pp. 9-11; also Gibbins, pp. 188-93.

Review Essays
Essais critiques

Frank Caucci

**La question d'identité, ou la représentation sous
toutes ses formes**

Ancelovici, Marcos et Francis Dupuis-Déri. *L'Archipel identitaire : recueil d'entretiens sur l'identité culturelle*. Montréal : Les Éditions du Boréal, 1997, 214 p.

Angenot, Marc. *Les Idéologies du ressentiment*. Montréal : XYZ éditeur, 1997. 199 p.

Beausoleil, Claude. *Le Motif de l'identitaire dans la poésie québécoise, 1830-1995*. Montréal : Estuaire, 1996. 262 p.

Brûlé, Michel. *Q-de-sac*. Montréal : Les Éditions des Intouchables, 1997. 125 p.

Les quatre livres dont il s'agit dans cet essai critique ont en commun, explicitement ou non, le projet d'élaborer une problématique de la représentation. En esquissant une approche métalinguistique de la représentation, en faisant valoir des visions à la fois macroscopique et microscopique de la société et de la politique contemporaines, et en réévaluant l'histoire de la poésie québécoise depuis ses origines, chacun des auteurs apporte à la grande question de l'identitaire une analyse autant personnelle que probante, et parfois controversée.

L'ouvrage de Marc Angenot porte sur une étude de la notion du ressentiment dans son application à la conjoncture culturelle contemporaine. Pour l'auteur, l'idéal-type du ressentiment s'exprime à travers une sophistication et dans un pathos de la plainte. À l'instar de Nietzsche et de Kierkegaard, il entend cette notion dans son acception philosophique des morales et des idéologies, des mises en vision du monde et, par conséquent, des stratégies politiques (21). En pratique, le ressentiment serait donc l'expression d'une vague d'angoisse face à la modernité et se donnerait libre cours en procurant une base éthique aux multiples groupes des marchés identitaires.

Angenot souligne le fait que l'être de ressentiment est obnubilé par le passé. Ainsi, la métaphore du tonneau des Danaïdes est évocatrice du travail interminable du ressentiment qui est impossible d'éliminer, voire de compenser ou de satisfaire. D'ailleurs, le caractère rancunier et

obsessionnel du ressentiment peut s'appréhender comme une passion mauvaise en quête d'exutoire (149).

L'exposition sur le ressentiment que fait Angenot lui permet de démontrer que les idéologies qui en découlent renforcent les mentalités collectives en passant par trois étapes : le renversement de valeurs, le repli identitaire et, enfin, la perpétuation de litiges pour eux-mêmes (39). Cette argumentation illustre bien que l'identité de ressentiment n'aboutit pas à la réalisation de soi, sinon à celle du groupe. À l'identité du « je est un autre » rimbaldienne, donc, se substitue le narcissisme collectif du « je est un nous ».

L'essentiel de la thèse d'Angenot fait valoir que l'idéologie du ressentiment crée des tribus dont l'intérêt est d'entraver le caractère hétérogène et interculturel de notre société postmoderne. En tant que tel, le ressentiment s'avère antidémocratique puisqu'il refuse l'altérité et la diversité, est incapable de faire de compromis et ne peut donc accorder d'importance au ressentiment des autres. Ce discours serait issu d'une dialectique éristique, ou de l'art d'avoir toujours raison (134).

En tissant un idéal-type heuristique du ressentiment, Angenot cherche à déconstruire les identités revendicatives afin d'en relever leurs rancunes communes. Ce faisant, il reconnaît le besoin anthropologique de la quête identitaire, tout en concevant l'identité comme interaction avec l'altérité et comme devenir. « Je distingue aussi l'identité comme herméneutique existentielle, dit-il, comme "poétique de soi" ou "musique intérieure," fort bien. Mais comme machine idéologique et doctrinaire, holà (181)! » Cette dernière proposition me paraît hâtive en pratique. Après tout, presque tous les pays des Amériques se sont constitués en tant que tels grâce à un processus de ressentiment. On pourrait en dire autant pour les pays de condition postcoloniale. Par ailleurs, sans mouvements revendicatifs, où en seraient la condition féminine, les droits de la personne, voire les régimes de tradition démocratiques?

Malheureusement, Angenot ne fait aucune étude de cas ni n'inscrit dans aucun concept son analyse du ressentiment, se contentant de ne pas fixer ses références, sinon de les déceler dans la culture contemporaine en général. Culture tout spécialement contemporaine? Force est de constater que le ressentiment a pénétré toute l'histoire de l'humanité. Cependant, le lecteur ne peut s'empêcher d'attribuer à l'auteur une intention implicite d'axer sur le Québec contemporain son analyse de l'idéologie du ressentiment.

Le pamphlet de Michel Brûlé se prête bien, sinon à la lettre, à l'esprit de la discussion que fait Angenot sur la culture du ressentiment. Car au cœur de son projet il relève le côté ethnocentrique du Parti québécois, tout en exposant les relations qu'entretient le parti indépendantiste avec les communautés culturelles. Il prétend, par ailleurs, qu'il est loin d'être le seul souverainiste convaincu d'être insatisfait avec cette relation.

Brûlé déplore la déclaration désormais notoire de l'ex-premier ministre Parizeau, au sujet du vote ethnique, à l'issue du référendum du 30 octobre 1995. Selon lui, depuis le commentaire de Parizeau, qui plaçait les allophones comme boucs émissaires, on assiste au Québec à une recrudescence du phénomène d'ethnisation. On ne peut ignorer, d'ailleurs, l'arbitraire des paroles du Premier ministre le soir du référendum, ni son besoin apparent de blâmer le vote « ethnique » pour sa défaite. Car lors d'une déclaration de 1993, devant le conseil national du Parti Québécois, Parizeau avait déjà fait appel à l'exclusion, en soumettant que la cause nationale pouvait trouver l'appui de la majorité « même si à peu près pas d'anglophones et d'allophones votent pour cela » (46).

L'auteur soumet que, depuis l'attitude revancharde du Premier ministre, il existe un malaise profond dans les relations interculturelles. Il semble même attribuer une valeur de synecdoque à la malheureuse déclaration, en constatant qu'elle ne représente « que la pointe de l'iceberg » (10). Toutefois, cette constatation à propos des effets des paroles du chef du gouvernement me paraît simpliste et inexacte. Le « malaise profond » dont parle l'auteur est un fait historique que Brûlé corrobore ailleurs dans son argumentation. À titre d'illustration, il va jusqu'à lamenter l'absence totale d'une représentation des communautés culturelles au sein du Parti Québécois. « Comment voulez-vous qu'un allophone soit souverainiste? fait-il remarquer. Il regarde le gouvernement fédéral et il voit des ministres qui sont issus des communautés ethniques et culturelles; il regarde le gouvernement du PQ et il voit qu'il n'y en a pas un seul » (39).

Pour étayer le parti pris, il évoque l'affaire Sciortino dans la circonscription de Mercier lors de la première assemblée d'investiture à la succession de Gérard Godin. Celui-là, ayant gagné au deuxième tour de scrutin par une majorité de treize votes, sera désavantagé à la suite d'un avis juridique en faveur de l'annulation de l'élection. En effet, la décision de Bernard Landry de faire reprendre l'assemblée d'investiture, pour la première fois de l'histoire du PQ (98), nuit à Sciortino qui, autrement, aurait pu être le premier ministre allophone d'un gouvernement péquiste. Brûlé insiste sur les motivations discutables de la procédure, sur le parti pris en partant de l'avis juridique et sur la collusion de Bernard Landry qu'il considère comme l'âme véritable du courant ethnocentrique au sein du Parti Québécois (11).

On ne peut nier le bien-fondé du ressentiment contre un PQ qui paraît ethnocentrique et rétrograde, et que l'on voudrait pluriethnique. Des critiques du PQ, jusqu'à certains souverainistes, dont Pierre Vallières, n'ont pas hésité à exprimer leur crainte que le nationalisme des francophones « pure laine » pourrait dégénérer éventuellement en xénophobie et en racisme. Cependant, la rhétorique de l'auteur de *Q-de-sac* aboutit à l'antithèse lorsque celui-ci, tout en ressassant la nécessité d'intégrer les immigrants pour qu'ils s'identifient à la majorité

francophone, se complaît à un langage nationaliste qui recèle le ressentiment ethnique et collectif.

En effet, Brûlé parsème son pamphlet de réflexions nationalistes qui sont l'effet d'une conscience passéiste. Il évoque la blessure historique de la Conquête et parle donc en termes de peuple vaincu — motif qui, selon lui, s'est perpétué jusqu'aux référendums de 1980 et de 1995. Sa diatribe contre les Anglais va jusqu'à les représenter comme une race diabolique. À titre d'exemple, il leur impute une politique d'assimilation à l'égard des immigrants : « étant donné que les Anglais sont le peuple le plus assimilateur de toute l'histoire de l'humanité, demande-t-il, est-il possible de penser une seconde qu'ils auraient laissé les immigrants élargir les rangs des francophones (25)? »

Il attaque ainsi l'impérialisme des Anglais tout en lamentant — sans même remarquer l'ironie de sa proposition — que l'assimilation des immigrants n'ait pas pu se faire de l'autre côté de la barrière linguistique. Il affiche une attitude paternaliste à l'égard des allophones qui grossiront les rangs des francophones. En même temps, il se réfère à Mordecai Richler et à des Juifs Ashkénazes comme des « vendus à la cause des Anglais » (51) et, donc, « assimilé[s] à l'impérialisme » (36).

D'après Brûlé, la scolarisation des enfants d'immigrants dans le système anglophone n'est presque pas l'effet de l'intransigeance du clergé « mais bien parce que les Anglais l'avaient décidé ainsi » (25). Par ailleurs, il illustre l'exemple des Anglais qui ont multiplié en nombre grâce à l'immigration, comme un modèle souhaitable afin d'éradiquer la marginalisation des « pure laine ». Nonobstant, il déclare comme argument essentiel que le nationalisme québécois, loin d'être raciste et impérialiste, est un nationalisme de survie, et donc positif.

De toute évidence, Brûlé paraît incapable d'admettre qu'un francophone de souche puisse se façonner une idéologie distincte de la sienne. Ce manque d'homogénéité en stratégie politique pousse l'auteur à constater « l'amnésie collective [et] l'aliénation de notre peuple » (13). Voici encore une preuve que son nationalisme relève d'une vision ethnique et collective. Comme il s'agit là d'un nationalisme trop étriqué pour certains francophones de souche, que dire alors des allophones dont les relations avec la majorité sont manifestement précaire, et la solidarité identitaire, à construire? Aussi, l'intervention du pamphlétaire en faveur d'une société d'inclusion paraît compromise tout autant que celle du premier ministre la nuit du 25 octobre 1995.

Dans leur livre d'entretiens avec des théoriciens et des écrivains, qui porte sur l'identité culturelle, Marcos Ancelovici et Francis Dupuis-Déri rappellent que la définition de la nation ne peut nullement s'élaborer sans l'affirmation d'une identité (11). Charles Taylor, qui appuie leur position, est de l'avis que le fédéralisme canadien offre l'avantage de construire un espace plus propice aux identités complexes. Cette thèse pourrait élucider

l'attrait des minorités au Québec pour le fédéralisme. D'ailleurs, Taylor ne croit pas qu'un Québec indépendant serait forcément disposé à accorder le même espace aux identités complexes.

Liah Greenfeld introduit une nouvelle dimension au discours de l'adhésion à la nation. En fonction de la définition qu'on a de la nation, on peut construire une identité nationale à la fois civique ou ethnique, individualiste ou collectiviste. « Lorsque l'adhésion est définie sur une base civique, explique-t-elle, la nationalité est synonyme de citoyenneté » (57). Selon cette typologie, les Canadiens fédéralistes, dont les anglophones et allophones du Québec, s'identifieraient à un nationalisme civique, alors que les Québécois souverainistes seraient motivés ethniquement. Ceux-là se rattachent comme individus au concept de la nation; ceux-ci y adhèrent comme collectivité. Cependant, Greenfeld rappelle que l'identité est une construction culturelle. Selon la politologue, même l'identité ethnique relève de la culture car « les attributs ethniques en soi n'affectent pas directement notre identité » (62).

La perspective qu'apporte Jean Larose à la question de l'identité envisage chaque individu comme ayant un rapport spécifique à la modernité ainsi qu'une identité en continuelle transformation. Néanmoins, il distingue entre deux types polaires d'appartenance nationale : l'allemand et l'américain. Alors que le premier type renvoie à l'enracinement par l'histoire et les origines, le deuxième propose la citoyenneté comme seule base d'adhésion à la nation. Il construit une filiation systémique entre, d'une part, le Canada anglais et les États-Unis et, d'autre part, le Québec et l'Allemagne. En même temps, tout en anathématisant le nationalisme traditionnel, il critique le rôle progressiste que se donne le Canada face à un Québec intransigeant et nationaliste. « C'est pour cela, dit-il, qu'on ne réussira à faire l'indépendance que si l'on commence par critiquer le nationalisme en nous présentant à notre tour comme les champions de la modernité » (74).

Les visions de Philip Resnick et de Georges Sioui font valoir des aspects de l'identitaire qui ne sont pas aussi fréquemment prononcés qu'ils méritent. D'une part, Resnick réitère l'idée que le Québec favorise davantage les droits de la collectivité que le Canada anglais. Il cite en exemple la défense de la langue française comme question d'intérêt national. Cependant, au dire de David Homel, cette question identitaire que représente la langue, pour les Québécois, nuit à la collectivité du fait qu'elle est mal gérée. Homel montre l'exemple de l'interdiction imposée aux élèves francophones d'apprendre l'anglais avant la quatrième année. En voulant protéger la langue française, cette loi défavorise ceux qu'elle était censée protéger. « Les anglophones apprennent les deux langues dès le début et ils forment donc l'élite, selon Homel. Les francophones apprennent l'anglais trop tard et très mal et, pour cela, ils risquent de rester en position désavantagée » (148). D'autre part, Resnick souligne l'opinion que les Québécois favorisent l'esprit individuel, relatifs aux Canadiens

anglais, en ce qui concerne le « droit à la différence, du respect des minorités et des autres identités, liées au sexe, à l'orientation sexuelle ou à la religion » (90).

Georges Sioui, lui, évoque le sentiment très profond d'appartenance familiale à la terre qu'éprouvent les Amérindiens. Ce faisant, il rend concrète la fameuse métaphore d'une géographie de l'esprit dont se sert Margaret Atwood pour définir l'identité canadienne, et qui se jouerait à l'échelle du pays. Paradoxalement, Lise Bissonnette attribue le problème de l'identitaire canadien-anglais à l'éclatement de cette même géographie. Selon elle, l'on ne peut inventer une identité commune qui n'existe pas, surtout que la géographie canadienne relève de la naissance artificielle du pays.

Pour Neil Bissoondath, l'identité canadienne est nettement plus définie aujourd'hui qu'elle ne l'était il y a une génération. Il attribue cette évolution à l'échec relatif du multiculturalisme qu'il conçoit comme négateur d'une identité et d'une culture canadiennes lesquelles étaient continuellement à refaire (156). Si l'écrivain d'origine trinitadienne rejette la vision multiculturaliste, Bissonnette n'admet pas l'essentialisme de certaines figures de l'*establishment* qui insistent sur l'être et l'âme du Québec. Pour l'un, comme pour l'autre, il s'agit de visions fausses. La première est trop floue; la deuxième, trop bornée. « L'humanité entrera dans l'âge adulte, retentit Amin Maalouf, le jour où chaque individu aura conscience de sa spécificité, et pourra s'estimer en droit d'assumer l'ensemble de ses appartenances » (171).

Comme Bissonnette, qui trouve évident que le drame de la Conquête a donné aux Québécois une identité particulière, le poète Claude Beausoleil explore cette thématique dans son étendu diachronique. En effet, *Le Motif de l'identitaire dans la poésie québécoise* illustre bien que la poésie du Québec affirme, à tous les niveaux, et d'une génération à l'autre, l'identité individuelle et collective. L'auteur de *Le Motif identitaire* n'omet pas de rappeler que cette poésie « a été un déclencheur d'identité et un lieu fomentant toutes les transformations sociales et culturelles » (35).

En présentant les origines de la poésie québécoise et en parcourant tout le XIX^e siècle, Beausoleil fait valoir le ton nostalgique et les envols épiques des voix qui inscrivent dans leurs visions la mémoire historique. En poésie québécoise, donc, le siècle dernier privilégie une identité collective. Il faut attendre le modernisme de Nelligan, à l'orée du XX^e siècle, pour rencontrer une voix nettement subjective. À l'instar de Rimbaud, le « je » se dira alors autrement (88), mais doucement, tout en parcourant la mémoire individuelle. Il s'agit d'une première vague moderniste qui restera relativement modeste, et ce, jusqu'à l'éclatement de *Refus global*. Car la société québécoise de la première moitié du siècle demeure passiviste et repliée sur elle-même. Bessette, ne parodie-t-il pas l'Index, dans *Le*

Libraire — institution toujours en vigueur au début de la Révolution tranquille?

À partir des années 1950, la modernité fait éclore la nouvelle poésie en revitalisant la langue et la forme. Le nationalisme revendicatif laisse ses traces sur cette poésie dont le joul et l'esprit moderne sont les indices principaux de la rupture avec le passé. Les années 1960 renforcent le sentiment nationaliste et celui de l'affirmation de soi, ce qui cimente la naissance de l'identité québécoise moderne. Cette évolution n'est pas sans pareil dans le monde postcolonial, elle se retrouve partout où il est question de se donner une nouvelle identité.

La poésie des années 1970 continue la révolution des idéologies et de l'expérimentation avec la langue. En ceci, l'écriture des femmes représente « un lieu de métamorphose et d'identification, la parole poétique devenant miroir des préoccupations et projection des désirs de changement » (169). Comparativement, les années 1980 paraissent privilégier la recherche intérieure, tout en s'ouvrant à plusieurs courants dont celui de l'américanité. Désormais, les poètes québécois approfondissent leur conscience moderne. Nicole Brossard, Yolande Villemaire, André Roy, entre autres, expriment personnellement et positivement leur expérience de l'Amérique urbaine. À titre emblématique, ce dernier demande, dans son recueil *Les Lits de l'Amérique*, « Entre San Francisco et Santiago de Chile, où va la poésie québécoise? ».

La poésie se fait donc de plus en plus plurielle. En réponse au poème de revendication de Michèle Lalonde, « Speak White, » Marco Micone juxtapose la parole immigrante à l'aliénation des années 1960. « Speak What? » demande-t-il, en faisant une référence dialectique au poème de Lalonde. Les poètes d'origine haïtienne sont parmi ceux qui contribuent largement au métissage culturel et à la mise à jour de la question identitaire. La poésie actuelle reflète donc le caractère transfiguré de la société québécoise, qui n'est plus monolithique, ni homogène. C'est pourquoi Beausoleil profère — aptement, à mon avis — la figure du kaléidoscope pour parler de la littérature québécoise d'aujourd'hui.

Les auteurs, dont je viens de commenter les idées principales, contribuent tous, chacun à sa manière, au discours sur le devenir. Dans la conjoncture actuelle d'une mondialisation croissante, on témoigne d'oppositions proportionnellement plus complexes de groupes et d'individus. Ce contexte complique la dynamique entre la généalogie, le vécu et l'imaginaire collectifs et personnels. Car entre l'histoire personnelle, les mythes d'appartenance et nos fantasmes existentiels, l'identité est à la fois plurielle et paradoxale. Comme le rappelle Amin Maalouf, dans *L'Archipel identitaire*, « confondre l'identité d'un homme avec une seule de ses appartenances, démesurément gonflée, est un appauvrissement » (171).

Gillian Whitlock

“One Nation”

- Davey, Frank. *Post-National Arguments. The Politics of the Anglophone-Canadian Novel since 1967*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993.
- Godard, Barbara. *Collaboration in the Feminine. Writings on Women and Culture from “Tessera.”* Toronto: Second Story Press, 1994.
- Hunter, Lynette. *Outsider Notes. Feminist Approaches to Nation State Ideology, Writers/Readers and Publishing*. Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1996.
- Lecker, Robert, ed., *Canadian Canons. Essays in Literary Value*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
- _____. *Making It Real. The Canonization of English-Canadian Literature*. Concord, Ontario: Anansi, 1995.
- Neuman, Shirley & Kamboureli, Smaro. *Amazing Space. Writing Canadian Women Writing*. Edmonton: Longspoon/NeWest, 1986.
- New, W.H., *Land Sliding. Imagining Space, Presence, and Power in Canadian Writing*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.

One effect of reading and writing about a national literature as an outrigger is a self-consciousness of being a visitor. Rather than the “slow drip” of ideas, debates and reviews feeding constantly into the arteries through immersion in the national culture, there are “infusions,” a rush of ideas, information and books which come from visits to Canada. For a brief time, daily reading of *The Globe and Mail*, watching *The National*, pilgrimages to Duthie’s and conversations at Starbuck’s recharge ideas, imagination and energy. Canadian Studies conferences outside of Canada fabricate the immersion effect; for a few days in Sydney or The Hague you become a voracious consumer of Canadiana: ideas, information, catalogues.

In her recent book, *Outsider Notes*, Lynette Hunter frets about teaching and researching Canadian writing as an outrigger on the international circuits. How does this affect our representation of, and our relation to, Canadian writing? One effect is to induce a perspective (sometimes explicit but almost always inferred) which is comparative — one is looking on from an elsewhere and immersed in its inventions and preoccupations. For Hunter, a concern with nation-state formation and an English location leads

to a strong sense of what Canada shares with other Western capitalist states, a common ground upon which more specific, national developments are played out. This framework for reading invokes the G7 as a cultural formation of sorts. From an Antipodean perspective, where the dynamics of post-colonialism and the formations of settler cultures tend to be the basis of comparison, the common ground Hunter traverses is unfamiliar. Although post-colonial readings focus on relations between the Old and New Worlds, these relations are rarely construed in terms of commonalities between England and its others.

Despite her concern with commonalities, Hunter distinguishes the nationalist dynamics of Canadian literary production from other national formations in the G7 aggregate. Commonalities and convergence are produced by global, multinational formations of capitalism and other social, cultural and economic processes which make nation-state formations redundant. Yet Hunter's analysis of literary production in Canada since the 1950s suggests it is distinguished by the role of the print culture in inventions of Canadian national identity. In Canada state support of writing, publishing and teaching literary texts has been directed towards imagining (and imaging) the nation as a community. "Canadian literature" is a relatively recent invention. Despite extensive support for the publication, writing and teaching of Canadian texts between 1960 and 1990 Canadian books still make up only 20% of sales in Canada as opposed to the national sales of 90% in England and the United States (Hunter, 1996, 33). The networks of publishers, academics, editors and writers are fragile; the government infrastructure for subsidizing writing and other literary pursuits is relatively recent; the journals, reference works and curricula are not long established. As Hunter remarks, the production of Canadian literature since 1950 is "indissolubly tied to an ideological project" — the invention of the nation, and access to print culture has not been uniform — "[b]ut at least there is a product" (18).

The task for "outsiders" is to take on board the complications of representing Canada through this "product" and interrogating the role of literary texts in imagining both the national and other communities. One might suggest that there is nothing peculiarly "outsider" about this. However, as Hunter remarks, it is easy to be seduced by the simplicities of "cultural tourism" when one is the only conduit of Canadian literature into classrooms at Leeds, Brisbane or Buenos Aires: "it is easy for an outsider to see Canada itself as a cultural fetish, a commodity, since I am not part of the social immediacies. It is easy for outsiders both to turn Canada into a banality, and to turn Canada into a constructive example of responses to multinational globalization, which is how I teach this writing" (117). Later chapters of *Outsider Notes* are organized around what Hunter does in her own CanLit curriculum at Leeds, and her status as a watcher of Canadian literature from there. As this makes clear, what outsiders turn CanLit into is partly determined by considerations which have little to do with Canada or

the Canadian, for our students and institutions are remote from it. Why should students in Leeds or Brisbane have any desire to read and discuss CanLit at all, let alone engage with the complexities of a variety of literary cultures which emerge from Canada? How we as teachers induce an engagement with the literary cultures of Canada, how we represent Canada to our own constituencies, has more to do with the social immediacies of our own location than what is going on in Ottawa, Oshawa or Red Deer.

Turning Canada into a banality is not a prerogative of outsiders of course, although Hunter may be right to suggest it is easier to ignore complexities in the outer spaces of Canadian Studies. One of the other effects of consuming the Canadian through infusions, in short, sharp and intense immersions which are fragmentary rather than continuous, is a heightened awareness of the paradigm shifts, the changes in direction which occur between times. When I first became interested in Canadian literature and criticism in the seventies, I can recall being grateful that Canada yielded so well to metaphor and theme. Cultural icons of Canadianness were easily grasped and emerged naturally from the land, nature and man’s interaction with it. The literature was so obedient to a limited set of codes, mythologies and themes that packaging “the Canadian” for undergraduate students outside of Canada was a straightforward thing, especially as *Survival* was short, easy to read and readily available. From the sixties through to Gaile McGregor’s *The Wacousta Syndrome* in 1985, one of the primary functions of literary criticism was to read Canadian literature for a Canadian essence represented in unitary terms.

This period and this critical practice which dominated in those years, when institutions of Canadian literary production were in rapid development and relatively well subsidized, have been reviewed extensively during the nineties. Watching the ongoing interrogation of thematic, iconic and mimetic representations of Canada in literature has been an intriguing exercise. Representing Canada now, at home and away, has become a more complex enterprise. The direct links between Anglophone-Canadian literature and the national identity, which then seemed cut and dried, has now been construed as an aftermath of the myth-making around the celebrations of the Centennial in 1967. Frank Davey argues that the Centennial and its nationalist sentiments were integral to the expansion of literary production and the Canadian book market, and the institutional development of Canadian literature as a teaching subject. The post-Centennial project has been to review the myth-making of those years. This suggestion is persuasive to those of us who witnessed the “making of a nation” around the Australian Bicentennial in 1988. Here, too, cultural activities of all kinds were implicated in a process of nationalist invention. Much of the work of the nineties in Anglophone-Canadian criticism has been a self-conscious return to thinking about representations of Canada and the Canadian, reviewing the making of the CanLit industry. Although the shift to representation has

been a feature of discourse theory and post-structuralism more generally, in Canada an interest in relations between the nation state and institutions of cultural production has given debates about “making it real” and the connections between literature and inventions of national identity a distinctively local resonance and relevance.

This has occurred most explicitly in the Davey-Lecker debates. Even at the height of thematic criticism in the seventies, Frank Davey’s essay “Beyond the Paraphrase” marked him as a non-believer. In 1993, he published a collection of essays, *Post-National Arguments. The Politics of the Anglophone Canadian Novel since 1967*, which is an extended critique of monological Canadian nationalism, with its search for the Canadian identity in terms of unified cultural characteristics and a homogenous nation. Davey dedicates this book to Robin Matthews, another literary critic who, whilst devoted to the idea of a distinctively Canadian ethos, has always envisaged the nation in terms of competing interests and conflict. Of course, conflict and the competing interests due to gender, ethnicity, class and sexuality were occluded by the “one nation” of Anglophone thematic criticism. Davey contrasts the certainties of the Centennial with the uncertainties of the nineties. He stresses that gender, ethnicity, class, region and economic structures can mark texts as decisively as nation by affecting the writer’s choice of codes. Literature is deeply implicated in contestations within nation formations in Davey’s view, and to ignore this is to invoke misleadingly harmonious constructions of Canadian literature, politics and culture. This critique draws on structuralism and post-structuralist thinking about language and referentiality. The direct representations and iconic simplicities of mimesis are replaced by awareness of how terms receive their definitions within the differential system of linguistic signs specific to particular language communities. Plurality and conflict replace singularity and essence.

This worries Robert Lecker. What happens when “the nation” is vacated as a term of reference and understanding. What happens if the pursuit of a Canadian canon is abandoned in favour of endlessly deferred signifiers? Interrogations of the Canadian canon emerged initially in Lecker’s edited book, *Canadian Canons. Essays in Literary Value* (1991) and, more recently, in *Making it Real. The Canonization of English-Canadian Literature* (1995). As an editor, publisher and critic of Canadian Literature for some 25 years, Lecker has been, as he remarks, both constructed by and an inventor of an Anglophone- Canadian canon: “I can’t pretend that I am innocent of contributing to canonical formations and, indeed I have profited from these formations” (Lecker, 1995, x). Central to Lecker’s critique is a questioning of that connection between literature, community and place, and the role of literature as one of the institutions which underwrites a national-referential aesthetic. And yet he remains committed to making connections between literary texts and the social world, Canadian writing and the making of a social collectivity in national terms, or nation and

narration. Although Lecker is critical of some of the simplicities of national myth-making, he wants to hold onto the civic functions of writing and criticism. More than that, he argues these activities need to become increasingly accessible to a wider public, and part of the ongoing making of connections between Canadian literature and Canadian space. From this perspective, the reaction against the mimetic-nationalist values that informed earlier Canadian criticism has gone too far: “students are seldom taught to see a connection between the Canadian literature they read and the Canadian space they inhabit, or, if they do, they are taught that the connection is so problematic and subjective that the ideas of collective action and community begin to seem worthless. In other words, the teaching of literature can effect no means of effective collective political change in the ‘real’ world because the nature of this world — in Canadian terms — has been radically called into question” (Lecker, 1995, 13-14).

These essays by Lecker and Davey are a radically different place to begin teaching Canadian literature. They play out debates in contemporary literary theory about representation in distinctively national terms. Conflict and difference are now well-established in reading Canadian writing. For some, of course, it was ever thus. The publication of writings from the feminist journal *Tessera* in Barbara Godard’s *Collaboration in the Feminine. Writings on Women and Culture from “Tessera”* (1994) is a reminder that there has always been a vigorous and diverse array of literary cultures in Canada and that the singular Canadian canon and identity were not the founding mythologies of all critical work. *Tessera*, a bilingual, pan-Canadian periodical grew from the “Women and Words” conference in Vancouver in 1983. Here, language and literature have never been just Anglophone, and the text has never been monologic and referential. Godard suggests that the elaboration of feminist discourse in the periodical was shaped by the image of multiple, *pluri-elle* women, open to the diversity of languages, races, economic situations and ideologies in Canada. *Tessera*, and the earlier Neuman and Kamboureli edition of feminist critical essays *Amazing Space. Writing Canadian Women Writing* (1986), are a reminder that the hegemony of nationalist mimetic representations of Canada was always contested by those who lived and/or wrote with an awareness of difference and the duplicities of language.

In W.H. New’s recent book, *Land Sliding. Imagining Space, Presence and Power in Canadian Writing* (1997), the image of a large black and white cow stares out from the front cover. One does not immediately realize that the markings of the cow are in fact a map of Canada, stretched across its back with Newfoundland emerging from the ears and British Columbia stretched over the rump. Together, this painting, “Laura Secord’s Udderly Patriotic Cow,” by Barbara Klunder, and New’s essays suggest just how ironic and critical representations of the nation have now become. New’s argument is especially interesting because it returns to the land, earlier such a rich source of nationalist metaphor and icon. He suggests that, although in

the past land-based metaphors have been used to represent a collective Canadian identity, a concluding image, *Land Sliding* examines why the land has so often been used in this way, and what this implies. The task here is to read critically icons of Canadianness, the uses of “land” as a verbal trope in Canadian writing. The discussion is interdisciplinary, drawing on literature, geography and fine arts. “Land” as signifier and signified multiplies: prairie, shield, muskeg, hoodoos. Local geographies and vocabularies proliferate. New is not interested in reiterating singular, cultural, nationalist understandings of “the” land in Canada, yet nor does he turn away from the real, or from making it real. The interconnections between politics and literature, the body politic and the literary text are neither singular nor fixed here. And yet the interest in “land” as a signifier by no means vacates the commitment to understanding Canada as a distinctive, albeit shifting and conflicted, cultural and social space. We may no longer use literary texts to generate a single icon to represent Canada and the Canadian, and yet literature and criticism remain fundamental to expressing and conceptualizing the Canadian collectivity. As the “Udderly Patriotic Cow” suggests, images of Canada and the Canadian are shifting, ironic, multiple and yet the shape and integrity of the beast remains.

Authors /Auteurs

Frank **CAUCCI**, Professor, Department of Modern Languages, Indiana University Northwest, 3400 Broadway, Gary, Indiana 46408, U.S.A.

William **CROSS**, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Mount Allison University, 144 Main Street, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada E4L 1A7.

Micheline **de SÈVE**, professeure titulaire au département de science politique et directrice de l'Institut de recherches et d'études féministes de l'Université du Québec à Montréal, C.P. 8888, succursale Centre-Ville, Montréal, Québec, Canada H3C 3P8.

John C. **HARLES**, Professor of Political Science, Messiah College, Grantham, Pennsylvania, 17027 U.S.A.

Lynda **JESSUP**, Department of Art, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6.

Barry J. **KAY**, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5.

Ronald G. **LANDES**, Chairperson and Professor in the Political Science Department at Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3H 3C3.

Brenda **O'NEILL**, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada R3T 5V5.

Deborah **PARNIS**, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Otonabee College, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada K9J 7B8.

Jennifer **SMITH**, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University, 1236 Henry Street, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3H 3J5.

A. Brian **TANGUAY**, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5.

Manon **TREMBLAY**, professeure agrégée, Département de science politique, Université d'Ottawa, C.P. 450, succursale A, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1N 6N5.

Linda **TRIMBLE**, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Canadian Studies Program, University of Alberta, 10-16 HM Tory Building, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2H4.

Gillian **WHITLOCK**, Professor, School of Humanities, Griffith University, Nathan Q4111, Australia.

Canadian Studies Journals Around the World ***Revue d'études canadiennes dans le monde***

The American Review of Canadian Studies. Quarterly/Trimestriel. \$60; \$25 (Student/Étudiant; retired membership/membres retraités); \$105 (Institutions). Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, 1317 F Street NW, Suite 920, Washington, DC, 20004-1105, U.S.A.

Editor/Rédacteur: Robert Thacker (St. Lawrence University).

The Annual Review of Canadian Studies. Yearly/Annuel. Japanese Association for Canadian Studies, Faculty of International Studies, Obirin University, 3758 Tokiwa-cho, Machida-shi, Tokyo 194-02, Japan.

Editor/Rédacteur: Kensei Yoshida (Obirin University).

Australian-Canadian Studies. Biannual/Semestriel. Subscription information to be obtained from/Pour tout renseignement sur les abonnements, veuillez contacter: Associate Professor Jan Critchett, School of Australian and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, P.O. Box 423, Warrambool, Victoria, Australia, 3280.

Editors/Rédacteurs: Hart Cohen (University of Western Sydney Nepean), Wendy Waring (Macquarie University).

British Journal of Canadian Studies. Biannual/Semestriel. Available through membership to the British Association for Canadian Studies/Disponible aux membres de l'Association britannique d'études canadiennes. David Ingram, Dept. of Geography, University of Birmingham, P.O. Box 363, Birmingham B15 2TT.

Editor/Rédacteur: Colin Nicholson (University of Edinburgh).

Canadian Issues/Thèmes canadiens. Annual/Annuel. \$Can15 per copy/l'exemplaire (plus 7% GST in Canada/TPS de 7 p. 100 en sus au Canada). Association for Canadian Studies, P.O. Box 8888, Station Centre-Ville, Montreal, Qc, H3C 3P8/Association d'études canadiennes, C.p. 8888, succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal (Qc), H3C 3P8.

Études canadiennes : revue interdisciplinaire des études canadiennes en France. Semestriel/Biannual. 220 FF. Association française d'études canadiennes, Maison des sciences de l'homme d'Aquitaine, Domaine Universitaire, 33405 Talence, France.

Rédacteur en chef/Editor-in-Chief: Pierre Guillaume (Université de Bordeaux III).

The Journal of American and Canadian Studies. Yearly/Annuel. The Journal of American and Canadian Studies. Sophia University, Institute of American and Canadian Studies, 7-1 Kioicho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102, Japan.

Editor/Rédacteur: Kimitada Miwa (Sophia University).

Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'études canadiennes.

Quarterly/Trimestriel. \$Can35; \$Can55 (2 years/ans); \$Can15 (Student/Étudiant); \$Can55 (Institutions). Plus 7% GST in Canada/TPS de 7 p. 100 en sus au Canada. Outside Canada, payment is required in American dollars/À l'extérieur du Canada, les frais sont en dollars américains. Journal of Canadian Studies, Trent University, P.O. Box 4800, Peterborough, Ontario, K9J 7B8.

Editor/Rédactrice: James R. Conley (Trent University).

The Korean Journal of Canadian Studies. Biannual/Semestriel. Articles are published in Korean/Publication de langue coréenne. Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Room 528, Seoul 120-749, Korea.

Editor/Rédacteur: Myung Soon Shin (Yonsei University).

Québec Studies. Biannual/Semestriel. US\$45; US\$35 (Student/ Étudiants); US\$50 (Libraries/Bibliothèques). Outside the U.S., please add US\$6/Abonné à l'extérieur des E.-U., prière d'ajouter 6\$US. Professor Jane Moss, French Department, Colby College, Waterville, ME 04901 USA.

Editor/Rédacteur: Robert Schwartwald (University of Massachusetts-Amherst).

Revista Española de Estudios Canadienses. Yearly/Annuel. 4.000 ptas; 8.000 ptas (Institutions). Asociacion española de estudios canadienses, Espronceda, 40, 28003, Madrid, Spain.

Editor/Rédacteur: Kathleen Firth (Universidad de Barcelona).

Revista Venezolana de Estudios Canadienses. Biannual/Semestriel. 500 Bs. Asociacion Venezolana de Estudios Canadienses.

Subscriptions/Abonnements: Embajada de Canadá, Torre Europa, Piso 7. Ave. Francisco de Miranda. Apartado 63.302. Caracas 1060, Venezuela.

Editor/Rédacteur: Vilma E. Petrash (Universidad Central de Venezuela).

Revue internationale d'études canadiennes/International Journal of Canadian Studies. Biannual/Semestriel. \$Can40 (Institutions); \$Can30 (Regular subscription/Abonnement régulier); \$Can20 (ICCS Members, retirees and students/Membres du CIEC, retraités et étudiants). Outside Canada, please add \$Can5/Abonnés à l'extérieur du Canada, prière d'ajouter 5\$can. Plus 7% GST in Canada/TPS de 7 p. 100 en sus au Canada. International Council for Canadian Studies/Conseil international d'études canadiennes, 325 Dalhousie, S-800, Ottawa, Canada K1N 7G2.

Rédacteur en chef/Editor-in-Chief: Kenneth H. McRoberts (York University).

Rivista di Studi Canadesi. Annual/Annuel. 30.000 lire; Foreign/Étranger, 40.000 lire. Rivista di Studi Canadesi, Grafischena, n. 13147723, Viale Stazione 177-72015 Fasano di Puglia, (Br-Italia).

Director/Directeur: Giovanni Dotoli (Università di Bari).

Zeitschrift für Kanada Studien. Biannual/Semestriel. DM25. Zeitschrift für Kanada Studien, Pädagogische Hochschule, Kunzenweg 21, D-79199 Freiburg, Germany.

Editors/Rédacteurs: Udo Kempf (Universität Freiburg), Reingard Nischik (Universität Konstanz).

**INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CANADIAN STUDIES
REVUE INTERNATIONALE D'ÉTUDES CANADIENNES**

SUBSCRIPTION/ABONNEMENT

Rates per year (for subscriptions in Canada, please add 7 % GST/Tarif par année (au Canada, prière d'ajouter 7 p. 100 de TPS):

- \$40 Institutions (\$45 outside Canada/à l'extérieur du Canada)
- \$30 Regular subscription/abonnement régulier (\$35 outside Canada/à l'extérieur du Canada)
- \$25 Members of associations affiliated with the Learned Societies/membres des associations affiliées aux Sociétés savantes (\$30 outside Canada/à l'extérieur du Canada)
- \$20 Members of ICCS Associations, retirees or students, include proof/membres des associations du CIEC, retraités ou étudiants, joindre une preuve (\$25 outside Canada/à l'extérieur du Canada)

Please indicate year of subscription/Veuillez indiquer l'année d'abonnement désirée :

- 1994 N°9 Canada and the USSR/CIS: Northern Neighbours/Partenaires du Nord :
le Canada et l'URSS/CEI
- No 10 Identities and Marginalities/Les identités et les marginalités
- 1995 N°11 Women in Canadian Society/Les femmes et la société canadienne
- N° 12 Aboriginal Peoples and Canada/Les peuples autochtones et le Canada
- 1996 N°13 Canada in the Americas/Le Canada dans les Amériques
- N° 14 Citizenship and Rights/La citoyenneté et les droits
- 1997 N°15 Time, Space and Place/Le temps, l'espace et le lieu
- N° 16 Nationalism and Globalization/Nationalisme et mondialisation
- 1998 N°17 Representation/La représentation
- N° 18 Diaspora and Exile / La diaspora et l'exil
- 1999 No19 Rebellion and Resistance / Rébellion et résistance
- N° 20 Sexuality / La sexualité
- 2000 No 21 Communications / Les communications
- N° 22 Retrospective on the XXth Century / Une rétrospective du XX^e siècle

Name/Nom

Address/Adresse

.
.
.
.

Credit card #/N° de carte de crédit :
MasterCard Visa

Expiry Date/Date d'expiration

Signature

Please return coupon and payment to/S.v.p., retourner ce coupon accompagné du paiement à :

**IJCS/RIEC
325 Dalhousie, S-800, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 7G2, Canada**

*Subscribe for 5 years and receive a 20 % discount or a free CD-rom containing the first sixteen issues of the IJCS.
Un abonnement de 5 ans vous donne droit à un rabais de 20 p. 100 ou à un CD-rom comprenant les seize premiers numéros de la RIÉC.*

